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ABSTRACT
The th e s is  examines th e  notion  th a t  an age of te rro rism  began in  th e  la te  
1960s. I t  i s  argued th a t  th i s  is su e  i s  complicated by th e  d if fe re n t meanings 
asso c ia ted  w ith the  term* te rro r ism . Three main meanings of th e  term  a re  
id e n tif ie d : a normative usage t r e a t in g  te rro rism  as  v iolence w ithout 
hum anitarian c o n s tra in ts ; i t s  a sso c ia tio n  with th e  low est level of v io len t 
c o n flic t; and a usage th a t  t r e a t s  te rro rism  a s  in  p ra c tic e  co-term inus with 
a s s a u lts  on th e  Vest. An exam ination o f the  most common g e n e ra lisa tio n s  about 
te rro rism  to  be found in  th e  l i te r a tu r e  follow s. The use o f th e  term in  
d if fe re n t con tex ts  i s  h ig h lig h ted  by case s tu d ie s  of Vest Germany and Northern 
Ireland . I t  i s  argued th a t  in  so  f a r  as  i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  t r e a t  th e  v a r ie tie s  
of modern te rro r ism s  a s  one, they  a re  b est seen a s  a p o s t-c o lo n ia l phenomenon 
which drew on the  le g itim isa tio n  of a n ti- im p e r ia lis t  vio lence a g a in s t co lon ia l 
ru le . The re luctance to  apply th e  term , te rro rism , to  p o l i t ic a l  vio lence in s id e  
Third Vorld coun tries  i s  considered . The c e n tra li ty  of an in te rn a tio n a l 
dimension to  te rro rism  i s  analysed , followed by an exam ination o f in te rn a tio n a l 
co -operation  to  co n tro l co vert v io lence by sm all groups th a t  c ro sse s  s ta te  
boundaries. Case s tu d ie s  of th e  ending of campaigns o f violence by sm all 
groups a re  presented to  underline  th e  ro le  played by in te rn a l group dynamics in  
te rro r ism . In conclusion, i t  i s  argued th a t  the  term, te rro r ism , i s  losing  i t s  
coherence and, p a r tly  fo r  th a t  reason , te rro rism  i s  un like ly  to  be seen as  a 
c e n tra l fe a tu re  of the in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic a l  system in  th e  p o s t-b ip o la r  era.
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Preface
This th e s is  covers th e  period up to  the  end of 1992. That has excluded 
from th e  scope of the  th e s is  some s ig n if ic a n t developments In th e  f ie ld  of 
te rro r ism  th a t  have occurred In th e  course of 1993. The most Im portant of 
th ese  were th e  following: th e  bomb In the  Vorld Trade Centre in  ffew York In 
February; th e  peace agreement between Is ra e l and th e  P a le s tin e  L iberation  
O rganisation (PLO); and th e  co n tac ts  between th e  B r it is h  government and th e  
P rov isional I r is h  Republican Army. The f i r s t  o f th ese  developments underlined 
th e  fa c t  th a t  th e  era  of c lan d es tin e  violence by sm all groups a c ro ss  n a tiona l 
boundaries I s  not over. The second and th ir d  th a t  th e  p rin c ip le  th a t  
government should not n eg o tia te  w ith 'te r ro r is ts *  has lo s t  much o f i t s  force.
The l i te r a tu re  on te rro rism  has tre a te d  the  PLO a s  an archetypa l t e r r o r i s t  
o rg an isa tio n , so  much so  th a t  th e  P a le stin ian  cause had become v ir tu a lly  
in separab le  from a sso c ia tio n  w ith te rro rism . Consequently, th e  transfo rm ation  
of th e  PLO seems bound to  a f fe c t  th e  use of th e  concept a s  a s tan d ard  of 
absolu te  illeg itim acy .
Chapter 1 of th e  th e s is  examines the d if f ic u l t ie s  in  th e  way of 
understanding th e  concept of te rro rism  In th e  l ig h t  o f th e  emotive fo rce  of the  
term . Chapter 2 analyses th e  a ttem p ts  by academics to  d is tin g u ish  te rro rism  
from o ther forms of violence. Chapter 3 examines c r i t ic a l ly  th e  g en era lisa tio n s  
th a t  have been made about te rro r ism  in the  v a s t  l i te r a tu re  th a t  has grown up 
about th e  sub ject. Chapter 4 examines th e  d if fe re n t s tra n d s  of p o l i t ic a l  
v iolence in  th e  la te  1960s and ea rly  1970s th a t  gave r i s e  to  modem usage of 
th e  term. Chapter 5 examines th e  background to  the  le g ltlm lsa tio n  of violence 
by sm all groups a t  th e  onset o f th e  age o f te rro rism . Chapter 6 examines the
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case of te rro rism  in  Vest Germany, while Chapter 7 explores th e  very  d if fe re n t 
case of Northern Ireland . Chapter 8 considers  the  ap p lica tio n  o f th e  concept of 
te rro rism  to  c o n f lic ts  in  th e  Third Vorld. Chapter 9 examines why an 
in te rn a tio n a l dimension i s  so c e n tra l to  te rro rism , while Chapter 10 examines 
th e  d if fe re n t s tra te g ie s  th a t  have been pursued to  combat te rro r ism  and th e  
measures th a t  th e  in te rn a tio n a l community has adopted to  outlaw h ijack ing  and 
ho stag e-tak in g . Chapter 11 employs case s tu d ie s  to  examine fa c to rs  th a t  have 
influenced the  ending of campaigns of violence, while Chapter 12 examines the  
re la tio n sh ip  between th e  age of te rro rism  and th e  nature of th e  in te rn a tio n a l 
p o li t ic a l  system .
Xy thanks a re  due to  th e  l ib ra ry  s t a f f  a t  the  follow ing l ib r a r ie s :  Queen's 
U niversity , B elfast; th e  B r it is h  L ibrary  of Economics and P o li t ic a l  Science; Jan 
Smuts House L ibrary; United S ta te s  Inform ation Service l ib ra ry  in  Johannesburg; 
and Linenhall L ibrary , B elfas t; fo r  th e ir  a s s is ta n c e  in  helping me to  tra c k  down 
th e  very d iverse  m ateria l th a t  I have needed fo r  th is  th e s is .  I am a lso  most 
g ra te fu l to  th e  United S ta te s  Consulate in  B elfas t fo r help  in  g e ttin g  hold of 
copies of the  S ta te  Department pub lica tion , P a tte rn s  of Global T errorism . 
Colleagues a t  both Queen's and V lts  have Influenced my ideas in  inform al 
d iscussions. Of these , sp ec ia l mention needs to  be made of Frank V right, 
P rofessor o f Peace S tudies a t  th e  U niversity  of Limerick when he died of cancer 
in  February 1993. For 17 years  he and I were colleagues in  th e  Department of 
P o li t ic s  a t  Queen's. He had a profound Influence on my th in k in g  about violence 
in  deeply divided so c ie tie s . His in s ig h ts  in to  why people re so rte d  to  p o li t ic a l  
violence complemented h is  own personal commitment to  peace. I should a lso  
mention P rofessor Adam Roberts o f th e  U niversity  of Oxford who encouraged me
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to  examine th e  Issue of te rro rism , notw ithstand ing  th e  tendency of many 
academics to  d ism iss th e  concept. F in a lly , I owe a deb t of g ra titu d e  to  my 
superv iso r, P ro fesso r James K ayall, who made numerous h e lp fu l comments on an 
e a r l ie r  d ra f t .  *y thanks to  a l l  th e  above a re  sub ject to  th e  usual d isc la im er 
th a t  I accept fu l l  re s p o n s ib il ity  fo r  th e  f in a l  product, w ith  a l l  i t s  
lim ita tio n s .
Adrian Guelke,
Johannesburg,
December 1993.
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Chapter 1 -  Introduction: B arrie rs  to_U nderstanding.T errorism  
By the  1990s, the  concept of te rro rism  had become so e la s t ic  th a t  th e re  
seemed to  be v ir tu a lly  no lim it to  what could be described  as te rro rism . For 
example, among t i t l e s  of books published in 1989 and 1990 were th e  following: 
fla rco te rro rism : Western S ta te  T errorism : ApartheljL-XeiXPrisn. ~ . The 
D estab iliza tio n  Report: and Pornography -  The Few T errorism . (1) An a ttem pt by 
c rim in a ls  to  e x to r t money from th e  m anufacturers of baby products by lacing  
ja r s  of baby foods on superm arket shelves with broken g la ss , tack s , and o ther 
harmful objects was quickly labelled  'consumer te rro r ism ' by much of the  
m edia.(2) In the  United S ta te s  the  long -estab lished  phenomenon of anonymous, 
obscene phonecalls was given th e  new desc rip tio n , 'telephone te r ro r is m '.(3) An 
academic te x t analysed rape as a ' t e r r o r i s t  i n s t i tu t io n '. (4) On th e  eve of the  
A rgentinian P res id en tia l e lec tio n  in  1989, the  country 's  finance m in is te r 
described  speculation  a g a in s t th e  A rgentinian currency as  'economic 
te r ro r ism ', (5) while the  Iraq i Ambassador to  the  United S ta te s  used the  same 
term in  o u tlin ing  a lleg a tio n s  in  October 1990 th a t  Kuwait had sought to  
sabotage h is  coun try 's  economy. (6) These examples should be d is tin g u ish ed  from 
the  use of th e  term s, te rro rism  and te r r o r i s t ,  fo r m etaphorical purposes by the  
media, such as  the  d esc rip tio n  in  a B ritish  newspaper of a breed of dog 
involved in a s e r ie s  of a tta c k s  on ch ild ren  as 'a t e r r o r i s t  on four l e g s '. (7)
The s tre tch in g  of the  term to  cover a wider and w ider f ie ld  of a c t iv i ty  i s  
in  p a r t  a response to  co n stan t reference  in  th e  media to  te rro rism  as a 
pervasive re a l i ty  of the  modern world. I t  has become alm ost im possible to  pick 
up a newspaper or to  l is te n  to  a news b u lle tin  w ithout coming acro ss  a 
reference  to  te rro rism  or t e r r o r i s t s .  More than ten years  ago, Brian Jenkins,
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one of the  leading s p e c ia l is ts  in  the  f ie ld , made a revealing  comment on th is
p o in t. 'At some po in t in  th is  expanding use of the  term ,' he declared,
'te r ro rism  can mean ju s t  what those who use the  term (not the  t e r r o r i s t s )  want 
i t  to  mean -  alm ost any v io len t a c t  by any opponent'.(8) Jenkins d id  not 
a n tic ip a te  th a t  the ap p lica tio n  of the  term would eventually  extend beyond even 
th e  notion  of violence a g a in s t an opponent.
The fa c t th a t  the  term  has lo s t  i t s  autom atic a sso c ia tio n  w ith the
p o l i t ic a l  realm is  in  p a r t  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  the  way th a t  te rro rism  has been 
analysed, opening the way to  the  term 's  ap p lica tio n  to  phenomena lacking  any 
p o l i t ic a l  resonance. Vhile the d iverse  range of phenomena to  which the  term 
has come to  be applied th rea ten s  th e  concept's  coherence, i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  
id e n tify  some common, i f  very general, themes in  cu rren t usage of th e  term , as a 
b r ie f  examination of th e  examples given in  the  f i r s t  paragraph w ill show. One 
theme common to  each of the  examples i s  th e  connotation of harm. The theme of 
v io lence i s  p resen t in  most, as i s  th a t  of coercion. The generation  of fe a r  or 
in tim id atio n  i s  another element to  be found in  a number of the  cases, but i t  is
not a s  pervasive an element as might be expected. Another fea tu re  of the
examples i s  the  fa c t th a t  an in te rn a tio n a l dimension i s  p resen t in  th e  m ajority  
of th e  cases. F inally , in  a m ajority  of the  examples, the  ac tio n s  described  as 
te rro r ism  were or are  co vert in  charac te r.
Of course, i t  must be emphasised th a t  th e  examples in  the  f i r s t  paragraph
a re  f a r  from ty p ica l of cu rren t usage of the  term . They rep re sen t th e  outer
lim its  of i t s  ap p lica tio n  and consequently form a poor sample fo r  drawing any 
conclusions about elem ents common to  te rro rism . I t  i s  no t because of 
pornography, obscene phonecalls, or currency speculation  th a t  the  p re sen t e ra
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has been id en tified  as an age of te rro rism . The notion  th a t  an age of 
te rro rism  began in the  la te  1960s i s  one of the  most common p ro p o sitio n s  in 
the  l i te ra tu re  on te r ro r ism .(9) Some w rite rs  have even id e n tif ie d  the  beginning 
of the  era w ith p a rtic u la r  events in  th is  period. For example, in  Ten Years of 
T errorism , published in 1979, Tony Geraghty id e n tif ie s  th e  studen t 
rev o lu tio n a rie s  of P a ris  in  May 1968 as 'the  p recu rso rs  of te r ro r is m '.(10) ( I t  
is  f a i r  to  say th a t th is  re tro sp e c tiv e  judgment owes more to  the  s h i f t  in  the  
ideolog ical clim ate th a t  took place in  the Vest in the  1970s than i t  does to  
any em pirical evidence link ing  the  generation of 1968 w ith p o li t ic a l  violence.)
Other events of the  la te  1960s th a t  have more reasonably  been id e n tif ie d  
as  key po in ts  in  the  development of te rro rism  were th e  s ix -d ay  war in  th e  
Middle East in  June 1967 and th e  death of Che Guevara in  B olivia in  October 
1967. The la t t e r  was re tro sp e c tiv e ly  seen as  marking th e  fa ilu re  of ru ra l 
g u e rr illa  w arfare in  Latin America, opening the  way to  urban te rro rism  as  an 
a lte rn a tiv e  s tra teg y . The form er had g rea te r influence a t  the  tim e on th e  use 
of the  term. The v ir tu a lly  un iversal sympathy fo r  th e  cause of Is ra e l in  the  
Vest following the  s ix -d ay  war was a s ig n if ic a n t fa c to r  in  loosening the  
media's in h ib itio n s  over th e  use of th e  term and th is  was re fle c ted  in  th e  
coverage given to  v io len t ac tion  by P a le stin ian s  in  response to  I s ra e l 's  
m ilita ry  v ic to r ie s . (11) Academic s tu d ie s  followed in  th e  wake of media usage.
I t  i s  th e re fo re  not su rp ris in g  th a t  the  overwhelming m ajority  of books and 
a r t ic le s  w ith th e  term, te rro r ism , in  th e ir  t i t l e  should date  from th e  1970s and 
1980s. Thus, Borman Provizer has noted th a t in  two major b ib lio g rap h ies  on 
te rro rism , over 99 per cent of th e  general works c ited  had been published from 
1968 on .(12)
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History- of ..usaga
Yet the  term I t s e l f  was not by any manner of means an invention  of the  la te  
1960s. According to  the  Oxford English D ictionary (OED), the  term s, te rro rism  
and te r r o r i s t s ,  were f i r s t  used in  the  English language in  1795 in  response to  
the  re ign  of te r r o r  in  post-rev o lu tio n ary  France. The OED quotes the  
conservative, Edmund Burke, on the  unleashing on the people of 'hell-hounds 
called  t e r r o r i s t s ' .<13) In the  n ineteenth  century, the  term s were applied  to  the 
violence of th e  ag ra rian  a g ita tio n  ag a in s t land lords and th e ir  agen ts in 
Ireland. Later in  th e  century, th e  d esc rip tio n  of t e r r o r i s t  became sp e c if ic a lly  
linked to  the  s tra te g y  of p o li t ic a l  a ssa ss in a tio n  employed by flarodnaya Volya 
(People's V ill) ag a in s t th e  T sa r is t  regime, p a r tic u la r ly  the  'blow a t  the  cen tre ', 
th a t  i s  to  say , the  a ssa ss in a tio n  of Tsar Alexander II in  March 1881.(14) By 
the  tu rn  of th i s  century, the  bomb-throwing a n a rch is t espousing th e  notion of 
'propaganda by th e  deed' came to  be seen as th e  archetypal t e r r o r i s t ,  (15) 
e s tab lish in g  a lin k  between anarchism and te rro rism  th a t  rem ains im portant to  
the  in te rp re ta tio n  of te rro rism  as ideology.
The term s were next applied  to  a now large ly  fo rg o tten  wave of 
a ssa ss in a tio n s  in  th e  1930s, culm inating in  the  death in  M arse illes in  1934 of 
the  King of Yugoslavia and the  Foreign M inister of France. The M arseilles 
a ssa ss in a tio n s  were c a rrie d  out by C roatian n a tio n a lis ts  and the  in te rn a tio n a l 
dimension of th e  k i l l in g s  prompted a response from th e  League of tfations. A 
committee of ex p erts  was s e t  up to  study the  problem. The re s u l ts  of i t s  
labours were p roposals fo r  two in te rn a tio n a l conventions; one fo r the  prevention 
and punishment of te rro r ism  and another to  s e t  up an in te rn a tio n a l crim inal 
court. They were both adopted in  1937. However, n e ith e r came in to  force.
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Understandably, few s ta te s  gave the  issu e  a p r io r i ty . Both the  conventions and 
th e  problem they addressed were overtaken by the  outbreak of the  Second World 
War.(16) In the  la te  1940s and the  1950s, te rro rism  was la rg e ly  a sso c ia ted  
w ith co lon ia l c o n flic ts , p a r tic u la r ly  those in  P a lestine , Malaya, Cyprus, A lgeria, 
and Kenya. However, p a r tly  because a question mark ex isted  over the  legitim acy 
of co lon ia l ru le  i t s e l f ,  term s o ther than t e r r o r i s t  were often used even by the  
a u th o r it ie s  to  describe those fig h tin g  co lon ial ru le . For example, th e  
in su rg en ts  in  Malaya were more usually  re fe rred  to  as ban d its  than  as  CTs or 
Communist T e rro r is ts , and th is  was re fle c ted  in  the  estab lishm ent by th e  
a u th o r it ie s  of a D irector of A nti-B andit O perations. (17) Another fa c to r  th a t  
discouraged the  use of the  term was doubt as to  whether i t  was ap p ro p ria te  to  
apply the term to  campaigns ta rg e ted  on the sec u rity  fo rces. That rem ains a 
conten tious issu e  and some w rite rs  continue to  in s i s t  th a t  properly  speaking 
th e  term  should only be applied  to  violence d irec ted  ag a in s t non- 
com batants. (18)
I t  i s  no table th a t a p a r t from i t s  id e n tif ic a tio n  with ac tio n s  by th e  s ta te  
during the  French revolu tion , the  term has usually  been applied  to  violence from 
below d irec ted  ag a in s t th e  s ta tu s  quo, though counter-exam ples from o ther 
periods can be found, such as  reference  to  the  Nazi p a r tic ip a n ts  in  K rista ln ach t 
a s  t e r r o r i s t s  in  a contemporary news rep o rt of those e v en ts .(19) The use of 
th e  term to  apply to  the  v io len t a c t iv i t ie s  of so c ia lly  conservative  groups such 
as  th e  Ku Klux Klan in th e  United S ta te s  provides another counter-exam ple. 
However, such usage appears to  be re la tiv e ly  uncommon. In th is  re sp ec t, the  
record  of the  usage of th e  term s i s  one of con tinu ity . For a l l  i t s  e la s t ic i ty ,  
cu rre n t usage likew ise revolves la rg e ly  around violence from below. The 1989
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ed itio n  of th e  OED id e n tif ie s  two meanings of te rro rism . The f i r s t  r e la te s  
sp e c if ic a lly  to  government by in tim idation  during th e  re ign  of te r ro r  in  p o s t­
revo lu tionary  France. The second defines te rro rism  as 'a policy  intended to  
s t r ik e  with te r ro r  those ag a in s t whom i t  is  adopted; th e  employment of methods 
of in tim idation ; the fa c t of te r ro r iz in g  or condition  of being te r r o r iz e d '. (20) 
S ig n ific an tly , a l l  the  examples th e  OED gives of th is  d e fin itio n , w ith perhaps 
th e  arguable exception of a re ference  to  OAS te rro rism  in  A lgeria in  the  early  
1960s, are of violence d irec ted  a t  the  overthrow of the  ex is tin g  p o l i t ic a l  
au th o rity . The most s ta r t l in g  asp ec t of the d e fin itio n  and i t s  examples, 
contemporary as well as h is to r ic a l ,  i s  the discrepancy th e re  is  between th e  
words used in  the  d e fin itio n  and th e  s itu a tio n s  in  the main to  which th e  term, 
te rro r ism , is  applied. To put th e  po in t s ta rk ly , th e  term ev iden tly  does not 
mean qu ite  what i t  says i t  does. In o ther words, actual usage d ep arts  somewhat 
from th e  word's etym ological ro o ts . Some i l lu s tr a t io n  w ill help to  e lucidate  
th i s  issue.
F ir s t ly , le t  us r e f le c t  fo r a moment on 'the  employment of methods of 
in tim id a tio n '. As an example one might th ink  of the  prevalence in  much of the
Third Vorld of the in tim idation  of peasants by powerful landowners.
A lte rna tive ly , one might take  the  case of the deployment of the  army in  a show
of fo rce  by an a u th o rita r ia n  s ta te  wishing to  dem onstrate to  i t s  c itiz e n ry  i t s
possession  of a monopoly of fo rce . In both th ese  cases th e  instrum enta l value
of in tim idation  to  the  u ser i s  se lf-e v id en t. However, in  n e ith e r  of th ese  cases
would Dne expect the  term, te rro r ism , to  be employed, even in  extreme in s tan ces
where such in tim idation  was accompanied by high levels  of overt violence. I t
may be objected th a t in  th e  case o f th e  in tim idation  of peasan ts, th i s  i s
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because the  in tim idation  has a so c ia l ra th e r  than  a p o li t ic a l  con tex t. However, 
th e  way th a t the  concept of te rro rism  has come to  cover violence fo r  so c ia l as 
well as p o li t ic a l  purposes makes th i s  argument unpersuasive. In any event, the 
objection does not ad d ress  the  case of in tim idation  by an a u th o rita r ia n  regime. 
While governments are  sometimes accused of p ra c tis in g  s ta te  te rro r ism , usage of 
th i s  term in a domestic con tex t tends to  be r e s tr ic te d  to  genocidal regim es 
such as ex isted  in  Uganda under Id i Amin or Cambodia under Pol Pot.
Lockerbie example
To the problem th a t in  a wide v a rie ty  of s itu a tio n s  'the  employment of methods 
of in tim idation ' tends n o t to  be seen as te rro rism , one may add th e  problem 
th a t  in  some of the most notorious in s tan ces  of te rro rism , causing te r r o r  has 
no t loomed la rg e  in  the  ob jectives of th e  p e rp e tra to rs , in  so f a r  a s  th ese  are 
known. (The q u a lif ic a tio n  i s  necessary  because in p rac tice  i t  i s  v ir tu a lly  
im possible to  uncover th e  whole tru th  about any a tro c ity .)  Let us take  the  case 
of the Pan Am je t  brought down in Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb in  December 
1988, re su ltin g  in  the  d ea th s  of 270 people. How does th is  a c t f i t  in  w ith the 
OED d efin itio n ?  One cannot reasonably argue th a t  i t  was designed to  s t r ik e  the 
passengers and crew w ith te r ro r .  From the  circum stances, i t  i s  q u ite  evident 
th a t  the  objective was to  k i l l  them, not to  fr ig h ten  them.
In it ia lly , th e re  was speculation  th a t  th e  a tro c ity  was conceived as  an ac t 
of revenge fo r  the  shooting  down by th e  USS Vincennes of an Iran ian  a i r l in e r  
during the  Gulf war. (21) However, the  crim inal in v estig a tio n  conducted by the 
S co ttish  a u th o ritie s  eventually  led to  th e  charging of two Libyans, though 
suggestions of both S yrian  and Iran ian  involvement have p e rs is te d . The most 
p lau sib le  explanation of Libyan involvement in  the  a tro c ity  was th a t  i t  was
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intended as an a c t of revenge or re ta l ia t io n  fo r the  bombing of Libya by the  
United S ta tes  in  A pril 1986. That American action  in  tu rn  was a response to  
th e  United S ta te s  government's b e lie f th a t  Libya had been a p a rty  to  a tta c k s  on 
American c itiz e n s . If  revenge does tu rn  out to  be the  motive fo r  the  bombing 
of Pan Am F lig h t 103, i t  would not be su rp ris in g . Revenge i s  a very common 
motive fo r violence in human a f fa ir s .  In many p a r ts  of the world, chains of 
revenge and re ta l ia t io n  a re  an im portant fa c to r  in  the  perpetuation  of p o li t ic a l  
violence.
If i t  i s  accepted th a t  the  motive fo r  the  Lockerbie bomb was p rim arily  
revenge, which i s  c e r ta in ly  quite  p ossib le , then the only b a s is  th a t  i s  l e f t  in 
th e  d ic tio n ary  d e fin itio n  fo r  c a llin g  the  Lockerbie bomb an ac t of te rro rism  is  
th a t  fea r was generated among the  public a s  an unintended consequence of th e  
bomb. C ertain ly , i t  i s  p lausib le  to  argue th a t  the  bomb increased the  an x ie tie s  
of a i r  passengers. However, th e re  i s  no reason fo r supposing th a t  th is  e ffe c t 
played an im portant p a r t in  the p u b lic 's  perception  of the  deed as  an a c t  of 
te rro rism . The deaths caused by the  bomb provide a much sim pler and more 
d ire c t  explanation of the  public outrage a t  th e  bomb and of public  perception  of 
th e  deed as an a c t of te rro rism . Furthermore, the  emphasis th a t  the  d ic tio n a ry  
d e fin itio n  p laces on in tim idation  as a motive or consequence of te rro rism  in  no 
way helps us to  d is tin g u ish  te rro rism  from o ther a c ts  of violence. P ra c tic a lly  
any a c t of violence has an in tim idatory  e f fe c t  of some kind. For th a t  m atter, 
acc iden ts th a t  cause f a ta l i t i e s  a lso  generate  fea r. Vhat needs to  be underlined 
a t  th i s  s tag e  in  th e  argument i s  th e  mismatch between th e  scope of the  
d ic tio n ary  d e fin itio n  of te rro rism  and the  ground th a t  i s  covered by the  term 
in p rac tice . This i s  very fa r  from being merely a sem antic quibble.
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The d ic tio n a ry  d e fin itio n  i s  not simply a quirky piece of etymology. Both 
academic and o f f ic ia l  d e f in itio n s  follow much the  same lin e s , as  we s h a ll  see 
when we examine them in the  next chapter. For the  moment, i t  i s  su f f ic ie n t 
th a t  the reader should be aware th a t  the obvious im plication  th a t  te rro rism  
causes fear may o ften  be a b a r r ie r  to  understanding p a r tic u la r  a c ts  of 
te rro rism  and, indeed, te rro rism  as a whole. I t  i s  a c lich e  in  the  l i te ra tu re  
th a t  t e r r o r i s t s  k i l l  sm all numbers of people in  order to  fr ig h ten  many 
more. (22) That may sometimes be tru e , but, in  p rac tice , sp reading  fe a r  among a 
c iv ilia n  population by the  ind iscrim ina te  k il l in g  of a few ra re ly  advances any 
p o lit ic a l  or so c ia l cause, while violence th a t i s  e x p lic itly  and c le a r ly  ta rg e ted  
a t a p a r tic u la r  s e t  of people cannot be expected to  induce extreme anxiety  in 
those outside th a t  group.
Terrorism paradox
Part of the  explanation  fo r  the  emphasis th a t  much of th e  l i te r a tu re  p laces on 
the psychological impact of te rro rism  beyond i t s  immediate v ic tim s i s  to  be 
found in  what has perhaps been the  most s tr ik in g  paradox of the  age of 
te rro rism . This i s  th e  fa c t  th a t  the  number of people th a t  have been k ille d  in 
a c ts  of te rro rism  world-wide appears to  have been extrem ely sm all. However, 
th is  statem ent needs to  be ca re fu lly  qualified . Most s t a t i s t i c a l  e stim ates  of 
the numbers k ille d  in  a c ts  of te rro rism  confine them selves to  in te rn a tio n a l or 
tran sn a tio n a l te rro r ism . On th i s  b a sis , the  number of people k il le d  s in ce  the  
la te  1960s i s  in  th e  low thousands. <23) Estim ates th a t  include those  k ille d  in 
domestic as well as in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  are  much harder to  come by, but 
Laqueur's estim ate  fo r  a s in g le  decade suggests a figu re  in  th e  low ten s  of 
thousands fo r  the  period s in ce  th e  1960s.(24) By comparison, in  th e  various
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c o n flic ts  in  the  coun tries  of C entral America, the  f a t a l i t i e s  from p o li t ic a l  
violence over th e  same period run in to  the  hundreds o f thousands. At f i r s t  
s ig h t, th e ir  exclusion from s t a t i s t i c s  on te rro rism  seems inexp licab le . The 
overwhelming m ajority  of those who have died have been c iv il ia n s  and the  fa c t 
th a t  th e  c iv ilia n  population has been te rro r ise d  in  the  process i s  very evident 
from th is  d esc rip tio n  of the  s itu a tio n  p reva iling  in El Salvador in  1985:
Salvadorean socie ty , a ffec ted  by te r r o r  and panic, a re s u lt  
of th e  p e rs is te n t v io la tio n  of b asic  human r ig h ts ,  shows 
the  following t r a i t s :  c o lle c tiv e  in tim idation  and 
generalised  fea r, on the  one hand, and on the  o ther the  
in te rn a lised  acceptance of the  te r r o r  because of the  da ily  
and frequent use of v io len t means. In general, so c ie ty  
accep ts the  frequent appearance of to rtu red  bodies, because 
b asic  r ig h ts ,  the  r ig h t  to  l ife , has abso lu tely  no 
overrid ing  value fo r s o c ie ty .(25)
Vhy then has th e re  been a re luctance  to  apply the  term to  these  c o n flic ts?
Vhat accounts fo r  the  concen tration  in the  l i te ra tu re  on s itu a tio n s  in  which '  
p o li t ic a l  violence k i l l s  very few people?
To answer these  questions, the  most obvious problem in applying the  term 
to  any s itu a tio n  needs to  be faced. This i s  the fa c t th a t  the  word, te rro rism , 
cannot possib ly  be tre a te d  as  i f  i t  were a n eu tra l, tech n ica l term fo r  a 
p a r tic u la r  category of violence. The term c a r r ie s  a m assive emotive punch. 
Indeed, i t  i s  probably one of the most powerfully condemnatory words in  the  
English language. However, i t s  u t i l i t y  would be lim ited , were i t  sim ply seen as 
an emotive term fo r any type of violence, even any type of p o li t ic a l  violence.
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In fa c t, the very emotive power of the  word has helped to  shape th e  more 
sp ec ific  ap p lica tio n  of th e  term. In p a rtic u la r , i t s  judgemental c h a rac te r has 
s tro n g ly  influenced the  p o li t ic a l  context in  which i t  i s  applied, because th a t  
judgement c a r r ie s  the  im plication  th a t  the violence in  question lack s  any 
legitim acy.
Illeg itim ate  violence
Indeed, 'the  ille g itim a te  use of violence fo r some so c ia l or p o l i t ic a l  purpose' 
might reasonably be put forward as a loose d e fin itio n  of cu rren t usage of the  
term (though such a d e fin itio n  would not cover a l l  the  examples of cu rren t 
usage of the  term given a t  the beginning of th i s  ch ap ter). In th i s  con tex t we 
need to  d is tin g u ish  between two d if fe re n t senses of 'i l le g it im a te ',  a sub jec tive  
meaning and one derived from the  ex istence of a consensus in  so c ie ty  on the  
issue. The sub jective p erspec tive  is  summed up in  the  dictum th a t  one man's 
t e r r o r i s t  i s  another man's freedom fig h te r , perhaps th e  most frequen tly  quoted 
aphorism about te rro rism  to  be found in the  l i te ra tu re .  But the  term , 
te rro rism , i s  a lso  o ften  used on th e  assumption th a t th e re  i s  a broad consensus 
in the  socie ty  in  question th a t  the  violence being described  i s  generally  
perceived as ille g itim a te . From th is  perspective , no t merely can th e  word be 
used more or le s s  ob jectively  but i t s  fea tu res can be determined by examining 
the term s of so c ie ty 's  consensus on the issue.
I t  i s  e a s ie s t to  e s ta b lis h  in  what con tex t violence i s  generally  perceived 
as ille g itim a te  by considering  how violence i s  norm ally ju s tif ie d . I t  i s  ra re  
fo r violence to  be g lo r if ie d  as  an end in  i t s e l f .  The usual ju s t if ic a t io n  of i t s  
use i s  th a t  i t  c o n s ti tu te s  an e ffec tiv e  means to  a leg itim a te  end. Often 
fu rth e r q u a lif ic a tio n s  a re  added th a t  the  means employed must be p rop o rtio n ate
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to  the  end being sought and th a t  o ther means must not be av a ilab le  to  achieve 
th e  same end. In Vestern so c ie tie s , i t  i s  generally  argued th a t  th e re  can be no 
ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r the  use of p o li t ic a l  violence w ithin an e ffe c tiv e ly  functioning  
liberal-dem ocracy, because o ther means are  availab le  to  influence public po licy  
and, p e rio d ica lly , th e  com position of the  government. Further, given the  
ex istence  of such dem ocratic p rocesses, th e re  would seem to  be l i t t l e  likelihood  
in  p ra c tice  th a t  violence fo r a so c ia l or p o li t ic a l  purpose would a t t r a c t  
s ig n if ic a n t support in  a s ta b le  democracy. Such considera tions explain  why in 
the  Vest organised violence of a life - th re a te n in g  ch arac te r which has the  aim 
of coercing the  government of an e s tab lish ed  liberal-dem ocracy i s  alm ost 
invariab ly  labelled  te rro rism  and why th e  p e rp e tra to rs  of such deeds a re  alm ost 
as c o n sis te n tly  labelled  te r r o r i s t s .  I t  should be noted th a t  spontaneous forms 
of violence, such as r io t in g , are  norm ally not regarded as  a spec ies  of 
te rro rism , even though in  extreme cases they may lead to  lo s s  of l i f e .
A ttitudes towards violence d irec ted  ag a in s t property  v a rie s  among lib e ra l-  
democracies, though much depends on whether th e  a c t in question i s  seen as p a r t  
of a la rg e r campaign th a t  does th rea ten  l i f e .  (26)
However, ou tside of s ta b le  libera l-dem ocracies, a category  of s ta te s  th a t  
tends to  overlap with th e  in d u s tr ia lis e d  coun tries  of the  F i r s t  Vorld, the  use 
of the  term s, te rro r ism  and te r r o r i s t ,  i s  seen as fa r  more problem atic fo r a 
number of reasons. F ir s t ly ,  the  legitim acy of forms of government o ther than 
th e  lib e ra l-dem ocra tic  tends to  be regarded a s  questionable in  the  Vest, a . 
perception  th a t  has been re in fo rced  by th e  frequency of th e i r  co llapse . A 
consequence of such doubts i s  a re luctance  to  apply the  term , te rro r ism , to  a c ts  
of violence d irec ted  a t  the  overthrow of such system s. Secondly, any doubts
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about th e  regim e's legitim acy n a tu ra lly  tend to  be re in fo rced  by s ig n s  of 
p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i ty ,  including violence. Indeed, the  h igher the  level of 
violence in any c o n flic t, the  more re luctance th e re  i s  lik e ly  to  be in  the  
V estern media to  apply th e  term, te rro rism , to  the  s itu a tio n . Third ly , th e re  is  
le s s  p ressu re  on the  V estern media to  condemn p o li t ic a l  violence in  coun tries  
not seen as p a r t of the  Vest. As a re su lt, th e re  is  le s s  like lihood  th a t  the  
term, te rro rism , w ill be used simply fo r th e  purpose of condemnation. In these  
circum stances, a narrow view of the  a p p lic a b ili ty  of th e  term is  lik e ly  to  be 
tak en .
A pplication in  the  Third Vorld
For a l l  of these  reasons, th e  term s, te rro rism  and t e r r o r i s t ,  tend to  be used 
much le s s  c o n s is ten tly  ou tside  the  sp ec if ic  context of s ta b le  l ib e ra l-  
democracies. A few examples w ill i l lu s t r a te  the  po in t. Shortly  a f te r  th e  
bloody expulsion of pro-democracy dem onstrators from Tienamen Square, Beijing, 
in  June 1989, an explosion on a Shanghai t r a in  k ille d  e ig h t passengers. There 
was widespread specu lation  in  the  Vestern media th a t th e  explosion was caused 
by a bomb in response to  th e  k i l l in g s  in  Beijing, but i t  was no ticeab le  th a t  - 
re p o rte rs  avoided using th e  term, te rro rism , in connection w ith th is  
specu lation . (27) A s im ila r  re luctance to  use th e  term was evident in  the  
rep o rtin g  of car-bornbs in  Kabul, Afghanistan, during th e  1980s th a t  caused 
la rge  numbers of c iv il ia n  c asu a ltie s . I t  would be f a i r  to  in te rp re t  th ese  
in h ib itio n s  a s  the d e s ire  to  avoid leg itim is in g  e ith e r  th e  regime in  question or 
i t s  methods fo r dealing w ith p o li t ic a l  opponents. By c o n tra s t, th e  media has 
had no h e s ita tio n  in  desc rib in g  as te rro rism  some events th a t  have taken place 
in th e  Third Vorld, such as  the explosion of a bomb th a t  brought down a South
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Korean je t  o ff the  co ast of Burma in  November 1987 or th e  tak ing  and 
imprisonment of V estern hostages in  Lebanon.
One can id en tify  a th ird  category of cases where th e  V estern media have 
been divided over whether to  use the  term s. An example i s  the  'armed s tru g g le ' 
th a t  th e  African National Congress (AKC) conducted a g a in s t th e  South A frican 
government up to  th e  suspension of the  campaign in August 1990. The 
com paratively ra re  in s tan ces  in  which bomb a tta ck s  in  th e  urban a reas  k ille d  
c iv il ia n s  in the  course of the  campaign generally  were labelled  a c ts  of 
te rro rism . The much more conten tious issue was the app ro p ria ten ess  of 
lab e llin g  the  AITC i t s e l f  a t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isation . But how the  AITC was 
described , in  p rac tice , re fle c ted  p o lit ic a l  a tti tu d e s  tow ards th e  A frican 
n a tio n a lis t  cause more than  judgements about th e  AKC's involvement in  p a r tic u la r  
a c ts  of violence. Thus, when the  B ritish  Prime M inister, M argaret Thatcher, 
branded the AITC 'a t e r r o r i s t  o rg a n is a tio n '(28) in October 1987, her sta tem en t 
was widely in te rp re ted  as an expression  of her a tt i tu d e  towards th e  p o l i t ic a l  
a sp ira tio n s  of the  AITC and welcomed or c r i t ic is e d  on th a t  assum ption. This was 
a lso  apparent in  re sp ec t of the  American S ta te  Department pub lica tion , Patterns 
of Global Terrorism , which l is te d  the  AITC in i t s  'worldwide overview of 
o rg an isa tio n s  th a t engage in  te r ro r is m '.(29) By c o n tra s t, while th e  l ib e ra l  
p re ss  in  South A frica remained extremely c r i t ic a l  of th e  AtfC's s tra te g y  of 
'armed s tru g g le ', i t  by and la rg e  shrunk from using th e  term , t e r r o r i s t ,  to  
describe  e ith e r  the campaign i t s e l f  or ind iv idual members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, 
the  AMC's m ilita ry  w ing.(30)
The p o lit ic a l  importance a ttached  to  the  use of th e  term, te rro r ism , and 
i t s  in te rp re ta tio n  is  even more c le a rly  i l lu s tra te d  in  th e  case of th e
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P alestin ian s . In December 1988 the  leader of the  P a lestine  L iberation  
O rganisation (PLO), Yasser A rafat, made c lea r h is  acceptance of th e  r ig h t  of 
Is rae l to  e x is t , which i s  embodied in  UIT Security  Council re so lu tio n  242. He 
a lso  renounced a l l  forms of te rro rism . The American government responded by 
declaring  th a t A ra fa t's  s ta tem en ts had met i t s  conditions fo r  e s ta b lish in g  a 
dialogue with th e  PLO. This was d isputed by the  I s ra e l i  government which 
claimed th a t A ra fa t's  support fo r  the  continuation of th e  P a le s tin ian  u p ris in g  
in the  occupied te r r i to r ie s ,  the  in tifa d a , co n stitu ted  backing fo r a form of 
te rro rism . I t  was a theme th a t  Is ra e l continually  harped on. For example, in 
July 1989 the I s ra e l i  government expressed disappointm ent when the  American 
S ta te  Department declined to  c a l l  an inc iden t in  which a P a le s tin ian  caused a 
number of deaths by grabbing the  s tee rin g  wheel of a bus and p ropelling  the  
vehicle in to  a rav ine, an ac t of te r ro r is m .(31)
Is rae l was unsuccessful in persuading the  Vest of i t s  view of the  in tifada  
fo r th ree  main reasons. F ir s t ly , the  prime concern of th e  Vest was the  ending 
of P a lestin ian  involvement in  in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism . Violence w ith in  g rea te r 
Is ra e l was a le s s e r  concern. Secondly, the  stone-throw ing and o ther 
spontaneous a c ts  of p o li t ic a l  violence th a t appeared to  embody th e  in tifada  did 
not f i t  Vestern conceptions of th e  nature of te rro rism . T hird ly , th e  ac tio n s  
taken by the  I s ra e l i  army to  quell the  in tifada  c as t th e  P a le s tin ian s  in  th e  
ro le  of the  p rin c ip a l v ic tim s of violence. In the  event, the  dialogue between 
th e  American government and the  PLO was suspended as a r e s u l t  of th e  fa ilu re  of 
th e  PLO to  condemn an a tta ck  on Is ra e l across in te rn a tio n a l f ro n tie r s  in  May 
1990. For the  United S ta te s , the  in te rn a tio n a l dimension of the  episode was
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c ru c ia l. The d if f ic u l ty  fo r  the  PLO a t  the  tim e lay in  repud ia ting  an a tta ck  on 
Is ra e l as opposed to  one on a th ird  party .
In te rn a tio n a l dimension
Given th a t th e re  has been a tendency to  apply the  term te rro r ism  by and large 
to  p o li t ic a l  violence in  Western liberal-dem ocracies or d irec ted  a g a in s t such 
s ta te s  in te rn a tio n a lly , th e  enormous d is junc tion  th a t e x is ts  between the  numbers 
k ille d  in  a c ts  of te rro r ism  and the  global fig u re  fo r those  who d ie in a l l  
forms of p o lit ic a l  violence, becomes explicab le . Vestern libera l-dem ocracies 
predominate among s ta b le  p o lit ie s  and s ta b le  p o li t ie s , v ir tu a lly  by d e fin itio n , 
face fa r  le ss  p o li t ic a l  violence than th e ir  le s s  s ta b le  co u n terp arts . I t  i s  
th e re fo re  not a t  a l l  su rp ris in g  th a t  the  numbers k illed  in  te rro rism  appear to  
be very sm all in  re la tio n  to  those  k ille d  in  a l l  forms of p o li t ic a l  violence. I t  
could hardly  be otherw ise. The consequence i s  th a t  i t  i s  in ev itab ly  the 
c itiz en ry  of the  in d u s tr ia lis e d  democracies th a t  appears to  be most a t  r is k  
from te rro rism . This im pression i s  compounded by the concen tra tion  of the  
s t a t i s t i c a l  research  in to  te rro rism  on in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism , in te rp re ted  in 
the  f i r s t  in stance  as s itu a tio n s  in  which th e  n a tio n a lity  of th e  victim  and th a t 
of the  p e rp e tra to r d if f e r .  U nsurprisingly , the  highly mobile peoples of the  
F ir s t  Vorld tend to  be d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly  represented  in such s itu a tio n s . 
Consequently th e  fig u res  on in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  sim ply provide fu rth e r  
evidence fo r what i s  a log ica l but u ltim ate ly  somewhat absurd im plication  of 
cu rren t usage of th e  term . This i s  th a t  i t  i s  the  a ff lu e n t and secure c itiz e n s  
of the  Vest who are  most threatened  by te rro rism , and not th e  tru ly  te rro r is e d  
peoples in  coun tries  a f f l ic te d  by c iv i l  war, whether in  th e  Third Vorld o r in  
form erly Communist s ta te s .
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E arlie r, some of the  reasons fo r  the  re luctance in  the  V estern media to  
apply the  term, te rro rism , to  c o n f lic ts  in the  Third Vorld were explored. An 
im portant aspect of th a t  re luctance , which is  p a r tic u la r ly  s a l ie n t  to  the  
c o n f lic ts  in C entral America, rem ains to  be d iscussed . This i s  the  issue  of the 
ro le  of the s ta te  in  p o li t ic a l  violence. In most se rio u s  c iv i l  c o n f lic ts , 
ac tio n s  by the  armed fo rces of the  s ta te  account fo r a la rge  m ajority  of th e  
deaths. This i s  p a r tly  because the  le th a l capacity  of th e  s ta te  i s  alm ost 
in v ariab ly  g re a te r  than th a t  of i t s  opponents. I t  i s  a lso  because th e re  a re  few 
r e s t r a in ts  on th e  behaviour of the  fo rces of th e  s ta te  in  s itu a tio n s  of the  
breakdown of p o li t ic a l  au th o rity . In extreme cases of the  massacre of la rge  
numbers of c iv il ia n s , the  ac tion  of the  secu rity  fo rces would be lik e ly  to  
a t t r a c t  in te rn a tio n a l c r itic ism  as  a human r ig h ts  v io la tio n . However, such 
cases are  not generally  described  as  a c ts  of te rro rism . The charge of s ta te  
com plicity  in  te rro rism  usually  re fe rs  i t s  involvement in  covert ac tion  
undertaken outside th e  boundaries of the  s ta te  in question. For example, during 
the  1980s the  American S ta te  Departm ent's P a tte rn s  of Global Terrorism  lim ited  
i t s  accusations ag a in s t the  Afghan government of involvement in  te rro r ism  to  
a c t iv i t ie s  undertaken outside Afghanistan i t s e l f .  (32) Reluctance to  use th e  
term, te rro rism , in  re la tio n  to  th e  ac tio n s  of the  s ta te  stems from an im portant 
p r in c ip le  th a t  underlies the  p o l i t ic a l  o rgan isa tion  of th e  modern world. This 
i s  th e  p rin c ip le  th a t  the  s ta te  possesses a monopoly of leg itim ate  violence in 
any so cie ty .
As the  overarching au th o rity  w ithin domestic so c ie ty , the s ta te  i s  
resp o n sib le  fo r  th e  maintenance of law and order w ith in  i t s  own boundaries. In 
th e  absence of an overarching au th o rity  w ithin the  so c ie ty  of s ta te s ,  i t  i s  a lso
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so le ly  responsib le  fo r  the  defence of the  realm ag a in st ex tern a l a tta ck . These
two ro le s  have re in fo rced  the  p riv ileg ed  position  of the  s ta te  in  re la tio n  to
the  use of violence or force, as  th e  action  of the s ta te  to  m aintain order or »
fo r se lf-defence  i s  more commonly ca lled . In general, a presum ption of
legitim acy a tta ch es  to  the  action  of the  s ta te  in th is  f ie ld . This even app lies
to  s itu a tio n s  where doubts e x is t  as to  the  regim e's legitim acy, on the
assumption th a t  public  in te re s t  in  the  maintenance of order o r th e  defence of
the  country transcends th e  issue  of the  p o li t ic a l  colour of the  regime in  power.
Where a regim e's hold on power i s  th reatened  by v io len t c o n flic t, th is  
assumption is  le s s  lik e ly  to  be made. In such circum stances, as we saw e a r lie r , 
th e  v io len t opponents of the  s ta te  a re  unlikely  to  be ca lled  t e r r o r i s t s  by 
outside opinion. But the  read iness  to  deny legitim acy to  regim es challenged by 
popular fo rces, does not generally  extend to  applying the  term , t e r r o r i s t ,  e ith e r  
to  the  actions of s ta te  fo rces under th e ir  con tro l or to  the  regim es them selves.
Some w rite rs  in the  f ie ld  of te rro r ism  use the concept of s ta te  te rro rism  in 
th i s  context, (33) but th e re  i s  l i t t l e  likelihood of such usage gaining general 
acceptance because of the  a b so lu tis t  judgement involved in  th e  use of the  term , „ 
te rro rism . The co ro llo ry  of accusing a regime of s ta te  te rro rism  would be th a t 
i t  lacked any legitim acy. In many circum stances, such a judgement would seem 
dangerously unbalanced.
That leaves the  sp ec ia l case of the  't e r r o r i s t  s ta te ',  th e  designation  
developed by th e  Reagan A dm inistration, to  apply sp e c if ic a lly  to  s ta te s  engaged 
in , or giving support to  c lan d estin e  violence outside th e ir  own boundaries.
C learly , i f  i t  were in te rp re ted  l i te r a l ly  i t  would apply to  th e  United S ta te s  
i t s e l f ,  though th a t  im plication  would be re jected  by most Americans. In
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p ra c tic e , th e  term is  used fo r propaganda purposes to  p illo ry  s ta te s  in  c o n f lic t 
w ith the  United S ta te s . Which s ta te s  to  p illo ry  has in ev itab ly  become an issue 
in  American dom estic p o li t ic s .  For example, the  question of whether South 
A frica should be included among the  designated t e r r o r i s t  s ta te s  was a minor 
issu e  in  the  1988 American P res id en tia l e lec tio n . Iraq was re in s ta te d  on the  
l i s t  a f te r  the  invasion of Kuwait. The obvious d if f ic u l ty  with th e  whole notion 
of a ' t e r r o r i s t  s ta t e ' i s  th a t  i t  im plies th a t  an ille g itim a te  regime (or one so 
regarded by the  United S ta te s) has no r ig h t  to  take ac tion  in  i t s  own defence 
beyond i t s  own borders. In a world in  which the  se lf -h e lp  p r in c ip le  ap p lies  to  
the  defence of s ta te s ,  th is  i s  a d if f ic u l t  p roposition  to  su sta in .
However, in  general, th e re  i s  le s s  d if f ic u l ty  in  lab e llin g  th e  s ta t e 's  use 
of c lan d estin e  violence beyond i t s  borders as te rro rism  than th e re  i s  in  
c a llin g  s ta te s  th a t  au th o rise  such a c ts  t e r r o r i s t  s ta te s .  Thus, ou tside of 
France, th e  s ink ing  of the  Rainbow W arrior by French agents in  1985 was widely 
ch arac te rised  as  an a c t of te rro rism . (34) However, very few would suggest th a t  
th i s  episode would ju s tify  c a llin g  the  French government a t e r r o r i s t  regime, 
with a l l  the  overtones of p o li t ic a l  illeg itim acy  th a t such a d e sc rip tio n  would 
imply. That i s  not to  say th a t  describ ing  a s ta te 's  use of c lan d estin e  violence 
beyond i t s  borders as te rro rism  i s  generally  unproblem atic. Context m atters.
A s ta te  under a ttack  from fo rces beyond i t s  borders would argue th a t  i t  was 
ju s t if ie d  in  using such methods to  defend i t s e l f .  Whether i t s  a c tio n s  were 
described  by o thers  as  te rrro r ism  would p a r tly  hinge on in te rn a tio n a l 
percep tions of th a t  regim e's legitim acy and p a rtly  on the  c la r i ty  of the  lin k  
between th e  s ta t e 's  ac tio n s  and i t s  defence.
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Ideological dimension
The American government's use of th e  term, te rro rism , i s  c lea rly  re la te d  to  i t s  
own p a rtic u la r  ideolog ical perspective . But i t  would be wrong to  suppose th a t 
the term 's ideological dimension simply re s id es  in the  ra th e r  su p e rf ic ia l b ias  
th a t  governments dem onstrate when applying the  term. I t  i s  deeply embedded in 
the judgemental ch arac te r of the  term i t s e l f .  The in v ariab le  im plication  of 
condemnation p o s itiv e ly  req u ire s  the  ap p lica tio n  of ideological p r in c ip le s  to  
determine when i t  is  leg itim ate  to  use the term. Given the o rig in s  of the  term 
in Western p o li t ic a l  d iscourse , i t  i s  in ev itab le  th a t i t  should be the  lib e ra l 
p rin c ip le s  which underpin government in  the  Vest th a t  have shaped the 
ideological boundaries of the  term in  p rac tice . Indeed, i t  i s  ev ident th a t  i t  is  
e as ie r  to  understand cu rren t usage of the term  by applying l ib e ra l  p rin c ip le s  
to  the  question of the  legitim acy of p o li t ic a l  violence than by examining the 
etymology of the  word i t s e l f .  I t  should be noted th a t  the  word, l ib e ra l , in 
th is  context re fe rs  to  the  p rin c ip le s  of th e  ru le  of law and of com petitive 
e lec tio n s  on which th e re  i s  a broad consensus in  the  West. I t  should not be 
confused with the  narrower use of the  term, l ib e ra l, to  re fe r  to  l e f t  of cen tre  
opinion in the  United S ta te s .
Admittedly, the  s tre tc h in g  of the  term, te rro rism , to  apply to  a c ts  w ith a 
crim inal ra th e r  than a so c ia l or p o li t ic a l  purpose has muddied th e  w aters 
somewhat. In such cases, th e  question of the  legitim acy of p o l i t ic a l  violence 
is  no longer re lev an t. However, th a t  does not a l te r  th e  fa c t th a t  in  i t s  
prim ary app lication  to  p o li t ic a l  violence, the  term has an ideo log ical dimension 
th a t c lea rly  needs to  be recognised in  any d iscussion  of th e  meaning of 
te rro rism . In fa c t, the  fa ilu re  of much of the  l i te ra tu re  on te rro r ism  to
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acknowledge th i s  Ideological dimension co n s titu te s  one of the most s ig n if ic a n t 
b a r r ie r s  to  understanding te rro rism . Without paying due regard  to  the  term 's 
ideolog ical dimension, much about how and why i t  i s  used i s  lik e ly  to  be 
m issed. For example, i t  i s  because the  term is  rooted in  a s p e c if ic a lly  Western 
p o li t ic a l  perspective  of the  world th a t  i t  has proved so useful to  those  in  the 
West who wish to  a s s e r t  the  su p e rio rity  of Western values and who do not wish 
to  accommodate o ther values or perspectives.
Understanding
So f a r  the  b a r r ie rs  to  the  understanding of te rro rism  th a t  have been id en tified  
in th i s  in troduction  have concerned the term, te rro rism , i t s e l f .  They can 
usefu lly  be summarised under fiv e  headings: f i r s t l y ,  th e  widening scope of the 
term; secondly, the  fa c t th a t  the  term does not quite  mean what i t  says i t  does; 
th ird ly , the re la ted  po in t th a t  causing fea r i s  not a d is tin g u ish in g  fea tu re  of 
te rro rism ; fo u rth ly , the  excep tionally  s trong  emotive overtones of the  term; and 
f i f th ly ,  i t s  ideo log ical dimension. What remains to  be d iscussed  i s  the issue 
of understanding i t s e l f .  How to  approach the  subject of te rro rism  with a view 
to  developing an understanding of i t  i s  much more problem atic than  i t  might 
appear a t  f i r s t  s ig h t.
The d if f ic u lty  i s  b e st elucidated through an example. On 21 November 
1974, 21 people were k ille d  and 162 injured by bombs placed in  two public 
houses in  the  cen tre  of Birmingham. An inadequate telephone warning minutes 
before th e  explosions id e n tif ie d  the bombings as the work of th e  P rov isional 
IRA (I r ish  Republican Army). There was a s tro n g  reac tio n  to  th e  bombings 
throughout B ritish  so c ie ty . The Guardian, described them in  an e d ito r ia l  a s  'an 
outrage beyond endurance '.(35) A n ti-Ir ish  dem onstrations ac ro ss  th e  English
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Midlands provided an in d ica tion  of the  public mood. The fea r th a t  the  backlash 
ag a in s t the I r ish  might lead to  public d iso rd er was one fa c to r  in  the  
government’s  response to  the  bombings, the in troduction  of the Prevention of 
Terrorism  Act, which was described by the  Home Secretary  of th e  tim e, Roy 
Jenkins, as a 'draconian m easure '.(36) In ju s tify in g  the  measure, Jenkins 
declared th a t he had given up try in g  to  understand th e  motives of people 
responsib le  fo r  outrages such a s  the  pub bombings. His words encapsulated the 
mood of the moment.
Their resonance derived from the  double meaning of the word, understand. 
Vhile the prim ary sense of the  word is  to  comprehend the  sources and causes of 
the  object of explanation, the  word has a secondary connotation in  human 
a f f a i r s  of empathy w ith the  ac tio n s  being examined. Jenkins c le a r ly  had the  
la t t e r  connotation in  mind. In the  context of B ritish  policy  tow ards northern  
Ireland, Jenk ins 's  words s ig n alled  an end to  the r a t io n a l is t ic  assum ption th a t  
B ritish  governments had made h ith e rto . This was th a t  an end to  th e  violence 
could be achieved through tack lin g  the  leg itim ate  p o li t ic a l  grievances of people 
in Horthem  Ireland . A con tribu to ry  fa c to r  to  the governm ent's pessimism in 
th is  respec t had been the  fa ilu re  e a r l ie r  in  1974 of th e  pow er-sharing executive 
in northern  Ireland which had been estab lish ed  with th e  support of the B ritish  
government. In term s of wider public opinion, the Birmingham pub bombings 
represented  a watershed in  a tt i tu d e s  towards violence emanating from the 
c o n flic t in  no rthern  Ire la n d .(37)
In p a rtic u la r , th e re  was a marked hardening of opinion which was most 
c lea rly  re flec ted  in the  disappearance of any equivocation in  applying the  term, 
te rro rism , to  p o li t ic a l  violence tak ing  place in  northern  Ireland  o r emanating
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from th e  province. The change in  the  atmosphere produced a marked s h i f t  in  
public  d iscourse  away from a ttem pts to  understand the  causes of th e  violence in  
no rth e rn  Ireland. A gainst the  background of th e  Birmingham bombs, they smacked 
too much of a ttem pting to  provide ra tio n a lis a tio n s  fo r  what was to ta l ly  
unacceptable. One consequence was th a t  B ritish  opinion on the  UK mainland 
became blinded to  the  s ta te  of opinion in no rthern  Ireland . The r e s u l t  was 
th a t  when Sinn Fein, the  p o li t ic a l  wing of the  P rov isional IRA, achieved a 
re la tiv e ly  modest measure of e lec to ra l success in  the  1980s, the  B ritish  public 
was both deeply shocked and su rp rised . The p u b lic 's  lack of empathy fo r the  
no rthern  Ireland problem had led to  a dim inution of i t s  understanding in the 
broader sense.
Understanding te rro rism  in  general p re sen ts  the  problem th a t  th e  term, 
te rro r ism , e n ta i ls  an a b so lu tis t  judgement th a t  seems qu ite  incom patible with 
the  re te n tio n  of any element of empathy fo r  i t s  p e rp e tra to rs  or th e  s itu a tio n  
th a t  spawned them. As a m atter of fa c t, absence of empathy i s  a very evident 
fea tu re  of the  l i te ra tu re  on te rro rism . I t  i s  most c le a rly  re fle c ted  in a 
re la t iv e  lack of in te re s t  in  the  explanations those id e n tif ie d  as  t e r r o r i s t s  - 
have to  o ffe r fo r  th e ir  ac tio n s. I t  is  not d if f ic u l t  to  suggest why. In the  
f i r s t  place, no w rite r  seeking to  e s ta b lish  h is  or her c re d en tia ls  in  the f ie ld  
of te rro rism  would wish to  provide, or even appear to  provide, any 
ra t io n a lis a tio n s  fo r a c ts  of te rro rism . That i s  c le a rly  a r is k  in  any 
exp lo ra tion  of the m otivations of the  t e r r o r i s t  from th e  t e r r o r i s t 's  po in t of 
view. A much sa fe r  procedure i s  to  a t tr ib u te  bad motives to  t e r r o r i s t s  on the 
b a s is  th a t  they intended th e  very w orst consequences of th e ir  a c tio n s . In the 
second p lace, th e re  i s  the  problem of f i t t in g  the  explanations th a t  t e r r o r i s t s
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give in to  the framework provided by the  concept of te rro rism . The 'ism ' of 
te rro rism  c lea rly  im plies the  ex istence  of an underlying philosophy of violence 
or m entality  th a t  a l l  t e r r o r i s t s  share  whatever th e ir  d ifferences of p o li t ic a l  
ideology. The d if f ic u l ty  i s  th a t  the  explanations of t e r r o r i s t s ,  as  w ill be 
seen, provide scan t em pirical evidence of such a coherent b a s is  fo r te rro rism .
The approach th a t  w ill be taken in  th is  th e s is  i s  th a t  analysing  how 
people labelled  as t e r r o r i s t s  ju s tify  th e ir  ac tio n s  i s  necessary  to  an 
understanding of the  violence th a t  th e  term, te rro rism , encompasses. Such an 
approach e n ta i ls  a number of d if f ic u l t ie s .  The most im portant as well as the  
most obvious i s  th a t  i t  i s  d if f ic u l t  to  ge t to  g rip s  w ith the m otivations of 
t e r r o r i s t s  in th e  sense no t ju s t  of app recia ting  the  p o li t ic a l  ob jectives of 
th e ir  ac tions but of understanding how they view the  moral conten t of the  means 
employed. The l i te ra tu re  on te rro rism  is  l i t te r e d  with p lausib le  exp lanations 
of t e r r o r i s t  ac tio n s  th a t  make no reference to  the t e r r o r i s t 's  view of how the  
world works or of th e ir  expecta tions of th e  consequences of th e ir  ac tio n s. The 
weakness of such ex te rn a l exp lanations i s  th a t  in the  absence of inform ation 
about the percep tions of th e  t e r r o r i s t s  them selves, they tend to  p resen t a 
p ic tu re  of t e r r o r i s t s  e ith e r  as ca lcu la tin g  ro b o t- lik e  machines or as  m entally 
deranged. Both p ic tu re s  have con tribu ted  to  the  ex istence  of an in o rd in a te  fea r 
of te rro rism  th a t  may iro n ic a lly  have contributed  to  i t s  u t i l i ty  as an 
instrum ent of p o li t ic a l  ac tion . More h e a lth ily , the fe a r  has a lso  con tribu ted  to  
a hunger fo r explanations of te rro rism  so as to  enable so c ie ty  to  come to  term s 
with the  phenomemon. Of course, th a t  begs th e  question whether te rro rism  can 
be regarded as  a coherent phenomenon, a question th a t  w ill be addressed in  the  
next chapter.
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Some readers  may fee l th a t  the  d iscussion  in th is  chap ter has already 
exposed so many d if f ic u l t ie s  in th e  ap p lica tio n  of the  term, te rro r ism , to  
contemporary p o li t ic a l  violence as to  c a s t doubt on th e  value of th e  whole 
concept. (How the  academic l i te ra tu re  on te rro rism  has defined th e  term is  
examined in g re a te r  depth in  the  next chap ter.) They may a lso  fee l th a t  the  
sm all numbers of people k illed  in  a c ts  of te rro rism , as the  term is  used in the  
Vestern media, does not ju s tify  th e  a tte n tio n  lavished on the  sub jec t. I t  is  
notable, fo r example, th a t  in no s in g le  year since  the  la te  1960s, when 
s t a t i s t i c s  on the  subject f i r s t  came to  be co llected , has the number of deaths 
from in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism , as measured by a number of d if fe re n t research  
groups and o f f ic ia l  agencies, reached even a thousand. Iro n ica lly , i t  i s  alm ost 
c e r ta in ly  the  case th a t  p ropo rtionate ly  fewer people have died in  V estern 
so c ie tie s  as a re s u lt  of p o li t ic a l  violence in  the  p resen t 'age of te rro r ism ' 
than in any o ther period in  these s o c ie tie s ' h is to ry .
However, th e re  i s  no g e ttin g  away from the  influence th a t the  concept of 
te rro rism  e x e rts  on contemporary p o li t ic a l  l i f e ,  esp ec ia lly  in  th e  Vest.
Ignoring the  concept because of i t s  m isleading connotations does nothing to  
reduce th a t influence. Indeed, i t  simply leaves the f ie ld  open to  o th e rs . If 
the  concept has done damage in deeply divided so c ie tie s  by encouraging s e l f -  
righ teousness on the  p a r t of the d if fe re n t communities, th a t  needs to  be 
explained, not neglected. These a re  some of the  reasons why the  influence of 
te rro rism  on the  modern world is  worth examining, not in  s p ite  of, but in  the 
lig h t of, the b a r r ie r s  th a t  e x is t to  understanding the  term . Furtherm ore, an 
e lucidation  of the  issue  of te rro rism  has a wider relevance to  an understanding 
of both the nature of the  world and of the age in which we liv e .
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Chapter 2 ~ D is tin g u ish in g Terrorism  from o ther forms of Violence 
The question considered in  th i s  chap ter i s  whether te rro rism  can be 
d is tingu ished  from o ther forms of violence and, i f  so, in  what way. I t  i s  
c ru c ia l to  the in te lle c tu a l c re d ib i l i ty  of te rro rism  as  a concept th a t  i t  should 
be p o ssib le  to  do so on grounds o ther than sim ply one's own sub jec tive  
d isapproval of p a r tic u la r  ac tio n s. That te rro rism  is  a sp ec ia l form of violence 
is  an assumption th a t  runs through v ir tu a lly  a l l  of th e  l i te ra tu re  on the  
sub ject. A useful s ta r t in g  po in t fo r  a d iscussion  of th e  d is tin g u ish in g  
fea tu res  of te rro rism  is  the  sch o la rsh ip  of Alex Schmid. In h is  monumental 
work of reference, P o li tic a l T errorism , Alex Schmid analysed the  con ten t o f 109 
d e fin itio n s  of te rro rism . He id e n tif ie d  twenty-two elem ents in  th ese  
d e fin itio n s  and calcu la ted  the  frequency of th e ir  occurrence. His re s u l ts  are  
s e t  out in  the  tab le  below (1):
Table 2.1 Frequency of D efin itional Elements in  109 D efin itions
Element Frequency
,
1. Violence, force 83.5%
2. P o li tic a l 65 %
3. Fear, te r ro r  emphasized 51 %
4. Threat 47 %
5. (Psych.) e ffe c ts  and (an tic ip a ted ) reac tio n s  41.5%
6. V ic tim -ta rge t d if fe re n tia tio n  37.5%
7. Purposive, planned, sy stem atic , organized ac tion  32 %
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8. Method of combat, s tra te g y , ta c t ic  30.5%
9. E xtranorm ality , in  breach of accepted ru les ,
w ithout hum anitarian c o n s tra in ts  30 %
10. Coercion, ex to rtio n , induction of compliance 28 %
11. P u b lic ity  aspec t 21.5%
12. A rb itra r in ess ; im personal, random character; 
ind isc rim in a tio n  21 %
13. C iv ilian s, noncombatants, n eu tra ls ,
o u ts id e rs  as v ic tim s 17.5%
14. In tim idation  17 %
15. Innocence of v ic tim s emphasized 15.5%
16. Group, movement, o rgan ization  as  p e rp e tra to r 14 %
17. Symbolic aspect, dem onstration to  o thers 13.5%
18. In ca lcu lab ility , u n p red ic tab ility , unexpectedness
of occurrence of violence 9 %
19. C landestine, covert na ture  9 %
20. R epetitiveness; s e r ia l  or campaign ch arac te r of
violence 7 %
21. Crim inal 6 %
22. Demands made on th ird  p a r t ie s  4 %
At the  end of a lengthy considera tion  of c r i t ic is m s  of an e a r l ie r  a ttem pt 
to  define  the  term , Schmid o ffe rs  h is  own d e fin itio n  of te rro r ism , drawing on 
16 o f the  22 elem ents id e n tif ie d  above. I t  i s  worth quoting in  fu l l  a s  probably 
the  most rigorous e f fo r t  th e re  has been to  define te rro rism .
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Terrorism  is  an a n x ie ty -in sp irin g  method of repeated 
v io len t action , employed by (sem i-)c landestine  ind iv idual, 
group, or s ta te  a c to rs , fo r  id io sy n c ra tic , c rim ina l, o r 
p o li t ic a l  reasons, whereby -  in  c o n tra s t to  a ssa ss in a tio n  
-  th e  d ire c t ta rg e ts  of violence a re  not th e  main ta rg e ts . 
The immediate human v ic tim s of violence a re  generally  
chosen randomly ( ta rg e ts  of opportunity) or se le c tiv e ly  
(rep resen ta tiv e  or symbolic ta rg e ts )  from a ta rg e t  
population, and serve  as message generato rs. T hreat- and 
v iolence-based communication p rocesses between t e r r o r i s t  
(o rgan ization), (im periled) v ic tim s, and main ta rg e ts  a re  
used to  m anipulate the  main ta rg e t  (audience (s ) ) , tu rn ing  
i t  in to  a ta rg e t  of te r ro r ,  a ta rg e t  of demands, or a 
ta rg e t  of a tte n tio n , depending on whether in tim id a tio n , 
coercion, or propaganda i s  p rim arily  sought. (2)
Schmid leaves i t  to  the  read er to  in fe r  which s ix  elem ents he has l e f t  out. I t  
i s  easy enough to  id en tify  one c lu s te r  o f elem ents th a t  has been l e f t  out.
These a re  the  norm ative elem ents, numbers 9, 13, and 15 in  the ta b le . They 
emphasise th a t  te rro rism  s tr ik e s  a t  innocent o r non-combatant v ic tim s in  breach 
of norms governing the hum anitarian conduct of c o n flic ts . Their exclusion can 
be explained by Schmid's d e s ire  to  provide an objective and, a s  he sees i t ,  
s c ie n t i f ic  d e fin itio n  of th e  term.
Vhat Schmid f a i l s  to  recognise i s  th a t  h is  use of the  term , violence, gives 
h is  own d e fin itio n  a norm ative dimension as violence i s  f a r  from being a value- 
free  word. I t s  emotive overtone i s  only s l ig h tly  le ss  powerful than  th a t  of
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te rro r ism  i t s e l f .  Indeed, th e  concept of violence i s  su f f ic ie n tly  im portant in 
th e  con tex t of understanding te rro rism  to  w arrant considera tion  a t  some length 
before o ther a sp ec ts  of Schmid's d e fin itio n  a re  analysed.
Defining violence
If  th e  essence of violence is ,  as  Gerald P ries tlan d  argues, 'th a t  physica l power 
i s  d e lib e ra te ly  employed w ith the  u ltim ate  sanction  of physica l pain  and l i t t l e  
choice but su rrender or physica l re s is ta n c e ', (3) c h a ra c te r is a tio n  of an ac tion  
as  v io len t a lso  usually  e n ta i ls  d isapproval and th a t  i t  i s  i l le g itim a te . 
Legitim ate violence, i f  not q u ite  an oxymoron, i s  usually  described  by another 
word such as force. This ap p lies  most obviously to  a c tio n s  of the  agents of 
the  s ta t e  such as th e  po lice  in  upholding law and order, but i t  a lso  ap p lies  to  
th e  p r iv a te  ind iv idual in  circum stances such as se lf-d e fen ce . Thus, to  describe 
the  ac tio n s  of a householder in  re la tio n  to  a bu rg lar a s  v io len t would imply 
th a t  th e  householder's reac tio n  had gone beyond what was reasonable  in  the  
circum stances. S im ilarly , in  a sp o rtin g  context v io len t p lay  i s  ac tio n  beyond 
th e  l im its  of th e  game, such as  a low blow in  a boxing co n tes t. In sh o rt, a 
presumption of illeg itim acy  a tta ch es  to  the  use of th e  word, violence. Vhat 
th a t  means in  re la tio n  to  te rro r ism  is  th a t  any d e fin itio n  of the  concept th a t 
employs the term , violence, a s  most do, a lso  c a r r ie s  th a t  norm ative presumption 
with i t .  In h is  l i s t in g  of the  frequency of d e f in itio n a l elem ents, Schmid 
t r e a t s  the  term force as a synonym fo r violence, but in  fa c t  the  normative 
connotations of the  two words are  qu ite  d iffe re n t. Of course, the  same action  
i s  o ften  described as  an a c t o f violence and as an a c t  of fo rce  by ind iv idua ls  
with d if fe re n t p e rspec tives on the  event in  question.
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Judgement of whether a  p a r tic u la r  action  i s  v io len t or not i s  lik e ly  to  
vary, according to  th e  percep tions of those making i t .  This p o in t was n icely  
dem onstrated by a survey c a rrie d  out by the In s t i tu te  of Social Research a t  the 
U niversity  of Michigan in  th e  la te  1960s. The In s ti tu te  asked a sample of 
1,374 American males to  c h a ra c te r is e  a s e r ie s  of a c ts  as  v io len t o r not. Of the 
sample 57 per cent rep lied  th a t  shooting a lo o te r was not a v io le n t a c t, while 
alm ost a th ird  of the  sample even considered beating  s tu d en ts  not to  be 
v io len t. On the  o ther hand, 58 per cent ch arac te rised  th e  burning of d ra f t  
cards, a t  th a t  time a widespread form of p ro te s t ag a in s t American involvement 
in  the  war in Vietnam, an a c t  of v io len ce .(4) These re s u l ts  i l lu s t r a te  the  
impact of c o n flic t on percep tions of what c o n s ti tu te s  violence. At tim es of 
c r i s i s  th e re  may be l i t t l e  d isp o s itio n  to  accept a view of violence th a t  accords 
with l ib e ra l  p rin c ip le s , even in  a re la tiv e ly  s ta b le  liberal-dem ocracy . However, 
i t  would be wrong to  draw th e  conclusion th a t  the  use of the  term should 
th e re fo re  be regarded as  sim ply sub jective, a way of saying 'I  d isapprove of 
th i s '.
In the  f i r s t  p lace, in  most so c ie tie s  th e re  i s  a widespread measure of 
agreement on what the  no tion  of violence broadly encompasses. For example, 
most so c ie tie s  share  th e  same notion of what c o n s ti tu te s  an a c t o f murder. 
F urther, in  some so c ie tie s  th e re  i s  su ff ic ie n t agreement on what i s  or i s  not 
v io len t th a t  one can c le a r ly  Id en tify  th e  ex istence  of a consensus on where the 
lin e  i s  to  be drawn between violence and force. In the  second p lace, while use 
of the  term, violence, c a r r ie s  a  presumption of illeg itim acy , i t  does not 
autom atically  imply condemnation in  the  way th a t  the  term , te rro r ism , does.
This i s  because people recogn ise  th a t  in  c e r ta in  sp ec ia l circum stances, ac tio n s
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which they  would norm ally c h a ra c te r is e  as  v io len t may be ju s tif ie d  in  order to  
achieve a le g itim a te  end. For example, th e  legitim acy of ty ran n ic id e  has long 
been recognised in  many p a r ts  of th e  world. Most contemporary p o l i t ic a l  
p h ilosoph ies envisage circum stances in  which th e  v io len t overthrow of the  
e x is tin g  p o l i t ic a l  system  or revo lu tion  i s  ju s tif ie d . At a s l ig h t ly  more 
mundane lev el, th e  r i o t  has gained a measure of accep tab ility  a s  a means of 
expressing  a community's g rievances, e sp ec ia lly  in  circum stances where th a t  
community has l i t t l e  access to  o th e r forms of p o li t ic a l  expression. However, 
th e  sem i-leg itim acy  of th e  r i o t  depends on i t s  being seen as a spontaneous 
expression  of d isco n ten t. Governments consequently tend to  play up th e  ro le  of 
ou tside  a g i ta to r s  as  a way of d is c re d it in g  r io te r s .
In s ta b le  lib e ra l-dem ocracies  in  the  Vest, the  r io t  i s  one of th e  few 
forms of v io lence about which th e re  i s  any measure of equivocation. Action 
a g a in s t c r im in a ls  by v ig ila n te s  i s  another, though the  degree of equivocation 
v a rie s  from country  to  country. In co u n tries  w ith e ffec tiv e  crim ina l ju s tic e  
system s, sympathy fo r  th e  v ig ila n te  i s  lik e ly  to  be minimal. In fa c t , fo r  the 
most p a r t, th e re  i s  a consensus in  such so c ie tie s  th a t  c rim in a lises  the  use of 
violence, c le a r ly  d is tin g u ish in g  violence from th e  force used by th e  po lice  to  
uphold law and o rder. The d is tin c tio n  i s  underpinned by the  p lacing  of legal 
l im its  on what agen ts of th e  s ta t e  may do in  the  name of force.
CriminalisatlQn
The purpose of c r im in a lis a tio n  i s  to  is o la te  the  p e rp e tra to r  of a c ts  o f violence 
from the  r e s t  o f so c ie ty  and to  deny him or her the  defence th a t  h is  o r her 
a c tio n s  had a s o c ia l  or p o l i t ic a l  ju s t if ic a t io n . I t s  e ffec tiv en ess  depends on 
th e  ex istence  o f a  leg a l system  th a t  can be re lie d  upon to  punish Ind iv iduals
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g u ilty  of such a c ts  re g a rd le ss  of the  m otivation behind them, except where i t  
c o n s ti tu te s  a m itig a tin g  circum stance. The most obvious t e s t  of such a system 
i s  how i t  t r e a t s  cases in  which ind iv iduals take  th e  law in to  th e i r  own hands, 
such a s  a man seeking revenge fo r  a  wrong done to  h is  s i s te r .  In an e th n ica lly  
divided so c ie ty , th e  t e s t  may be even s ta rk e r , sim ply whether th e  system is  
capable of punishing a member of a dominant or m ajority  community 
ap p ro p ria te ly  fo r  an a c t  of violence ag a in st a member of a subordinate or 
m inority  community.<5)
In a so c ie ty  where th e re  is  a large measure of consensus in  re la tio n  to  
the  peaceful conduct of p o l i t ic a l  a f f a ir s ,  c r im in a lisa tio n  may make p o ssib le  a 
sim ple equation between a c ts  of p o li t ic a l  violence and te rro r ism . Thus, the  
B r it is h  Prevention of Terrorism  Act of 1974 defines te rro rism  in  the  f i r s t  
in s tan ce  sim ply a s  'the  use of violence fo r p o li t ic a l  e n d s '.(6) A lte rna tive ly , 
the  term , te rro r ism , may be applied to  forms of violence th a t p resen t a re a l  or 
perceived th re a t  to  the l iv e s  of members of the  general public, reg a rd le ss  of 
th e ir  m otivation . Thus, th e  B ritish  Prevention of Terrorism  Act defines 
te rro rism  in  th e  second in s tan ce  a s  Including 'any use of violence fo r  the  
purpose of p u ttin g  the  public  or any sec tion  of th e  pub lic  in  fe a r '.  (7) In 
e ith e r  case, such c rim in a lisa tio n  of violence depends on i t s  p e rp e tra to rs  being 
perceived as  a tin y , a n t i - s o c ia l  m inority . C rim ina lisa tion  as  a s tra te g y  fo r 
iso la tin g  those  re s o r tin g  to  violence fo r p o li t ic a l  ends i s  by no means 
confined to  lib e ra l-d em o crac ies . I t  i s  a lso  an a t t r a c t iv e  option fo r 
a u th o rita r ia n  s ta te s .  However, c rim in a lisa tio n  in  an a u th o rita r ia n  s ta te  w ill 
o ften  be d if fe re n t to  th a t  in  a liberal-dem ocracy in  a number of re sp ec ts .
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F ir s t ly , much g re a te r  la titu d e  w ill generally  be allowed to  th e  agen ts of 
the  s ta t e  under the  ru b ric  of force. Secondly, the  s ta te  w ill o ften  seek to  
c rim in a lise  a much la rg e r range of p o l i t ic a l  a c ts  under the  heading of violence 
or te rro r ism  than would a liberal-dem ocracy. An example is  the  very extensive 
d e fin itio n  of te rro rism  in  South A frica 's  1967 Terrorism  Act. This defined 
te rro r ism  as any a c tiv ity  lik e ly  to  'endanger th e  maintenance of law and order*. 
The Act includes a c t iv i t ie s  w ith any of 12 l is te d  re s u lts  w ith in  th i s  category. 
These include, among o th e rs , the  promotion of 'general d is lo ca tio n , d istu rbance  
o r d iso rd e r ', 'p rejudice ' to  'any in d u stry  or undertak ing ', causing 'h o s t i l i ty  
between the White and o ther in h a b ita n ts  of th e  Republic', 'obstruction* to  the 
'f re e  movement of any t r a f f i c  on land, a t  sea o r in  th e  a i r ',  and even 
'embarrassment* to  'the  ad m in is tra tio n  of the a f f a i r s  of the  s ta t e '.  (8) 
Furthermore, the  Act placed the  onus on those  accused under i t s  p ro v is io n s  to  
prove th a t  they did not in tend th e i r  a c tio n s  to  have any of th e  l i s te d  re s u lts .
Using the  term, te rro rism , as  a b lanket term fo r v ir tu a lly  any form of 
ex traparliam en tary  opposition  serves a number of purposes. F i r s t ly ,  i t  is  
designed to  e s ta b lish  the  illeg itim acy  of such opposition in the  eyes of the  
dominant community, i f  not the  general public. Secondly, i t  p rov ides a 
J u s tif ic a tio n  fo r  the  severe punishment of d is se n t by a sso c ia tin g  such d is se n t 
w ith a c ts  of violence such as murder. T hirdly , i t  i s  aimed a t  persuading the  
ou tside  world of the  m arginal natu re  o f p o li t ic a l  opposition to  the  s ta tu s  quo. 
Such lab e llin g  i s  most lik e ly  to  be successfu l where v io len t o r o th e r a c ts  of 
p ro te s t  ag a in s t the  regime are  perceived as iso la ted  in c id en ts  w ithout p o li t ic a l  
resonance among the  population a t  la rg e . At th e  o ther end of th e  spectrum , in  a 
so c ie ty  engulfed by p o li t ic a l  violence, such lab e llin g  rap id ly  lo ses  any ex tern al
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c re d ib il i ty .  Vhen i t  i s  apparent th a t  th e  s ta te  has lo s t  the  capacity  to  
c rim in a lise  a c ts  of violence d irec ted  a t  i t s  ru le , i t s  own legitim acy i s  lik e ly  
to  be in  question. This i s  e sp ec ia lly  tru e  of the  a u th o rita ria n  s ta te , which is  
o ften  lacking in  c red ib le  sources of leg itim acy o ther than i t s  capacity  to  
m aintain  law and order and the outward appearance of p o li t ic a l  s ta b i l i ty .  
Consequently, the  suppression  of v io le n t opposition  in ev itab ly  c o n s ti tu te s  a 
high p r io r i ty  fo r such s ta te s .
R epresentative violence
However, p o li t ic a l  violence may not be d irec ted  ag a in s t the  s ta te  p er  se.
Indeed, one of th e  most common s i tu a t io n s  of p o l i t ic a l  violence i s  in te r ­
community c o n flic t. I t  i s  a con tex t in  which i t  i s  very d if f ic u l t  e ith e r  to  
su s ta in  a cross-community consensus on th e  d iv id ing  lin e  between force and 
violence or to  c rim in a lise  ind iv idual a c ts  of violence. Vhat i s  more, p o l i t ic a l  
violence may no longer be perceived a s  so le ly  the  ac tio n s  of ind iv iduals but as 
re p re se n ta tiv e  of the  community from which i t  emanates and fo r  which i t  i s  
reasonable  to  make members of th a t  community accountable. In such 
circum stances, a tt i tu d e s  tow ards v io lence in ev itab ly  become coloured by whose 
violence one fe e ls  th reatened  by. Vhen re p re se n ta tiv e  violence <9) has taken 
hold in  a s itu a tio n  of inter-com m unity c o n f lic t, i t  becomes common to  ju s t ify  
violence in  th e  s tra te g ic  term s th a t  s ta t e s  use in  an ex tern al context.
Thus, violence ag a in s t the  o th er community may be presented as a form of 
de terrence  or a s  a pre-em ptive a tta ck , when th e  ju s t if ic a t io n s  of community 
se lf-d e fen ce  o r of r e p r is a l  a re  not av a ilab le . In th i s  way, cycles of violence 
may become e stab lish ed  th a t  prove alm ost im possible to  con tro l. In many 
so c ie tie s , the danger of a cc id en ta lly  tr ig g e r in g  such cycles c o n s ti tu te s  a
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powerful Influence on p o l i t ic a l  behaviour, re fle c ted  in  what may seem to  the  
o u ts id e r from a p o l i t ic a l ly  s ta b le  so c ie ty  an excessive in s is ten c e  on the 
observance of fo rm a litie s . An example i s  th e  taboo in  Northern Ireland  on 
d iscu ssin g  p o li t ic s  or re lig io n  w ith members of the  o ther community. <10) The 
ex istence  of so c ia l mechanisms to  r e s t r a in  violence i s  o ften  re f le c te d  in 
so c ie tie s  lik e  Northern Ireland  in  a very low level of v io len t crim e. By 
c o n tra s t, the  very success of s ta b le  libera l-dem ocracies in  c rim in a lis in g  
violence has reduced the  need to  re ta in  such so c ia l mechanisms, because 
in c id en ts  of violence a re  no longer so th rea ten in g  to  the  so c ie ty  a t  large. A 
theme th a t  runs through much of th e  l i te r a tu re  on te rro rism  i s  th a t  te rro rism  
i t s e l f  i s  in p a r t  the  product of a weakening of r e s t r a in ts  on violence, (11) thus 
p ro jec tin g  the  cond itions w ith in  s ta b le  so c ie tie s  th a t  su ffe r  very l i t t l e  
p o l i t ic a l  violence on to  o th e r so c ie tie s  where qu ite  d if fe re n t cond itions 
p rev a il.
Defence of one's community provides one of the most b asic  ju s t if ic a t io n s  
of p o li t ic a l  violence, analagous to  the  defence of one's country a g a in s t ex ternal 
a tta ck . Indeed, where the  ac tion  taken appears in tr in s ic a l ly  defensive, i t  i s  
un like ly  th a t i t  w ill even be ca lled  v io le n t s in ce  such ac tion  req u ire s  no 
ju s t if ic a t io n . C alling an a c t  v io len t i s  tantamount to  an acknowledgement th a t 
i t  does requ ire  ju s t if ic a t io n . This i s  because no so c ie ty  or community approves 
of violence as  an end in  i t s e l f .  I t s  ju s t if ic a t io n  r e s ts  on i t s  being 
reasonably  seen as the  only e ffec tiv e  means to  a leg itim ate  end. The 
im plica tions of th is  a sp ec t of usage of th e  term, violence, have been most 
lu c id ly  expounded by Hannah Arendt.
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Violence, being instrum ental by nature, i s  ra tio n a l to  the 
ex ten t th a t  i t  i s  e ffec tiv e  in  reaching th e  end th a t  must 
ju s tify  i t .  And since  when we a c t we never know w ith any 
c e r ta in ty  the  eventual consequences of what we a re  doing, 
violence can remain ra tio n a l only i f  i t  pursues sh o rt-te rm  
goals. Violence does not promote causes, n e ith e r h is to ry  
nor revo lu tion , n e ith e r p ro g ress  nor reaction ; but i t  can 
serve to  dram atize grievances and bring  them to  public  
a tte n tio n . As Conor Cruise O'Brien (in a debate on th e  
legitim acy of violence in  th e  Theatre of Ideas) once 
remarked, quoting William O'Brien, the  n ineteen th -cen tu ry  
I r ish  ag ra rian  and n a tio n a lis t  a g ita to r : sometimes 
'violence i s  th e  only way of ensuring a hearing fo r 
m oderation'. To ask the  im possible in  order to  ob tain  the 
p o ssib le  i s  not always counter-productive. And indeed, 
violence, co n tra ry  to  what i t s  prophets t r y  to  t e l l  us, is  
more the  weapon of reform than of revolu tion . (12)
But while acknowledging th a t  violence may serve re fo rm is t ends, Arendt p o in ts  
out th a t  'the  danger of violence, even i f  i t  moves consciously w ith in  a non­
ex trem ist framework of sh o rt-te rm  goals, w ill always be th a t  the  means 
overwhelm the end'. (13) Of course, reform is  already  a s tep  beyond th e  use of 
violence fo r  ends perceived as defensive, though i t  i s  no t uncommon fo r  
defensive ends to  be mixed in  with more am bitious p o li t ic a l  goals.
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Judgin g violence
A fundamental im plication  of the  instrum enta l ch arac te r of violence i s  th a t  
v iolence can only be judged in  re la tio n  to  the  ends fo r  which i t  i s  being used. 
Thus, i t  i s  easy to  produce a reac tio n  of h o rro r to  an a c t of violence, sim ply 
by ensuring th a t  th e  p resen ta tio n  of th e  violence is  detached from i t s  
instrum ental ju s tif ic a tio n . A w rite r  may wish to  invoke such a reac tio n  in  
o rder to  c a s t  p a r tic u la r  events in  ^an unfavourable l ig h t  or to  make a more 
general comment on the  darker a sp ec ts  of human nature. At the  o ther end of the 
spectrum  apparen tly  g ra tu ito u s  a c ts  of violence may be ra tio n a lis e d  by placing 
a favourable con stru ctio n  on th e  m otivation of th e ir  p e rp e tra to rs . An obvious 
d if f ic u l ty  i s  th a t  no outside observer can fu lly  know what i s  in  the  mind of 
th e  p e rp e tra to r  of an a c t of vio lence. Judging violence in ev itab ly  involves 
in te rp re ta tio n  and d ifferences of in te rp re ta tio n  may be as im portant in  
accounting fo r co n flic tin g  reac tio n s  to  p a r tic u la r  episodes of violence as 
d iffe ren ces  in  b asic  norms about what i s  r ig h t  or wrong.
The same s to ry  to ld  d if fe re n tly  may evoke qu ite  d if fe re n t re ac tio n s . The 
various ways in  which the  violence in  Shakespeare's p lays has been in te rp re ted  
a t  d if fe re n t tim es provides an i l lu s t r a t io n  of th i s  po in t. For example, the  
Royal Shakespeare Company's production of th e  Henry VI tr i lo g y  in  the  1960s, 
which was condensed and put to g e th er w ith Richard II I  under th e  t i t l e  of 'The 
Var of the  Roses', tre a te d  the  v io len t events i t  encompassed a s  an in te g ra l p a r t 
of th e  p o li t ic a l  power s tru g g le  and subord inate  in  importance to  the  objective 
of o ffice . By c o n tra s t, when th e  same company performed the  fu l l  tr i lo g y  in  
th e  mid 1970s, th e  violence was portrayed  in  term s of wanton and a rb itra ry  
c ru e lty  ra th e r  than  instrum ental n ecess ity . Power was presented  as  sim ply the
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means to  s a t is fy  lu s t  fo r  b lo o d le ttin g . The change in  in te rp re ta tio n  m irrored 
th e  hardening of a t t i tu d e s  tow ards p o li t ic a l  violence in  B rita in , which was 
perhaps mainly due to  th e  impact on B ritish  so c ie ty  of the  N orthern Ireland  
c o n f lic t .  Both productions were acclaimed in  th e i r  tim e .(14)
Another more recen t example was provided by the  debate on th e  French 
revo lu tion  generated by th e  ce leb ra tio n s  of th e  b icentenary of th e  storm ing of 
th e  B a s tille  in  1789. In both B rita in  and the  United S ta tes , a negative view of 
th e  revolu tion  tended to  p rev a il, matching th e  dominantly conservative  mood of 
th e  two so c ie tie s . I t  was most c le a rly  re fle c ted  in the  success o f Simon 
Schama's book, C itiz en s . (15) Schama urged h is  readers  not to  a v e r t th e i r  eyes 
from the  violence th a t  accompanied th e  revo lu tion  in  i t s  various s tag e s , with 
th e  im plication  th a t  ap o lo g is ts  fo r  th e  revo lu tion  had glossed over i t s  g o rie r 
a sp e c ts . In re a l i ty ,  th e re  was l i t t l e  danger of th a t  in  e ith e r  America or 
B rita in  where the  g u illo tin e  and th e  re ign  of te r ro r  formed the  p rin c ip a l images 
people had of the  French revo lu tion , Images re in fo rced  by the th ru s t  of cu rren t 
h is to r ic a l  in te rp re ta tio n  of the  events of th e  revo lu tion  which had c a s t  doubt 
both on the p ro g ressive  in te n t of the  rev o lu tio n aries  and on th e  reactio n ary , 
na tu re  of the ancien regime.
In fa c t, th e re  would appear to  be a very much g re a te r  danger of an 
exaggeration of th e  c e n tr a l i ty  to  the  revo lu tion  of the  lo ss  of l i f e  in  the  
re ig n  of te r ro r . Thus, in  comparison w ith the  v a s t numbers th a t  have been 
k ille d  in the revo lu tions of the  tw en tie th  century, the  number o f v ic tim s of the 
French te r ro r  were re la tiv e ly  few, both abso lu tely  and p ro p o rtio n a te ly  to  
population, some 14,000 in  the period between 1792 and 1794.(16) Perhaps even 
more s tr ik in g ly , f a r  more people were k ille d  in  the  re p r is a ls  taken by the
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B ritis h  a u th o ritie s  following the  defeat of th e  1798 reb e llio n  in  Ireland , (17) a 
reb e llio n  which th e  French revolu tion  had in sp ired , than  in  the  French re ig n  of 
te r ro r .  Admittedly, these  k i l l in g s  were them selves ou tstripped  by those th a t  
occurred in  the  Vendee region of France follow ing the  rev o lu tio n .(18)
In sp ite  of such com parisons, th e re  i s  no denying the  e ffec tiv en ess  o f the  
use of the  re ig n  of te r ro r  to  evoke horro r, re f le c te d  in  i t s  co n trib u tio n  to  the  
estab lishm ent of the  term, te rro rism . (19) Indeed, i t  probably a lso  accounts fo r 
the  fa c t  th a t  one of the  meanings th a t  became a ttached  to  the  word, t e r r o r i s t ,  
during the  n ineteenth  century was th a t  of a la rm is t or scaremonger. The Oxford 
E nglish  D ictionary gives the  following example of th is  usage: 'the  t e r r o r i s t s  of 
th is  country a re  so extrem ely alarmed a t  th e  power of Bonaparte', (20) quoting 
the  l ib e ra l  c le r ic , Canon Sydney Smith. This usage appears to  have died out 
tow ards the  end of the  n ineteenth  century and d e sp ite  the  a la rm is t nature  of 
much of the  contemporary debate on te rro rism , e sp ec ia lly  in re la tio n  to  th e  
p o s s ib i l i ty  of a t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isa tion  making use of a crude nuclear device, 
the  usage has not been revived. Whether a p a r tic u la r  a c t of violence or type of 
violence evokes h o rro r i s  very much dependent on th e  perspective  from which i t  
i s  viewed. I t  i s  worth re c a llin g  th a t  the g u illo tin e  i t s e l f  was introduced to  
provide a sw if te r  and more humane form of execution w ith the in ten tio n  th a t  the  
p riv ileg e  of execution by d ecap ita tion  should no longer be confined to  the  
n o b ility . (21)
I f  such a view of the  g u illo tin e  seems sca rce ly  cred ib le  today, i t  sim ply 
r e f le c ts  the  fundamental t ru th  th a t  th e re  i s  no n ice way to  execute anyone, 
whether by le th a l in jec tion , the  e le c tr ic  ch a ir , o r any o ther method. Indeed, 
one can go fu rth e r . There is  no n ice way to  k i l l  anyone. However, while many
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co u n tries  have abolished c a p ita l punishment, even most p a c i f is t s  would accept 
th a t  th e re  a re  circum stances when k il l in g  a human being i s  ju s t if ie d . The most 
obvious of th ese  i s  where i t  appears to  be the  only way to  prevent someone 
from k il l in g  o ther people. Furtherm ore, in  th is  con tex t, the means used would 
be regarded as  wholly subordinate  to  the end being achieved. In th e  face of an 
unambiguous th re a t, th e  use of v ir tu a l ly  any means whatsoever would appear 
Ju s tif ie d , provided of course th a t  i t  did not i t s e l f  endanger the  liv e s  of 
o th e rs .
In p rac tice , the  ju s t if ic a t io n  of violence i s  ra re ly  about a c ts  as 
s tra ig h tfo rw ard ly  p ro tec tiv e  of human l i f e  as th a t. I t  generally  tu rn s  on two 
elem ents, the  issue  of what i s  in  the  mind of the  p e rp e tra to r  and i t s  ac tua l 
consequences. Since the  l a t t e r  i s  usually  somewhat e a s ie r  to  e s ta b lis h  than  the 
form er, consequences tend to  loom la rg e r in  the  judgement of v iolence than 
m otives. In p a r tic u la r , where a campaign of violence i s  successfu l in  achieving 
i t s  p o li t ic a l  ob jectives, percep tions of the  campaign w ill tend to  hinge on the 
legitim acy of th e  ob jectives ra th e r  than the  means employed. Typically , th e  
w inners w ill label the  campaign a war, a lib e ra tio n  s tru g g le , o r a revo lu tion  as 
they th in k  appropria te , but w ill dwell more on the  outcome than on th e  process 
i t s e l f .  Those who died on th e  winning s ide  w ill usually  be commemorated, but a 
v e il tends to  be drawn over th e  lo s s  of l i f e  on the  o th er s ide  and i t s  
circum stances. But i f  such an a tt i tu d e  on the p a r t of the  winners seems 
h y p o c ritic a l, the  a lte rn a tiv e  to  such se lec tiv e  memories may be th e  honest 
ju s t if ic a t io n  of a t ro c i t ie s  ra th e r  than  the  acknowledgement of wrong-doing.
This i s  because such acknowledgement may seem to  d e tra c t from th e  legitim acy 
of one's cause. Thus, Benny M orris 's  research  in to  the  tru th  behind the
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creatio n  of the  P a le s tin ian  refugee problem prompted accusations th a t  the  e ffe c t 
of h is  work was to  d e leg itlm ise  Z ionism .(22)
One may compare the  P a le s tin ian  case w ith the  se le c tiv e  memories th a t  
opinion in  th e  Republic o f Ireland  re ta in ed  of i t s  War of Independence. This 
became evident a f te r  the  onset o f th e  Troubles in  Northern Ire land  in  th e  la te  
1960s, and more p a r tic u la r ly , th e  emergence in  the  1970s of th e  P rov isional 
I r ish  Republican Army, claim ing l in e a l descent from th e  I r ish  Republican Army 
th a t  had fought the  B ritish  during th e  War of Independence. There was 
re la tiv e ly  l i t t l e  sympathy fo r th e  P rov isional IRA in  the  Republic which had 
evolved in to  a s ta b le  liberal-dem ocracy  in  marked c o n tra s t to  th e  p o l i t ic a l  
s itu a tio n  in  northern  Ireland . Many people in the  South, p a r tic u la r ly  those  of 
the  o lder generation  who s t i l l  regarded the  achievement of independence from 
B rita in  as providing th e  b a s is  of th e  legitim acy of the  coun try 's  p o l i t ic a l  
in s t i tu tio n s , in s is te d  th a t  th e  a c t iv i t ie s  of the  P rov isional IRA had nothing in 
common with th e  IRA of the  p a s t, o ften  re fe rred  to  in  th is  con tex t a s  the  good 
old IRA. While a d is tin c tio n  could c le a r ly  be drawn between th e  p o li t ic a l  
context of the  P rov isional campaign and the  War of Independence, many genuinely 
believed th a t  th e  actua l methods of violence employed by th e  IRA in  the  p a s t 
had been d iffe re n t from what they  saw as the  t e r r o r i s t  methods of the  
P rovisional IRA. This eventually  prompted Sinn Fein, th e  p o l i t ic a l  wing of the 
P rovisional IRA, to  bring  out a pamphlet under the  t i t l e  of The Good Old 
IRA. (23) I t  sim ply reproduced contem porary newspaper accounts of IRA 
a c t iv i t ie s  in  th e  years 1919, 1920, and 1921.
The i r r e s i s t ib le  and shocking im plication  was th a t  th e re  were no grounds 
fo r  d is tin g u ish in g  between the  old IRA and the  new in  term s of methods. What
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th e  pamphlet brought out very persuasively  was th e  s tr ik in g  s im ila r i ty  in  
d e ta i l  of a t r o c i t ie s  in  the  two campaigns. Vhile th is  s im ila r i ty  has 
discouraged fu r th e r  reference to  th e  good old IRA by the  P ro v is io n a ls ' c r i t ic s ,  
i t  has not helped to  re h a b ili ta te  the  P ro v isio n a ls ' image in  th e  eyes of 
Southern opinion. This is  p a r tly  because the  p resen t c o n flic t in  Northern 
Ire land  has i t s e l f  been a stim ulus to  a h is to r ic a l  revisionism  in  th e  Republic 
th a t  has perm itted  a d e -rom an tic isa tion  of th e  n a tio n a lis t  heroes of the  
p a s t. <24) Such rev ision ism  has become p o ssib le  because th e  South 's p o li t ic a l  
in s t i tu t io n s  have in  p ra c tice  achieved a legitim acy th a t  i s  independent of the 
h is to r ic a l  foundations of the  s ta te .
Ends and means
As a g e n e ra lisa tio n  one can say th a t  a c ts  of violence w ill appear more 
leg itim a te  i f  th e  ends are  emphasised and le s s  leg itim ate  i f  th e  means form 
th e  focus of a tte n tio n . This i s  ev iden tly  tru e  of words d esc rib in g  d if fe re n t 
forms and types of violence. C ategories of ends, such as revo lu tion , coup 
d 'e ta t ,  and counter-insurgency a re  f a r  le s s  emotive or derogatory  than  
ca teg o rie s  of means, such as  a ssa ss in a tio n , bombings, and to r tu re , d e sp ite  the 
ev iden t Interdependence of means and ends. Terrorism , while no t a s  sp e c if ic  a 
d e sc rip tio n  of method as bombing o r a ssa ss in a tio n , c lea rly  belongs w ith them, 
among th e  means. Like to r tu re , te rro rism  p er  se  has few defenders. But to  
d is tin g u ish  te rro r ism  from o ther forms of violence, more needs to  be 
e s ta b lish e d  than  sim ply th a t  i t  i s  an Indefensib le  means, assuming th a t  the  
Judgement of means can ever be separa ted  from th e  issue  of ends. However, 
p re c ise ly  because the  term obviously does ca rry  an Im plication o f condemnation, 
th e re  i s  a good case to  be made fo r  an e x p lic itly  normative d e f in itio n  of
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te rro rism . Such an approach would requ ire  the  r e s t r ic t io n  of the  term  to  
methods of vio lence seen as  abso lu te ly  ille g itim a te  in  a l l  c ircum stances or, 
more r e a l is t ic a l ly ,  very c lea r  d e f in itio n s  of th e  circum stances in  which such 
methods were wholly ille g itim a te . I t s  weakness i s  th e  absence of a c lea r  
consensus among s ta te s  or world opinion a t  la rg e  as  to  the  con ten t of such a 
norm, compounded by the  problem of try in g  to  judge means w ithout re ference  to  
ends.
A s tr ik in g  aspect of Schmid's d e fin itio n  of te rro rism  quoted a t  the  
beginning of th is  chap ter is  i t s  general exclusion of a s sa ss in a tio n . Schmid 
argues th a t  'while a ssa ss in a tio n  aims a t  having the  v ictim  dead, te rro r ism  does 
not care  about th e  v ictim  i t s e l f ' .  (25) This i s  an a ttem pt by Schmid to  meet the 
p o in t th a t  th e re  i s  often  no reasonable  b a s is  fo r  in fe rr in g  an in te n t to  cause 
t e r r o r  to  o th e rs  in  the case of an a ssa ss in a tio n . In p a r tic u la r , th e  p o li t ic a l  
purpose behind an a ssa ss in a tio n  may be achieved d ire c tly  by th e  death  of the  
ta rg e tte d  ind iv idua l. Where th a t  i s  th e  case, i t  may not seem ap p ro p ria te  to  
label th e  a c t one of te rro rism . Hone th e  le ss , th a t  has not prevented 
a ssa ss in a tio n  along with bombings from being seen by the  media and th e  public 
a s  ty p ic a l o f te rro r ism . However, from Schmid's re se rv a tio n s  about including 
a ssa ss in a tio n  in  a d e fin itio n  of te rro r ism , a more general im p lica tion  about the 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of te rro rism  may be in fe rred .
This is  th a t  te rro r ism  tends to  be seen as  a method of violence where the 
connection between means and ends i s  In d irec t ra th e r  than d ire c t . This makes 
i t  p o ssib le  to  g en era lise  about th e  purposes of te rro rism  through re ference  to  
aims such as coercion, in tim id atio n , and propaganda th a t  are  them selves simply 
means to  the  u ltim ate  p o li t ic a l  ob jec tives of a campaign of te rro r ism .
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Furthermore, s in ce  coercion, in tim idation , and propaganda a re  no t in  them selves 
leg itim ate  ends, such g en e ra lisa tio n  re in fo rces  the  assum ption th a t  te rro r ism  is  
abso lu tely  il le g itim a te  as  a method of violence. Thus, in  p ra c tic e , th e  term, 
te rro rism , tends to  be applied to  a c ts  of violence where th e  d is tan ce  between 
means and ends seems p a r tic u la r ly  large.
One obvious circum stance in  which the  d is tan ce  between means and ends 
w ill appear la rg e  i s  in  th e  case of fa ilu re . I t  follow s from th e  in strum enta l 
ch a rac te r of violence th a t  i f  i t  does not work, i t  cannot e a s ily  be ju s t if ie d .
Of course, no-one embarking on a campaign of violence can p o ssib ly  know fo r  
c e r ta in  what th e  outcome w ill be. But c lea rly  the  longer th e  odds a g a in s t 
success the more d if f ic u l t  i t  w ill be to  Ju stify  re s o r t  to  v io lence. Further, 
th e  la rg e r th e  d isp ropo rtion  between th e  means av ailab le  and th e  ends being 
sought, the  le s s  cred ib le  a campaign of violence i s  lik e ly  to  appear and the  
more lik e ly  i t  i s  to  be labelled  one of te rro rism . The most obvious example 
would be the a ttem pt to  achieve a revolu tion  in  an outwardly s ta b le  and 
prosperous so c ie ty  lik e  th a t  of, say , Japan through sm all sca le  v iolence. The 
o th e r s id e  of the  coin i s  th a t  where a campaign of violence i s  su ccessfu l in ,  
achieving i t s  aims or i s  on a sca le  th a t  makes success appear a p o s s ib il i ty ,  
th e re  is  lik e ly  to  be a re luctance  to  apply the  label, te rro r ism , to  i t .
Of course, judgements of the  m orality  of campaigns of v io lence a re  not 
sim ply based on judgements of th e  likelihood of success, but on judgements of 
th e  legitim acy of the ends as w ell. But the  very ex istence  of la rg e  sca le  
c o n f lic t  i s  lik e ly  to  make a judgement of the legitim acy of th e  end more 
d if f ic u l t ,  esp ec ia lly  i f  the  w ishes of the  people a ffec ted  a re  considered  
im portant in  reaching such a judgement. Admittedly, the  a t t i tu d e s ,  b e lie fs , and
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d e s ire s  of peoples in  the  Third Vorld are  o ften  d i f f ic u l t  to  d isce rn  in 
s itu a tio n s  of c o n f lic t and th e ir  perceptions tend to  be neglected when 
Judgements are  made about the  legitim acy of violence in  such s itu a tio n s .
However, th e re  i s  usually  s u ff ic ie n t s e n s i t iv i ty  to  th i s  issu e  to  undermine any 
consensus on the  use of term, te rro r ism , in the  con tex t of ex tensive  c o n flic t. 
Guerrillas and terrorists
The a sso c ia tio n  of te rro r ism  by and large with sm all sca le  violence is  
re fle c ted  in a c lu s te r  of elem ents in  Schmid's a n a ly s is  of d e fin itio n s  of 
te rro rism , in  p a r tic u la r , numbers 11, 17, 19, and 21 in  Table 2.1. Symbolic 
violence ca rried  out covertly  but w ith a view to  p u b lic ity  i s  c h a ra c te r is t ic  of 
low level c o n f lic ts . C learly , too , the  issue of c rim in a lity  only a r is e s  in  
circum stances where p o li t ic a l  au th o rity  i s  s u f f ic ie n tly  secure to  make such a 
judgement p ossib le . This perspective  f i t s  in well w ith the  s te reo ty p e  of the  
t e r r o r i s t  as someone engaged in  a c lan d estine ly  conducted campaign of violence 
a s  p a r t of a sm all group on the extreme fringe  of the  p o l i t ic a l  spectrum . The 
obvious c o n tra s t i s  w ith th e  s te reo ty p e  of the  g u e rr illa  a s  someone who i s  p a r t 
of a la rge , and often  uniformed, army, openly carry in g  arms. However, while 
th ese  s te reo ty p es  p lay  a p a r t  in  how the  words a re  used, g u e rr i l la  and 
t e r r o r i s t  are  a lso  used in terchangeably  with re sp ec t to  con tex t to  in d ica te  
d isapproval (in the  case of the te r r o r i s t )  and a more n eu tra l a t t i tu d e  (in  the 
case of g u e rr illa ) .
Further, th e  ap p lica tio n  of th e  term, te rro rism , to  th e  low est level of 
c o n f lic t seems somewhat paradoxical in  view of massive emotive punch th a t  the 
word c a r r ie s . In sh o rt, why should the  lowest level of violence evoke th e  most 
ho rro r?  One can co n stru c t a p a r t ia l  answer to  th is  question  by drawing a
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d is tin c tio n  between violence in  th e  con tex t of peace and violence in  the context 
of war and by arguing th a t  te rro r ism  is  p o li t ic a l  violence in  the  context of 
peace and shocking fo r th a t  reason. Providing a measure of support fo r th is  
p e rspec tive  i s  the  p ra c tice  of l ib r a r ie s  of c la s s ify in g  books on te rro rism  under 
crime and those on g u e rr i l la s  under war. However, one fa c to r  th a t  has tended 
to  cu t acro ss  the  use of the  term , te rro rism , to  apply to  th e  low est level of 
c o n f lic t  i s  th e  tendency in  the West to  t r e a t  any v io len t challenge to  a 
liberal-dem ocracy or even any p o lity  th a t  meets th e  formal requirem ents of a 
liberal-dem ocracy as  ille g itim a te  and hence an example of te rro r ism , even i f  the 
violence e sc a la te s  to  a level th a t  p o in ts  to  a fundamental breakdown of 
p o l i t ic a l  au th o rity . An example i s  th e  use of the  term , t e r r o r i s t ,  to  apply to  
the  various p ro tag o n is ts  in  the  c o n f lic t  in  S ri Lanka. (26) I t  i s  a lso  a fa c to r 
in  th e  tendency to  c la s s ify  the  Sendero Luminoso in  Peru a s  t e r r o r i s t s  ra th e r  
than g u e rr i l la s , no tw ithstanding th e i r  mode of operation. (27)
So fa r  we have id e n tif ie d  two ways of d is tin g u ish in g  te rro r ism  from other 
forms of violence. One i s  norm ative, id en tify in g  te rro r ism  w ith  ac tio n  th a t  
v io la te s  b asic  notions of what i s  acceptable on hum anitarian grounds in the  
conduct of c o n f lic ts . The o ther id e n tif ie s  te rro rism  w ith a p a r tic u la r  level of 
c o n flic t, in  e ffe c t, t re a tin g  the  word as  a techn ica l term fo r  p o li t ic a l  violence 
w ith in  the  confines of b a s ica lly  s ta b le  p o lit ie s . One can r e la te  th e  two 
to ge ther in  so f a r  as what i s  perceived as acceptable on hum anitarian grounds 
tends to  vary  according to  the  level of c o n flic t. However, n e ith e r  approach 
suggests  what in  concrete term s a c ts  of te rro rism  encompass. In fa c t, 
d e f in itio n s  in  general a re  unhelpful in  th is  re sp ec t. However, a concrete 
p ic tu re  of what a c ts  the  term is  app lied  to  can be constructed  through
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examining common usage over a period of time, providing us w ith a th ird  way of 
d is tin g u ish in g  te rro rism  from o ther forms of violence, 
testing usage
To do th i s  I have analysed th e  chronology of te r r o r  in  Dobson and Payne's 
study , The Never-Ending Var.(28) Their chronology covers events between July 
1968 and October 1988. I t  f i t s  in  well th e re fo re  w ith the  notion th a t  th e  la te  
1960s were the  beginning of an age of te rro rism  th a t  continues to  a f f l i c t  the  
p lan e t. The authors do not claim  th a t  th e ir  chronology is  comprehensive, merely 
th a t  i t  h ig h lig h ts  the  main tren d s  in  te rro rism . A ltogether, th e re  a re  286 
item s in  the  chronology, some of them re fe rr in g  to  more than one ac tu a l 
in c id en t. At the same tim e, some of the  item s re fe r  to  p o li t ic a l  d ec la ra tio n s , 
e x tra d itio n  cases, a r r e s t s ,  the  in te rcep tio n  of weapons, and th e  outcome of
t r i a l s  th a t  c lea rly  are  not them selves a c ts  of te rro rism .
The following types of violence are  included in the  chronology; h ijack ings, 
kidnapping and hostage-tak ing  (including one inc iden t in  which th e  victim  was a 
h o rse ), bombings of various kinds (f ire , le t te r ,  car, lo rry , among o th er forms of 
bombs and including bombing fo r th e  purpose of sabotage), a s s a ss in a tio n s , 
a t ta c k s  on diplom ats, a tta c k s  on c iv i l  a i r l in e r s ,  m iss ile  and ro ck e t a tta ck s , 
product contam ination, and some Inc iden ts  of shootings th a t  do no t f a l l  in to  
th e  category  of a ssa ss in a tio n . The American bombing of Libya in  A pril 1986 i s  
included in  the  chronology but the  au th o rs ' comments make i t  ab so lu te ly  c lea r
th a t  they do no t regard  i t  as  i t s e l f  an ac t of te rro rism . That a lso  ap p lies  to
some o th er a c ts  taken by sec u rity  fo rces  th a t  they l i s t .  Excluding th ese  cases, 
th e  frequency of d iffe re n t types of violence is ,  to  take the  leading ca teg o ries , 
a s  follow s. Bombings and attem pted bombings of various kinds account fo r  39
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per cen t of th e  to ta l .  A ssass in a tio n s  and attem pted a ssa ss in a tio n s  c o n s titu te  
24 per cen t of th e  to ta l ,  while kidnapping and hostage-tak ing  account fo r  14 
per cen t. F in a lly , h ijack ings fea tu re  in 8 per cent of the  item s. I f  one looks 
a t  frequencies from another angle, a tta c k s  on diplom ats of a l l  k inds fea tu re  in 
9 p e r cen t of th e  item s and a tta c k s  on a i r l in e r s  in  17 per cen t. Over two- 
th i r d s  of th e  item s in  th e  chronology are  cases of in te rn a tio n a l or 
tra n sn a tio n a l te rro rism . Most of the  cases of purely domestic te rro r ism  are  
drawn from four coun tries; th e  United Kingdon (in re sp ec t of no rth e rn  Ire land), 
Vest Germany, I ta ly , and Spain. Hot a s in g le  in c iden t in  the  chronology i s  
located  in  C entral America.
Vhile a more comprehensive chronology of the  la s t  twenty years  of 
te rro r ism  would c e r ta in ly  show a wider geographical spread of in c id en ts  and 
would probably encompass a ra th e r  wider range of types of vio lence than  th a t  
devised by Dobson and Payne, th e i r  chronology does accura te ly  r e f le c t  the  
p r io r i t i e s  and general o rien ta tio n  of the Western media in  re la tio n  to  
te rro r ism . In p a r tic u la r , any chronology re ly in g  on th e  major d a ily  papers of 
the  United S ta te s  or B rita in  would cover much th e  same ground as  th e i r s  does 
and provide much the  same p ic tu re  of te rro rism . S p ec ifica lly , what many of the 
item s in  Dobson and Payne's chronology have in  common i s  th a t  they re fe r  to  
a c ts  of v iolence th a t  fr ig h ten  or a ff ro n t c itiz e n s  of p o l i t ic a l ly  s ta b le  
co u n trie s  in  th e  F ir s t  World. Thus, th e  average c itiz e n  i s  frig h ten ed  by bombs, 
s in ce  they pose a th re a t to  him o r her as a bystander. The bombs may come in 
various form s, though they do not include a e r ia l  bombing or a r t i l l e r y  
bombardment s in ce  these  a re  not r i s k s  th a t c itiz e n s  of th e  developed world face 
and one would n o t expect to  fin d  e ith e r  in  a chronology of te rro r ism , however
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te r r ify in g  to  those on the  receiv ing  end of such action . H ijackings do pose a 
th re a t  to  the ord inary  c itiz en  of the  Vest in  an age of mass t r a n s i t  by a ir ,  as 
does any o ther form of a tta ck  on a c iv i l  a i r l in e r .  While a ssa ss in a tio n  i s  not 
generally  perceived as  a th re a t to  th e  ord inary  c itiz en , i t  i s  an a ffro n t, 
esp ec ia lly  where the  ta rg e t is  a p o li t ic ia n  or diplom at whose ro le  i s  to  
rep resen t the c itiz en .
Of course, th e  likelihood of th e  ord inary  c itiz en  being a ffec ted  d ire c tly  
by these  types of violence i s  extrem ely sm all and very, very much sm aller than 
th a t  of h is  or her being a victim  of ord inary  crime. However, the  in d irec t 
influence on the  ord inary  c itiz en  of te rro rism  is  considerable in  term s of the 
sec u rity  precautions which i t  has n ecess ita ted . Furthermore, th e  ord inary  
c itiz e n  i s  often  conscious of being the  ta rg e t of the  p o li t ic a l  message th a t  the 
violence is  seeking to  convey, th e  communication function re fe rre d  to  by Schmid 
in  h is  d e fin itio n  of te rro rism . In p rac tice , th i s  generally  compounds the 
c it iz e n 's  sense of outrage since  i t  c a r r ie s  th e  im plication th a t  h is  or her 
p o li t ic a l  response is  open to  such m anipulation. I t  a lso  p o in ts  to  the  obvious 
lim ita tio n  of th is  approach to  d is tin g u ish in g  te rro rism  from o th e r forms of 
violence. This i s  th a t  i t  d esc rib es  a phenomenon p rin c ip a lly  of concern to  the 
F i r s t  World and leaves out the  tru ly  te r r ify in g  violence th a t  people in  much of 
the  Third World face.
To summarise, in  th is  chap ter we have id e n tif ie d  th ree  ways of 
d is tin g u ish in g  te rro rism  from o th er forms of violence; f i r s t l y ,  norm atively; 
secondly, as an in d ica to r of th e  level of violence; th ird ly , as  a d esc rip tio n  of 
th e  types of violence of a generally  p o li t ic a l  or so c ia l ch a rac te r  th a t  th rea ten  
Western c itiz en s . Each approach has i t s  advantages. For example, whatever i t s
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o ther drawbacks, th e  la s t  does conform with common usage, which i s  an 
im portant co n sidera tion  i f  confusion i s  to  be avoided in  d iscu ssin g  any issue .
In fa c t , none of th ese  approaches can reasonably be d iscarded . C learly , a 
consensus on a s in g le  approach to  defin ing  the  concept would help to  a s s i s t  i t s  
in te lle c tu a l c re d ib i l i ty  and th e  ex istence  of a number of p o ssib le  approaches 
leaves a question mark over th a t  issue . As necessary  in  subsequent chap ters , 
th e  reader w ill be reminded of which approach i s  th e  most s a l ie n t  in  the  
con tex t of what i s  being d iscussed .
I t  a lso  needs to  be borne in  mind th a t common to  a l l  th ree  approaches is  
th a t  te rro rism  i s  a form of violence and what follow s from th a t .  This i s  th a t  
i t  i s  v ir tu a lly  im possible to  judge any a c t of violence sim ply a s  a means 
w ithout re ference  to  the  end th a t  provides the  m otivation fo r th e  deed. Because 
th e  ends m atter so  much, we should not expect method alone to  provide us with 
th e  b a s is  fo r  reaching  a judgement about any a c t of violence. In th e  case of 
te rro rism  th i s  issu e  tends to  be obscured because the  term  tends to  be applied  
to  campaigns of violence where th e  d is tance  between means and ends appears 
p a r tic u la r ly  la rge . Indeed, the  concept of te rro rism  c a r r ie s  the  im plication^ 
th a t  absolu te judgements about methods of violence are  p o ssib le  w ithout 
reference  to  u ltim ate  purposes o r b asic  m otivation. This has encouraged the  
b e lie f  th a t  a general theory of th e  causes of te rro rism  is ,  in  p r in c ip le , 
p o ssib le . This i s  the  issue  we examine next.
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Chapter 3 -  The Poverty of General Explanations
The inadequacy of th e o rie s  of the  causes of te rro rism  i s  a frequen t
com plaint in  the  l i te ra tu re  on the  subject. (1) Rone the  le ss , the  u sefu lness of 
g en era lis ing  about the  causes of te rro rism  as i f  i t  could be tre a te d  a s  a s in g le  
phenomenon ra re ly  tends to  be questioned, except perhaps fo r the  
acknowledgement th a t overt s ta te  te r ro r  req u ires  ra th e r  d if fe re n t trea tm en t 
from sm all sca le  c landestine  violence, the  p rin c ip a l focus of the  th e o r is ts  of 
te rro rism . Vhile typologies of te rro rism  are  common as a way of handling the  
d if fe re n t circum stances in  which te rro rism  i s  employed, th e  very use o f the  
term generally  in d ica tes  a commitment to  th e  p ro p o sitio n  th a t  te rro r ism  
c o n s ti tu te s  a c lea rly  d is t in c t  form of violence. Hot su rp ris in g ly , th e  most 
powerful and in f lu e n tia l th eo rie s  a re  those th a t  bu ild  on the  assum ption of 
te r ro r ism 's  s in g u la rity . The b e s t known of th ese  a re  the  conspiracy th e o rie s  
th a t  seek to  explain te rro rism  in i t s  prim ary m an ifesta tions w ith re ference  to  
a common hidden hand m anipulating events from a fa r .
The most famous of th ese  i s  C laire  S te r l in g 's  The T error netw ork. (2) In
her view, the  hidden hand behind much in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  in  th e  1970s was
the  Soviet Union, with Cuba and Libya c a s t in  the  ro le  of a Junior 
accomplices. (3) Vhile the  Soviet Union has been th e  fav o u rite  ta rg e t  of most of 
the  conspiracy th e o r is ts , a l te rn a tiv e  conspiracy th e o rie s  cen te ring  on 
Vashington and the  American C entral In te lligence  Agency a lso  e x is t ,  (4) though 
some of these  have been constructed  more in  reac tio n  to  th e  Soviet conspiracy  
school than as  complete world-views in  them selves. But what v ir tu a l ly  a l l  
conspiracy th eo rie s  have in  common, reg a rd le ss  of th e i r  p a r tic u la r  ta rg e t ,  i s
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th a t  they p o rtray  te rro r ism  as p a r t  of s tra te g y  aimed a t  e s ta b lish in g  world 
domination and u n restra in ed  by moral considera tions.
In th is  re sp ec t, they have qu ite  a lo t in  common with approaches to  
te rro r ism  th a t  locate  th e  phenomemon in  the  castin g  o ff of a l l  moral r e s tr a in t ,  
what might be ca lled  the  demonic view of te rro rism . For example, Paul 
V ilkinson, th e  leading fig u re  in  th e  study of te rro rism  in  B rita in , id e n tif ie s  
the  follow ing as some of the  key c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of p o l i t ic a l  te rro rism : 
'in d iscrim in a ten ess , u n p red ic tab ility , a rb ita r in e s s , ru th le s s  d estru c tiv en ess , and 
the  im p lic itly  amoral and antinomian nature  of a t e r r o r i s t 's  challenge '. (5) Such 
a p erspec tive  c lea rly  begs the fu r th e r  question of why such an abandonment of 
moral r e s t r a in t  should occur. The answers given to  th is  question  vary 
considerably . Some th e o r is ts  a t t r ib u te  lack of moral r e s t r a in t  to  psychological 
fa l l in g s  of the  t e r r o r i s t s .  Other w rite rs  have emphasised th e  ro le  of the  
perm issive so c ie ty  in  c rea tin g  the  b a s is  fo r  such lack of r e s t r a in t ,  a view th a t 
provides a convenient explanation  of why th e  age of te rro r ism  began in  th e  la te  
1960s. S t i l l  o thers  have in s is te d  th a t  moral breakdown has to  be understood in 
i t s  own term s as the  product of moral choice. (6) But because each of these  
answers sh ares  an underlying assumption th a t  te rro rism  i s  abso lu te ly  ev il, 
whichever approach i s  taken in  th e  end p ro jec ts  the same, extrem ely gloomy view 
of human nature .
Causes of te rro r ism
In p rac tice , few w rite rs  a p a r t from th e  crudest conspiracy th e o r is ts  opt fo r 
e n tire ly  monocausal explanations of te rro rism . For example, Martha Crenshaw's 
widely quoted a r t ic le ,  'The Causes of T errorism ', id e n tif ie s  a wide range of 
p recond itions, 'fa c to rs  th a t  s e t  th e  s tag e  fo r  te rro rism  over th e  long run ' and
-  66  -
p re c ip ita n ts , 'sp e c if ic  events th a t  immediately precede th e  occurrence of 
te rro r ism '. (7) She fu r th e r d iv ides preconditions in to  'enabling or perm issive 
fa c to rs , which provide o p p o rtu n ities  fo r te rro rism  to  happen, and s itu a tio n s  
th a t  d ire c tly  in sp ire  and m otivate t e r r o r i s t  cam paigns'.(8) Thus, she argues 
th a t  m odernisation has produced a number of fa c to rs  th a t  have been a 
s ig n if ic a n t perm issive cause of te rro rism , in  p a r tic u la r , through th e  c rea tio n  
of networks of tra n sp o r t and communication. She g ives a s  one example th a t  'the 
Popular Front fo r  the L iberation  of P alestine  could no t indulge in  h ijacking  
w ithout the  je t  a irc raft'.< 9>  Less t r i t e ly ,  she id e n tif ie s  ITobel's invention  of 
dynamite in  1867 as an example of a technological d iscovery  th a t  opened the 
way to  bombing as  a t e r r o r i s t  ta c t ic  in  the  la te  n ineteen th  century. (10) These 
two examples underscore th e  a sso c ia tio n  of te rro rism  w ith sp e c if ic  methods such 
as bombings and hijacking.
At th e  same time, her emphasis on m odernisation as an enabling fa c to r
begs the  question  of whether what d is tin g u ish es  te rro rism  from violence of the  
p a s t i s  sim ply a question of methods and the  a v a ila b il i ty  of new means. On 
th i s  b a s is , one might p lau sib ly  argue th a t the  age of te rro r ism  re a lly  began ,in  
the  1870s w ith th e  f i r s t  a n a rc h is t bombings and has continued ever s ince , 
though in te rru p ted  by th e  tw en tie th  cen tu ry 's  two world wars. From th i s  
perspec tive , th e  la te  1960s did not mark the  beginning of a new form of
violence but th e  resumption of th e  use of methods th a t  went back, in  th e  case
of bombings, nearly  a hundred years. Taking th i s  argument fu r th e r , one might 
contend th a t  what needs explain ing  i s  le ss  p resen t-day  te rro r ism  than  the  s ta te  
of re la tiv e  p o l i t ic a l  quiescence in  the  liberal-dem ocracies of th e  Vest in  the  
two decades th a t  followed th e  Second Vorld War.
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Other enabling fa c to rs  id e n tif ie d  by Crenshaw -  and by many o ther w rite rs , 
fo r  th a t  m a tte r(11) -  a re  u rban isa tion , the  ex istence  of a t r a d i t io n  of th e  use 
of violence fo r  p o li t ic a l  ends, and the  government's in a b ili ty  o r unw illingness 
to  prevent te rro rism . P o li t ic a l  fa c to rs  loom much la rg e r  in  Crenshaw's 
d iscu ssio n  of th e  d ire c t causes of te rro rism . She sen s ib ly  em phasises the  ro le  
th a t  th e  t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n 's  perception and in te rp re ta tio n  of th e  s itu a tio n  
p lays as a causal fa c to r. Given the  wide d iv e rs ity  of p o li t ic a l  circum stances 
in  d if fe re n t p a r ts  of the world, th e  co ro lla ry  of th i s  observation  would seem to  
be th a t  useful g en era lisa tio n  about te rro rism  on a g lobal b a s is  i s  lik e ly  to  be 
lim ited . However, th is  i s  not a lin e  of argument th a t  Crenshaw follow s.
D espite taking a very wide view of what te rro rism  encompasses, Crenshaw seems 
re lu c ta n t to  abandon the  quest fo r  psychological explanations capable of cu ttin g  
a c ro ss  the p o li t ic a l  d iffe ren ces  in  context. Further, nowhere does Crenshaw 
question  the  coherence of the  concept of te rro rism  i t s e l f .
G enera lisa tions about te rro rism
Set out below a re  a number of the  more s ig n if ic a n t g e n e ra lisa tio n s  th a t  have 
been made in th e  l i te ra tu re  about th e  nature and causes of te rro rism . They 
include p ropositions derived from th e  th eo rie s  touched on above and a few 
o th e rs , as well as some of the  commoner building blocks used in  th e o ris in g  
about the  subject.
1. Terrorism  i s  a form of su rro g a te  w arfare d irec ted  ag a in s t the  Vest.
2. Terrorism  is  a concom itant of a modem in d u s tr ia l  o r p o s t- In d u s tr ia l  
so c ie ty .
3. Terrorism  i s  a patho log ical phenomenon.
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4. L iberal-dem ocracies a re  by nature  more vulnerable to  te rro r ism  than are  
o ther forms of government.
5. Terrorism  is  a product of the  dem ocratisation of violence.
6. Terrorism  i s  a weapon of th e  weak.
7. Terrorism  k i l l s  re la tiv e ly  few people.
8. Terrorism  i s  a reac tio n  to  violence by the  s ta te .
9. Terrorism  is  a response to  the  fa ilu re  of mass p o li t ic a l  movements.
10. An age of te rro rism  began in  the  la te  1960s.
Much of the r e s t  of th i s  chap ter w ill be devoted to  a sse ss in g  th ese  
p ropositions in  re la tio n  to* the  th re e  meanings of te rro rism  id e n tif ie d  in  the  
la s t  chapter. Hone of th e  p ro p o sitio n s  i s  s a tis fa c to ry  by i t s e l f  as  an 
explanation of te rro rism , which i s  hard ly  su rp ris in g  given th e  c o n flic tin g  
s tran d s  of meaning to  be found in  the  notion of te rro rism  i t s e l f .  However, 
there  i s  something to  be learned from examining each of them.
The f i r s t  p roposition , th a t  te rro rism  i s  in  e ffec t a form of in d ire c t 
aggression, of c landestine  w arfare in an era of o s ten sib le  peace, i s  a c en tra l 
contention of those who see te rro rism  as a conspiracy d irec ted  a g a in s t the  
Vest, usually from Moscow. C laire  S te rlin g  i s  the most obvious rep re sen ta tiv e  
of th is  viewpoint. In The T error fretwork she id en tified  1968 as  the  year when 
the  Kremlin's t e r r o r i s t  o ffensive was launched, but with th e  p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  
i t s  launch going back e a r l ie r .  Thus, she attached  p a r tic u la r  im portance to  the 
T ricon tinen ta l Conference held in  Havana in  1966, which was a ttended  by some 
five  hundred delegates rep resen tin g  o rgan isa tions in  d if fe re n t p a r ts  of the  
Third Vorld.<12) The openly s ta te d  purpose of the conference was to  give 
support to  groups in  a v a rie ty  of con tex ts through exp ressions of in te rn a tio n a l
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s o lid a r ity  w ith th e ir  s tru g g le  a g a in s t im perialism , conceived as th e i r  common 
enemy. L itt le  more than th a t  can be gleaned from th e  public  record  of the  
proceedings. S te rlin g  i s  by no means the f i r s t  person to  p lace importance on 
an open gathering  as the  o rig in  of a conspiracy. For example, during the  
1960s, Brian C rozier's  theory  th a t  Moscow had handed out the  o rders fo r  
revolution in South-East Asia a t  an Asian Youth Conference in  C alcutta  in  
February 1948, enjoyed a measure of influence. The theory  has not stood th e  
t e s t  of time. (13)
The g is t  of S te r l in g 's  argument was th a t  Moscow was linked d ire c tly  o r 
in d irec tly  to  a v a rie ty  of P a le s tin ian  groups, the  Baader-Meinhof group in  Vest 
Germany, the  Red Brigades (B rigate Fosse) in  I ta ly , ETA <Euzkadl ta Azkazatuna 
Basque Homeland and L iberty) in  Spain, and the  P rov isional IRA in  northern  
Ireland among o thers . The im plication  of her work was no t merely th a t  th e  
Soviet Union was behind much of th i s  te rro rism  but th a t  i t  was a r e s u lt  o f a 
Soviet Master Plan d irec ted  ag a in s t th e  Vest. The weakness of the  th e s is  was 
most evident on a case by case b a s is . In p a r tic u la r , none of the  d e ta iled  
s tu d ie s  of Baader-Meinhof, th e  Red Brigades, ETA, or th e  P rov isional IRA gave 
any weight to  lin k s  w ith the  Soviet Union. (14) This was perhaps le a s t  
su rp ris in g  of a l l  in  the  case  of th e  P rovisional IRA s in ce  one of the  reasons 
fo r  th e  founding of the  o rg an isa tio n  was h o s t i l i ty  to  Communist Influence in  
the  O ffic ia l Republican movement. (15)
Vhat i s  tru e  is  th a t  in te rn a tio n a l lin k s  of a l l  k inds have assumed some 
importance a t  an opera tional, as  opposed to  a causal, level in  th e  case of many 
i f  not most, t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n s . However, th is  r e f le c ts  the  growth of 
in te rn a tio n a l Interdependence more than  i t  does a  p lo t on th e  p a r t  of any
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p a r tic u la r  country or group of coun tries. One consequence of interdependence is  
th a t  there  has been more than s u ff ic ie n t m ateria l availab le  to  connect not ju s t 
America and the Soviet Union but even sm aller coun tries  such as Is ra e l , Iran, 
and South A frica with many of the  w orld 's c o n flic ts  in  one way or another. (16) 
But th e  ex istence of such connections usually  has l i t t l e  or nothing to  do with 
th e  reasons fo r violence in  th ese  s itu a tio n s . Furthermore, the  estab lishm ent of 
ex te rn a l lin k s  frequently  took p lace a t  th e  in i t ia t iv e  of the  local p a r t ie s  and 
th e re fo re  cannot reasonably be a ttr ib u te d  to  any global design on the  p a r t  of 
the  outside power or powers involved. I t  is  notable th a t  the  conspiracy 
th e o rie s  of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  have exercised very l i t t l e  influence on 
academic s tu d ie s  of any s ta t e 's  fo reign  policy . (17)
The credence given to  S te r l in g 's  th e s is  owes much to  the  fa c t  th a t  the  
V estem  liberal-dem ocracies have tended to  be seen as  the  prim ary v ic tim s of 
te rro rism , in p a r t  because of the p a r tic u la r  methods th a t  tend to  be asso c ia ted  
w ith te rro rism  and in  p a r t  because of th e  d isp ro p o rtio n a te  a tte n tio n  th a t  
events in  these  coun tries receive in  th e  Vestern media. Given th e  in te n s ity  of 
h o s t i l i ty  between Vest and East th a t  ex isted  a t  various tim es a f te r  1945, i t  is- 
hard ly  su rp ris in g  th a t  the  Soviet Union should have been lig h ted  on a s  a 
scapegoat fo r  such events. Another a t tra c t io n  of the  th e s is  was th a t  i t  was an 
explanation th a t  suggested to  a V estem  audience th a t  the  violence in  question 
was u tte r ly  without legitim acy and n ice ly  underscored the  Ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r 
condemning i t  as  te rro rism . The disadvantage of le ss  exo tic  exp lanations was 
th e i r  tendency to  h ig h lig h t Issues th a t  threw an unfavourable l ig h t  on the  
country in  question, even i f  they f e l l  sh o rt of ju s tify in g  re s o r t  to  violence. 
That accounts fo r  the  read in ess  o f po lice  ch ie fs  and o ther public  o f f ic ia ls
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faced by episodes such as  bombings to  give credence to  no tions of ex tern al 
m anipulation. Hot su rp ris in g ly , S te rlin g  made considerable  use of such 
sta tem en ts  to  b u ttre s s  her argument. (18)
The c re d ib il i ty  of conspiracy th eo rie s  of te rro rism  d eriv es  from a fu r th e r 
fa c to r . This is  simply the  fa c t th a t  the c landestine  use of violence tends 
n a tu ra lly  to  involve a hidden conspiracy. In fa c t, i t  i s  o ften  extrem ely 
d i f f ic u l t  to  e s ta b lish  th e  fu ll  tru th  about p a r tic u la r  c lan d es tin e  a c ts  of 
violence. Vho ca rried  out an a c t and why i s  frequen tly  th e  su b jec t of 
con troversy  and may be q u ite  im possible to  e s ta b lish  beyond doubt. For 
example, i t  seems unlikely  th a t  th e re  w ill ever be fu lly  s a t is fa c to ry  
exp lanations of such m ysteries as  th e  a ssa ss in a tio n  of P residen t Kennedy or the 
attem pted a ssa ss in a tio n  of Pope John Paul II. Such u n certa in ty , th e  ex istence 
of which in  fa c t  s ig n if ie s  nothing in  p a r tic u la r , provides g r i s t  fo r  the  
conspiracy  th e o r is t 's  m ill. At th e  same time, the  long h is to ry  of th e  
involvement o f s ta te  in te llig en ce  agencies in  a c ts  of violence such a s  bombings, 
attem pted bombings, a s sa ss in a tio n s , and attem pted a ssa ss in a tio n s  provides a 
measure of ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  the  susp icion  th a t  i s  d irec ted  a t  s ta t e s  as 
p o ssib le  p e rp e tra to rs  of p a r tic u la r  episodes of c landestine  violence.
The co llapse  of th e  Communist system in  Eastern Europe in  1989 and 1990 
uncovered new evidence o f lin k s  between Vestern t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n s  and 
E astern  in te llig en ce  agencies. (19) This evidence may req u ire  some reassessm ent 
in  the  case o f p a r tic u la r  o rg an isa tio n s  of the  ro le  played by E astern  
in te llig en ce  agencies in  th e i r  a c t iv i t ie s .  However, i t  has stopped f a r  sh o r t of 
e s ta b lish in g  the  case of those  who argued th a t  groups such a s  Fed Army Faction 
in  Vest Germany were co n tro lled  from the  East. In general, th e  ra th e r  sm all
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number of cases in  which i t  can be e s tab lish ed  th a t  fo reign  in te llig en ce  
agencies were im plicated in  te rro rism  do not ju s tify  th e  suggestion th a t  some 
w rite rs  on te rro rism  have put forward th a t th e re  was a tren d  to  s ta te -d ire c te d  
and s ta te -sponso red  te rro rism  in  th e  1980s. (20). Vhat increased  in  th e  1980s 
was simply Vestern awareness of the  ro le  th a t  some s ta te s  played d ire c t ly  or 
in d ire c tly  in  re la tio n  to  some campaigns of c landestine  violence. This was 
p a rtic u la r ly  the  case in  re la tio n  to  the  longstanding involvement of a number 
of Arab s ta te s  in  the  a c t iv i t ie s  of various P a le stin ian  o rg an isa tio n s.
Modernity and, .terrorism
A number of w rite rs  have suggested th a t  c e r ta in  fea tu res  of modern V estern 
so c ie tie s  have increased th e ir  v u ln e rab ility  to  te rro rism . A good example i s  
the  anonymity of modem c i t ie s ,  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  mobile populations th a t  
in h ab it the apartm ents in  these  c i t i e s  frequently  have no idea of the  Id e n tity  
of th e ir  next door neighbours, c rea tin g  scope fo r  c e l ls  to  h ide in  such a reas  
without a t tra c t in g  a tte n tio n . That means th a t  any group can re s o r t  to  
c landestine  forms of violence w ithout the  need to  re ly  on a measure of popular 
sympathy fo r th e i r  ac tio n s  to  provide a cloak over th e i r  a c t iv i t ie s .  F urther, 
the  cosmopolitan ch arac te r of V estern c i t ie s  and the ease of t ra v e l between 
them have enhanced the  ease with which foreign  groups can conduct c lan d es tin e  
campaigns of violence w ithin  such coun tries. I t  i s  an issu e  th a t  xenophobic 
p o lit ic ia n s  in  the  Vest a re  able to  ex p lo it in  th e ir  campaigns ag a in s t m igrant 
workers and immigration generally . (21)
However, i t  i s  easy to  exaggerate the issue  of s e tt in g . In p a r tic u la r , 
h ijack ings have o rig in ated  from a irp o r ts  in  a l l  p a r ts  of the  world. S im ilarly , 
a ssa ss in a tio n s  and bombings have occurred in  many d if fe re n t p laces. Vhat i s
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perhaps more to  the  po in t Is  th a t  th e  c landestine  violence a sso c ia ted  with 
te rro rism  is  one of the  few forms of p o li t ic a l  violence, a p a r t from rio tin g , 
th a t  i s  possib le  in  the  modern in d u s tr ia l  and p o s t- in d u s tr ia l  so c ie ty . That is  
to  say, the  kind of p o li t ic a l  breakdown in  which i t  i s  p o ssib le  fo r  la rge  
numbers of people to  ca rry  arms openly in  a g u e rr illa  army i s  only lik e ly  to  
occur in  a so c ie ty  where a considerab le  proportion  of the  population s t i l l  liv e  
in  the  ru ra l a reas. However, the  m il i t ia s  th a t  have appeared in  the  Balkans and 
in  th e  southern repub lics  of the  form er Soviet Union caution a g a in s t making the 
assumption th a t la rge  sca le  v io len t p o li t ic a l  c o n flic t i s  only p o ssib le  in  the  
poorest countries of the  Third World.
Vhile Individual a c ts  of te rro rism  in  the  sense of the  use of p a r tic u la r  
methods can occur alm ost anywhere, te rro rism  i s  most lik e ly  to  be id e n tif ie d  as 
a problem in co u n tries  where such a c ts  are  divorced from o th er forms of 
violence. In p a r tic u la r , a c ts  of te rro rism  a re  usually  seen as  the  a c ts  of 
te r r o r i s t s .  Vhere such a c ts  a re  c a rr ie d  out by the  sec u rity  fo rces  of th e  s ta te  
o r by a g u e rr illa  army, th e re  i s  lik e ly  to  be considerable in h ib itio n  about 
applying the term, te rro rism , to  such a c ts . P rec isely  because th e  k inds of 
organised violence p o ssib le  in  a h igh ly  developed In d u s tr ia l so c ie ty  tend to  be 
lim ited  to  forms of c landestine  violence assoc iated  w ith te rro r ism , lab e llin g  
those  who use violence as t e r r o r i s t s  tends to  be le ss  problem atic, even so le ly  
on th e  grounds of method. The n e t re s u lt  i s  to  s treng then  the  im pression th a t  
te rro rism  is  a phenomenon th a t  p a r tic u la r ly  a f f l i c t s  Western so c ie tie s , 
notw ithstanding th e  fa c t th a t  th ese  so c ie tie s  su ffe r  f a r  le s s  p o l i t ic a l  violence 
than o ther a reas  of the  world.
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I t  might be argued th a t  th i s  i s  because of the  sp ec ia l ch a rac te r in  
normative term s of the  violence a ffe c tin g  Vestern so c ie tie s . In p a r tic u la r , i t  
might be suggested th a t  what d is tin g u ish es  te rro rism  in  th e  Vest from, say, the  
conduct of g u e rr illa  w arfare i s  the  k il l in g , in ju ring , o r th rea ten in g  of innocent 
bystanders. I t  i s  a common enough im pression, but one fo r  which th e re  i s  not a 
g rea t deal of ju s t if ic a t io n  in  re a l i ty .  Indeed, in  p rac tice , o th e r forms of 
violence tend to  be ju s t a s , i f  no t more, ind iscrim ina te  in  th e i r  impact on 
innocent bystanders than the  methods th a t  tend to  be a sso c ia ted  w ith te rro rism . 
The flood of refugees from areas  of c iv i l  war i s  testim ony to  the  te r ro r is in g  
Impact on c iv i l ia n s  of high lev e ls  of c o n flic t. The a sso c ia tio n  of te rro rism  
with the  lowest level of p o li t ic a l  violence lin k s  the  te rm 's  use to  s i tu a tio n s  
where the  ac tu a l r i s k  to  most c iv il ia n s  is  generally  extrem ely sm all. However, 
le s s  im portant than  the  ac tu a l numbers of c iv il ia n s  k ille d , in jured , or 
th reatened  by te rro rism  is  the  perception  of the  public th a t  t e r r o r i s t s  
d e lib e ra te ly  ta rg e t  c iv il ia n s  and bystanders as  p a r t of th e i r  s tra te g y . Of 
course, d if fe re n t publics, in te rn a l as well as ex tern al, may have d iffe re n t 
perceptions in  th i s  re sp ec t and th i s  may be a fa c to r in  how they  label 
p e rp e tra to rs  o f p o li t ic a l  violence.
Terrorism  as patho log ical
The perception  th a t  t e r r o r i s t s  seek to  maximise th e  impact of th e i r  ac tio n s  on 
so c ie ty  by th e  very randomness of th e i r  choice of v ic tim s i s  one of the fa c to rs  
underpinning the  view of te rro rism  as  a pa tho log ical phenomenon. Thus, 
te rro rism  is  o ften  seen as  the  product of minds th a t  c a rry  out ac tio n s  on the  
b a s is  of a crude ca lcu la tio n  of th e i r  u t i l i t y  w ithout reference  to  moral 
co n sidera tions. However, such a view is  very often  in fe rred  from th e
-  75  -
consequences of a t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n 's  ac tio n s  w ithout re ference  to  th e  
ac tua l th in k in g  of any te r r o r i s t .  This i s  e sp ec ia lly  lik e ly  to  be th e  case 
where th e re  i s  a wide gu lf between the  pu b lic 's  conception of m orality  and of 
how th e  world works and th a t  of the  t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isation . The wider th e  gulf 
the  le s s  lik e ly  i t  i s  th a t  the public  w ill understand how the  t e r r o r i s t  
o rg an isa tio n  i t s e l f  ju s t i f ie s  i t s  ac tio n s, not ju s t  in  u t i l i t a r ia n  term s but 
m orally and no t merely in  propaganda term s to  th e  outside world but to  i t s  own 
members and su p p o rte rs .
On the whole, governments faced by t e r r o r i s t  campaigns have l i t t l e  
in te r e s t  in  see ing  a narrowing of th i s  gulf. Indeed, i t  i s  lik e ly  to  be in  the  
governm ent's in te r e s t  th a t  the public  should regard  t e r r o r i s t s  and a c ts  of 
te rro rism  as  devoid of moral con ten t and incapable of being leg itim ised  from 
any persp ec tiv e . But governments can become v ic tim s of th e ir  own propaganda in  
th is  re sp ec t. In p a r tic u la r , i f  they f a i l  to  take in to  account the  p rocesses by 
which those engaged in  te rro rism  ju s t ify  th e ir  ac tio n s  to  them selves, they  may 
unw itting ly  prolong campaigns of te rro rism  by tak ing  ac tio n s  th a t  re in fo rce  the 
t e r r o r i s t s '  b e lie f  in  the  ju s t if ic a t io n  of th e ir  campaign.
Anger a t  a campaign of te rro r ism  may be fu r th e r  in te n s if ie d  by the  b e lie f  
th a t  th e  u t i l i t y  o f the violence i s  dependent on how successfu l i t  i s  in  th e  
m anipulation o f th e  pu b lic 's  emotions. If  i t  seems un likely  th a t  the  pub lic  w ill 
respond in  th e  way demanded of i t  by the  t e r r o r i s t s ,  the  campaign o f te rro rism  
i s  lik e ly  to  appear fu ti le , i f  not sen se less . The more sen se less  any campaign 
appears, the  more reasonable i t  may seem to  ca teg o rise  i t  as pa tho log ical. 
A lte rn a tiv e ly , te r ro r ism 's  apparent re lian ce  fo r  i t s  success on the  m anipulation 
o f public  em otions may be tre a ted  no t as in ev itab ly  fu t i le ,  but ra th e r  a s
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placing a moral Im perative on th e  public to  r e s i s t  I t s  demands. In th is  case, 
te rro rism  Is  tre a te d  as a t e s t  of the  moral fa b ric  of th e  a f f l ic te d  so cie ty  and 
te rro rism  takes on demonic ra th e r  than simply patho log ical connotations. Of 
course, few t e r r o r i s t s  a re  lik e ly  to  share  the view th a t  th e  campaign of 
te rro rism  they a re  involved in  i s  e ith e r  pathological or demonic, though they 
may take th a t view of the  behaviour of o ther o rg an isa tio n s, including those of 
th e  s ta te . Indeed, such p o la risa tio n  of a tti tu d e s  i s  commonplace in  c o n flic ts  
th a t  have become in s t i tu t io n a l is e d .(22)
Liberal-dem ocracy*s vulnerabl 1 l ty
One of the most common p ro p o sitio n s  in  the l i te ra tu re  on te rro r ism  is  th a t  i t  
i s  a form of violence to  which liberal-dem ocracies are  e sp ec ia lly  prone. (23) 
L iberal-dem ocracy's v u ln e ra b ility  has been presented as , on th e  one hand, 
evidence of a conspiracy by i t s  ideological enemies, and, on th e  o ther, a 
consequence o f th e  very freedom th a t  liberal-dem ocracy perm its. Thus, S te rlin g  
argues th a t 'CtJhere i s  nothing random in th is  concentrated  a s s a u lt  on the  
sh rink ing  area of the  world s t i l l  under democratic ru le . Hot only i s  i t  e a s ie r  
and sa fe r  to  be a t e r r o r i s t  in  a free  country than i t  i s  in  a po lice  s ta te ,  i t  
i s  ideologically  more satisfy ing* . (24) Chronologies of a c ts  of te rro rism  and 
s t a t i s t i c s  of a c ts  of te rro rism , p a r tic u la r ly  in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism , seem to  
bear out the p ro p osition . However, i f  we focus on the  meanings of te rro rism  
ra th e r  than on what might make liberal-dem ocracy more vulnerable to  te rro rism  
than  other forms of government, i t  w ill be evident th a t  th e  p ro p o sitio n  has 
more to  do w ith what types of violence are  assoc iated  w ith te rro r ism  than with 
any peculiar v u ln e ra b ility  of liberal-dem ocracy as a p o l i t ic a l  system .
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F ir s t ly , one of the  reasons fo r  the a sso c ia tio n  of te rro rism  and l ib e ra l-  
democracy is ,  paradoxically , the  success of liberal-dem ocracy in  m aintaining 
p o li t ic a l  s ta b i l i ty ,  p a r tic u la r ly  in  in d u s tr ia lis e d  so c ie tie s . Most of th ese  
so c ie tie s  have only been affec ted  by low level c o n flic t. In fa c t, the  very 
e ffec tiv en ess  of government in  th ese  so c ie tie s , in  marked c o n tra s t to  the  
d e b ilita te d  p o l i t ic a l  system s of th e  Third Vorld, has prevented the  outbreak of 
more serio u s  c o n f lic t  and, as  we saw in  the  l a s t  chap ter, one of the  ways one 
could d is tin g u ish  te rro rism  from o ther forms of violence was as th e  lowest 
level of c o n f lic t. In sh o rt, the  a sso c ia tio n  of liberal-dem ocracy and te rro r ism  
i s  due in  p a r t  to  the  absence of more serious c o n f lic t in  these  so c ie tie s .
Secondly, among those who share  a b e lie f  in  lib e ra l-dem ocra tic  values 
th e re  i s  a much g rea te r read in ess  on normative grounds to  label a c ts  of 
violence th a t  occur in a liberal-dem ocracy as  te rro r ism  than th e re  would be in  
re la tio n  to  s im ila r  a c ts  under a d if fe re n t p o l i t ic a l  system . Here again i t  i s  
the  very success of lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  values th a t  accounts fo r  the  im pression 
of the  v u ln e ra b ility  of such system s to  te rro r ism . A fa c to r  th a t  helped to  
underscore th e  notion th a t  liberal-dem ocracy as  a system  was pecu liarly  
vulnerable to  te rro rism  was the apparen t s ta b i l i ty  of th e  Communist world 
during the  1970s and most of the  1980s and the  r a r i ty  of any form of p o li t ic a l  
violence behind the  iron  cu rta in . However, the  p o l i t ic a l  upheaval in  th ese  
so c ie tie s  a t  th e  end of the 1980s has tended to  undermine the  fo rce  of th i s  
argument. In p a r tic u la r , i t  i s  no longer p o ssib le  to  a t tr ib u te  the  re la t iv e  
tra n q u il l i ty  of th ese  so c ie tie s  p r io r  to  th e  la te  1980s to  any inheren t 
q u a litie s  of th e i r  p o li t ic a l  system s and such t r a n q u i l l i ty  as  ex is ted  in  th ese  
countries appears to  have been an h is to r ic a l  moment th a t  has now passed in  the
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case of most of them, r a th e r  lik e  the  two decades of dom estic peace th a t  
V estern Europe enjoyed following th e  Second Vorld Var.
D em ocratisation of violence
A more profound p ro p osition , and one th a t  has a bearing on upheavals in  the  
Communist world, i s  the  notion th a t  the  tren d  towards mass p a r tic ip a tio n  in  
p o l i t ic s  concomitant w ith m odernisation has brought w ith i t  th e  dem ocratisation  
of violence and th a t te rro r ism  i s  a symptom of th is  p rocess. One can id en tify  
a whole range of fa c to rs  th a t  have made re s o r t  to  violence by th e  o rd inary  
c itiz e n  easie r; the  decline  of so c ia l h ierarchy  and of the  capac ity  of local 
pow er-holders to  co n tro l populations; the  ready a v a ila b il i ty  of weaponry and 
esp ec ia lly  the  ease w ith which sm all arms can be purchased in  many p a r ts  of 
the  world w ith s ta te s  dumping th e ir  a rsen a ls  of obsolescent weapons on the  
arms market; and o ther asp ec ts  of in d u s tr ia l and p o s t- in d u s tr ia l  so c ie ty  th a t  
have already been mentioned such as  the  anonymity of modern c i t i e s  and access 
to  tra n sp o rta tio n  and communication. At a p o li t ic a l  level, th e  f i r s t  of these  
i s  of p a r tic u la r  s ig n ifican ce . In th e  absence o f local co n tro l, th e  issu e  of the 
legitim acy of the  p o li t ic a l  system I t s e l f  and of the ju d ic ia l arrangem ents fo r  
the  suppression  and c rlm ln a llsa tio n  of v io len t d is se n t assumes c ru c ia l 
Importance. In so c ie tie s  where sharp  e thn ic  d iv is io n s  e x is t ,  th e  p rocess of 
dem ocratisation and of l ib e ra l is a t io n  i s  often  fraugh t w ith th e  danger of in te r -  
communal violence, e sp ec ia lly  in  circum stances of economic change giving r is e  
to  c o n flic t over resources. The inter-communal violence th a t  has accompanied 
the process of dem ocratisa tion  in  th e  southern repub lics  of th e  former Soviet 
Union provides an i l lu s t r a t io n  of such d if f ic u l t ie s .
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S o c ie ties  th a t  have su ccessfu lly  made the  t r a n s i t io n  from a s itu a tio n  in 
which tr a n q u il l i ty  i s  m aintained by th e  force and influence of local power- 
h o lders  to  th e  co n tro l of men and women by laws deriv ing  th e i r  legitim acy from 
popular p a r tic ip a tio n , however in d ire c t, in  the  p rocesses th a t  make those laws, 
o ften  a re  rem arkably b lind  to  the  d if f ic u l t ie s  th a t  le s s  fo rtu n a te  so c ie tie s  
encounter in  c o n tro llin g  violence. B ritish  a tt i tu d e s  tow ards I r is h  violence 
during th e  n ineteen th  century provide a s ig n if ic a n t example. Up to  the  mid 
n ineteen th  century  the  sca le  of d iso rd e r in  B rita in  and Ireland  was more or 
le s s  comparable, (25) but th e re a f te r  th e  experience of th e  two so c ie tie s  
diverged, w ith B rita in  alone making th e  successfu l t r a n s i t io n  to  a so c ie ty  
c h arac te rised  by the  ru le  of law and a decline of d iso rd e r. In th e  p rocess the  
v iolence of th e  p a s t was rap id ly  fo rgo tten  and the  divergence prompted an 
unfortunate tendency in  the  B ritish  estab lishm ent to  a t t r ib u te  violence in  
Ireland  to  th e  pecu liar m entality  of i t s  in h ab itan ts , ra th e r  than  to  d ifferences 
in  th e  circum stances of the  two so c ie tie s . B elief th a t  th e  I r is h  a re  endowed 
with an inheren t d e sire  to  f ig h t i s  a fa c to r th a t  continues to  colour B ritish  
a tt i tu d e s  tow ards violence in , or emanating from, Northern Ireland . I t  has even 
cropped up a s  an explanation of th e  p resen t Troubles in  N orthern Ireland in  
academic s tu d ie s  of te rro rism . (26)
One reason  fo r the  prevalence of such explanations i s  an aspec t of 
te rro rism  touched on e a r l ie r ,  th e  la rg e  d is tan ce  th a t  seems to  e x is t  between the 
means being used and the  goals sought. This d is tan ce  a lso  p rovides p a r t  of the 
explanation fo r  the  c h a rac te risa tio n  of te rro rism  a s  a s tra te g y  of desperation  
and as  the  weapon of the  weak. The im plication  i s  th a t  th e  s tro n g  a re  in  a 
p o sitio n  to  pursue both a more d ire c t  and a more c e r ta in  ro u te  to  th e ir  goals.
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Thus, to  take th e  extreme case, m ilita ry  conquest i s  a much su re r  method of 
d ic ta tin g  p o lic ie s  than re ly in g  on a few bombs to  e l i c i t  th e  requ ired  p o l i t ic a l  
response. Indeed, in  most circum stances te rro rism  seems lik e ly  to  e l i c i t  the  
opposite  response to  what i t  seeks, re s is ta n c e  to  i t s  demands p rec ise ly  because 
of th e i r  id e n tif ic a tio n  w ith such methods.
The odds ag a in s t success suggest desperation  and weakness. However, here 
i t  i s  necessary  to  draw a d is tin c tio n  between s tra te g ic  te rro r ism  and ta c t ic a l  
te rro r ism , a d is tin c tio n  made by Lawrence Freedman in  an in te re s t in g  an a ly s is  
of th e  sub ject. (27) In th e  l a t t e r  case, te rro rism  sim ply forms one of a number 
of instrum ents in  a broader s tra te g y , as, fo r example, when i t  i s  employed by 
s ta te s .  In th is  context, i t  i s  hard ly  app ropria te  to  c h a ra c te r is e  the  use of 
te rro rism  as  a weapon of th e  weak. As an example, Freedman makes re ference  to  
the use of te rro rism  by p a r t is a n s  in  the  Second Vorld Var in  th e  ov era ll 
context of th e  b a t t le  a g a in s t Bazi occupation. In the  form er case, where 
te rro rism , conceived in  any of th e  th ree  ways id e n tif ie d  in  th e  l a s t  ch ap te r, is  
the  so le  or, a t  any ra te , th e  prim ary means being employed, th e  g en e ra lisa tio n  
th a t te rro rism  i s  the  weapon of the  weak holds up much b e tte r . Freedman g ives 
as an example of s tra te g ic  te rro r ism  ETA's campaign fo r  an Independent Basque 
homeland. He argues th a t  dependence on te rro rism  tends to  be a s ig n  of 
s tra te g ic  fa ilu re  and he suggests  th a t  the  successes of s t r a te g ic  te rro r ism  
tend to  be la rg e ly  negative, preven ting  outcomes opposed by the  t e r r o r i s t s  
ra th e r  than  achieving p o s itiv e  goa ls. Freedman has in  mind th e  capac ity  of 
te rro rism  to  p o la rise  s i tu a tio n s , thereby wrecking th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of compromise 
through n eg o tia tions.
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Related to  the  notion of te rro rism  as  the  weapon of the  weak I s  the  
common observation  th a t  te rro rism  k i l l s  re la tiv e ly  few people. (28) I t  i s  worth 
noting  s tra igh taw ay  th a t  th i s  g en era lisa tio n  ru le s  out th e  in c lu sion  of s ta te  
te r r o r  w ithin  the  conception of te rro rism , as th e  notion of s ta t e  te r r o r  i s  
g enerally  asso c ia ted  w ith cases of genocidal regim es, th e  v ic tim s of which 
number in  the  m illions. Indeed, the  enormous d is p a r i ty  between th e  numbers 
k ille d  in  s ta te  te rro rism  and those k ille d  in  te rro r ism  from below i s  reason 
enough to  question th e ir  trea tm en t as examples of th e  same phenomenon. At the 
same time, i t  i s  worth underlin ing  the ex trao rd in ary  im plication  th a t  follow s 
from tre a tin g  th e  two together.
This i s  the  im plication  th a t  i t  i s  necessary  fo r  the  s ta te  to  k i l l  very 
la rg e  numbers o f people i f  i t  i s  to  be successfu l in  te r ro r is in g  a population, 
while t e r r o r i s t s  from below are  supposed to  achieve o r a t  le a s t  a ttem pt to  
achieve the same re s u lt  through the  deaths of a handful of people. I t  
underscores once more th e  inappropria teness of a l i t e r a l  in te rp re ta tio n  of the  
term. I t  i s  very doubtful i f  any t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n  would expect to  achieve 
i t s  goals through the  c rea tio n  of a clim ate of fe a r  in  any way analagous to  „ 
th a t  in  a to ta l i ta r ia n  s ta te ,  as  described, fo r  example, in  Hannah A rendt's 
c la s s ic  study of to ta li ta r ia n ism . (29) L i t t le  more needs to  be added here about 
the p roposition  th a t te rro r ism  k i l l s  few people, s in ce  th e  issu e  was discussed  
in  Chapter 1. However, i t  should be noted th a t  th e  p ro p o sitio n  most c lo se ly  
f i t s  th e  meaning of te rro r ism  as  low level c o n flic t. , .
Role of the state
The p roposition  th a t d e s ire  fo r  revenge p lays a p a r t in  th e  making of 
t e r r o r i s t s  i s  d iscussed  by Crenshaw in  her a r t i c le  on th e  causes of te rro rism
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and by Schmid in  h is  survey of th eo rie s  of te r ro r ism .(30) They give a number 
of examples drawn from d if fe re n t periods. In p a r tic u la r , both mention th e  ro le  
th a t  the  d e s ire  fo r  vengeance played in  the  a n a rch is t violence of th e  1890s.
But perhaps the  most s tr ik in g  case of a l l  i s  the  ro le  th a t  th e  unprovoked and 
unpunished k i l l in g  of a s tuden t dem onstrator by the  po lice  in  Vest B erlin  
during the  v i s i t  to  the  c i ty  by th e  Shah of Iran  in June 1967 appears to  have 
played in  the  development of te rro rism  in  Vest Germany. (31) These examples -  
and, in  fa c t, a l l  the  cases th a t  Crenshaw and Schmid mention -  involve 
vengeance a g a in s t a c ts  of violence (or force) by the  s ta te .  They th e re fo re  
would seem to  provide support fo r  the  p roposition  l is te d  above th a t  te rro r ism  
i s  a response to  violence by th e  s ta te . The notion th a t  vio lence from below is  
very often  a reac tio n  to  pre-em ptive action  by the s ta te  forms th e  in te re s t in g  
th e s is  of John V alton 's book on national re v o lts , Reluctant Rebels. (32) But 
how fa r  V alton’s  ideas might be applied to  cases of te rro r ism  i s  a question 
th a t  can b e st be answered em pirically . I t  i s  an issue  to  which we s h a ll  re tu rn  
in  subsequent ch ap te rs  when examining p a r tic u la r  campaigns o f violence. The 
issu e  of revenge I t s e l f  i s  b est subsumed under the Im portant question  of 
m otivation. This question is  the  subject of Chapter 5.
The notion th a t  te rro rism  is  a response to  the fa ilu re  of mass p o li t ic a l  
movements has been put forward by Richard Rubenstein as  an explanation  of the 
cu rren t wave o f te rro rism  s tre tc h in g  back over two decades. (33) He argues th a t 
the  cond itions fo r  te rro rism  have been created  by the  growth in  th e  s ize  of the 
in te l l ig e n ts ia ,  the  sh a tte r in g  of i t s  hopes fo r  so c ia l tran sfo rm atio n , and the  
absence or weakness of mass p a r t ie s  capable of engaging i t s  energ ies o r 
commitment in  a so c ia lly  useful ro le . Thus, he c h a rac te rise s  te rro r ism  as 'an
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iso la ted  in te l le c tu a l 's  dream of e ffic acy ' and lie argues th a t  'the  most e ffec tiv e  
counter t e r r o r i s t  device yet discovered i s  popular m obilization fo r  s ig n if ic a n t 
change'. (34) Of course, th a t  answer presupposes the  read iness  of th e  s ta t e  to  
to le ra te  such popular m obilisa tion . In th e  cases th a t  Walton examines i t  i s  
p rec ise ly  the  unw illingness of the  s ta te  to  allow peaceful mass m obilisa tion  
th a t  c rea te s  th e  conditions fo r  na tiona l re v o lt.
C learly the  more successfu l any s ta t e 's  s tra te g y  of rep ress io n  is  in  
dealing  with mass movements, the  more lik e ly  i t  i s  th a t  the  re su ltin g  violence 
from below w ill appear il le g itim a te  and the  more lik e ly  i t  w ill be to  a t t r a c t  
the  label of te rro rism , though the  nature of the  v io len t ta c t ic s  employed w ill 
a lso  have some bearing on th is .  M ilita ry  ru le  in Latin America during th e  
1970s and 1980s provides the  most obvious examples o f s ta te s  re so rtin g  to  
rep ress io n  to  crush left-w ing  or p o p u lis t mass movements. However, in Western 
Europe, the d is in te g ra tio n  of th e  le ft-w in g  mass movements of the  1960s c lea rly  
had o ther causes than s ta te  rep ress io n . In th i s  con tex t Rubenstein makes much 
of th e  swing to  th e  r ig h t  of le ft-w in g  p a r tie s  as a cause of d is illu sionm en t 
th a t  led to  te rro rism . But Rubenstein 's th e s is ,  lik e  th e  previous p roposition , 
i s  b e st examined em pirically  to  see how fa r  h is  model holds up ac ro ss  a range 
of cases.
The Age of Terrorism
This b rin g s  us f in a lly  to  another issu e  th a t  req u ires  an examination of th e  
h is to r ic a l  evidence, the  p roposition  th a t  an age of te rro rism  began in  th e  la te  
1960s. However, th e re  i s  much more to  th i s  issu e  than th e  fac tu a l one of 
whether the  incidence of p o li t ic a l  violence over the  l a s t  two decades ju s t i f ie s  
th a t  c h a rac te risa tio n . In th is  con tex t th e  d if fe re n t ways we id e n tif ie d  of
-  64  -
d is tin g u ish in g  te rro rism  from o ther forms o f p o li t ic a l  violence a re  p a r tic u la r ly  
s a l ie n t .  For example, in  so f a r  as te rro rism  i s  Id en tified  w ith low level 
c o n f lic t, one might argue th a t  the  d e sc rip tio n  of the  period sin ce  the  1960s as 
an age of te rro r ism  was simply a ra th e r  convoluted way of saying th a t  the  
p resen t era  i s  one of peace, a t  le a s t  fo r  th e  V est. Admittedly, th e  war in  
Vietnam overlaps with the  beginning of th e  age o f te rro rism , but the  
involvement of American combat troops was being wound down during Kixon's 
f i r s t  term as  P residen t of the  United S ta te s  and by 1973 the  war was 
e s s e n tia l ly  over fo r the  Americans. One m ight a lso  po in t to  the  1973 Yom 
Kippur war and the  1982 c o n flic t in  the  South A tlan tic  over th e  Falkland 
Is lan d s  as  o th e r in s tan ces  of wars Involving s ta te s  in  the  Vest, but n e ith e r 
war la s te d  long. Vestern s ta te s  were prom inent in  the  1991 war in  the  Gulf to  
expel Iraq  from Kuwait, but i t  too was of s h o r t duration .
S ig n ific an tly , previous waves of te rro rism , in  the  1890s and th e  1930s, 
have a lso  been assoc ia ted  with periods of peace. The a sso c ia tio n  i s  not as 
su rp ris in g  as i t  might f i r s t  appear. Only in  circum stances of peace i s  the  
sm all-group violence assoc ia ted  with te rro r ism  capable of a t t r a c t in g  s u ff ic ie n t 
a tte n tio n  to  appear to  w arrant the  d e sc rip tio n  of te rro rism . In sh o rt, the  
shocking ch arac te r of te rro rism  req u ires  a background of t ra n q u i l l i ty  fo r 
maximum impact. I t  a lso  derives i t s  impact from another fa c to r  th a t  Cameron 
noted in  1970 and th is  i s  th a t  ' i t  has always seemed th a t  the  violence of the 
p resen t was unexpected and, in  a sense, undeserved '.(35) But e ra s  of peace tend 
to  be recognised only in  re tro sp e c t, when th e re  i s  a g re a te r  read in ess  to  
app recia te  the  inconsequential ch arac te r of th e  violence th a t  occurred during 
such a period.
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From a normative in te rp re ta tio n  of th e  concept, of te rro rism , th e  issue  of 
an age of te rro rism  can be approached from two angles, from th e  p erspec tive  of 
widespread v io la tio n  of ex is tin g  norms governing the  conduct of c o n f lic t or 
from th e  perspec tive  th a t  i t  i s  the  development of such norms th a t  has led to  
the  c h a ra c te r is a tio n  of the  age as  one of te rro r ism . A case can be made out 
fo r  both persp ec tiv es. On the  one hand, one might po in t to  the  tak in g  of 
hostages a s  an a c tiv i ty  th a t  has become p rev a len t during the  age of te rro r ism  
th a t  very c le a rly  v io la te s  e s tab lish ed  norms of w arfare. On th e  o th er hand, i t  
i s  ev iden t th a t  the  term, te rro rism , i s  ro u tin e ly  applied today to  a c ts  such as  
p o l i t ic a l  a ssa ss in a tio n  th a t  were as  p reva len t p r io r  to  the  age of te rro r ism  but 
were no t categorised  as  te rro rism . F ina lly , i f  we take  te rro r ism  as  a 
d e sc rip tio n  of the  types of violence th a t  have th reatened  V estern c itiz e n s  
during the  l a s t  two decades, the  ex istence  of an age of te rro rism  sim ply 
follow s from cu rren t usage of the  term. The word, cu rren t, deserves underlin ing  
fo r th e  general conception of what types of violence te rro r ism  encompasses i s  
not s ta t i c .
Here again i t  i s  worth noting the  ro le  th a t  changes in  th e  way c e r ta in  
a c ts  a re  ch arac te rised  have underscored th e  im pression of a w atershed in  
re la tio n  to  a c ts  of p o li t ic a l  violence in  the  la te  1960s. That im pression has 
been used to  ju s t ify  explanations of the  age of te rro r ism  in term s of a 
breakdown of moral c o n s tra in ts . Even more im portan tly , i t  has been used to  
ju s tify  the  need fo r harsh  p o lic ie s  in confron ting  th e  problem of te rro r ism  and 
fo r th e  shedding of lib e ra l il lu s io n s  about human nature  th a t  th e  phenomenon of 
te rro rism  appears to  co n trad ic t. Indeed, a t  one level, the  fa c t th a t  th e  p resen t 
age i s  widely charac te rised  as one of te rro rism  re f le c ts  the  success of V estern
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co nserva tives in  changing the  ideological c lim ate  in  re la tio n  to  p o li t ic a l  
violence as  much as i t  does actual p a tte rn s  of violence. In fa c t , i f  we take 
the  th re e  types of violence most c lo se ly  a sso c ia ted  w ith the p re sen t wave of 
te rro r ism , bombings, a ssa ss in a tio n s , and h ijack in g s, what i s  new i s  th e ir  
c h a ra c te r is a tio n  as  a c ts  of te rro r ism  a s  much as th e ir  prevalence.
This ap p lie s  even to  h ijack ings. For example, according to  th e  chronology 
of te r r o r  compiled by Dobson and Payne, th e  f i r s t  h ijacking  of a plane by 
P a le s tin ian s  occurred in July 1968.(36) As i t  happens, i t  i s  the  very f i r s t  
item in  th e i r  chronology. I t  was a lso  one of th e  f i r s t  h ijack ings, i f  not the  
f i r s t ,  th a t  was generally  labelled  an a c t of te rro r ism . However, i t  was very 
fa r  from being the  f i r s t  hijacking of a plane. According to  th e  American 
Federal Aviation A dm inistration, world-wide a to ta l  o f 79 h ijack ings occurred in  
the  years  from 1930 to  1967.(37) Admittedly, one reason why e a r l ie r  h ijack ings 
did no t a t t r a c t  the  label of te rro rism  is  th a t  the  aim of such h ijack ings was 
usually  lim ited  to  forcing  the p i lo t  to  f ly  th e  plane to  a p a r tic u la r  
d e stin a tio n  and did not involve a ttem pting  to  gain more general p o li t ic a l  
concessions through d ire c t th re a ts  to  the  liv e s  of th e  passengers, though of 
course any h ijack ing  involves a t  le a s t  an in d ire c t  th re a t to  th e  passengers.
But once P a le stin ian  groups re so rted  to  h ijack ing  fo r the  purpose of 
hostag e-tak in g , a tti tu d e s  towards h ijacking  fo r  any purpose tended to  harden 
and, in  p a r tic u la r , the  somewhat jocu lar view th a t  had been taken of h ijack ings 
between America and Cuba in  the  ea rly  1960s became a th in g  of th e  p a s t. In the  
p re sen t clim ate, any hijacking tends to  be lab e lled  an a c t of te rro r ism , 
re g a rd le ss  of i t s  purpose. Vhile passengers a re  f a r  more conscious of the  
danger of h ijacking  than they were in  the  p a s t , h ijack ings in  fa c t  co n s titu te  a
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f a r  sm aller proportion  of to ta l  commercial f l ig h ts  today than they did p r io r  to  
th e  age o f te rro rism . (38) This i s  only p a r tly  because of the  counter-m easures 
th a t  were taken in  response to  th e  ra sh  of h ijack ings by P a le stin ian  groups in  
th e  la te  1960s and early  1970s, when a i r c r a f t  h ijack ings reached th e i r  peak. 
More fundam entally, i t  r e f le c ts  the  exponential growth in  a i r  t r a f f ic .
The cu rren t view of what the  term , te rro r ism , encompasses has not merely 
a ffec ted  percep tions of contemporary violence. I t  has a lso  s ta r te d  to  change 
th e  perception  of violence in  the  p a s t. Thus, a r t ic le s  and chap ters  in  books 
have begun to  appear on the  sub jec t of te rro rism  in  th e  1950s and f i r s t  h a lf  of 
the  1960s th a t  re fe r  to  a c ts  of p o li t ic a l  vio lence th a t  had not been ca lled  
te rro r ism  a t  th e  tim e they were com m itted.(39) Over tim e th is  p rocess seems 
lik e ly  to  lead to  a rev ision  of our p ic tu re  of the  p a s t and in  th e  long-run i t  
may ac tu a lly  undermine the sense th a t  the  la te  1960s marked a watershed in  the 
employment of p o li t ic a l  violence, th e  main b a s is  fo r th e  notion of an age of 
te rro rism  i t s e l f .  In th is  resp ec t, the  study of te rro r ism  may end up following 
a somewhat s im ila r  tra je c to ry  to  th a t  of im perialism . In th a t  case, th e  very 
ideas th a t  were applied to  analyse th e  period of form al expansion of empire 
between 1870 and 1914, the  so -ca lled  age of im perialism , led economic 
h is to r ia n s  to  in s i s t  on the  importance of th e  c rea tio n  of inform al empires 
p r io r  to  ac tua l co lonial annexation, u n ti l  eventually  i t  became p o ssib le  to  
suggest th a t  th e  la te r  period was ac tu a lly  one of the  c r i s i s  of im perialism . (40) 
The notion th a t  the  p resen t period w ill eventually  come to  be seen as one of 
the c r i s i s  of te rro rism  is  perhaps a l i t t l e  fa r-fe tc h e d . But a t  th e  very le a s t  
i t  seems lik e ly  th a t  the concept of te rro rism , including i t s  a b so lu tis t
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overtones, i s  going to  have an e ffe c t on people 's view of the  p a s t fo r  good or 
i l l .
The ten  g en era lisa tio n s  th a t  have been examined in  th i s  chap ter rep re sen t 
some of th e  more common conclusions to  be found in  the  l i te ra tu re  on te rro rism . 
The l a s t  th re e  provide useful markers fo r  th e  d iscussion  of the  h is to ry  of 
te rro r ism  and w ill be considered fu r th e r  in  the  next two chap ters . However, 
while each of th e  g en era lisa tio n s  touches on an aspec t of the  nature  of 
te rro rism  in  one conception or another, none seems to  take  us very fa r  tow ards 
an explanation  of why te rro rism  occurs, though some provide clues as to  the  
cond itions in  which i t  occurs. Furthermore, i f  one bears in  mind which 
conception of te rro rism  re la te s  to  which g en e ra lisa tio n , the  la rg e  element of 
tautology in  some of these  p ro p o sitio n s  is  evident.
Thus, given th a t  th e  media id e n tif ie s  te rro r ism  la rg e ly  w ith violence 
d irec ted  a t  s ta b le  liberal-dem ocracies of th e  Vest, to  say  th a t  te rro rism  
la rg e ly  a f fe c ts  so c ie tie s  with th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of Western l ib e ra l-  
democracies i s  doing no more than id en tify in g  cu rren t usage of th e  term . One 
po ssib le  reason fo r  the  fa ilu re  of w rite rs  on te rro rism  to  produce more 
in c is iv e  exp lanations of the  occurrence of te rro r ism  may simply be th a t 
te rro rism , however we choose to  d is tin g u ish  i t  from o ther forms of violence, 
does not rep re sen t a s in g le  phenomenon and th a t  d if fe re n t exp lanations of 
d if fe re n t te rro r ism s  w ill take us fu r th e r . This i s  th e  ta sk  to  which we must 
now tu rn .
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Chapter 4 -  Varieties of Terrorisms
The onset of the age of te rro rism  in  the  la te  1960s is  often linked in  the  
l i te r a tu re  on te rro rism  to  watershed events in  th a t decade, most p a r tic u la r ly  
the  d efea t of Arab s ta te s  by Is ra e l in  the s ix -d ay  war of June 1967, the  death  
of Che Guevara in  October 1967, and the  s tu d en t re v o lt in  France in  Kay 
1968.<1) They provide a convenient s ta r t in g  p o in t fo r  d is tin g u ish in g  among 
d if fe re n t te rro r ism s , though to  complete the  p ic tu re  two fu r th e r  events should 
be added to  th i s  l i s t ,  the c lashes between the  po lice  and c iv il  r ig h ts  
dem onstrators in  Londonderry in  October 1968 th a t  marked the s t a r t  of n o rthern  
Ire lan d 's  p resen t Troubles and, perhaps somewhat le s s  s a t is fa c to r i ly ,  the 
fa ilu re  of the  n a tiona l Democratic Party  GTPD) to  gain parliam entary  
rep resen ta tio n  in  the Vest German general e lec tio n  in  1969 a f te r  i t s  e a r l ie r  
success a t  s ta t e  level. These events had l i t t l e  in  common beyond the  
s ig n if ic a n t fa c t  th a t each represented  a fa ilu re  o r a defeat. That i s  s e l f -  
evident in  the  f i r s t  and la s t  cases. Guevara's death was seen as marking th e  
fa ilu re  of ru ra l  g u e rrilla  warfare in  Latin America. Left-wing p a r tie s  su ffered  
a crushing d efeat in the e lec tio n s  th a t followed the  Kay events in  France, while 
the  c lash es  in  Londonderry were a s ign  of the fa ilu re  of reform in northern  
Ireland.
Admittedly, in  none of the cases i s  th e re  a d ire c t  lin k  between th e  event 
and the  outbreak of p o li t ic a l  violence th a t  was seen as  marking the  emergence 
of the age of te rro rism . Indeed, i t  would be d i f f ic u l t  to  e s ta b lish  an in d ire c t 
link  between th ese  events and p a r tic u la r  groups th a t  came to  be labelled  as  
t e r r o r i s t  o r even p a rtic u la r  ca tego ries  of te rro rism . But each of these  even ts 
was s ig n if ic a n t  in  the se tt in g  of the  p o li t ic a l  tren d s  id e n tif ie d  with one o r
other category of te rro rism . The ca teg o ries  of te rro rism  th a t can be id e n tif ie d  
from th e  fiv e  events are , following the o rder of events given above: Middle 
E astern , Latin American, Hew Left, S e p a ra tis t , and B eo-Fascist. The la s t  th ree  
were generally  asso c ia ted  w ith the in d u s tr ia lis e d  developed world. Vhlle 
s e p a ra t is t  movements re so rtin g  to  violence ex is ted  in  A frica and Asia in  th is  
period , th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  played no p a r t  in  th e  fo rg ing  of the  concept of 
te rro rism . Each of the  categories w ill be d iscussed  in  tu rn , but to  take 
account of the tendency of B eo-Fascist te rro r ism  to  be paired  w ith Bew Left 
te rro rism , the  l a s t  two categories  w ill be taken  in  reverse  order.
Middle Eastern
Violence by P a le s tin ian s  ag a in s t Is ra e l d id not s t a r t  in  the afterm ath  of the  
s ix -d ay  war. I t  goes back to  the very foundation of the  s ta te . Further, 
violence between Arabs and Jews w ithin  P a lestin e , out of which Is ra e l was 
c reated , even p redates the estab lishm ent of a League of Bations mandate over 
the  te r r i to r y  a f te r  the  F ir s t  Vorld Var. Vhile such violence, e sp ec ia lly  when 
i t  involved a tta c k s  on c iv ilia n s , has been lab elled  as te rro rism  in  re tro sp e c t, 
i t  was the ac tio n s  of righ t-w ing  Jewish p a ram ilita ry  o rg an isa tio n s, the  Irgun 
and the  Lehi, during th e ir  offensive ag a in s t the  B ritish  a u th o r itie s  between 
1944 and 1948 th a t  was most commonly sin g led  out as te rro rism  a t  the  tim e. (2) 
One in c id en t in  p a r tic u la r  achieved n o to rie ty  throughout the  world as an 
a c t o f te rro rism , the  bombing by Irgun of th e  B ritish  headquarters in  King 
David's Hotel in  Jerusalem on 22 July 1946. Binety people died in  the  a tta ck . 
The proclam ation of the  s ta te  of Is ra e l by th e  rep re sen ta tiv e s  of the  Jewish 
community on th e  eve of B rita in 's  departure  in  May 1948 was followed by an 
invasion of the  te r r i to r y  by Arab arm ies. Their defeat ensured th a t  the  new
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s ta te  -was not s trang led  a t  b ir th . I s ra e l 's  Var o f Independence was accompanied 
by a v a s t movement of population giving r i s e  to  the  c rea tio n  of la rg e  numbers 
of P a le s tin ian  refugees on the  borders of th e  new s ta te .  (3) In th e  years 
follow ing the  defeat of th e  Arab s ta te s ,  in f i l t r a t io n  o f Is rae l by groups of 
P a le s tin ian s  took place on a  minor sca le . A fter the  Egyptian revo lu tion  in
1952, the  government th e re  took a hand in  the  o rgan isa tion  of I n f i l t r a t io n , 
re c ru itin g  P a lestin ian  refugees in to  u n its  of fedayeen. I s ra e l 's  response to  
a tta c k s  ac ro ss  the country 's borders was harsh  re ta l ia t io n . For example, a f te r  
a grenade a tta ck  on a Jewish v illag e  k ille d  a woman and two ch ild ren  in  October
1953, th e  I s ra e l i  army bombarded and attacked  th e  Jordanian v illa g e  of Kibya, 
destroy ing  40 houses and k il l in g  53 v illa g e rs . Ending fedayeen r a id s  was one
of I s r a e l 's  p rin c ip a l objectives in  the  Suez war of 1956.
The P a le stin ian s  were slow to  develop p o l i t ic a l  o rg an isa tio n s  th a t  were 
independent of the Arab s ta te s  in  which th e  refugees lived . The most 
s ig n if ic a n t f i r s t  6tep in  th is  d ire c tio n  was the  form ation of Fatah in  1956- 
57.(4) I t  was followed by the  estab lishm ent of the  P alestine  L iberation  
O rganisation (PLO) in January 1964 a t  the  in i t ia t iv e  of the Arab s ta te s  a t  a 
summit of th e  Arab League in  Cairo. Vhile the  s ta te s  claimed th a t  the  PLO's 
crea tio n  would allow P a le stin ian s  to  play a ro le  in  th e  lib e ra tio n  of th e i r  own 
country, they a lso  intended the  o rgan isa tion  to  provide them w ith a mechanism 
fo r ex erc is in g  con tro l over P a le s tin ian  p o li t ic a l  m obilisation . In fa c t, the  PLO 
only came in to  i t s  own as  an o rg an isa tion  independent of the s ta te s  and 
rep re sen ta tiv e  of P a lestin ian  opinion a f te r  the  1967 war. In 1969 Fatah gained 
con tro l of the  Executive Committee of the  PLO and has dominated the  
o rg an isa tio n  ever since under the  chairm anship of Y asser A rafat. (5) The s ix -
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day war was a massive blow to  the  Arab s ta te s .  Egypt, Jordan, and Syria 
su ffe red  hum ilia ting  defeat on th e  b a t t le f ie ld  and la rge  lo sses  of te r r i to ry .  
There was l i t t l e  sympathy fo r th e ir  p lig h t in  th e  Vest, where th e  outbreak of 
the  war tended to  be blamed on E asse r 's  brinkm anship. The lo ss  of confidence 
in  the  Arab s ta te s  as  agents o f th e ir  deliverance from Is rae l prompted 
P a le s tin ian s  to  re ly  on th e ir  own resources, leading to  a flood o f re c ru its  in to  
Fatah. At th e  same time, o ther, more ra d ic a l P a le s tin ian  o rg an isa tio n s  sprang 
up, including th e  Popular Front fo r  the  L ibera tion  of P alestine  (PFLP) and the  
Democratic F ront fo r  the  L iberation  of P a le s tin e  (DFLP).(6>
In the  year following the s ix -d ay  war, P a le s tin ian s  launched a number of 
a tta c k s  ac ro ss  I s ra e l 's  enlarged borders. They achieved re la tiv e ly  l i t t l e  
success, while prompting ferocious re ta l ia t io n  by Is ra e l ag a in s t neighbouring 
s ta te s ,  e sp ec ia lly  Jordan. Fatah gained considerab le  p re s tig e  throughout the 
Arab world by in f l ic t in g  heavy lo sse s  on an I s ra e l i  fo rce  ra id in g  i t s  base a t 
Karameh in  Jordan in  March 1968, but i t  was soon apparent th a t  th e  conditions 
did not e x is t  fo r  the  estab lishm ent of g u e rr i l la  w arfare w ithin th e  t e r r i t o r ie s  
Is ra e l had occupied as a re s u lt  of i t s  v ic to ry  in  the  s ix -d ay  war. The 
P a le s tin ian s ' p o l i t i c a l .and m ilita ry  weakness, coupled w ith th e i r  s tro n g  sense 
th a t they had been le t  down both by the  Arab s ta te s  and the  world a t  la rge , 
provided the  impetus fo r  the  adoption of new ta c t ic s  in  the c o n f lic t with 
Is ra e l, a s  d id the  d esire  of the new o rg an isa tio n s  to  outflank  r iv a ls  in  proving 
th e ir  revo lu tionary  c red en tia ls . On 23 July 1968, th ree  members o f the  PFLP 
hijacked an El A1 je t  en route from Rome to  Tel Aviv and forced i t  to  land in 
A lgiers. A fter p ro trac ted  n eg o tia tions, leading to  I s ra e l 's  agreeing to  free  16 
P a le s tin ian s  im prisoned fo r in f i l t r a t io n ,  th e  plane and i t s  passengers and crew
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were re leased . -Vhile h ijacking  of a i r l in e r s  - was not a new ta c t ic ,  h ijack ing  fo r 
the  purpose of seiz ing  hostages was.
The enormous impact of th is  f i r s t  h ijack ing  in drawing th e  a tte n tio n  of 
the  outside world to  the  p lig h t of the P a le s tin ian s  w hile a lso  e x tra c tin g  
concessions from the  Is ra e li  government prompted a ra sh  of fu r th e r  h ijack ings 
over the  next four years. In August 1969, a Trans Vorld A irlines je t  en rou te  
to  Tel Aviv was hijacked by the  PFLP and forced to  f ly  to  Damascus. The plane 
was destroyed and two I s ra e l i  passengers exchanged fo r  13 Syrian p riso n e rs  in 
Is ra e l. In September 1970 four planes were hijacked by the  PFLP; a S w issair 
je t ,  a Pan Am je t  and a TVA je t ,  a l l  en rou te  to  Hew York from d if fe re n t 
European c i t ie s ,  and a BOAC je t  en route to  London from Bombay. Three of th e  
p lanes were forced to  land in  Dawson's F ield , a Second Vorld Var a ir f ie ld  in  the 
Jordanian d ese rt, where they were eventually  blown up. The fourth  was 
destroyed a t  Cairo a irp o r t . The passengers held hostage a t  Dawson's F ield were 
re leased  in  exchange fo r  P a le s tin ian s  imprisoned or being held in  custody in  
Vest Germany, Sw itzerland, and B rita in . <7)
The new th re a t  th a t  h ijack ings represen ted  to  a i r  t r a v e l le r s ,  who were by 
and la rg e  from peaceful and p o lit ic a lly  s ta b le  Vestern so c ie tie s , previously 
untouched by events in  the Middle East, gave a fu r th e r in te rn a tio n a l dimension 
to  the  A rab -Israe li c o n flic t. To th e  p o te n tia l danger of confron ta tion  between 
the  super-pow ers as a re s u l t  of the  c o n flic t was added th e  fu r th e r  th re a t of 
s p il l-o v e r  of violence from the continuance of th e  c o n flic t. But i f  the  in i t i a l  
e ffe c t of the  h ijackings was to  generate an aw areness o f P a le s tin ian  grievances, 
the p e rs is ten ce  of the th re a t  and the involvement of P a le s tin ian s  in  o ther, 
b loodier a c ts  of violence in  and outside of Is ra e l cemented the  id e n tif ic a tio n
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of the  P a le s tin ian  cause with te rro r ism . Among the ac tio n s  th a t  brought 
n o to rie ty  to  th e  P a lestin ian  cause in  th e  e a r ly  years of the  age of te rro rism  
were a PFLP ca r bomb th a t  k ille d  12 people in  Jerusalem in  November 1968; th e  
d estru c tio n  of a Sw issair plane by a m id -a ir  explosion with th e  lo s s  of 47 
liv e s , with suspicion  fa llin g  on a P a le s tin ian  group, though never proved; th e  
ambush of a school bus in  Is ra e l in  Kay 1970 In which nine p u p ils  and th ree  
teachers  were k illed ; an a tta ck  on Lod a irp o r t  in  Is ra e l in  May 1972 by th ree  
members of the  Japanese United Red Army a c tin g  in  a sso c ia tio n  w ith the  PFLP, 
re su ltin g  in  th e  deaths of 28 people, 16 of whom were Puerto Rican p ilg rim s; 
and th e  a tta c k  on the I s ra e li  q u a rte rs  a t  th e  Munich Olympics by Black 
September in  which a to ta l  of 17 people died, including the  fiv e  
p e rp e tra to rs . <8)
The Black September O rganisation had come in to  being follow ing Jordan 's  
bloody expulsion of the PLO th a t  began in  September 1970. Jo rdan 's  action  was 
i t s e l f  prompted by the  impact on th e  so c ie ty  of p e rs is te n t  I s ra e l i  ra id s  
ag a in s t P a le s tin ian  commandos employing Jordan as  a base fo r th e i r  operations. 
In i t ia l ly ,  Black September had d irec ted  i t s  a tta c k s  a t  re p re se n ta tiv e s  of the  
Jordanian Government. For example, i t  was re sp o n sib le  fo r the  a ssa ss in a tio n  of 
the Jordanian Prime M inister in  Cairo in  November 1971. But while the 
connection between Is ra e li  r e ta l ia t io n  and the  estab lishm en t - of Black September 
was in d ire c t, th e  fe ro c ity  of I s ra e l 's  response to  violence d irec ted  a g a in s t i t ,  
whether a t  home or abroad, in general tended to  a c t as a spur ra th e r  than a 
d e te rren t to  P a le stin ian  violence.
Following the  f i r s t  a tta ck s  on El A1 p lanes in  1968, Is ra e l launched a 
commando a tta c k  on B eirut a irp o r t  in  December 1968 in  which i t  destroyed 13
c iv il ia n  planes belonging to  th ree  Arab a i r l in e s . (9) In the  sh o r t term , such 
ac tio n  sim ply served to  v a lid a te  th e  p o l i t ic a l  e ffec tiv en ess  of th e  P a le s tin ian s  
a c tio n s  a g a in s t c iv ilia n  a ir l in e r s ,  c re a tin g  th e  b a s is  fo r cycles of violence.
In th e  longer term the  d e s ta b ilis a tio n  of the  p o li t ic a l  system in  Lebanon a s  a 
r e s u l t  of th e  s p il l-o v e r  of the c o n f lic t between Is ra e l and the  P a le s tin ian s  
I t s e l f  became a potent new source of violence emanating from th e  Kiddle East. 
The reg io n 's  a sso c ia tio n  with te rro rism  was fu r th e r  re in forced  by the  impact on 
Lebanon of th e  1979 revo lu tion  in  Iran.
Latin American
A s-in the  case of the Middle East,, p o li t ic a l  violence in  Latin America in  the  
la te  1960s has to  be viewed ag a in s t the  backdrop of a long h is to ry  of violence 
and in s ta b i l i ty .  From th i s  perspec tive , th e re  i s  l i t t l e  ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  
s in g lin g  out the  la te  1960s as a period when the  con tinen t was p a r tic u la r ly  
bese t by p o li t ic a l  violence. -Hone the  le ss , events in  th is  period in  Latin 
America did play a p a r t  in the  development of the  idea th a t  th e  la te  1960s 
co n stitu ted  the  beginning of an age of te rro r ism . During the  f i r s t  h a lf  of th e  
1960s Latin America had been much influenced by the  example of C as tro 's  
revo lu tion  in  Cuba. However, by the  time of Che Guevara's death in  B olivia in 
October 1967 and a f te r  th e  defeat of o ther ru ra l  g u e rr illa  movements in 
Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia, i t  was evident th a t  the  Left could not achieve 
power in  the  r e s t  of Latin  America by im ita tin g  the  Cuban model o f revo lu tion . 
One of the  commonest explanations of th e  fa ilu re  of th e  Cuban model was the 
urban o rien ta tio n  of th e  population.
In flu en tia l in  arguing the  case fo r  urban g u e rr illa  w arfare to  take  account 
of th i s  r e a l i ty  was the  B razilian , C arlos M arighela. His Handbook of Urban
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G uerrilla  V arfaref which he completed in  June 1969, was tra n s la te d  in to  a 
number of languages a f te r  h is -d e a th  and had a  considerab le  influence on th e  Few 
Left in  Europe. (10) Xarighela broke w ith th e  B razilian  Communist P arty  in  1967 
over h is  advocacy of a v io len t revolu tion  to  overthrow the  m ilita ry  
d ic ta to rsh ip  th a t  had seized  power in  B razil in  a coup d 'e ta t in  1964. He went 
on to  found the  ALE (Acao Liber tad ora JTaclonal -  Action fo r n a tio n a l 
L iberation) committed to  p u ttin g  in to  p ra c tic e  h is  ideas fo r urban g u e rr illa  
w arfare. X arighela was k ille d  in  an ambush in  Eovember 1969 in  th e  wave of 
po lice  a c t iv i ty  th a t  had followed the  kidnapping by th e  ALE of th e  American 
Ambassador to  B razil, Charles E lbrick , in  September 1969. E lbrick  was re leased  
in  re tu rn  fo r  th e  free ing  of 15 p riso n e rs  who were flown to  Mexico where they 
were g ran ted  p o li t ic a l  asylum. In the  course of 1970 th e  Japanese Consul- 
General in  Sao Paulo, the  Vest German Ambassador, and th e  Swiss Ambassador 
were a l l  kidnapped and re leased  in  exchange fo r  a to ta l  of 115 p riso n e rs .
The ta rg e tin g  of diplom ats was a fea tu re  of urban g u e rr illa  campaigns in  a
number of o ther Latin American coun tries. In Uruguay th e  most well known of 
the L atin  American urban g u e rr illa  movements, th e  Tupomaros, named a f te r  an 
eigh teen th  century Inca re s is ta n c e  leader, kidnapped the  B ritish  Ambassador, 
Geoffrey Jackson in  January 1971. He was re leased  nine months la te r  a f te r  over 
a hundred Tupomaro p riso n e rs  escaped from ja i l .  At a lower lev e l, th e  honorary 
B ritish  consul in  Rosario in  Argentina, who was a lso  th e  manager of a local 
m eat-packing p lan t, was kidnapped in  May 1971 by the  ERP (.Fjercito 
Revolucionario Popular -  People's Revolutionary Army). He was re leased  a f te r  a 
week in  c a p tiv ity  following the  d is tr ib u tio n  of food to  th e  poor in  Rosario.
More commonly, the  ERP ta rg e ted  the  executives of m ultina tional companies. The
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executive president- of F la t In Argentina was k ille d  a f te r  being kidnapped by 
th e  ERP in  March 1972. In March 1970 th e  Vest German Ambassador to  Guatemala, 
Count Karl von S p re ti, was kidnapped by members of FAR (Fuerzas Armadas 
Rebeldes*- Rebel Armed Forces). He was k ille d  a f te r  th e  Guatemalan government 
refused  to  meet the  k idnappers' demands fo r th e  re lease  of p riso n e rs . The 
re fu sa l provoked s trong  p ro te s ts  from the  Vest German government. (11)
The kidnapping of diplom ats and of fo reign  businessmen was the  p rin c ip a l 
reason fo r the  a tte n tio n  th a t the  urban g u e rr i l la s  of Latin America received in  
the  V estern media. I t  was a lso  th e  main reason fo r th e i r  c h a rac te risa tio n  as 
t e r r o r i s t s .  (12) However, the  p o li t ic a l  con tex t of these  groups' violence varied  
very considerably , as  a b r ie f  comparison of events in  B razil, A rgentina, and 
Uruguay w ill make c lea r. The ALIT in  B razil launched i t s  campaign of violence 
a g a in s t the  m ilita ry  d ic ta to rsh ip  in  1968. The beginning of the  campaign 
co n sis tin g  of bombings ag a in s t p roperty  and bank ro b beries  coincided w ith a 
wave of s tuden t p ro te s ts  provoked by th e  death of a s tu d en t a t  th e  hands of the  
police  during a dem onstration in  Rio de Janeiro . I t  followed th e  fa ilu re  of 
a ttem pts in  1967 to  e s ta b lish  ru ra l focos  (nuclei) on th e  Cuban model as a 
b a s is  fo r  opposition  to  the  regime. (13)
An early  victim  of the  campaign was an American army o ff ic e r , Captain 
Charles Chandler, sho t dead outside h is  home in Sao Paulo in  October 1968. But 
i t  was through th e  kidnapping of diplom ats th a t  th e  ALH and o th er minuscule 
groups operating  in  th e  urban a reas  of B razil achieved th e i r  g re a te s t impact.
The se izu re  of a rad io  s ta t io n  in  Sao Paulo and the  b roadcast of a speech by 
Marighela in  August 1969 provided another high po in t o f a campaign th a t  began 
to  f iz z le  out towards th e  end of 1971. The campaign had coincided with the
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most harsh ly  rep re ss iv e  phase of m ilita ry  ru le  in  B razil between 1964 and 1985. 
Torture played an im portant ro le  in  crushing  the  campaign of th e  urban 
g u e rr i l la s , who were a lso  pursued by u n o ff ic ia l v ig ila n te  o rg an isa tio n s  such as  
a group ca lled  th e  Commando fo r Hunting Communists. But the  p o li t ic a l  
in e ffec tiv en ess  of the  ALIT and the  o th er groups, d esp ite  th e ir  success in  
a t tr a c t in g  world-wide headlines, was a lso  due to  th e i r  very narrow p o li t ic a l  
base, the  fa c t th a t  they enjoyed l i t t l e  support ou tside the  ranks of studen t 
a c t iv is t s .  (14)
The p o li t ic a l  s itu a tio n  in  Argentina in  th e  la te  1960s was very d if fe re n t 
to  th a t  in  B razil, desp ite  su p e rf ic ia l resem blances. Argentina too was under 
m ilita ry  ru le , a s  a re s u l t  of a coup d 'e ta t  in  1966. As in  B razil, e a r l ie r  
a ttem p ts  to  e s ta b lish  ru ra l focos  had ended in  fa ilu re . However, th e  m ili ta ry 's  
hold on power in  Argentina was much weaker and by 1969 i t  was encountering 
widespread opposition to  the  continuance o f i t s  ru le . (15) Consequently, from 
the o u tse t, urban g u e rr illa  movements in  Argentina both a ttra c te d  fa r  la rg e r 
numbers in to  th e i r  ranks and enjoyed more widespread popular sympathy than  in 
B razil. T he-la rgest grouping were th e  Montoneros, a le ft-w in g  n a tio n a lis t  
movement th a t  supported th e  re tu rn  to  power of th e  ex iled , former d ic ta to r , Juan 
Peron, whom th e  army had deposed in  1955. I t  was formed la te  in  1969. The 
o ther main urban g u e rr illa  movement was the  M arxist ERP which was founded in  
June 1970. Kidnappings netted  the two o rg an isa tio n s  la rg e  sums of money w ith 
which to  su s ta in  th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s .  In March 1971 the m ilita ry  government 
conceded defeat by announcing th a t  i t  would hand the  country over to  c iv il ia n  
ru le . In March 1973, th e  P eron ist candidate , Hector Campora, was elected  
P residen t. A fter 50 days in  power he stood down to  c le a r  the way fo r Juan
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Peron's re tu rn  to p o w er. Peron duly achieved an overwhelming v ic to ry  In th e  
P res id e n tia l e lec tio n  in  September 1973. He died le s s  than a year la te r  in  July 
1974, and was succeeded by h is  widow, Isabel.
The-Montoneros suspended th e ir  campaign of violence during 1973 and 1974, 
though p o li t ic a l ly  they soon found them selves a t  odds with Peron. However, th e  
EBP continued i t s  campaign throughout th e  period  of t ra n s it io n  to  c iv ilia n  
government. There were 58 p o lit ic a l  murders during the  course o f 1973; 110 in 
1974.(16) One fa c to r in  the  esca la tio n  of vio lence was a v io len t righ t-w ing  
response to  the  continuation of le ft-w in g  violence. The b est known of the  
righ t-w ing  p aram ilita ry  groups was th e  T rip le  A (Alianza Anticommunista 
Argentina -  Argentine Anti-Communist A lliance). I t  had close l in k s  with the  
government and the  police. A fter Isabel Peron was inaugurated a s  P residen t, the  
Montoneros resumed th e ir  campaign o f v iolence in  response to  'aggression  by 
police and para -p o lice  groups ag a in s t the  people 's fo rc e s '.(17) This led tD a 
fu r th e r  sharp  esca la tio n  in  the level of violence and p a r tic u la r ly  of p o li t ic a l  
a ssa ss in a tio n s . The victim s included not ju s t  p o li t ic ia n s  and jo u rn a lis ts  but 
rank and f i l e  trad e  u n io n is ts , teachers, and p r ie s ts .  To add to  th e  
government's d if f ic u l t ie s ,  the  economy was bese t w ith rampant in f la tio n , while 
production was s tagnan t. In March 1976 th e  m ilita ry  took power in  a- coup 
d 'e ta t. M ilita ry  ru le  put an end to  the a c t iv i t ie s  of the  urban g u e rr i l la s  in  
the so -ca lled  d ir ty  war between 1976 and 1979 in th e  course of which 
approxim ately 10-12,000 people 'd isap p eared '.(18) A fter defeat in  the  war with 
B rita in  over the  Falkland Islands in  1982, th e  m ilita ry  once more re tu rned  the  
country to  c iv il ia n  ru le .
Unlike B razil and A rgentina, Uruguay was a liberal-dem ocracy in  th e  la te  
1960s, though i t  was a democracy going through a severe c r i s i s .  Student u n rest 
in  1968 had re su lted  in th e  suspension of th e  c o n s titu tio n  and th e  d ec la ra tio n  
of a s ta t e  of emergency. The c r i s i s  was p a r t ly  p o li t ic a l .  Uruguay's an tiquated  
tw o-party  system had become, unresponsive to  pub lic  opinion. I t  was a lso  p a r tly  
economic. The country had been su ffe rin g  th e  economically depressing  im pact of 
a la rg e  d e te r io ra tio n  in  th e  country 's  term s o f trad e  w ith th e  ou tside  world 
during th e  1960s. The Tupomaros were formed in  1962. However, they  only 
became ac tiv e  a s  urban g u e rr i l la s  on a reg u la r b a s is  in  1968. To begin w ith, 
they cu ltiv a ted  a Robin Hood image by d is tr ib u tin g  th e  proceeds o f superm arket 
and bank ro b beries  to  th e  poor. As a consequence, they succeeded in  a t t r a c t in g  
a measure of public support. This was re f le c te d  in  th e  support th e  Tupomaro- 
backed Broad Front a ttra c te d  in th e  e lec tio n s  of JTovember 1971 when th e  Front 
won 18 per cent of the  vote, though th is  was le s s  than  the  Tupomaros, which had 
suspended operations during the  campaign, had hoped fo r.
In October 1969 th e  Tupomaros in an operation  Intended to  mark th e  second 
ann iversary  of Che Guevara's death took over th e  sm all town of Pando. The 
k il l in g  of th ree  of the  g u e rr illa s  by th e  po lice  a f te r  they had surrendered  and 
the to r tu r in g  of o thers contributed  to  a b i t t e r  c o n f lic t between th e  Tupomaros 
and Uruguay's secu rity  fo rces. In 1970 an American ad v ise r to  th e  Uruguayan 
police was kidnapped and murdered. However, th e  h ighpoint of th e  c o n f lic t was 
in  1972. In A pril the  Tupomaros k ille d  th re e  sec u rity  o f f ic ia ls  whom they had 
id e n tif ie d  a s  members of a s ta te -su p p o rted  death squad. The k i l l in g s  were 
followed by th e  d ec la ra tio n  of a s ta te  of war by th e  government. In th e  next 
th ree  months over a hundred members of the  Tupomaros were k ille d  and th e re
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were sev e ra l hundred a r r e s t s  by th e  sec u rity  fo rces. By the tim e the  m ilita ry  
seized power In July 1973, th e  Tupomaros had .a lread y  been v ir tu a lly  destroyed . 
Uruguay entered a period of harsh ly  re p re ss iv e  m ilita ry  ru le  w ith the  country 
having th e  h ig h est p o li t ic a l  p riso n e r to  population r a t io  in  the  world. (19) In 
the  mid 1980s c iv ilia n  ru le  was re s to red .
Of th e se  th ree  Latin American cases, only th e  B razilian  f i t s  th e  notion  of 
te rro rism  a s  low level c o n flic t. In both th e  A rgentinian and Uruguayan cases, 
the s i tu a tio n  verged on c iv i l  war. Further, in  th ese  two cases, a tta c k s  on 
fo re ig n e rs  were a very sm all p a r t of th e  o v e ra ll c o n f lic t ,  though i t  was th i s  
aspect o f the  a c t iv i t ie s  of th e  in su rgen ts  in  a l l  th re e  cases th a t  led to  th e i r  
being lab elled  te r r o r i s t s  in te rn a tio n a lly . But i t  was no t the  only reason why 
they were so labelled . Another was th e  nature  of urban g u e rr illa  a c t iv i t ie s ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  in  co n tra s t to  ru ra l g u e rr illa  w arfare. Because th e re  could be no 
question of e s tab lish in g  lib e ra ted  a reas  in  th e  urban a reas  ou tside  the  con tex t 
of a fu l l  sca le  revolution or c iv i l  war, th e  a c t iv i t ie s  of urban g u e rr i l la s  were 
n ecessa rily  c landestine . In p a r tic u la r , th e re  was no p o s s ib i l i ty  of e s ta b lish in g  
a foco  in  th e  c ity , which is  why C astro and Guevara saw th e  c ity  as the  
graveyard of th e  g u e rrilla . (20) From the  o u tse t th e  image of the  urban 
g u e rr illa  was of a person in  a mask, a man o r woman who was on th e  run. This 
con trasted  unfavourably w ith the  image of th e  ru ra l  g u e rr i l la  as  a  member of a 
large peasan t army carry ing  weapons openly and defending te r r i to r ie s  th a t  had 
been lib e ra te d  from secu rity  fo rces o ften  le s s  d isc ip lin ed  in  th e  use o f fo rce  
than th e  g u e rr i l la s  themselves.
If  t h i s  image tended to  rom antic ise  th e  natu re  of ru ra l  g u e rr illa  w arfare, 
the very fa c t  th a t  such w arfare seemed to  pose no conceivable th re a t  to
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ord inary  Western c itiz en s , whatever th e  concerns of Western governments, 
in ev itab ly  re inforced  th e  ra th e r  benign a t t i tu d e  taken tow ards such w arfare, 
d e sp ite  the  immense to l l  i t  took in  liv e s . During th e  1980s Western 
governments, as the  sponsors of ru ra l g u e r r i l la  w arfare in  a number of 
co u n trie s , such as Afghanistan, them selves came to  develop a s tak e  in  th e  view 
th a t  ru ra l  g u e rr illa  w arfare co n stitu ted  a leg itim a te  form of armed s tru g g le , a t  
le a s t  in c e r ta in  circum stances. In p a r tic u la r , support fo r  anti-Communist 
insurgencies was a c en tra l fea tu re  of th e  Reagan Doctrine.
The view th a t  th e re  were fundamental d iffe ren ces  between ru ra l  g u e rr i l la s  
and urban g u e rr illa s  was not w ithout ju s t if ic a t io n . F ir s t ly , w ithout a serio u s  
breakdown of the  government’s  au th o rity  and widespread popular d isa ffe c tio n  a t  
le a s t  in  the  a reas  where th e  g u e rr illa s  e s ta b lish e d  th e i r  operations, ru ra l 
g u e rr i l la  w arfare was unlikely  to  prove su sta in ab le . Such exacting  p o li t ic a l  
precond itions did not apply to  the  covert a c ts  o f violence undertaken by urban 
g u e rr illa s . Secondly, th e  re la tio n sh ip  between means and ends was much c le a re r  
and more d ire c t  in th e  case of ru ra l g u e rr i l la  w arfare. I t  was to  d isp lace  the  
government in  th e  ru ra l a reas  as a f i r s t  s te p  to  th e  replacem ent of th e  whole 
p o li t ic a l  system.
The p o li t ic a l  ra tio n a le  fo r  th e  opera tions of urban g u e rr i l la s  was much 
le s s  s tra ig h tfo rw ard . Thus, Marighela suggested th a t  one of th e  ob jectives of 
th e  urban g u e rr illa  was to  prepare th e  ground fo r  ru ra l g u e rr illa  w arfa re .(21)
He i s  a lso  associated  w ith th e  view th a t  urban g u e rr i l la s  through provoking 
re p r is a ls  from the  a u th o ritie s  could thereby a c t as  a c a ta ly s t  fo r  popular 
revo lu tion . In h is  Handbook of Urban G uerrilla  W arfare, Marighela argued th a t
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once th e  population took th e  a c t iv i t ie s  of th e  urban g u e rr illa  se r io u s ly  h is  
success would be assured.
The government can only In te n s ify  I t s  rep ress io n , "thus 
making th e  l i f e  of I t s  c it iz e n s  h a rd er-th an  ever: homes 
w ill be broken in to , p o lice  searches organized, innocent 
people a rre s te d  and communications broken; po lice  te r r o r  
w ill become th e  o rder o f th e  day, and th e re  w ill be more 
and more p o li t ic a l  murders -  in  sh o rt a m assive p o l i t ic a l  
persecution . The population w ill re fuse  to  co llab o ra te  
w ith the  a u th o ritie s , so  th a t  th e  l a t t e r  w ill find  th e  only 
so lu tio n  to  th e ir  problems l ie s  in  having recourse  to  the  
ac tu a l physical liq u id a tio n  of a l l  th e ir  opponents. (22)
In th i s  way, Marighela argued, th e  g u e rr i l la s  would win mass support, paving th e  
way to  the  overthrow of th e  d ic ta to rsh ip . I t  was an argument to  which th e  Mew 
Left in  V estern Europe proved highly  recep tiv e , though the  p o l i t ic a l  cond itions 
th e re  could hard ly  have been more d if fe re n t from those  th a t  p revailed  a t  the  
tim e in  B razil.
MiBW-.Left
Mo event i s  more c lo se ly  asso c ia ted  with th e  r i s e  of th e  Mew Left in  th e  1960s 
than the  studen t re v o lt in  France in  May 1968. Since many w rite rs  on te rro r ism  
a lso  tend to  a sso c ia te  th e  beginning of the  age of te rro rism  w ith the  
ideological influence of th e  Mew Left, i t  i s  no t su rp ris in g  th a t  th e  events of 
1968 have found a p lace in  the  l i te ra tu re .  (23) Yet, iro n ica lly , i t  i s  d i f f ic u l t  
to  e s ta b lish  any more d ire c t  l in k  between th e  even ts of 1968 and forms of 
p o li t ic a l  violence asso c ia ted  with te rro rism . This i s  le s s  su rp ris in g  than  i t
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might seen a t  f i r s t ,  s ig h t. Support fo r  revo lu tionary  violence w ith in  Western 
s o c ie tie s  was a m inority view among adheren ts of th e  New Left. What was 
ce n tra l to  th e  New Left was re jec tio n  of no t only th e  a u th o rita r ia n  s tru c tu re s  
th a t  had grown up in  the. Vest as  a re s u l t  o f th e  Cold War, but a lso  th e  Soviet 
model o f Communism. Associated w ith th i s  re ac tio n  a g a in s t Vest and E ast was 
sympathy fo r  th e  Third Vorld and, p a r tic u la r ly , fo r  revo lu tionary  fig u res  in  the  
Third Vorld who appeared to  o ffe r a ra d ic a l a lte rn a tiv e . But support fo r  a n ti­
im p e ria lis t s tru g g le s  in th e  Third Vorld did  no t au tom atically  t r a n s la te  in to  a 
b e lie f  in  th e  u t i l i t y  of violence w ith in  th e  h eartlan d s  of cap ita lism .
In th e  decade a f te r  Nay 1968 France, in  ra th e r  s t r ik in g  c o n tra s t to  i t s  
two la rg e s t  neighbours, Vest Germany and I ta ly , remained large ly  unaffected by 
extreme le ft-w in g  violence. Admittedly, France was a ffec ted  to  a lim ited  ex ten t 
in  th i s  period by s e p a ra t is t  violence, but th i s  posed ra th e r  le s s  of a th re a t  to  
the  co u n try 's  p o li t ic a l  system than had violence asso c ia ted  with th e  issu e  of 
A lgeria a t  th e  beginning of the  1960s. Three co u n tries  stand  out as th e  main 
sources of New Left violence during the  1970s, a t  le a s t  in term s of v is ib i l i ty ,  
i f  not in  term s of number of actua l in c id en ts . They were Vest Germany, I ta ly , 
and Japan.
As co u n tries  the  th ree  had q u ite  a lo t in  common. They had a l l  been Cor 
been p a r t  of) f a s c is t  d ic ta to rsh ip s  in  th e  1930s. They were a l l  defeated in  th e  
Second Vorld War. Furthermore, they  owed th e i r  lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  in s t i tu t io n s  
in  la rge  p a r t  to  th e  Western powers th a t  had defeated them. Inev itab ly , 
th e re fo re , th e  legitim acy of th e ir  in s t i tu t io n s  was to  some ex ten t bound up with 
the  p re s tig e  of these  powers, and most p a r tic u la r ly  w ith th a t  of th e  United 
S ta te s  of America. This was fu r th e r  underpinned by th e i r  subordinate
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re la tio n sh ip  w ith  the  United S ta te s  in  fo re ign  po licy  term s. Even w ith in  th i s  
framework they  had to  tre ad  carefu lly  in  fo re ig n  policy  m atte rs  so as to  avoid 
ra is in g  sp ec tre s  of the p a st. Such r e s t r a in t s  gave r i s e  to  ten sio n s  in  a l l  
th ree . The development th a t  most obviously a ffec ted  American p re s tig e  
adversely  during th e  la te  1960s and ea rly  1970s was th e  war in  Vietnam. ' 
Opposition to  th e  war played a major ro le  in  th e  r i s e  of the Sew Left in  th e  
United S ta te s  and many o ther coun tries. The obvious exception in  th is  re sp ec t 
was France and i t s  absence as a fa c to r  i s  perhaps one reason why Few Left 
te rro rism  did n o t emerge in  the  country u n ti l  th e  end of the  1970s. Opposition 
to  the  war was most lik e ly  to  spawn a v io len t fr in g e  in  those co u n tries  where 
the  presence of American troops s ig n if ie d  o r appeared to  s ig n ify  the  co u n try 's  
subordination to  the  United S ta te s . I t  was h a rd ly  su rp ris in g  th a t  the  p r in c ip a l 
Few Left groups assoc iated  with te rro r ism  in  th e  th re e  coun tries, the  Vest 
German Fed Army Faction <Rate Anaee Fraktlon) , th e  I ta lia n  Red Brigades 
(B rigate Fosse), and the  Japanese United Red Army (Seklgun) should a l l  a t  one 
time o r another have ca rried  out . a tta c k s  on American diplom atic and m ilita ry  
personnel. (24)
H o s tility  towards th e  United S ta te s  a lso  took a righ t-w ing , n a tio n a lis t  
form in  a l l  th re e  coun tries. The most s ig n if ic a n t combination of le ft-w in g  and 
righ t-w ing  p o l i t ic a l  violence took p lace in  I ta ly  and th e  in te ra c tio n  of two 
catego ries  o f te rro rism  was one reason why I ta ly  was by fa r  the  most se rio u sly  
affected  in  term s of f a ta l i t i e s  caused by p o l i t ic a l  violence. (25) However, 
because of th e  domestic o rien ta tio n  of much of I ta ly 's  violence and perhaps 
because i t s  p o s itio n  was no t regarded as  q u ite  so s e n s itiv e  in th e  con tex t of 
European s ta b i l i ty  as th a t  of Vest Germany, I ta lia n  p o li t ic a l  violence generally
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a t t r a c te d . le s s  a tte n tio n  .than the  much lower level o f violence su ffered  by Vest 
Germany. Vhy th e  ra th e r  lim ited  violence th a t  took p lace in  V est Germany 
should have ra ised  such alarm is  d iscussed  fu r th e r  in  the  chap ter on te rro r ism  
and lib e ra l-d em o cracy .. Vhat rem ains to  be d iscussed  here i s  th e  Japanese case. 
As I t  happens, th i s  i s  a lso  the  case th a t  f i t s  c lo se s t th e  th e s is  of th e  onset 
of an age of te rro rism  in  the  la te  1960s and e a rly  1970s.
The Japanese United Red Army (URA) was formed in  September 1969, a 
ra d ic a l offshoot from an organ isation  of s o c ia l i s t  s tu d en ts. (26) I t  emerged 
ag a in s t th e  backdrop of two years of widespread and v io len t s tu d en t u n res t th a t  
had closed many of the  coun try 's  u n iv e rs itie s . The o rgan isa tion  f i r s t  a t t ra c te d  
in te rn a tio n a l a tte n tio n  in  March 1970 when nine of i t s  members hijacked a Japan 
Air Lines plane and forced i t  to  f ly  to  Forth  Korea. I t  next made an impact 
ou tside  of Japan with th e  involvement of th re e  of i t s  members in  a m assacre a t  
Lod a irp o r t  in  Is ra e l in  Kay 1972, though th e  g r is ly  s to ry  of th e  o rg an isa tio n 's  
execution of twelve of i t s  own members e a r l ie r  th a t  year in Japan over po licy  
d iffe ren ces  a lso  gained wide coverage. (27)
In September 1974 th ree  URA members seized hostages a t  the  French embassy 
in The Hague. The a tta ck  was linked to  th e  fa c t  th a t  a URA member was being 
held a t  the  tim e by the French customs. I t  was successfu l in  securing  h is  
re lease . All four were then flown to  Damascus, S yria . The ta c t ic  was repeated 
with th e  seizure  of hostages a t  the  American Consulate in  Malaysia in  1975. On 
th is  occasion, f iv e  URA members imprisoned in  Japan were freed to  secure th e  
re lease  of th e  hostages. In 1977 URA members hijacked a JAL je t  to  A lgiers. 
A fter th a t  th e  a c t i t iv ie s  of the URA became ep isod ic . In i t s  1987 re p o rt on
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te rro r ism  th e  S ta te  Department estim ated th e  s tre n g th  of the  Japanese Red Army 
a t  between 30 and 40.(28)
F eo -F asc lst
A fea tu re  common to  -the various Few L eft groups th a t  engaged in  violence in  the  
in d u s tr ia lis e d  coun tries  was th e ir  very narrow p o li t ic a l  base. This form s the  
most obvious d ifference  between th ese  cases and most Latin American groups 
with s im ila r  ideologies. At the  o ther end of th e  p o l i t ic a l  spectrum fa r  r ig h t  
or F eo -F asc ist groups have a lso  operated a t  th e  fr in g es  of popular opinion. 
Indeed, one explanation of the  extreme r ig h t 's  r e s o r t  to  violence has been th e ir  
lack o f success a t  th e  b a llo t box. This i s  th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r using th e  
fa ilu re  .of th e  FPD to  achieve parliam entary  rep re sen ta tio n  in th e  Vest German 
fed era l e lec tio n  o f 1969 as a peg fo r  d iscu ss in g  the  co n tribu tion  of violence by 
F eo -F asc ist groups to  th e  development o f th e  concept o f te rro rism . P eter Merkl 
describes th is  explanation as  the  'f i r e  sa le  th eo ry ' of p o li t ic a l  violence, 
applying i t  to  ac tio n s  of th e  fa r  r ig h t  in  Vest Germany a f te r  th e  1969 e lec tio n  
scuppered th e  FPD's e le c to ra l p rogress. (29)
The f i r e  of th e  movement i s  out and the  d isappoin ted  
m ilita n ts  embark on h igh ly  d estru c tiv e , even su ic id a l and 
quixotic  ac tio n s  to  rek in d le  i t .  But th e ir  despera te  
violence re a lly  s u l l ie s  and cheapens whatever con stru c tiv e  
l e f t -  or righ t-w ing  p o l i t ic a l  id e a ls  and ac tio n s  may have 
insp ired  them before. The tu rn  of a ra d ic a l p o li t ic a l  
movement in  decline to  s c a tte rs h o t violence i s  thus in  a 
sense i t s  f in a l se llo u t, a f i r e  s a le  of ruined noble 
in ten tio n s . (30)
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Much o f th e  violence o f-th e  extreme r ig h t  in  Vest Germany was d irec ted  a t  
fo re ign  workers. P rio r to  th e  u n ifica tio n  of th e  two Germanies in  1990, th i s  
form of v iolence was a t  i t s  peak in  th e  e a r ly  1980s. In an episode in  1980 two 
refugees were burn t to  death with Molotov c o ck ta ils . However, th e  p r in c ip a l a c t 
of vio lence by th e  extreme r ig h t  to  a t t r a c t  in te rn a tio n a l a tte n tio n  to  th e ir  
a c t iv i t ie s  was th e  bomb a t  the  Munich beer f e s t iv a l  in  September 1980 th a t  
k ille d  13 people, including i t s  p e rp e tra to r . I t  i s  th e  only a c t o f the  extreme 
r ig h t  in  Vest Germany th a t  one fin d s  included in  chronologies of te rro rism .
But w hile the  p e rp e tra to r had once been a member o f a Heo-Hazi group, the  
Defence Sports  Group Hoffman, th e  evidence does not suggest th a t  h is  action  
formed any p a r t  of an organised rig h t-w in g  campaign of violence. Merkl 
compares the  inc iden t to  such n o n -p o litic a l mass murders as th e  shooting spree  
by a loner th a t  k illed  16 people in A ustin, Texas, in  1966.(31)
The country in Europe most se rio u sly  a ffec ted  by H eo-Fascist violence was 
Ita ly . Between 1969 and 1986 415 people died in  I ta ly  in  a c ts  of p o li t ic a l  . 
v iolence. <32) Over a f i f th  of th ese  died in  a s in g le  inc iden t, th e  bombing of 
Bologna railw ay s ta tio n  in  August 1980. The in c iden t was one of severa l s tra g i  
(m assacres) a ttr ib u te d  to  the  extreme r ig h t .  The f i r s t  of th ese  took p lace in  
December 1969 when a bomb in  a bank k il le d  17 people in  Milan. In th e  f i r s t  
phase o f the  r ig h t-w in g 's  campaign of v io lence between 1969 and 1974, th e  two 
main H eo-Fascist groups engaged in violence were OH (Ordine Jfuovo -  Hew Order) 
and AH (.Avanguardla Fazionale -  H ational Vanguard). Both.groups were formed 
well before the  age of te rro rism , OH in  1956 and AH in  1960. Indeed, a c ts  o f 
p o li t ic a l  violence, including murder, had been a fea tu re  of I ta lia n  socie ty  
through the  1950s and the  1960s. (33) But in  so f a r  a s  th e  r e s o r t  to  s tra g i  by
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the  extreme r ig h t  represented  a q u a lita tiv e  e sca la tio n  in  p o l i t ic a l  violence in  
th e  country, the  I ta lia n  experience f i t s  in to  th e  time frame of th e  age o f 
te rro r ism . Furthermore, th e  ind isc rim in a te  natu re  of th e  extreme r ig h t 's  
vio lence epitom ised the  a sso c ia tio n  th a t  was made between te rro r ism  and th e  
k i l l in g  of innocent bystanders.
The aim of the  Feo-F ascist campaign was to  persuade th e  public  through 
the  very clim ate  of in secu rity  i t s  own violence created  to  accept th e  need fo r  
a u th o rita r ia n  government. (34) A s in i s t e r  aspec t of th i s  so -ca lled  s tra te g y  of 
ten sio n  was th e  evidence of the  d ire c t  involvement of elem ents of th e  I ta l ia n  
in te llig en ce  serv ice  (S IS).(35) This interm eshing of p a r t  of th e  s ta te  
estab lishm ent w ith th e  f a r  r ig h t  gave rig h t-w in g  violence in  I ta ly  a p o l i t ic a l  
seriousness th a t  i t  lacked elsewhere w ith in  th e  in d u s tr ia l  world. At th e  same 
tim e, th e  I ta lia n  case c le a rly  d if f e r s  from those  of Latin  American death squads 
ch arac te rised  by a close re la tio n sh ip  w ith elem ents in  th e  s ec u rity  fo rces  of 
the s ta te ,  s in ce  the  aim in  the  I ta lia n  case  was th e  actua l overthrow of th e  
coun try 's  p o l i t ic a l  in s ti tu tio n s , whereas th e  ro le  o f Latin  American death 
squads was generally  d irec ted  towards th e  defence o f the  s ta tu s  quo. In th e  
la te  1970s a new generation of F eo -F asc ist o rg an isa tio n s  appeared, of which th e  
most s ig n if ic a n t were FAR (ATuclei Armati JRivoluzionarl -  Armed Revolutionary 
Fuclei) and TP ( Terza Poslzione -  Third P o s itio n ). A fa c to r  in  th e  growth of 
F eo -F asc ist groups both in  th is  period and e a r l ie r  was th e  growing pop u la rity  
of th e  I ta lia n  Communist Party  (PCI) and th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  i t  m ight g e t in to  
government through sharing  power w ith th e  C h ris tian  Democrats, th e  rig h t-w in g  
p arty  th a t  had dominated I ta lia n  p o l i t ic s  s in ce  the  end of th e  Second Vorld 
Var.
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Paradoxically , th a t  was a lso  a fa c to r  in  the  growth of le ft-w in g  p o l i t ic a l  
v iolence. Elements on th e  l e f t  saw the  inc reasin g  reformism of th e  PCI a s  a 
b e tray a l of i t s  revolu tionary  m ission. A number of le ft-w ing  o rg an isa tio n s  
committed to  th e  use of violence came in to  being in  th e  la te  1960s and e a r ly  
1970s a g a in s t a backdrop of studen t p ro te s t  and in d u s tr ia l u n res t. The most 
im portan t o f th ese  o rg an isa tions, the  Red Brigades, was launched in  Milan in
1970. To begin with, i t s  violence was lim ited  to  sabotage and kidnapping of 
sh o r t  duration  fo r  propaganda purposes. In June 1974, members of th e  
o rg an isa tio n  k ille d  two p a rty  o ff ic ia ls  in  a ra id  on th e  M eo-Fascist I ta lia n  
Social Movement (MSI). The ra id  followed th e  bombing of a tra d e  union r a l ly  by 
th e  extreme r ig h t  in which e igh t people had died. The k illin g  , o f th e  two MSI 
o f f ic ia ls  represented  the  c ro ssing  of an im portant th resho ld . Henceforth, the  
Red Brigades became an o rgan isation  ready to  ju s tify , and to  c a rry  out, th e  
murder of p o li t ic a l  opponents. I t  was most ac tiv e  in  th e  years 1978 to  1980, 
th e  so -c a lle d  years of lead. (36)
Leonard Weinberg id e n tif ie d  a number of common fa c to rs  behind th e  r i s e  of 
both M eo-Fascist and Mew Left p o li t ic a l  v io lence in I ta ly . He argued th a t  th e  
sharp  c o n tra s t between th e  ideological s ty le  of I ta lia n  p o li t ic s  and th e  ac tua l 
r e a l i ty  of bargaining w ithin  the  p o lit ic a l  system was a fa c to r in  prom pting 
d isgruntlem ent w ith the  p o li t ic a l  process. F urther, both rig h t-w in g  and l e f t -  
wing could harken back to  a time in  the re la t iv e ly  recen t p a st o f th e  use of 
v io lence ag a in s t the other. H eo-Fascists barkened back to  the  a fterm ath  o f the  
F i r s t  World War, when M ussolini's F a sc is ts , a s  they perceived i t ,  saved th e  
country from a Communist revolution, while th e  Mew Left g lo rif ie d  th e  ac tio n s  of 
the  I ta lia n  R esistance in  the  f in a l s tag es  o f th e  Second World War. 'Each s id e '
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wrote Weinberg 'has been.arm ed,w ith a h is to r ic a l  example of i t s  v ic to ry  through 
violence over th e  o th er '. (37) The th ird  fa c to r  id e n tif ie d  by Weinberg was 
pervasive  popular d is s a tis fa c t io n  w ith th e  function ing  of the  I ta lia n  s ta te .
This was compounded by the  hegemonic p o s itio n  of th e  C h ris tian  Democrats 
w ithin  the  p o li t ic a l  system , which had given th e  p a rty  a dominant p o s itio n  in  
a l l  o f I ta ly 's  governments since  1945, and by th e  widespread perception of th e  
p o l i t ic a l  system  as the  embodiment of a gerontocracy because of the  age of th e  
leading fig u res  in  government. (38)
Separat is t
The f in a l  source of p o li t ic a l  violence in  th e  la te  1960s and early  1970s 
underpinning th e  perception of the  dawn of an age of te rro rism  was s e p a ra t is t  
n a t io n a lis t  violence w ithin the developed world i t s e l f .  nowhere were p o li t ic a l  
s t r a in s  over th e  question of na tional id e n ti ty  more apparent than  in  northern  
Ireland w ith th e  onset of intercommunal v io lence in 1968 and 1969. But w hile 
the s itu a tio n  in  northern  Ireland gave r i s e  to  th e  most in tra c ta b le  of a l l  th e  
c o n f lic ts  w ithin  the developed world over th e  question of n a tio n a lity  and while 
p o li t ic a l  violence in the province continues to  loom la rge  w ithin the  l i te r a tu re  
on te rro r ism , in i t ia l ly  th e  connection between te rro r ism  and reg ional 
nationalism  was forged elsewhere. In October 1970 a c e ll  Df th e  FLQ (Front de 
Liberation du Quebec -  Quebec L iberation Fron t) kidnapped the  B ritish  Trade 
Commissioner, James Cross. The FLQ demanded, among o ther th in g s , the  re lease  
of p riso n e rs , money, and the  pub lication  of th e  o rg an isa tio n 's  m anifesto.
When the  Canadian government refused to  meet th ese  demands a p a rt from 
g iv ing  p u b lic ity  to  the FLQ's m anifesto, ano ther c e ll  of the FLQ kidnapped 
P ie rre  Laporte, a m in iste r in  the  p ro v in c ia l government of Quebec. He was
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murdered a f te r  an attem pted escape. According to  one of th e  members of th e  FLQ 
c e ll , th e  motive fo r kidnapping Laporte was th e  FLQ's unw illingness to  c a rry  out 
th e  th re a t  to  k i l l  Cross as an o u ts id e r to  th e  c o n flic t and, in  fa c t , Cross was 
u ltim ate ly  re leased  in  December 1970 in  exchange fo r  fre e  passage out o f th e  
country fo r h is  kidnappers. L aporte 's k i l l e r s  were caught and sentenced to  long 
p riso n  term s. In response to  th ese  even ts, th e  Canadian government enacted 
draconian emergency measures. These were allowed to  lapse  a t  th e  end o f A pril
1971. A rres ts  of FLQ members continued during 1972 and by th e  end of th a t  
year, th e  campaign of s e p a ra t is t  violence was e ffe c tiv e ly  over. (39)
Vhile th e  FLQ f i r s t  gained in te rn a tio n a l prominence as  a re s u l t  of the  
1970 kidnappings, i t s  campaign of vio lence was a t  i t s  peak in  1968 and 1969.
The o rg an isa tio n  had ac tu a lly  been founded in  1963. I t s  campaign had begun 
with bombings ag a in st m ilita ry  ta rg e ts .  In a l l  th e  d if fe re n t phases of i t s  
campaign of violence FLQ ac tio n s  re su lted  in  the  deaths of seven people. (40) 
Vhile the  murder of Laporte produced a s tro n g  backlash and a lo s s  of public  
support fo r  th e  o rgan isation , th e  main reason fo r the  FLQ's decline  seems to  
have been th e  success of co n s titu tio n a l separatism  in th e  form of the  P arti 
Quebecols (PQ). I t achieved an e le c to ra l breakthrough with 23 per cent of th e  
vote and second place in  the p ro v in c ia l e lec tio n s  in  Quebec in  December 1970.
PQ's success led to  th e  defection  in  1971 of a form er leader of the  FLQ.
He ca lled  fo r  th e  abandonment of v iolence and the  t r a n s fe r  of th e  s tru g g le  to  
the  e le c to ra l plane. Iro n ica lly , i t  l a te r  tra n sp ire d  th a t  a communique 
supposedly issued  by a FLQ ce ll in  response to  th is  c a l l  and which urged th e  
continuation  of the campaign of violence was th e  work o f th e  Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and was put out w ith th e  in ten tio n  of c re a tin g  d isu n ity  w ith in
- 1 1 7 -
the  o rg an isa tio n . (41) 3 u t PQ's success* culm inating in  i t s  v ic to ry  in  th e  1976 
p ro v in c ia l e lec tio n s  in Quebec, simply made th e  FLQ irre v e la n t. Even th e  
in a b il i ty  of th e  PQ to  ca rry  a referendum in  1980 on th e  p a r ty 's  proposal fo r  
so v e re ig n ty -asso c ia tio n  fo r Quebec fa iled  to  rev ive  s e p a ra t is t  violence.
In re tro sp e c t, i t  i s  evident th a t  th e  a tte n tio n  th a t  the  FLQ received 
during i t s  b r ie f  heyday was u tte r ly  out of p roportion  to  the  o rg an isa tio n 's  
actua l p o l i t ic a l  s ign ificance . There were D tie r v io len t, s e p a ra t is t  : 
o rg an isa tio n s  in  the  developed world th a t  posed a fa r  g rea te r th re a t to  th e i r  
re sp ec tiv e  c e n tra l governments. An example was ETA (Euskadi ta  Askatasuna -  
Basque Homeland and L iberty  ). ETA was founded in  1959, a m ilita n t breakaway 
group from th e  youth sec tion  of the  Basque n a tio n a lis t  Party  (PFV). The PJTV 
i t s e l f  had been in  ex istence since  1895. A fter F ranco 's v ic to ry  in  the  Spanish 
C ivil Var between 1936 and 1939, Basque cu ltu re  and Basque nationalism  were 
ru th le s s ly  suppressed as a th re a t  to  th e  un ity  of Spain. However, by th e  tim e 
of ETA's form ation, the  s itu a tio n  was beginning to  ease somewhat. ETA did  not 
s t a r t  out w ith  a commitment to  pursue i t s  goal o f Basque independence by 
violence. That developed in  the mid 1960s p a r tly  as  a re s u lt  of the  adoption 
of the  theo ry  th a t  p o li t ic a l  p rog ress  would come through a s p ira l  of ac tion  
followed by rep ress io n  leading to  fu r th e r ac tio n  and p a r tly  through the  
influence o f th e  success of na tional lib e ra tio n  movements in th e  Third Vorld.
To begin w ith, ETA's campaign of vio lence co n sis ted  mainly of a c ts  o f 
sabotage and bank robberies. The f i r s t  death occurred in  1968, the  year from 
which ETA's campaign i s  most usually  dated. In 1970 a m ilita ry  tr ib u n a l 
sentenced s ix  members of ETA to  death in connection w ith th is  k il l in g , th e  
a ssa ss in a tio n  o f a local secu rity  police ch ie f. Franco commuted th e  sen tences
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a f te r  th e  re le a se  of the  honorary Vest German consul In San Sebastian , whom ETA 
had kidnapped during th e  course of the  t r i a l .  The e ffe c t of the  Burgos t r i a l  
was to  win ETA in te rn a tio n a l a tte n tio n  and to  provide a flood of re c ru i ts  to  ... 
i t s  cause. (42) ETA's campaign has spanned th e  l a s t  years  of Franco 's ru le  to  
the  d ic ta to r 's  death in  JTovember 1975, th e  period of t r a n s i t io n  to  th e  June 1977 
e lec tio n s , and democratic ru le  a f te r  th e  1977 e lec tio n s  to  th e  p resen t day. In 
fa c t, th e  achievement of democratic ru le  saw an e sca la tio n  in  the  level of 
Basque s e p a ra t is t  violence and i t  reached a peak in  1980 coincid ing  w ith the  
f i r s t  e lec tio n s  fo r the parliam ent of the  Basque autonomous reg ion . (43)
In 1986, th e  number of deaths a ttr ib u te d  by th e  Spanish government to  ETA 
in  a l l  i t s  various m anifestations and fa c tio n s  reached 500, making i t  f a r  and 
way th e  most im portant source of p o l i t ic a l  v iolence in  Spain. In th e  ea rly  
years of ETA's campaign, the  nature of th e  Franco regime encouraged sympathy 
fo r th e  o rg an isa tio n 's  cause and in h ib ited  th e  use of th e  term , te rro r ism , in  
connection w ith ETA's campaign. The estab lishm ent of democracy has dim inished 
ex tern a l sympathy fo r s e p a ra tis t  v iolence in  Spain, though democracy has a lso  
provided ETA w ith the  opportunity to  dem onstrate th a t  i t s  a c t iv i t ie s  enjoy 
s u b s ta n tia l, i f  m inority , support among the  Basques them selves. In the  
e lec tio n s  fo r  the  Basque regional parliam ent in 1990, th e  m ilita n t Basque p a rty  
a sso c ia ted  w ith ETA, Herri Batasuna (HB), won 18 per cen t of th e  v o te .(44)
Vhile th e  chronology of ETA's s e p a ra t is t  campaign f i t s  th e  th e s is  o f an 
age of te rro r ism  from the  la te  1960s w ell, th e re  a re  o ther cases th a t  do not.
A few s e p a ra t is t  campaigns ac tua lly  preceded the  age of te rro r ism  and were over 
before i t  began. An example is  the campaign by German-speakers in  South Tyrol 
fo r  g re a te r  autonomy from Rome. South Tyrol became p a r t  o f I ta ly  as  th e  re s u lt
-  119 -
of the First Vorld Var. After the. Second Vorld Var, the area was promised a 
measure of autonomy in recognition of the language and culture of its 
inhabitants. After the failure of the Italian government to meet the 
expectations of the German-speakers for a new deal, their campaign against Rome 
took a violent turn in the late 1950s and early 1960s. There were a total of 
20 fatalities during the course of the campaign, though for the most part the 
violence in what was called the war of the pylons was directed against 
property. (45) The conflict was defused by concessions made by the Italian 
government to the German-speakers in 1969. However, tensions s t ill  exist 
between Italian- and German-speaking inhabitants of South Tyrol and these gave 
rise to minor acts of violence in the area in the late 1980s.(46)
However, the case of South Tyrol was the exception rather than the rule.
In many of the peripheral areas of the developed world, there was an upsurge of 
separatist nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s that coincided with the onset of 
the age of terrorism. Vhere such separatist nationalism was accompanied by 
organised violence, it provided one of the strands in the development of the 
current concept of terrorism. Two questions arise: why did earlier examples of 
separatist violence not attract the attention achieved by organisations such as 
ETA and the IRA in the 1970s and why did violent separatist and/or nationalist 
movements in the Third Vorld play so little  part in the shaping of the concept? 
Forthem Ireland provides a very clear illustration of the issue raised by the 
first question. In sharp contrast to the onset of the Troubles in 1968, the 
IRA's border campaign between 1956 and 1962 made virtually no impact on the 
outside world. In regard to the second question, it may be objected that 
Palestinian groups should be seen as Third Vorld movements, not least because
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the Palestinian cause has enjoyed such widespread support in the Third Vorld. 
However, if  the Palestinian case can be seen as an exception, it  is  a partial 
exception since Israel, the object of the.Palestinians' campaign, was not 
regarded and did not regard itself as part of the Third Vorld.
An attempt to answer the two questions themselves at this point would 
take us beyond the scope of this chapter which was simply to identify the 
different categories of political violence that were forged together in the 
making of the modem concept of terrorism, as that term has generally been 
understood in the last two decades. As the title  of this chapter is meant to 
suggest, the process involved the glossing over of considerable differences 
among these categories. Vith the passage of time the concept has come to span 
an even wider field with the arrival of new terrorisms such as Islamic 
terrorism and narco-terrorism. Vhat is more, the term in contrast to its  usage 
at the beginning of the age of terrorism has even come to be applied to a 
number of the separatist movements in the Third Vorld.
Academics in the field have continued to press for the inclusion of state 
terrorism.(47) Popular recognition of the extent to which people are terrorised 
by governments has grown, particularly as a result of the work of Amnesty 
International.(48) However, confusion among the terms, terrorist state, state- 
sponsored terrorism, and state terrorism has discouraged use of the last term 
outside the academic world. But while this extension of the concept was 
motivated in large part by a desire for more even-handed analysis of the 
problem of political violence, it has tended to obscure rather than illuminate 
the foundations of the modern concept. These are examined further in the next
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chapter In which the question of the legitimisation of the different categories 
of violence Identified in this chapter is addressed.
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Chapter 5 - The Legitlmlsatlon of Terrorism 
Before examining how groups seek to justify resort to organised violence, 
it is  helpful first to consider the reasons why people usually obey the 
political authorities that rule over them. Five reasons are commonly put 
forward. Firstly, habit is suggested as a powerful reason for people's day to 
day acceptance of existing political authority. Secondly, the capacity of 
political authority to provide a framework of security, of law and order 
constitutes another motive for accepting existing political authority, whatever 
its character in other respects. Thirdly, fear of the consequences of 
disobedience or negative sanctions play a part. Fourthly, inducements or 
positive sanctions provide a motive for at least some people in the society to 
support the regime. Finally, it  is  commonly argued that people obey political 
authority because they recognise the legitimacy of its  claim to rule over them. 
The last is also generally seen as the mo6t important reason for people's 
obedience and consequently the most durable basis for the establishment of 
stable government in any society.<1> Most of the world's governments today 
claim that they are legitimate by reason of being representative of the people 
over whom they rule. Vhlle this claim is open to question in the case of many 
of the world's governments, the fact that the vast majority of governments pay 
at least lip-service to the notion of popular sovereignty matters politically. 
Legitimacy and popular mobilisation
If the opposition in any country is able to demonstrate unambiguously that the 
government does not represent the majority of the population through, for 
example, mobilising large numbers of people on the streets against its  rule, the 
existing government will be placed in jeopardy. There have been some striking
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examples of the fall of regimes over the last twenty-five years due to their 
failure to match mobilisation by opposition groups. The fall of the Shah of 
Iran In 1979 provides one such example. Attempts by the regime's security 
apparatus, SAVAK, to orchestrate demonstrations In the Shah's favour failed to 
reach the scale or intensity of opposition protests against the regime, despite 
the regime's forceful discouragement of 6uch protests with consequent fatalities 
among the demonstrators. It was this failure that prompted defections from 
hitherto loyal armed forces, precipitating the regime's complete collapse. (2)
President Xarcos of the Philippines owed his downfall In 1986 not merely 
to his Inability to convince domestic and world opinion that he had prevailed, 
as he claimed, at the ballot box, but also to 'people's power* through which the 
opposition was able to control the streets. As in the Shah's case, defections 
from the armed forces finally put an end to the existing regime's hold on 
power. (3) But the most dramatic demonstration of the power of popular 
mobilisation to change governments was provided by the events in Eastern 
Europe in the second half of 1989. In this case the most important factor 
facilitating the process of change lay outside the individual countries. It was 
the Soviet Union's disavowal of any intention to intervene to shore up the 
continuation of any local Communist party's monopoly of power. Significantly, 
the changes in Eastern Europe followed the holding of elections on a 
competitive basis inside the Soviet Union itself, indicating that Gorbachev's 
commitment to pluralism was real and not simply rhetorical.
Even governments that have come to power as a result of competitive 
elections within a llberal-democracy have proved on occasion to be vulnerable 
to political mobilisation on the streets. In particular, the events in Kay 1968
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In France clearly threatened the survival of President de Gaulle's government. 
However, unlike Xarcos or the Shah of Iran, de Gaulle was able to match the 
mobilisation by his opponents by bringing his supporters on to the streets in 
numbers even greater than they had been able to muster. (4 > Popular 
mobilisation against the government should not be confused with popular 
mobilisation over particular policies of the government. In general, the latter 
does not pose a threat to the existence of an elected government. Indeed, such 
mobilisation may not even prevent the government from carrying through 
unpopular policies in a particular area of government. Consequently, provided 
there is little  likelihood that the mobilisation of opinion over a particular 
issue will lead to the questioning of its legitimacy, government has little  
reason to suppress such mobilisation. Indeed, it  generally has every Incentive 
not to do so, since a policy of suppression, however successful in preventing 
protest from getting off the ground, will exact some price from the government 
in terms of loss of legitimacy, whether internally or externally.
However, in some cases the Issues over which popular mobilisation is  
taking place may be too closely bound up with the basis of the government's 
legitimacy to be ignored by the power-holders. Two striking examples of 
popular mobilisation within liberal-democracies being met by attempts at 
suppression were the response of southern states within the United States to 
the civil rights movement of Xartln Luther King in the early 1960s and the 
reaction of hardline Protestant opinion, supported by elements in the province's 
security forces, to the Fort hern Ireland civil rights movement in the late 
1960s. (5) In both cases it  was local power-holders who were tarnished by the
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attempts at suppression, though with seme knock-on political effects on the 
central governments as well.
If government is determined to suppress popular mobilisation and provided 
it  has good reason to believe that it  can rely on the loyalty of those given 
the job of putting down by farce any manifestation of popular protest, it  may 
prove virtually impossible for the opposition to organise effective 
demonstrations against the government. An example was the incapacity of the 
opposition in Panama to sustain street protests against the governments 
decision to cancel the results of the Kay 1989 elections. (6) Monitoring of the 
election by Independent entitles that indicated that the opposition candidate 
had achieved a clear victory had ruled out the government's preferred option of 
rigging the outcome. However, in the end the Horiega government fell, not 
because of popular mobilisation against the regime, but as a result of American 
intervention in December 1989. Another reason, apart from suppression, that a 
strategy of popular mobilisation may fall is the difficulty of staging mass 
protests outside the urban areas. Vhere the vast majority of people live in 
urban areas, this does not present a major obstacle to the strategy. However, 
in countries in which the majority of the population live in the rural areas, it 
may be difficult to establish that mass protest in the cities is  representative 
of opinion in the country at large.
A weakness of the pro-democracy movement in China before its  suppression 
by the authorities in June 1989 wa6 the apparent absence of active support for 
the movement in the Chinese countryside. (7) In practice, that meant that the 
Chinese government could consider the option of suppression at a far later 
stage in the process of political mobilisation than could a regime where urban
-  129  -
opinion could not be isolated and Its significance dismissed. The danger of 
such Isolation explains in part why opposition elements in many Third Vorld 
countries turn to the countryside in the first place to mount a challenge to the 
sta tu s  quo. However, unlike the strategy of mass mobilisation in the urban 
areas, which in the right circumstances may succeed in bringing about change 
non-violently or, at any rate, with a minimum of violence and which may indeed 
be able to make play of the opposition's non-violence in the face of provocation 
and even violence by the government, rural strategies for change almost 
inevitably involve the use of violence against the agents of the government in 
the countryside. In other words, they usually take the form of guerrilla 
warfare. However, before examining the political implications of guerrilla 
warfare further, more needs to be said about how ideas on what constitutes 
legitimate government have evolved since 1945.
Mobilisation against colonial, rule
Popular sovereignty as a near-universal basis for the legitimacy of government 
is comparatively recent. At the beginning of the post-war era and the 
formation of the United Nations, most of the 175 or so sovereign independent 
states that currently make up the international political system were colonies 
of European powers or, in a very few cases, the United States. However, as the 
dominant power in the world, the United States opposed the continuation of 
colonialism after the war. American influence and, more importantly, the 
increased cost politically and economically of sustaining overseas empires 
persuaded the European powers to embark on a process of decolonisation.
However, the commitment to decolonise was by no means unconditional. At the 
outset, the process was selective. In a number of cases the colonial power
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resisted nationalist demands for independence. The result in most of these 
cases was violenoe against the colonial power to force it  out.
Portugal alone of the European colonial powers attempted to hang on to the 
whole of its  empire and, apart from Goa, an enclave on the Indian sub-continent 
which India took over by force in 1061, succeeded in doing so until the mid 
1970s. However, by the mid 1960s the Portuguese were confronted with guerrilla 
warfare against their rule in their three colonies on the African continent. In 
the case of the two main European colonial powers, Britain and France, strategic 
considerations and political commitments were the main reasons why they 
resisted decolonisation in particular cases. Strategic considerations were 
usually of two kinds. The location of the territory coupled with the existence 
of military bases provided one of the strategic imperatives for wishing to 
retain a colony. The ideological orientation of the principal nationalist 
movement towards Communism was another reason why a colonial power might 
resist decolonisation on strategic grounds. The main political factor 
complicating decolonisation was the presence in a number of colonies of Vhite 
settlers. They were Invariably opposed to independence under majority rule, 
while at the same time their well being and security was an issue capable of 
rousing domestic opinion within the metropolitan country itself.
The two cases that caused most difficulty to France were Vietnam and 
Algeria. Japan's occupation of Indochina during the Second Vorld Var had been 
a major blow to French colonial rule throughout the region because it destroyed 
one of the central pillars on which the legitimacy of colonial rule rested, its  
capacity to provide security for its  subjects against external attack. Japan's 
sudden surrender in August 1945 created a power vacuum in Indochina. This was
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partially filled by Ho CM Hinh's proclamation of an Independent Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in September. However, this ran contrary to what had been 
agreed by the major Allied powers at Potsdam and in accordance with the 
decisions made at Potsdam, Rationalist Chinese troops occupied the north of the 
country, while British troops occupied the south. (8) They were followed by 
French troops dispatched by the new government of France, Intent an making 
clear its  determination to re-establish colonial rule in Vietnam. This was to 
prove beyond France's power.
Between 1046 and 1054 the Viet Kinh, nationalist forces loyal to Ho Chi 
Xinh, fought a guerrilla war against French colonial rule. For the French 
defeat at Dlen Bien Phu in Xay 1054 was the final straw. It was quickly 
followed by the French government's agreement to Independence for all the 
countries of Indochina. However, in Vietnam's case the country was partitioned 
between north and south, with the Communist Viet Kinh in control of the north. 
American determination to prevent the south from falling under Communist rule 
resulted in their costly and unsuccessful intervention in Vietnam as they took 
over the defence of the fragile political entity France had created in the Bouth 
of the country to deny the Viet Kinh total victory. The fusing together in 
Vietnam of social revolution with anti-colonial nationalism helped to establish 
a political formula encapsulated by the concept of national liberation that was 
to prove Immensely influential not just in the Third Vorld but in the First 
Vorld as well. Xany of the violent movements that appeared in the First World 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s proclaimed national liberation as their aim. 
This was especially true of separatist groups. In fact, they frequently
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in corpora ted the term, national liberation, or its  equivalent in an apposite 
language, in their name. (9 >
Vietnam was by no means the only example of the success of the idea of 
national liberation in the Third Vorld. As significant in establishing the 
influence of the concept was the war in Algeria, France's other major colonial 
confrontation. France's reluctance to grant Independence to Algeria stemmed 
from the presence in the colony of a million Vhite settlers. The result was a 
protracted confrontation with nationalists from the colony's Xuslim majority 
organised in the FLX <Front de Liberation JTatianale ~ Rational Liberation 
Front). It began in Xovember 1954 with the launch of a guerrilla campaign by 
the FLX and ended with the country's Independence in July 1962. But whereas 
Vietnam was unambiguously identified with the success of tactics of rural 
guerrilla warfare, despite the role of conventional forces in the latter stages 
of the conflict, rural guerrilla warfare was seen as only one component of the 
Algerian war.
In particular, the battle of Algiers in 1956 and 1957 when the FLU carried 
out an urban bombing campaign in the country's capital exerted a powerful 
influence on perceptions of the war, as did the bombing campaign in 1961 and 
1962 of the pro-settler OAS (Organisation Armee Secrete -  Secret Army 
Orgnaisation). The consequence has been to identify the war in Algeria with 
the use of terrorism, an association reinforced by the lntercommunal character 
of much of the violence that occurred during the war. (10) By contrast, the 
term, terrorism, has rarely been applied to any phase of the conflict in 
Vietnam.(11) This has little  to do with perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
parties since the FLIT enjoyed far wider support in the international community
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for the cause of Algerian independence than the Vietnamese Communists were ever 
able to attract to their cause.
Before turning to cases in which Britain faced violent anti-colonial 
campaigns, the problem France s t il l  faces in the Pacific territory of Hew 
Caledonia should be mentioned. Vhlle the issue of Hew Caledonia could not 
begin to give rise to the difficulties France encountered in Vietnam and 
Algeria, if  only because the total population of Hew Caledonia is barely 150,000, 
the near equality in size of the indigenous and the settler populations with 
neither constituting a majority of the population makes the problem as 
politically Intractable as any that France has encountered in its overseas 
territories. Indeed, the intractability of the situation prompted British 
newspapers to compare Hew Caledonia with Fort hern Ireland. <12 > Tensions 
between the local Melanesians, known as Kanaks, and the French settlers or 
Cadoches had grown during the 1970s. These led to violence between the two 
communities in 1984 and 1985, prompting the French government to declare a 
state of emergency.
The immediate cause of the violence was Kanak opposition, organised 
through the FLHKS (Front de Liberation Kationale Kanak e t  S o c ia lis ts  -  Kanak 
Socialist Hatlonal Liberation Front), to the holding of a referendum on 
independence. There was further violence Involving the FLHKS in the run-up to 
France's Presidential election in 1988, making Hew Caledonia an issue in the 
campaign. The conservative candidate for the Presidency, Prime Minister Jacques 
Chirac, approved the use of force to rescue hostages held by members of the 
FLHKS. He hoped to boost his chances of election by this demonstration of his 
commitment to strong action against terrorism. Following the return to power
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of the French Socialist Party in June 1988, a compromise agreement wa6 reached 
between the FLXKS leader, Jean-Xarie Tjibaou, and the leader of the settlers, 
entailing the division of the territory into three self-governing provinces and 
the postponement of a referendum on Independence to 1998. The agreement 
survived Tjlbaou's murder in 1989.(13)
B rita in  and decolonisation
Violence played a prominent role in the transition to Independence of five 
British colonies: Xalaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, and Southern Rhodesia. In the 
last case, nearly 20,000 people died in a guerrilla war lasting seven and a half 
years. (14) However, the war did not Involve the colonial power directly. In 
fact, it began several years after the settlers had unilaterally declared 
independence to resist evolutionary progress towards majority rule. The 
situation in Xalaya bore same similarities to that in Vietnam. As in that case, 
Japanese occupation was a crippling blow to the legitimacy of colonial rule. As 
in Vietnam, Communists played a leading role in the organisation of resistance 
to the Japanese. However, in Xalaya guerrilla warfare against the colonial 
power did not commence immediately after the defeat of the Japanese, though 
soon enough afterwards to owe much to the networks established during the war. 
The Xalayan Communist Party (XCP) launched its  offensive against the colonial 
power in 1946. In June of that year the colonial authorities Imposed a state of 
emergency. It was only lifted in 1960, three years after Xalaya*s Independence 
in 1957. However, the Insurgency had effectively been defeated by the end of 
1955. The main reason for the failure of the XCP's campaign was its  inability 
to attract significant support outside the ethnic Chinese community who formed 
a minority of the country's population.(15)
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The presence of a small but economically and politically powerful 
community of Yhite settlers constituted the main obstacle to a peaceful 
transition to independence in Kenya. The Kau Xau Insurgency which began in 
1952 was a product of agitation over the land question, aggravated by 
demographic pressures in the African reserves, and of African nationalist 
demands for political rights that Britain was reluctant to grant because of 
settler opposition. The settlers rather than the colonial authorities formed 
the main target of the Xau Xau campaign, though, in practice, the actual number 
of Vhite farmers killed in the course of the campaign was very small, 
particularly in comparison with the casualties among the African population.<16) 
A state of emergency was declared from the outset and British troops were 
dispatched to the colony. A significant effect of their arrival was to weaken 
the political bargaining power of the settlers since it  underlined their 
dependence on the colonial power to maintain law and order. After the troops 
had brought the Insurgency under control, the British government Introduced 
political reforms. The state of emergency was lifted in 1960 and elections 
conceding the principle of African majority rule were held in 1961. By the time 
that Independence was granted in 1963, the country's Prime Kinister was Jomo 
Kenyatta, the African nationalist leader whom the colonial authorities had held 
responsible far the Kau Xau rebellion and had imprisoned throughout the 
emergency.
In Cyprus the British colonial authorities faced not a campaign for 
independence but a demand from the island's Greek majority for union with 
Greece that was fiercely opposed by the Island's Turkish minority. Vhile the 
Turkish minority constituted only 20 per cent of the population, the island's
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proximity to Turkey made its wishes politically impossible to ignore. However, 
the possibility of ethnic conflict was of secondary Importance in Britain's 
reluctance to withdraw from the island. That was principally due to the 
strategic importance Britain attached to the military bases it  maintained on 
the island. This was underlined by an ill-considered ministerial statement in 
1954 that Britain would never give up sovereignty for this reason. (17) By the 
end of 1955, Britain faced a guerrilla war against colonial rule. A state of 
emergency was declared in JTovember 1955 and in Xarch 1956 the leading figure 
in the Greek campaign for enosls (union with Greece), Archbishop Xakarlos, was 
deported. The driving force behind the Insurgency was EOKA (Ethniki Orgatnosis 
Kyprion Agoniston -  National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). Its campaign 
was a mixture of classical guerrilla warfare conducted from the Troodos 
mountains and covert operations, Including bombings in the towns. A further 
dimension of the conflict was intercommunal violence between Greeks and Turks. 
After a ceasefire by EOKA at the end of 1958, Kakarios as the leader of the 
Greek Cypriots accepted a compromise solution whereby Cyprus became an 
independent state in 1960 with special constitutional guarantees for the Turkish 
minority, while Britain retained two military bases on the island. Xakarlos 
became the first President of the new state.
The conflict in Aden arose out of Britain's desire to retain a naval and 
air base it  had built at a port that had once formed a key link in the defence 
of the British empire east of Suez. Vhile decolonisation had reduced Aden's 
importance in this respect by I960, Britain s t ill  wished to maintain a 
strategic role in the Indian Ocean. Britain also had significant economic 
Interests in the Arabian peninsula that it  wished to protect. Vlth demands for
-  137 -
decolonisation growing Britain attempted to shore up Its position In Aden 
through the creation of the Federation of South Arabia. This attached Aden to 
conservative sheikhdoms that looked to Britain far their protection. The 
arrangement was designed to provide a way of justifying Britain's continuing 
presence In Aden Itself. Resentment at Aden's Inclusion in the Federation 
provided the impetus for the establishment in 1963 of the Rational Liberation 
Front (HLF). The British colonial authorities declared a state of emergency in 
December of that year after an attack on the High Commissioner.
A sustained campaign of urban guerrilla warfare against the British 
presence followed. A notable feature of the campaign was the active support 
the Insurrection received from the city's residents. (16) In this respect, the 
campaign was very different In character from urban guerrilla campaigns of 
groups such as the Tupomaros and the Kon toner os in Latin America. A 
complicating factor In the situation was division In the ranks of the 
nationalists with the formation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied 
South Yemen (FLOSY) in 1966. However, like the JTLF, FLOSY was committed to the 
violent expulsion of the British from Aden. Mutiny by the Aden Armed Police in 
1967 graphically demonstrated the strength of hostility to continuing British 
rule. By this time, Britain had abandoned any intention of maintaining a 
military presence in the Federation after independence, but too late to save the 
Federation. In Movember 1967 Britain withdrew unilaterally from Aden. The MLF 
emerged as the dominant force in the territory and set up the People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen.
Violence played a more minor role in the path to independence in many 
other countries. In these as in the cases described above, the colonial powers
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fiercely contested the political legitimacy of those who resorted to violence 
against colonial rule. Indeed, only towards the very end of the process of 
transition did the colonial powers concede that the principle of decolonisation 
had near universal applicability. As long as they Intended to maintain colonial 
rule in significant cases, they were bound to defend the legitimacy of colonial 
rule as a general principle both to justify their presence in those territories 
and to counter the claims to legitimacy of any anti-colonial forces they faced. 
Consequently, during the process of decolonisation itself there was little  
disposition on the part of the colonial power to validate anti-colonial 
movements by acknowledging that they enjoyed popular support. This was 
especially the case where an anti-colonial movement resorted to violence 
against colonial rule. Thus, it  was common for successful nationalist leaders 
to be dismissed by the colonial authorities as political extremists out of touch 
with opinion in their own community, before the actual process of transition to 
Independence began. Vhere violence formed a component part of the struggle for 
independence, the leaders of the nationalist movement were likely to be 
anathematised as terrorists by the colonial authorities, as happened to Xakarlos 
in Cyprus and Kenyatta in Kenya.(19)
The most effective way for nationalist movements to counter such 
propaganda was through action that demonstrated the extent of their popular 
support to the outside world. Covert actions such as bombings and 
assassinations that did not depend on the existence of popular support for the 
nationalist cause were of little  value from such a perspective. Consequently, 
whatever value such actions might have in the overall context of a violent 
campaign, their political value in terms of demonstrating the legitimacy of the
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nationalist cause was limited. It is therefore not surprising that covert 
actions of the armed propaganda type that anarchists pioneered during the 
nineteenth century played relatively little  part in the colonial conflicts of the 
1950s and 1960s. However, at the end of the colonial era which was reached in 
the late 1960s with the completion of the process of decolonisation in most 
areas of the world, the logic of the situation changed fundamentally.
Once the process of decolonisation was more or less complete, virtually 
everyone, and not least the former colonial powers themselves, had an Interest 
in the legltlmlsation of the new post-colonial order. That even entailed the 
support by the former colonial powers of nationalist leaders who had once taken 
up arms against them. In the case of Britain the acceptance of the leaders 
once anathematised as terrorists was signalled by the ritual of tea with the 
Queen. In the short term this reversal of attitudes tended to rob the term, 
terrorist, of some of its sting since it  created a precedent for the 
transformation of former terrorist leaders into statesmen and of former 
terrorists into freedom fighters.
S elf-determ ination
For the leaders of the newly Independent states themselves, often presiding 
over fragile political systems and faced with a revolution of rising 
expectations, it  was vitally important that there should be no question mark 
over their position as rulers. Shoring up their position involved glorifying 
the anti-colonial struggle and their role in it. It also entailed the 
representation of colonial rule as not just a fundamental denial of the 
principle of self-determination, but an affront to the human dignity of the 
people ruled over. Henceforth, colonial rule was presented as illegitimate in
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principle. The logical corollary of this proposition was that violence directed 
at the overthrow of colonial rule and at enabling the people to exercise their 
right to self-determination was legitimate. Since the former colonial powers 
themselves had a stake in the stability of the new post-colonial order, both 
because they s t ill  had significant economic interests in their former colonies 
and because the new order could be presented as a testimony to the success with 
which they had managed the process of decolonisation, there was little  
disposition on their part to contradict such propositions. The new 
international consensus on the interpretation of the principle of self- 
determination was incorporated in the 1970 D eclaration of P rin c ip les  of 
In te rn a tiona l Law concerning Friendly  R elations and Co-operation among S ta te s  
in  accordance w ith the  Charte r  of th e  United N ations. (20) I t  was passed by the 
United ITatlons General Assembly without a vote under a special 'consensus' 
procedure which reflected unanimity or near-unanimity among the members and 
which gave extra legal authority to resolutions adopted under it.
The declaration placed a duty on every state to refrain from any forcible 
action that deprived people of their right to self-determination. It proclaimed 
that those seeking to exercise their right to self-determination had not merely 
the right to resist but the right to seek external assistance for their 
struggle. Vhlle the declaration allowed for the possibility that people might 
not seek to exercise their right to self-determination through the creation of 
an independent state, it  insisted that the option of independence should remain 
available to any territory that did not form an integral part of an existing 
sovereign independent state. The right of secession from such a state was 
explicitly denied. The world the declaration envisaged was one that would be
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wholly made up of sovereign Independent states, equal in status, and possessing 
permanently fixed boundaries. By Implication, the declaration attached a 
presumption of Illegitimacy to any political arrangement that stood In the way
of the achievement of such a world. It was made clear In the declaration that 
'the people' entitled to self-determination should be interpreted simply as the 
will of a majority of the population living within a particular territory. In
practice, there remained considerable scope for argument over how this 
seemingly clear-cut principle should be applied in particular cases. And in any 
event, the restriction of the right of self-determination to territorial 
majorities was contestable.
For the most part, the declaration simply represented a p o st hoc 
endorsement of the new order that had been created as a result of 
decolonisation. However, there were a few situations in which Its Implications 
were more radical. In particular, it gave added international legitimacy to the 
struggles against Vhite minority rule in southern Africa and against Portuguese 
colonial rule. In this context, neither Portugal's redefinition of the terms of 
its rule by proclaiming its overseas territories provinces nor South Africa's 
claim that it was implementing the principle of self-determination through the 
creation of independent homelands cut much ice internationally. At the same 
time, the dawning of the post-colonial order did not make an immediate 
practical difference to the situation in southern Africa or in other parts of 
the Portuguese empire. By this time, guerrilla warfare was taking place in all 
of Portugal's territories on the African continent. It had also begun in South 
Vest Africa. In these territories, the form that the anti-colonial struggle 
would take had already been determined. In South Africa and in Rhodesia, the
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fonn of African nationalist opposition to Vhite rule s t ill  remained to be 
determined. At this point (the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 
1970s), no serious challenge existed to the continuation of Vhite rule.
Vhile Vhite minority rule in southern Africa and the Portuguese empire 
stood out as the most obvious examples of political arrangements that violated 
the international community's interpretation of the norm of self-determination, 
the end of the colonial era created opportunities for the exposure of other 
situations as anachronistic or anomalous in a post-colonial world. However, 
their exposure depended on those opposed to the sta tu s  quo being able to seize 
the moment to attract the attention of the world to their particular cauBe. At 
the Bame time, the logical implication of the propositions that colonial rule 
was illegitimate in principle and that violence directed at its overthrow was 
justified was that it  was sufficient to define a situation as colonial to 
provide a justification for violence directed at the overthrow of the s ta tu s  
quo. In particular, groups committed to the use of organised violence were 
freed from the imperative of demonstrating mass support for their actions as a 
way of legitimising their activities.
However, the disappearance of this imperative proved a distinctly double- 
edged development for the remaining anti-colonial movements. Groups with a 
very narrow or even non-existent popular base could grab the headlines through 
covert acts of violence that could be justified as striking a blow against 
colonialism and thereby outflank well established anti-colonial movements with 
long records of organising opposition to the colonial power. Such tactics 
tended to devalue the currency of anti-colonial violence in general. There was 
the further danger that a conflict fought at the level of covert action would
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favour the state, since almost all states had agents trained in appropriate 
6kllls for such a campaign.
After colonialism
Most nationalist movements in the post-colonial age faced another difficulty. 
This was to secure international acceptance of the proposition that the 
situation they faced was a colonial one. Given the link that had been 
established between the existence of colonial rule and the justification of 
political violence, it  was hardly surprising that there should be considerable 
reluctance for any but the most clear-cut cases to be defined as examples of 
colonial rule. In this context a further factor Intervened. Vhlle the passing 
of the colonial era marked the end of an age of formal, constitutional 
domination of much of the Third Vorld by major Vestem powers, it  did not usher 
in an era of equality among nations except in the most formal, legal terms.
Quite apart from the vast differences in power and wealth among states, the 
Vest s t ill  dominated the Third Vorld both economically and politically.
It did so in part through its  Influence over the elites of Third Vorld 
societies. In this context the leading power was not Britain or France but the 
United States. For example, although most of the states of Latin America had 
been Independent for more than a hundred years, the United States s t ill  
exercised a considerable measure of informal control over their political 
development. Both economic Interests and strategic considerations were factors 
in how this control was exercised. The effect was to align the United States 
with right-wing and authoritarian elements in societies characterised by 
extreme inequality in their distribution of wealth and power. In the 1950s the
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terxo, garilas, was coined in Latin America to describe pro-American and 
extremely right-wing factions within the military. <21 >
The ending of colonial rule naturally tended to put a spotlight on other 
forms of subordination. The contradiction between the claim of the new post- 
colonial order to embody relationships of equality between states and the 
reality of dependence of much of the Third Vorld led Inevitably to the 
questioning of the legitimacy of other forms of subordination. The concept that 
best encapsulated the existence of non-legal and non-constitutional forms of 
domination was imperialism. One consequence was a burgeoning of interest in 
theories of Imperialism both in the Vest and in the Third Vorld. This growth 
of interest in theories of imperialism Itself played a part in a mare general 
intellectual revival of Xarxism as a form of analysis since the most 
sophisticated explanations of imperialism as a force structuring relationships 
between the Vest and the Third Vorld tended to be rooted in Xarxism.(22) The 
issue that gave political resonance to the concept of Imperialism in this period 
was the war in Vietnam.
It provided a striking example of the lengths to which the United States 
was prepared to go to impose its will on a Third Vorld society. To all but the 
most blinkered supporters of American policy, the resistance the Americans 
encountered suggested that their efforts to create an alternative to Communist 
rule enjoyed little  popular support in South Vietnam. The lack of legitimacy of 
American intervention in Vietnam naturally led to a wider questioning of 
America's role in the Third Vorld. At the same time, the Incapacity of the 
United States to prevail in Vietnam underscored American weakness and 
vulnerability. In these circumstances, it  hardly seemed absurd to suggest that
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further Vietnams might bring about the collapse of the whole structure of 
American domination over the Third Vorld.
Violence -against. imperialism
Further, If violence against colonial rule was justified, it hardly seemed 
unreasonable to suggest that violence against imperialism was too. Indeed, the 
obvious inference to be drawn from most theories of imperialism was that 
imperialism represented a deeper and more fundamental system of domination 
than the formal structures of colonialism itself. It was therefore a short 6tep 
in theory to justify violence against imperialism. Thu6, nationalists who were 
concerned primarily with changing formal structures of power through secession 
from an existing First Vorld state, often found it  expedient to couch both their 
demands and their resort to violence against the central state in anti­
imperialist terms. Revolt in the peripheries of the First Vorld was another 
dimension of the questioning of the legitimacy of structures of domination, for 
the Third Vorld's subordination to the Vest was not the only structure of 
domination exposed by the passing of the colonial era.
Hierarchy within the Vest itself and particularly America's domination of 
the Vestem alliance also represented such a structure. It too became a target 
of the attack on imperialism. Hot surprisingly, the notion that the Vestern 
alliance itself was a function of imperialist domination proved most persuasive 
in countries such as Vest Germany and Japan that had been forced by reason of 
historical circumstance to play a largely passive and subordinate role within 
the alliance during the 1950s and 1960s. By contrast, there were few even on 
the left of the political spectrum in Britain who did not believe that the 
country's special relationship with the United States was fundamentally the
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product of free political choice, however much they might have deplored it.
This was one reason why Britain was so little  affected by organised violence 
from Sew Left groups. A group called the Angry Brigade operated briefly in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s and was responsible for a few, very minor acts of 
violence, but its  political Impact was negligible, even within the far left of 
the political spectrum.(23)
Readiness to resort to political violence in this period did not simply 
reflect the Influence of theories of imperialism on the legltlmisatlon of 
violence. It was also a reflection of the transitional character of the period 
between a colonial and a post-colonial world. In general, one would expect 
transition to weaken the effectiveness of a number of the usual restraints on 
the employment of violence. Habit provides an unpersuasive argument for 
passivity during a period of change, while the calculation of negative and 
positive sanctions becomes more uncertain. The turbulence that often 
accompanies a process of transition also tends to make the argument that the 
status quo provides a framework of security less convincing. At the same time, 
the supposition during times of transition that anything may be possible, if  
only the moment is seized, creates a climate conducive to the appearance of 
groups ready to gamble on the outcome of the use of violence to effect change. 
Admittedly, these arguments apply with more force to transition at a domestic 
level than to transition at a global level, as the impact of change at a global 
level is  much more variable in its  effect on behaviour at a domestic level.
Hone the less, there seems good reason to connect the onset of the age of 
terrorism with the transition taking place in world politics during the period 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Just as the rhetoric of anti-imperial Ism was used to Justify the use of 
covert violence by a very wide variety of groups with divergent objectives and 
differing levels of support and In vastly different political contexts, so the 
concept, terrorism, was employed to give coherence to a multitude of very 
different challenges to the sta tu s quo. However, there was slightly more to the 
term than simply a useful umbrella under which different strands of 
contemporary political violence could be Included. Firstly, It contained a clear 
and explicit implication that the violence so described was perceived as utterly 
and absolutely illegitimate. In effect, it  represented the clear drawing of a 
line between contemporary political violence and the violence of the colonial 
era. Secondly, the use of the term across Vestem societies to apply to 
particular tactics of covert violence, such as hijacking, hostage-taking, and 
attacks on diplomats, provided an early indication of a consensus In the Vest 
not to accord legitimacy to such methods, even if  It meant altering previous 
practice such as the leniency shown In the past to hijackers from Eastern 
Europe. This consensus s t ill  allowed room for disagreement In the Vest on how 
the political conflicts giving rise to violence should be dealt with. This was 
to be most apparent In relation to the Issue of the Palestinians. But these 
differences remained slight compared to the measure of concord there existed to 
face down the different manifestations of violence that made their appearance 
under the banner of anti-imperialism In the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Small groups thought they could justify the use of violence by claiming 
that they were striking a blow against imperialism, but this proved to be a 
snare. Fighting imperialism was not like fighting colonial rule. In the 
struggle against colonial rule, the relationship between means and ends was
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relatively clear. Colonial administrations formed concrete targets. Further, it  
was clear what the political boundaries of the contest for legitimacy were.
Both the relationship between means and ends and its  political limits were 
anything but clear in the battle against imperialism. Grotesque inequality in 
living standards between the First Vorld and the Third Vorld was a concrete 
reality, but imperialism as a theory of how such inequality was maintained was 
an abstraction from that reality. Depending on the theory, virtually anyone or 
anything could be presented as a legitimate target in the campaign against 
imperialism. The problem was that for the wider public to accept that such and 
such was a legitimate target required them to accept the theory. The obsession 
of groups engaged in covert violence with the propagation of lengthy 
manifestoes justifying and explaining their actions reflected a recognition on 
their part that their actions did not speak for themselves.
However, in practice, such manifestoes tended to be written in such 
abstractly ideological terms as to be incapable of striking a political chord 
with the wider public. That is s t ill the case. For example, when the Red Army 
Faction wounded a senior official in the German Ministry of the Interior in 
1990, it  issued a statement that the attempted assassination was the 'beginning 
of a long phase of struggle against the newly established Greater German/Vest 
European world power'. (24) Further, the very association of such manifestoes 
with acts of violence provided the public with the strongest possible motive 
for rejecting any political message they contained. By contrast, violence that 
tackled the Inequality in society directly, such as the actions of the Tupomaros 
in Uruguay in literally stealing from the rich and giving to the poor, did
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manage to secure a measure of public understanding and sympathy. But action of 
this sort was the exception rather them the rule.
Of course, some of the violent groups that Incorporated an anti- 
imperialist perspective in their programmes were also engaged in the pursuit of 
more concrete nationalist or local political objectives. Indeed, in practice, 
these objectives often played a more important role in their activities than the 
abstract battle against imperialism. Such groups were also often able to 
generate a measure of popular support on this basis. The attraction of putting 
an anti-imperialist gloss on their campaigns was that it  provided a 
unlversalist basis on which they could appeal for support in the outside world. 
However, it  also carried the danger of unlversalislng the basis of opposition to 
their objectives. This was especially likely to happen if  a group acted on its  
anti-imperial 1st rhetoric by attacking Vestem businessmen or diplomats. The 
publicity that could be gained by such action made it  a particularly tempting 
course to follow. However, association with such attacks also provided part of 
the explanation as to why separatist and nationalist groups using violence 
should have attracted the label of terrorist in this period, when prior to this 
period they had not. Attacks on foreign nationals came to be perceived as the 
essence of international terrorism.
However, the label of terrorism was also applied to violence within the 
confines of a single political system in a variety of political circumstances, 
though it  tended to be used with least reservation in relation to violence 
within the context of longstanding llberal-democracles. In the next two 
chapters two very different cases of organised violence within a liberal- 
democratic framework are examined. They provide more specific illustration of
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the process of the legitimisation of terrorism In the sense both of how groups 
attempted to justify their U6e of violence and of how opinion was mobilised 
against them.
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Chapter 6 - On th e  Fringe; P o li t ic a l  Violence In S tab le Democracies
Few organisations have been more closely identified with the concept of 
terrorism than the RAF <Rote Anaee Fraktion -  Red Army Faction) or Baader- 
Xelnhof group in Vest Germany. The story of the Baader-Meinhof group itself is  
easy to summarise. In April 1968, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and two 
accomplices planted fire bombs in two Frankfurt department stores, timed to 
detonate at midnight. Their arrest, trial, conviction, and imprisonment on 
charges of arson followed. In Kay 1970, Baader was sprung from custody during 
a visit to a library outside prison by a group that Included the journalist, 
Ulrike Kelnhof, an event that in retrospect was seen as marking the birth of 
the RAF. After a brief 6ojoum in June to a Palestinian training camp in Jordan 
which was arranged through contacts in Fatah, the group returned to Vest 
Germany, when it  began its  activities as an underground and in the process 
attracted new recruits to its  ranks. Kuch of the early activity of the group 
consisted of bank robberies. They caused a wave of hysteria through Vest 
Germany and a massive police operation to track down the perpetrators. In 
April 1971 the group published a manifesto, the Concept of the Urban Guerrilla, 
in the name of the Red Army Faction. It marked the first use of the term to 
describe the group. The manifesto proclaimed that the strength of the 
authorities' reaction to the group's activities was a proof of its  success. At 
the same time, it  derided chatterers in the fight against imperialism.
The first death to arise out of the group's underground activities occurred 
in July 1971 when a member of the RAF was shot dead in a shoot-out with a 
policeman. In October a policeman died when challenging two members of the 
group. The campaign reached a peak in Xay 1972 when two American army bases
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in Frankfurt and Heidelberg were bombed, killing four American soldiers. The 
bombings were carried out by the RAF in response to the escalation that month 
of American military action against Forth Vietnam, including the mining of 
Haiphong harbour. In the same month, the RAF bombed the headquarters of Axel 
Springer's rightwing publishing empire in Hamburg, injuring 17 print workers 
and office staff. In this case, there were telephone warnings that bombs were 
about to go off and that the building should be cleared but they were not 
believed by the telephonists who received them. The following month saw the 
arrest of the RAF's leading members. However, it  was Kay 1975 before the main 
trial of the group on a wide range of charges, Including murder, began. The 
trial reached a conclusion nearly two years later in April 1977 when Baader, 
Ensslin, and Raspe were sentenced to life imprisonment. By then two out of the 
five care figures in the organisation were dead. Holger Xelns died in the 
course of a hunger strike in November 1974, while Ulrike Xeinhof committed 
suicide in prison in Xay 1976 after falling out with other members of the group 
during the course of the trial. An indication of the conflict within the group 
was Ensslin's disavowal in court of the attack on Springer's headquarters, an 
attack with which Xeinhof was identified.(1)
Second generation
By the mid 1970s a second generation of the RAF and organisations associated 
with it, such as the 2 June Xovement, had come into being. Kuch of the violence 
of the second generation was directed at freeing prisoners or supporting their 
protests against the conditions under which they were being held. In February 
1975, the Christian Democrat candidate for Xayor of Vest Berlin, Peter Lorenz, 
was kidnapped. His kidnappers identified themselves as members of the 2 June
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Movement and demanded the release of six prisoners. Mane of the prisoners the 
kidnappers listed had been accused or convicted of murder. A statement issued 
by the kidnappers amounted to an acknowledgement that they had carefully 
pitched their demands to a level they thought the state was likely to meet.
Their calculation proved correct. Five of the six prisoners the kidnappers had 
named were flown to South Yemen where they were granted asylum. The sixth 
prisoner had refused to be part of the arrangement. Lorenz was released.
In April 1975 six people armed with pistols and explosives seized the Vest 
German Embassy in Stockholm in Sweden, taking 12 hostages in the process.
They identified themselves as members of the Holger Xelns Commando of the RAF. 
Their principal demand was the release of 26 prisoners, including the leading 
figures In the Baader-Xeinhof group. It was flatly rejected by the Vest German 
government. By this time the Embassy's military attache had already been 
murdered. His murder was followed by that of the economic attache, prompting 
the Swedish police to make preparations to storm the building. At this point, a 
series of explosions set off accidentally from within brought the siege to an 
end. One of the gunmen was killed outright by the explosions. Another died 
later from his Injuries.
Attempts to secure the release of RAF prisoners reached a peak in 1977.
In September 1977 the President of the Employers' Association, Hans-Xartin 
Schleyer, was kidnapped by members of the RAF. The kidnappers outlined their 
demands in a letter. Their principal demand was the release of 11 RAF 
prisoners, Including Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe. In October further pressure 
was put on the Vest German government by the hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner. 
The central demand of the four hijackers claiming to represent an organisation
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styling Itself the Struggle against Vorld Imperialism was, In the words of 
their leader, 'Captain Xohammed', 'the release of our comrades In German 
prisons'. (2) He turned out to be a known member of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). After stops at several airports, the plane 
ended Its journey at Mogadishu in Somalia, where It was stormed by members of 
GSG9, a special anti-terrorist unit of Vest Germany's Border Police. Three of 
the hijackers were killed and the fourth seriously wounded in the operation 
which was successful In securing the release of the plane's remaining 86 
passengers and crew. At an earlier point In the hijack, the plane's pilot had 
been murdered by the hijackers. Shortly after the news of the outcome of 
GSG9's storming of the plane was broadcast, Baader, Ensslin and Raspe committed 
suicide. The following day, Schleyer's body was discovered In the boot of an 
abandoned car in a town in France close to the country's border with Vest 
Germany.
The events in the autumn of 1977 did not mark the end of organised 
violence by the RAF and other groups. Acts of violence by such groups 
continued through the 1980s. Opposition to the deployment of American Cruise 
and Pershing missiles was one factor In the revival of organised left-wing 
violence, with much of it directed at American military personnel or property. 
Two Americans were killed by a car bomb in August 1985 in an attack on an 
American air force base. Prison conditions also continued to provide the focus 
for mobilisation of support for the RAF, with a series of hunger strikes by 
prisoners through the 1980s. The RAF also attacked prominent figures In Vest 
Germany's political and business establishments. A senior foreign ministry 
official and a director of Siemens were murdered in 1986.
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A leading Vest German banker, Alfred Herr hausen, chief executive of the 
Deutsche Bank, was killed by a bomb attack on his car at the end of Hovember 
1989. The RAF letter admitting responsibility attacked the wartime record of 
the Deutsche Bank as justification. It also demanded that RAF prisoners should 
be brought together in a single unit. (3) The RAF's campaign continued after 
German reunification. On 1 April 1991, the RAF shot dead Detlev Rohwedder, the 
head of the Treuhand holding company, charged with the task of privatising East 
German Industry at his home in Dusseldorf.(4> However, a year later the RAF 
issued a statement to the press, acknowledging that 'we have not been able to 
achieve a breakthrough in our combined international struggle'. (5) The RAF 
declared that it  would cease its  attacks on leading representatives of industry. 
At the same time, it  made a complete end to its  campaign of violence 
conditional on the release of some prisoners and free association in one prison 
for the rest.
The relatively muted reaction in Germany to the RAF's statement was a 
reflection of the fact that the RAF had long since ceased to be seen as a 
serious threat to the country's political stability. In fact, 1977 was the 
turning point in this respect. Stefan Aust, the author of the most detailed 
account of the activities of the Baader-Heinhof group, summarised their outcome 
at this point as follows:
By the autumn of 1977, sometimes called "German Autumn", 
twenty-eight people had lost their lives in RAF attacks or 
shooting incidents. Seventeen members of the urban 
guerrilla movement were dead. Two wholly innocent persons 
had been accidentally shot by the police in the course of
-  157  -
their Investigations. Forty-seven dead: that is  the 
balance of seven years' underground fighting in the Federal 
Republic. They were seven years that changed Vest 
Germany. (6)
There is relatively little  disagreement in the literature about the basic 
story itself* notwithstanding inevitable controversy about some of the details 
of particular violent events, including the suicides. However, there is much 
less agreement about the significance of these events. Explanations range from 
full-blown conspiracy theories that treat these events as part and parcel of a 
covert war by Moscow against the Western llberal-democracles to accounts which 
suggest that the group's activities were more the product of the personal 
circumstances members of the group found themselves in than of their particular 
political convictions. But before different explanations are examined, it  is  
useful to consider what needs to be explained. Vhile it  is  important that the 
roots of the violence itself should be understood, it  is  perhaps as important in 
this case to explain why events that involved relatively few people, whether as 
participants or victims, should have had such an enormous impact on the 
political life of Vest Germany. Indeed, the most puzzling aspect of the whole 
Btory is why the war of 'six against 6ixty million', (7> as Heinrich Boll put it  
in an article at the beginning of 1972, should have caused such political panic. 
But let us start by looking at the motivation of the principal participants 
first, before considering these wider issues.
Explanations
Klaus Vasmund has argued that personal factors played an important role in the 
slide into terrorism of the first generation of the RAF, though he also treats
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the radicallsatlon of the student protest movement during the late 1960s as a 
factor in the precipitation of political violence. He argues that the act of 
arson by Baader and Ensslin in 1968 which marked the first step on the path to 
resort to organised violence was a personal gesture on their part against 
bourgeois society, though he accepts that it  was a politically motivated protest 
against the Vietnam war and the political situation in Vest Germany as well.
He continues:
The Becond step, however, the liberation of Baader with the 
aid of firearms, was by no means politically motivated but 
was based on private or personal Interests: namely Gudrun 
Ensslin's desire to free her boyfriend from prison. The 
political justification for this act was provided much 
later. (8)
But it  was the seriousness of this crime that committed everyone Involved in it 
irrevocably to the underground, though the actual planning of the escape Itself 
had been made hurriedly by a group brought together spontaneously for the 
purpose by Ensslin. Little thought was given to the possible consequences. In 
the course of springing Baader from custody, a library official had been shot 
and seriously wounded and the day after the escape 'Wanted' posters went up 
across Vest Germany with a large photograph of Ulrike Xeinhof under the 
heading of 'Attempted Xurder in Berlin' and offering 10,000 DX reward for her 
capture. According to Astrld Proll, who was a member of the group Involved in
Baader's escape but who later broke with the RAF,
It was the first wanted campaign of this kind to be run in
post-Var Germany. It was an early indication of the
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tragic pattern of escalation and entanglement in which the 
state and the faction have been embroiled ever since, and
where each has persisted In Its Illusions about the enemy
In order to justify Its own merciless actions. <9>
One does not have to accept Proll's implicit equation of the actions of the 
state with those of the RAF to accept the farce of the argument she is putting 
forward. The demonlsatlon of groups such as the RAF meant that once 
individuals had crossed the threshold of illegality, their prospects of ever 
rejoining normal society were virtually non-existent. The logical alternative 
was to escalate their conflict with society, while seeking political 
rationalisations for their actions. In practice, the extremely exaggerated
reaction of the state, which treated their activities as a serious threat to the
country's political system, which they never were, simply lent credence to these 
rationalisations and encouraged more of the same. Once underground, the 
individual became dependent on the group for survival and subject to Its 
overpowering Influence. Even in prison there was no escape, as the Isolation 
imposed upon RAF prisoners, on the grounds of the danger they posed to society, 
cut them off from other possibilities. The point was actually made in court by 
Ulrike Xeinhof herself.
How can a prisoner kept in isolation show the authorities, 
always supposing he wanted to, that his conduct has 
changed? How? How can he do it  in a situation from 
which every expression of life has already been cut out? 
The prisoner kept in isolation has only one possible way
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of showing that his conduct has changed, and that's 
betrayal. <10>
Vasmund makes much of the importance of group dynamics in his account of the 
political socialisation of Vest German terrorists. (11) The obvious analogy is  
with the deviant behaviour of a criminal gang. Much of the behaviour of the 
RAF fits  such an analogy very well: the concern with the survival of the gang, 
with avenging the deaths of gang members, and the priority given to operations 
aimed at securing the release of comrades from prison as opposed to action to 
further RAF's political aims.
Political. .motivation
But where the Baader-Xeinhof group clearly differed from an ordinary criminal 
gang was in the political motivation of its  members, though admittedly RAF's 
political aims were Bomewhat vague. Two themes ran through the political 
pronouncements of the RAF's leading members. They were opposition to American 
imperialism and the subordinate position of Vest Germany within an imperialist 
system and the characterisation of the response of the authorities to their 
activities as fascist. At the trial in 1974 for her part in Baader's escape, 
Ulrike Xeinhof explained the organisation's aims as follows: 'The anti- 
imperialist struggle, if it  is to be more than mere chatter, means annihilation, 
destruction, the shattering of the Imperialist power system - political, 
economic and military'. (12)
It was typical of the RAF leader's bombastic rhetoric and her tendency to 
speak in generalities which failed to establish any clear relationship between 
means and ends. At the beginning of 1975 the leading figures in the 
organisation provided written answers from prison to questions from Per
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Spiegel. In response to a question on how they saw the political situation in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, they replied: 'An Imperialistic centre. U.S. 
colony. U.S. military base. Leading Imperialistic power in Vest Europe, in the 
EC. Second strongest military power In MATO. Representative of the U.S. 
imperialistic interests in Western Europe.'(13)
In the same Interview they identified themselves as Marxists rather than 
anarchists. But their Marxism was much more a crude tool of analysis than a 
guide to the hind of society they wished to see. In particular, there is little  
evidence to suggest that there was any admiration in the RAF for the Soviet 
model of government as practised anywhere in Europe. Indeed, on the contrary, 
the philosophy of action espoused by the Mew Left with which the RAF identified 
stood in direct opposition to the political Btance taken by orthodox 
Communists. Further, at an early stage they gave up any expectation that their 
activities might attract support in the Vest German working class, which they 
wrote off in Marxist terms as a labour aristocracy. It was among students and 
marginal groups in society that they looked to recruit supporters, while they 
identified politically with Third Vorld liberation movements. Thl6 was most 
clearly reflected in the RAF's links with various Palestinian groups.
In the early years of their activities, the RAF placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the Vietnam war as a justification for their actions. The 
similarity between American actions in Vietnam and Mazi atrocities was a 
persistent theme of the defence lawyers during the main trial of the leading 
members of the first generation of the RAF. Further, the defence attempted to 
call witnesses who could testify that the American bases in Vest Germany which 
had been attacked by the RAF had played an important role in the American war
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effort in Indochina. However, the judges trying the case ruled consideration of 
such evidence inadmissible on the ground that the conduct of the Vietnam war 
was not relevant to the charges the defendants faced. The issue of the Vietnam 
war had also played a part in the 1968 trial of Baader and Ensslin for arson. 
They had claimed that they had committed the offence as a protest against 
indifference to the killing in Vietnam. Their claim then to have acted out of 
conviction was rejected by the presiding judge because it  had taken them seven 
months to confess to the crime.
Videspread opposition to the Vietnam war, especially among the younger 
generation of Vest Germans, was a factor in the popular sympathy that existed 
for the group when they first went underground. Such sympathy was at its  
peak after the death of Petra Schelm in a shoot-out with the police in July 
1971. Ten days after this episode, the Allensbacher Institute of Public Opinion 
published the results of a poll on public attitudes to the group's activities. 
Eighteen per cent of the sample accepted the proposition that the group was 
acting mainly out of political convictions. One in four respondents under the 
age of 30 admitted to sympathy for the RAF. Five per cent of the sample said 
they would be willing to shelter wanted members of the group overnight from the 
police, (14) The poll was a striking indication of the degree of alienation from 
the political system that s t ill existed at this time in Vest Germany, despite 
the fact that a reformist coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD) and Free 
Democrats (FDP> was in office, having come to power in 1969 with a pledge to 
introduce greater democracy into all areas of social and political life. The 
existence of such sympathy also in part explains why the activities of the RAF 
had caused such political panic in the establishment. However, at this point
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the RAF had not carried out any acts of premeditated murder. Once this line 
was crossed, sympathy for the group very quickly evaporated, leaving the RAF 
with a minuscule political base on the fringe of society.
Vest Germany in the 1960s
To understand the political roots of the first generation of the RAF, it  Is 
necessary to examine the political situation in Vest Germany before the group 
went underground. The late 1960s were a period of widespread student unrest in 
Vest Germany, as they were elsewhere in the industrialised world. In Vest 
Germany's case, conflict between the generations was a particularly important 
aspect of the unrest, exacerbated by the suspicion with which the post-war 
generation viewed their parents' record of usually at best passivity and at 
worst complicity during the Fazi era. The fact that former members of the Fazi 
Party were to be found in prominent positions in the liberal-democratic 
structures of the Federal Republic was a contributory factor to alienation from 
the political system among the younger generation. Questioning of the 
authenticity of the country's conversion to llberal-democracy was by no means 
confined to the young of left and right in Vest Germany. That democracy had 
shallow roots in Vest Germany was a common prejudice elsewhere in the Vest. (15) 
It was reflected in popular culture and in the cinema, in particular. For 
example, the implication that demons lurked just beneath the surface calm of 
Vest German life formed the highly effective basis of a very successful British 
spy thriller, The O ulller Memorandum.(16)
Another factor in the alienation from the political system was the 
existence from 1966 of a grand coalition between the country's two main 
parties, the Christian Democrats and the SPD. It was made possible by the
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SPD's moderation of its political stance on a whole range of issues in order to 
advance its acceptability as a party of government. The formation of the 
coalition made debate within the system even more constricted and such debate 
as s t ill  took place seemed increasingly out of touch with the tides of popular 
opinion outside parliament. An economic recession in 1966 and 1967 and the 
passage of emergency legislation in 1968 intensified dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of the political system.
One consequence of the belief that parliament no longer represented the 
full range of opinions in the country was the formation on the left of the 
Extraparliamentary Opposition, while the Heo-Eazl HDP became the beneficiary of 
right-wing protest votes against the system. Its rise was particularly 
unwelcome to the political establishment since it  prompted foreign concern over 
the future of the democratic system in Vest Germany. Disaffection was 
particularly marked among students. In a poll of student opinion at the end of 
1968, only 35 per cent of the respondents declared themselves satisfied with 
the existing political parties. The disaffection existed at both ends of the 
political spectrum, with 19 per cent of students wanting to be able to vote for 
a party to the right of the Christian Democrats, while 28 per cent wanted to be 
able to vote for a Communist party or other party to the left of the SPD.C17)
Support for the student protest movement was especially strong in Vest 
Berlin. In the 1960s Vest Berlin with relatively cheap accommodation and an 
exciting lifestyle in comparison with the provinces acted as a magnet for young 
people. Residence in Vest Berlin offered young men the further advantage of a 
means of escaping military conscription. A radical youth subculture grew up in 
Vest Berlin that was reflected in the size and frequency of student
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demonstrations in the city In 1967 and 1968. The response of the authorities 
to such expressions of dissent was not gentle. In a notorious episode in June 
1967 a student demonstrator, Benno Ohnesorg, was shot dead by a policeman 
during a protest against the visit to the city by the Shah of Iran. This 
episode was mentioned by a number of people who later turned to violence as an 
influence on their decision to join the underground. According to Astrid Proll, 
it was a watershed in Ulrike Xeinhof's life. (18) The event gave its name to the 
2 June Movement.
The shooting was not an isolated incident. Large numbers of students were 
Injured in aggressive police action during the course of the visit and, 
incredibly, agents of the Shah's own security police, SAVAK, were permitted to 
weigh into the protesters with cudgels that included steel bars. The torrent of 
abuse directed by the Springer press against the student movement was a factor 
in the polarisation of opinion underlying such violence. Vhen a young, right- 
wing house-palnter shot the student leader, Rudi Dutschke, in Vest Berlin in 
April 1968, there were demonstrations against the Springer press by angry 
students who blamed the newspapers for the attempt on Dutschke's life. Violent 
clashes between the police and students ensued when students attempted to block 
distribution of Springer's papers. (19)
Vhlle the student protest movement was a formative influence on many of 
those who joined the RAF in the 1970s, the relationship between the 
radicalisation of the student movement in this period and the resort to 
organised violence was by no means direct. From some of the statements made 
by leading figures in the first generation it  would appear that disappointment 
at the subsidence of the protest movement provided the real trigger for the
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move towards violence. For example, Ulrike Xeinhof decrlbed the reasons for 
RAF's formation in 1970 as follows:
Hauseated by the proliferation of the conditions they found 
in the system, the total commercialization and absolute 
mendacity in all areas of the superstructure, deeply 
disappointed by the actions of the student movement and 
the Extraparliamentary Opposition, they thought it  
essential to spread the idea of armed struggle. Hot 
because they were so blind as to believe they could keep
that initiative going until the revolution triumphed in
Germany, not because they imagined they could not be shot 
or arrested. Hot because they so misjudged the situation 
as to think the masses would simply rise at such a signal. 
It was a matter of salvaging, historically, the whole state 
of understanding attained by the movement of 1967/1968; it  
was a case of not letting the struggle fall apart 
again. (20)
Xeinhof's account fits nicely Xerkl's 'fire sale theory' of political violence 
discussed in chapter 4. Kerkl applied it  to the actions of the far right
following their disappointment at the failure of the HPD to break through the 5
per cent barrier to representation in the Vest German parliament, but it can as 
easily be used to explain the turn towards organised violence by elements of 
the left. Richard Rubenstein's notion of terrorism as 'an isolated 
intellectual's dream of efficacy*(21) would also seem to be an apposite 
description of the case of Ulrike Xeinhof herself.
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Institutionalisation of the RAF
Vhat the political situation in Vest Germany in the 1960s does not explain was 
the capacity of the RAF to attract new generations to its  ranks. It can be 
explained in part in terms of a knock-on effect of the original campaign, with 
the deaths of members of the first generation providing the emotional Impetus 
for new recruits to the RAF from among the larger pool of the group's 
sympathisers and so on. It is also possible to make some generalisations about 
the type of person who joined the RAF as a result of the research that has been 
carried out on the social and psychological attributes of people convicted of 
involvement in its activities. Xembers of the RAF were mainly drawn from the 
upper middle classes, with an above average level of education, though only a 
minority ever held full-time employment. Conflict at home was a frequent 
feature of their family background. Personal connections often played an 
important role in drawing the individual into the underground. Rot merely were 
a large number of couples to be found in the RAF, but brother and sister pairs 
were also common.
Vide publicity has been given to these findings and there has been a 
tendency to extrapolate them to other situations where they emphatically do not 
apply, such as northern Ireland where membership of paramilitary organisations 
is  overwhelmingly working class in terms of social background. It has also 
encouraged the belief that it  is possible to construct a psychological profile 
of the terrorist. The very fact that those engaged in organised violence in 
Vest Germany lacked any political base of substance within the society itself 
does perhaps suggest that such violence may be a pathological phenomemon, at 
least in part. In support of this proposition can be cited the contribution
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that the Socialist Patients Collective in Heidelberg, a group experimenting with 
new methods of therapy, made to the development of the RAF. (22)
However, such explanations have some very obvious limits. Social and 
psychological similarities among members of violent organisations are in 
practice not that telling as factors, simply because the actual numbers engaged 
in any kind of political violence have been so small. In fact, they would form 
an infinitesimal proportion of people who shared all the most typical social 
and psychological characteristics of convicted members of the RAF. (23) Further, 
if  social and psychological factors were so important, one would expect that 
countries with a similar social structure to that of Vest Germany would face a 
similar pattern of political violence. But while other developed countries in 
Western Europe have also been afflicted by small-group violence to varying 
degrees, there have been very large differences in the patterns of political 
violence in the countries affected. The differences suggest the primacy of 
political factors. The problem of explaining the survival of the RAF even simply 
as a fringe phenomenon remains.
The obvious implication that might be drawn from RAF's survival through 
the 1980s is  that profound alienation from the political system continued to 
exist on the margins of Vest German society and that this resulted in the 
institutionalisation of terrorism. Reaction on the left to new political 
developments, such as the HATO decision on the deployment of Cruise and 
Pershing missiles and the nuclear sabre-rattling of the Reagan Administration 
in the early 1980s, are one possible explanation for such alienation. From this 
perspective, one might argue that the end of the Cold Var has so profoundly 
changed the German political environment as to remove what had been a potent
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source of alienation on the left of the political spectrum, the relationship 
between the United States and Vest Germany In the context of the Cold Var 
system.(24) Alternatively, It can be argued that more permanent factors lie at 
the root of such alienation. Thus, the RAF can be treated as the product of the 
long term influence on German society of traditions of political thought, 
particularly anarchism, that deny the state's legitimacy and that have 
previously given rise to political violence. From this perspective, it  is  the 
tranquillity of German society during the 1950s that is  exceptional and 
requires explanation. Certainly, fear that the emergence of the RAF represented 
a revival of traditions of political violence that had destabilised government 
in Germany in the past was an important factor in the political reaction to the 
initial activities of the Baader-Xelnhof group. (25)
Incomplete legitim acy
Another approach is to suggest that a factor underpinning both left-wing and 
right-wing political violence in Vest Germany was the incomplete legitimacy of 
the Federal Republic of Germany; incomplete because of the partition of Vest and 
East Germany and because of the restraints imposed on its  policies as a legacy 
of the Fazi era. The collapse of democratic institutions under the Veimar 
Republic due to the system's deficiency in legitimacy provides the obvious 
historical precedent for this view and, indeed, the exaggerated reaction to the 
appearance of organised violence in Vest Germany owed much to the anxiety that 
history was repeating itself. In fact, at no stage did the level of political 
violence in Vest Germany ever provide any justification for such fears about 
the durability of the country's democratic institutions, explicable as the fears 
are as a response to the burden of the past and the political establishment's
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own Inner doubts about the legitimacy of the Federal Republic. One might have 
expected the re-unification of Germany in 1990 to have ended all such fears, 
but they have been kept alive by new problems, in particular, the economic 
difficulties and the rise of xenophobia and attacks on foreigners that have 
accompanied re-unification.
If the thesis of 'incomplete legitimacy' by Itself does not provide a 
convincing explanation of organised left-wing violence in the 1970s, it  was 
certainly the case that political violence gained credibility from the fact that 
the state Itself treated such violence as a serious threat to the political 
system. To provide a comparative perspective on this point it  is  useful to 
compare Vest Germany's reaction to 47 deaths in seven years stemming directly 
or indirectly from the Baader-JCeinhof group's campaign with the reaction of a 
more secure liberal-democracy to a much higher level of violence over a shorter 
period. Jeffrey Ross and Ted Gurr have compiled figures for three categories of 
terrorism in the United States during the 1960s using the Few York Times Index. 
According to their figures, there were six reported deaths between July 1968 
and December 1970 as a result of Vhlte supremacist attacks against Blacks and 
civil rights workers. This category Includes 'clandestine bombings, arson, 
shootings, beatings, and major cross-burning incidents but excludes mob attacks 
and riots'. (26) In the same period there were 49 deaths as a result of Black 
activists' attacks on Vhites and shootouts with police. This category excludes 
violent acts during ghetto riots. Four deaths resulted from the third category 
of anti-war and anti-establishment bombings and arson. In short, there were a 
total of 59 reported deaths as a result of what would now be classlfed as 
terrorism in a matter of two and a half years. However, the figures for deaths
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tend to understate the extent of such violence. For example, In evidence to 
Congress, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury reported that there had been 
a total of 4,330 bombings In the United States In the period from January 1969 
to April 1970.(27)
However, while there was widespread concern In the United States In the 
late 1960s over the much broader Issue of violence In general, bombings and the 
like were not conceptualised as a separate problem of terrorism, nor was 
terrorism per se  seen as a serious threat to the political system. In short, 
what Gurr has carefully separated out was seen as only part of a much wider 
problem of violence In the society. Further, the need to address the social, 
economic, and political Issues underlying violence in a broad sense was 
accepted. Indeed, it was recognised that the health of the country’s political 
system was at stake. It is Interesting to speculate what the political 
consequences would have been if  clandestine violence had been separately 
conceptualised as a problem of terrorism and the organisations and Individuals 
responsible systematically labelled as terrorist.
It seems reasonable to suggest, firstly, that it  would have been more 
difficult for any reforms to have been carried through and, secondly, that 
America would be facing today a qualitatively much more serious problem of 
organised violence of all types. The United States is  fortunate that its most 
notorious terrorist organisation, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), and Its 
most notorious terrorist, the exceptionally unfortunate Patty Hearst, owe their 
reputation to events In the mid 1970s by which time much of the violence 
associated with the civil rights movement and protest over the Vietnam war had 
burnt itself out. (28) Of course, the very fact that this was a period of
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relative domestic tranquillity in the United States made it much easier and 
much more likely that the violence of a group like the SLA would be singled out 
in this way.
The argument that the problem of political violence in Vest Germany was 
exacerbated by the overreaction of the authorities and their treatment of the 
problem as a much greater threat to the political institutions than it  was ever 
capable of being helps to explain the durability of political violence in the 
1970s. However, it is not quite so helpful in explaining its  persistence 
through the 19806 since after the freeing of hostages at Mogadishu the belief 
that such violence posed a serious threat to the survival of democratic 
institutions in Vest Germany clearly subsided. The collapse of Communist rule 
in East Germany has uncovered some evidence of assistance to Vest German 
terrorists by the Stasl, but not on a scale or of a character to account for the 
persistence of the violence in Vest Germany.<29)
A more significant factor was the fact that the problem of political 
violence continued to be conceptualised as one of terrorism. The effect has 
been to give disparate violent events a coherence and a continuity they would 
otherwise lack. For example, the Munich beer festival bomb in September 1980 
is  typically treated as the very centrepiece of right-wing terrorism in Vest 
Germany, notwithstanding the absence of evidence that the perpetrator was 
acting as a member of any group committed to the use of violence and the 
difficulty of divining his intentions from the circumstances in which the bomb 
actually exploded. Ironically, there would seem good reason to suppose that 
both the continuity and the coherence imposed on events by the concept of 
terrorism have been factors in the legitimisation of political violence by
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removing from Individuals joining underground organisations or even acting 
Independently of any organisation the psychological burden of justifying 6uch 
violence ab in itio .
From the histories of many violent organisations it  would seem that the 
burden of justifying murder in practice and not simply in theory is  a very 
considerable one, but once that threshold is  crossed very few restraints on 
what is  accepted as permissible survive. Vhereas it  took nearly two years from 
the birth of the RAF to the organisation's involvement in what were 
unambiguously acts of premeditated murder, no such inhibition has been evident 
in the behaviour of the second and subsequent generations of the RAF, a fact 
reflected in an increase in serious offences by left-wingers during the 
1980s. (30) The Vest German case is quite typical. Even in the far more 
violent conditions of Forthern Ireland, more than a year passed between the 
formation of the Provisional IRA committed to fight the British military 
presence in the province and the death of the first British soldier in the 
conflict.
In the case of the Italian Red Brigades (Brigate Fosse -  BR) launched in 
1970, 'the first occasion on which the BR carried out a premeditated act of 
cold-blooded murder* (31) was in June 1976, with the killing of the chief 
procurator of Genoa and his two bodyguards. It clearly becomes easier for 
members to carry out acts of murder and to justify such acts to themselves 
when the organisation has already crossed that threshold or where a new group 
is  able to claim more or less direct descent from such an organisation. 
Fotwithstanding the extremely negative overtones of terrorism as a term, the 
state's conceptualisation of political violence as a problem of terrorism is
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likely to assist such a process of legitimisation by placing fresh outbursts of 
violence in such a framework of purposeful action. This does not only apply to 
the behaviour of groups on the fringe of the political spectrum. The relative 
ease with which agents of any state can be persuaded to kill, even outside the 
context of self-defence or war, illustrates just how important the framework in 
which acts of violence or force are carried out generally is.
In this chapter, the case of organised left-wing violence in Vest Germany 
has been examined in some depth with only a few allusions to other cases. Eut 
this case is  sufficiently typical of covert small-group violence in the 
industrial liberal-democracles to provide the basis of some generalisations 
about the nature of political violence in such societies. However, one 
qualification is necessary. It is by no means typical of industrial liberal- 
democracles in which the main political cleavages are territorial and ethnic 
rather than Ideological. Situations in which ethnic divisions co-exist with 
conflict over what constitutes the legitimate territorial boundaries of political 
authority are capable of generating violence on a qualitatively different scale 
from those in which class and Ideology provide the main basis of political 
divisions. These situations are examined in the next chapter through a case 
study of the northern Ireland conflict. But apart from such cases, it  is  
evident that organised political violence in liberal-democracles in the 
industrialised world is almost invariably a fringe phenomenon, though in a few 
cases the actual level of violence as measured by fatalities has been higher 
than occurred in Vest Germany. The basic reason that it  is a fringe phenomenon 
and seems likely to remain so is the difficulty groups resorting to covert
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violence have encountered in attracting and retaining significant levels of 
support for their activities.
Protest and liberal-democracy
In a liberal-democracy in an industrialised society there are many more 
opportunities for participation in politics than simply casting a ballot every 
four or five years, though for many people that provides a sufficient 
justification for according legitimacy to government in such a society. As 
discussed in the last chapter, liberal-democracles generally permit the peaceful 
mobilisation of popular opinion through the holding of mass demonstrations and 
mass demonstrations as expressions of public opinion often exert considerable 
influence on government policy. However, such demonstrations rarely challenge 
the legitimacy of government as such. In principle, it  is  possible for an 
elected government to Ignore even the largest demonstrations, though the danger 
exists, if  it does, that the legitimacy of the political system Itself may be 
called into question by at least some of the participants in such 
demonstrations, thereby creating the basis for smal 1-group violence.
For example, the decision of Vestem European governments to proceed 
(temporarily as it turned out) with the deployment of a new generation of 
American medium-range missiles in the face of huge protests against the policy 
in the early 1980s was widely seen as a factor in the revival or the initiation 
of small-group violence on the left in a number of these countries. However, 
with good reason, governments are usually far more concerned with the electoral 
consequences of Ignoring public opinion than they are about the danger of 
small-group violence as a by-product of resisting demands bached by mass 
demonstrations. This is because it usually takes much more than the disregard
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by government of public opinion over a particular issue to produce a violent 
reaction even from small groups on the fringe of society.
The myth of popular sovereignty s t ill  remains sufficiently strong that 
there is  very great reluctance right across the political spectrum to challenge 
the legitimacy of the decisions of an elected government in a liberal-democracy 
through covert violence. In practice, the influence of anarchist ideas rejecting 
the whole framework of the state and the state system remains extremely slight. 
It is in relation to issues where that myth of popular sovereignty is  most 
difficult to sustain that political violence is  most likely to arise and that is 
in the field of international relations. Thus, if  it  appears that an elected 
government's decision is the result not of the free will of its  members but 
the consequence of the country's subordination to a foreign power, its  
legitimacy will be compromised to the extent that covert violence may occur. 
But, as the frequency with which American installations and personnel have been 
attacked in Vestera Europe suggests, the target in the first instance is likely 
to be the foreign power perceived as being behind the decision.
However, the option of non-violent forms of protest in a liberal-democracy 
makes any kind of political violence very difficult to justify and underpins a 
general perception in liberal-democracles of covert violence as illegitimate and 
lacking in any significant measure of popular support. Indeed, so strong is  
this perception that there is a tendency in liberal-democracies to believe that 
covert violence lacks popular support wherever it  occurs, even outside the 
context of a stable, liberal-democratic framework of government. Quite clearly, 
this is  not necessarily the case. Because ideologically based covert violence 
is  for the most part accurately perceived as lacking a political base in a
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liberal-democracy, such violence often appears not merely wrong for that reason 
but also quite Incapable of bringing about any political change for the same 
reason. Consequently, it may appear virtually devoid of political meaning. 
Indeed, the horror such violence evokes has as much to do with public 
perception of its apparent irrationality as it  is  a response to its  lethal 
consequences. In fact, even in the most severely affected of the industrialised 
countries, ideologically based covert violence k ills extremely few people in 
comparison with other causes of violent death. The impression that such 
violence is irrational derives from the huge distance that appears to exist 
between the means used and the ends sought, in so far as these are discernible 
at all. Ironically, it  is from the state's reaction that it tends to derive its  
political significance.
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Chapter 7 -  Bpinb Culture; The Case of F o rt hem  Ireland 
The case of northern  Ireland Is  frequen tly  c ite d  in  books on te rro rism . <1 > 
Indeed, I t  i s  ra re  fo r books th a t  deal with te rro r ism  on a g lobal b a s is  not to  
r e fe r  to  no rthern  Ireland. In many ed ited  works, p o l i t ic a l  violence in  n o rthern  
Ire land  i s  considered a su ff ic ie n tly  im portant example of te rro rism  to  r a te  a 
ch ap te r, o r even two chap ters, on the  p a r tic u la rs  of no rthern  Ire lan d 's  
experience. (2) The fa c t th a t  the  p resen t wave of violence in  n o rthern  Ireland  
d a tes  from th e  la te  1960s, coinciding with th e  onset of the 'age of te rro r ism ', 
and th e  in te rn a tio n a l perception of the  United Kingdom as  a model l ib e ra l-  
democracy a re  two fa c to rs  th a t  have underpinned the  a sso c ia tio n  of the province 
w ith te rro r ism . By c o n tra s t, the  impact of th e  l i te r a tu r e  on te rro rism  on the  
study of th e  northern  Ireland c o n flic t has been s l ig h t .  The term , te rro rism , 
does not even appear in  the  index of John V hyte's m ag is te ria l survey of the  
l i te r a tu r e  on th e  c o n flic t. <3)
The reason fo r th is  i s  not sympathy among a n a ly s ts  of the  c o n f lic t fo r  
th e  proponents of violence in  e ith e r  community in  n o rthern  Ireland . Rather i t  
i s  p rin c ip a lly  because few academic a n a ly s ts  of the  c o n f lic t would endorse the  
assum ptions th a t  use of the  term tends to  imply, in  p a r tic u la r , th a t  a 
leg itim a te  p o li t ic a l  order e x is ts  th a t  i s  being challenged by the  violence of a 
tin y  m inority  of ex trem ists . The weakness of such a c h a ra c te risa tio n  of the  
v io lence in  northern  Ireland, in sharp  c o n tra s t to  th e  c r itic ism  to  be made of 
such a c h a rac te risa tio n  of p o li t ic a l  violence in  Vest Germany, i s  th a t  i t  
underestim ates the  g rav ity  of the  c o n flic t in  n o rth e rn  Ireland and th e  ex ten t to  
which th e  violence i s  embedded in th e  deep se c ta r ia n  d iv is io n  in  th e  so c ie ty  
between P ro te s ta n ts  and C atholics.
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Partition
n o rth e rn  Ireland , com prising s ix  of th e  32 counties of co lon ia l Ireland , was 
e s ta b lish e d  in  1920 a s  an autonomous p o l i t ic a l  e n ti ty  w ith in  th e  United Kingdom 
to  accommodate P ro tes tan t opposition  to  I r is h  Home Pule. That opposition  
re f le c te d  the  in te n s ity  of sec ta ria n  d iv is io n s  in  Ireland , e sp ec ia lly  in  th e  
n o r th -e a s t  of th e  is lan d  where P ro te s ta n ts  formed a m ajority  of th e  population. 
The d iv ide  as  a source of c o n flic t on th e  is lan d  went back to  th e  beginning of 
th e  17th Century when P ro tes tan t p la n ta tio n s  were estab lish ed  in  U ls te r to  
secure th e  te r r i to r y  fo r the B ritish  crown under King James 1. The se ttlem en ts  
and th e  land con fisca tion  th a t accompanied them prompted a re v o lt  by th e  
C atholic  na tive  population in 1641, which was marked by a tro c i t ie s  ag a in s t 
P ro te s ta n ts , such as the  drowning of 100 men, women, and ch ild ren  a t  Portadown.
The period of P ro tes tan t weakness was re la tiv e ly  sh o rt- liv e d . A 
consequence of the  v ic to ry  of (P ro te stan t) King Villiam  over (Catholic) King 
James a t  the  B attle  of the Boyne in  1690 was P ro te s ta n t p o li t ic a l  predominance 
in  Ireland . A century la te r , follow ing s e c ta r ia n  c o n f lic t in  th e  U ls te r 
countryside, the  Orange Order was founded to  commemorate King W illiam 's v ic to ry  
and to  ensure th e  maintenance of P ro te s ta n t predominance. In th e  19th Century, 
B e lfa s t, w ith a rap id ly  growing population as  a re s u lt  o f the  in d u s tr ia l  
revo lu tion , became the main focus of s e c ta r ia n  c o n flic t. There were r i o t s  in  
the  c i ty  as a r e s u lt  of antagonism between the  two communities in  1835, 1843, 
1857, 1864, 1872, 1884, 1886, and 1898.(4)
A fter p a r ti t io n , Northern Ire land  e lec ted  12 members to  th e  House of 
Commons in  London. They formed fo r th e  most p a r t  a bare ly  noticed  con tingen t 
on th e  C onservative benches, p a r tic u la r ly  as d iscussion  of the  p rov ince 's
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a f f a i r s  in  W estminster was not perm itted in  deference to  the  ex istence  of a 
N orthern Ireland parliam ent and government. For alm ost 50 years th e  B ritish  
p o l i t ic a l  system was insu la ted  from events in  n o rthern  Ireland and successive 
B r it is h  governments turned a b lind eye to  th e  way th a t  the  U nionist p a rty  ran  
northern  Ireland . This was on the s e l f - f u l f i l l in g  b a s is  th a t  only P ro te s ta n ts  
could be tru s te d  to  support the link  with B rita in . C atholics, c o n s titu tin g  over 
a th ir d  of the  p rovince 's population, were regarded as reb e ls  a t  h e a rt who had 
to  be kept in  th e i r  place. Their unsuccessful re s is ta n c e  to  p a r t i t io n  provided 
a ready ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r d iscrim ination  a g a in s t them in  the  new p o li t ic a l  
e n tity . Their subordination  was fu rth e r underlined by emergency le g is la tio n  
exclusively  d irec ted  a g a in s t the Catholic community and re ta in ed  through long 
periods of tra n q u il l i ty .
Orig ins of the  p resen t. Troubles
This system remained unchanged u n til the  1960s when d e te r io ra tin g  economic 
cond itions in  th e  province, due in p a r t to  th e  decline of i t s  tra d it io n a l  
in d u s tr ie s , provided the impetus fo r reform during  the  prem iership  of Terence 
0'ITeill. P o li t ic a lly , reform acted as a stim ulus to  C atholic demands fo r 
equality  of trea tm en t w ithin Northern Ireland  th a t  was re fle c ted  in  the  
emergence of th e  c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement. I t  a lso  prompted a backlash among 
P ro te s ta n ts  who blamed reform fo r the  ending of C atholic acquiescence in  th e i r  
subordination. Hardline L oyalists  regarded th e  c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement as a p lo t 
to  b ring  about a united  Ireland, the t ra d it io n a l  aim of I r ish  Republicans.
Their fe a rs  were a lso  aroused by the so c ia l and economic tren d s  of the  period, 
p a r tic u la r ly  the  erosion  of re s id e n tia l seg regation  between the  communities, 
which they saw as  a th re a t to  P ro tes tan t dominance.
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D isorder grew out of the  c o n flic t between C atholic  hopes and P ro te s ta n t 
fe a rs . The p resen t phase of the  Troubles, th e  co llo q u ia l term fo r  periods of 
u n re s t in  Ireland , Is  generally  dated from October 1968 and v io len t c lashes 
between the  po lice  and c iv i l  r ig h ts  dem onstrato rs who defied a government order 
banning them from marching through northern  Ire la n d 's  second c i ty , Londonderry. 
In August 1969 B ritish  troops were d ispatched  to  th e  province to  a id  the  c iv i l  
power a f te r  prolonged r io t in g  in  Londonderry and B e lfas t had exhausted th e  
resources of the  local secu rity  fo rces. I n i t ia l ly ,  C atholics welcomed the  
a r r iv a l  of B r itish  troops, not merely because they  p ro tec ted  C atholic  housing 
e s ta te s  from a tta c k s  by L oyalist mobs, but because th e i r  presence enhanced the 
B r it is h  government's re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r how no rth e rn  Ireland was governed. At 
th e  same tim e, th e  in te rn a tio n a l a tte n tio n  th a t  th e  s itu a tio n  in  northern  
Ire land  was a t tra c t in g  ra ised  Catholic ex pec ta tions of fa r-reach in g  reform.
However, a t  the  ou tse t, the  B ritish  government attem pted to  lim it th e  scope 
of i t s  involvement in  th e  a f f a ir s  of no rthern  Ireland  to  reform of the  sec u rity  
system . In p a rtic u la r , i t  wished to  m aintain th e  e x is tin g  U nionist government's 
p o l i t ic a l  autonomy. A major weakness of th e  policy  was th a t  from the  
persp ec tiv e  of the  C atholic m inority , i t  looked lik e  a programme fo r  the 
re s to ra tio n  of the  s ta tu s  quo ante . D isappointment a t  th e  narrow scope of 
B r it is h  policy  provided the  context fo r a ra d ic a lis a tio n  of C atholic  opinion, 
e sp ec ia lly  in a reas  where c o n flic ts  w ith th e  B r it is h  army over such s e n s itiv e  
is su e s  as the  rou tes of Orange Order marches provided an ad d itio n a l source of 
a lien a tio n  from the  B ritish  a u th o ritie s . The enthusiasm  with which C atholics 
had greeted th e  a r r iv a l  of the troops gradually  gave way to  d is illu s io n m en t and 
even h o s t i l i ty .
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Events In northern  Ireland took th e  Republican movement by su rp rise . In 
1956, th e  I r ish  Republican Army (IRA) had launched a border campaign in  support 
of a united Ire land , but had been forced to  c a l l  o ff  i t s  campaign, in  which s ix  
police o ff ic e rs  were k illed , in  1962 due to  lack  of support from th e  C atholic 
m inority  in  Northern Ireland. In th e  19606 th e  Republican movement came under 
the Influence o f le ft-w ing  in te lle c tu a ls  who blamed th e  fa ilu re  of th e  movement 
in the  p a s t on i t s  p o li t ic a l  iso la tio n  and i t s  e l i t i s t  m ilita rism  and persuaded 
the movement th a t  i t  should concen tra te  i t s  energ ies on campaigning on so c ia l 
and economic issu es . The v io len t tu rn  of events, in  no rthern  Ire land  in  1968 
and 1969 was a contingency fo r which th e  leadersh ip  o f the  Republican movement 
was m anifestly  unprepared.(5)
Birth of the ProvisionalIRA
The Republican movement s p l i t ,  leading to  the  form ation a t  the  end of 1969 of 
P rovisional IRA and sh o rtly  th e re a f te r  of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  wing, (P rov isional) Sinn 
Fein. The P rov isiona ls  embodied a rev iv a l of th e  creed of physica l fo rce 
Republicanism and quickly a ttra c te d  support among northern  Ireland  C atho lics, 
espec ia lly  in a reas  where there  had been sec ta ria n  c lash es. The P ro v is io n a ls ' 
paper, An Phoblacht. described th e  movement's aims as  being:
to  end foreign  ru le  in  Ireland , to  e s ta b lish  a 32-county 
Democratic S o c ia lis t  Republic, based on the  proclam ation of 
1916, to  re s to re  th e  I r ish  language and cu ltu re  to  a 
position  of s tre n g th , and to  promote a so c ia l o rder based 
on ju s tic e  and C h ris tian  p r in c ip le s  which w ill give 
everyone a ju s t  share  of th e  n a tio n 's  wealth. (6)
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The f a c t  th a t  th e  P rov isionals presented th e  c o n f lic t a s  a c la s s ic a l  a n t i -  
co lon ia l lib e ra tio n  stru g g le  in  which the  enemy was B ritish  im perialism  tie d  in  
with th e  d isp o s itio n  of much of the  world, including even some in  B rita in , to  
see IT o r t  hern Ireland as a  remnant of empire, a co lon ia l problem in  a p o s t­
co lon ia l age.
In i t ia l  operations o f the  P rov isional IRA were ju s tif ie d  in  term s of 
defending the Catholic ghettoes. This applied  even to  the  bombing of 
commercial prem ises in th e  c ity  cen tre  of B elfas t which began in 1970, because, 
as one of the  P rov isional leaders, Joe C ahill, explained, i t  stopped the  army 
from concentra ting  i t s  resources on the  ghettoes. (7) The. o ther ju s t if ic a t io n  
the P ro v isio n a ls  advanced fo r the  bombing campaign was th a t  i t  added to  th e  
economic burden of B ritish  occupation as the  co s t of compensating businesses 
f e l l  on the  B ritish  taxpayer. (8) The re s o r t  to  the  ta c t ic  of bombing re fle c ted  
the ready a v a ila b il i ty  of In d u s tr ia l explosives, such as  g e lig n ite , in  c o n tra s t 
to  a shortage o f o ther weapons. (9) The ta c t ic  con tribu ted  to  ex te rn a l 
percep tions of th e  P rovisional IRA as a t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isation , because, 
although the  bombing campaign a t  th i s  juncture was d irec ted  a t  p roperty  and 
warnings were given, acc iden ts and m istakes occurred th a t  led to  f a ta l i t i e s .
The long h is to ry  of the use of explosives in  previous campaigns by I r ish  
n a tio n a lis ts , going back as fa r  a s  the  Clerkenwell p rison  bombing ca rried  out 
by Fenians in  1867, meant th a t  th e re  was no in h ib itio n  on the  use of such a 
ta c t ic  fo r  the  leadersh ip  to  overcome.
Indeed, even before the  s t a r t  of the  p resen t Troubles bombs were seen as 
p a r t and p arcel of the cu ltu re  of I r ish  Republicanism and th is  was re fle c ted  in 
the p o rtray a l of Ir ish  Republicans in  B ritish  popular cu lture , as in  the  1967
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film , The Jo k e rs , which featured  a bomb hoax conveyed to  the po lice  by one of 
th e  p r in c ip a l ch arac te rs  p u tting  on a th ick  I r is h  accent. (10) By c o n tra s t, the  
P ro v isio n a ls  were re s tra in ed  from a tta c k s  on th e  army by public  opinion in  the  
ghe ttoes. However, as re la tio n s  between th e  army and th e  C atholic community 
d e te r io ra ted , th e  stance taken by th e  P ro v isio n a ls  became in c reasin g ly  
ag g ressive . At th e  beginning of 1971, th e  P rov isiona l IRA Army Council 
approved o ffensive  operations ag a in s t th e  B r it is h  army. In February a so ld ie r  
was k ille d  in  a gun b a tt le  with a P rov isional IRA u n it. He was the  f i r s t  army 
f a ta l i ty  of the  cu rren t Troubles. The bombing campaign was a lso  stepped up, 
leading  to  a r is in g  to l l  of c iv ilia n  c a su a ltie s  as  a re s u l t  of bungled warnings 
o r even no warnings a t  a l l .  In 1970 th e re  were 153 explosions in  ITorthem 
Ire land ; in  1971 1,022.(11) •
In response to  the  esca la tio n  of the  P rov isiona l IRA opera tions, the  
U nionist government introduced internm ent (providing fo r  de ten tion  without 
t r i a l )  on 9 August 1971. I t  produced an explosion of Catholic anger and 
resentm ent, re su ltin g  in a massive increase  in  support fo r  the P rov isiona l IRA 
in  th e  ghettoes and a sharp  jump in  the  level of violence. At th e  time of the  
in troduction  of internm ent, 34 people had died in p o li t ic a l  violence in the  
course of 1971. A fu r th e r 139 people had died by th e  end of th e  y e a r .(12) The 
reac tio n  of the  Catholic community to  internm ent con tribu ted  to  a P ro te s ta n t 
backlash , re fle c ted  in the  estab lishm ent in  September 1971 of th e  U lster Defence 
A ssociation (UDA), which brought to ge ther lo ca l L o yalis t v ig ila n te  o rgan isa tio n s  
th a t  had grown up in  a number of working c la s s  P ro te s ta n t e s ta te s . The s p ira l  
of v iolence was given fu r th e r impetus by ’Bloody Sunday', 30 January 1972, when 
13 unarmed dem onstrators were sho t dead by B r it is h  troops a f te r  an i l le g a l
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c iv i l  r ig h ts  march in Londonderry. - 'Bloody Sunday' a lso  tr ig g ered  o ff a n t i -  
B r itish  violence in  the Republic of Ireland  during which the B r it is h  embassy in  
Dublin was burn t down. In te rn a tio n a lly , th e  episode prompted f ie rc e  c r it ic is m  
of B r it is h  ru le  in  northern  Ireland, p a r tic u la r ly  in  th e  United S ta te s .
D irect ru le
A change in  th e  d irec tio n  of B ritish  policy  followed. On 24 March 1972 th e  
B r it is h  government imposed d ire c t  ru le  on no rth e rn  Ireland, tak ing  charge from 
the  local U nionist adm in istra tion  and suspending no rthern  Ire lan d 's  parliam ent 
a t  Stormont. The im position of d ire c t  ru le  prompted P ro tes tan t p ro te s t  on a 
sca le  th a t  matched Catholic reac tio n  to  th e  In troduction  of internm ent. At the  
tim e most P ro te s ta n ts  regarded th e  ex istence  o f a local ad m in istra tion  and 
parliam ent a t  Stormont as th e ir  guarantee th a t  they would not be forced in to  a 
united  Ireland ag a in st th e ir  w ill. Inev itab ly , th e re fo re , there  was widespread 
susp icion  among P ro tes tan ts  th a t  d ire c t  ru le  had been imposed in  order to  pave 
the  way fo r I r is h  u n ifica tion . But i f  many P ro te s ta n ts  saw the  downfall of 
Stormont as  a be trayal, most C atholics remained too suspicious of B ritish  
in te n tio n s  to  ce leb ra te  the  event as th e ir  v ic to ry , though i t  was welcomed by 
the  main n a tio n a lis t  party , the  Social Democratic and Labour Party  (SDLP), in  a 
statem ent which appealed to  'those engaged in  the  campaign of violence to  cease 
immediately'. (13)
The c a ll  was ignored by the  P rov isiona ls  who presented th e ir  own 
proposals fo r  a ceasefire  linked to  B ritish  w ithdraw al and the  estab lishm ent of 
a fed era l Ireland . They had a lready  dubbed 1972 'the  year of v ic to ry '. (14) The 
SDLP's hopes of an early  end to  internm ent to  defuse th e  s itu a tio n  were a lso  
dashed. Catholic fury over internm ent and 'Bloody Sunday' and P ro te s ta n t fe a rs
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of a s e ll-o u t by B rita in  in  response to  what they saw a s  reb e llio n  formed an 
extremely poten t mixture. In the  course of 1972, th e re  were 467 f a t a l i t i e s  in 
p o lit ic a l  violence, the h ighest number of deaths in  any year of th e  Troubles 
(see Table 7.1).
TABLE 7.1
Deaths i n .Iforthem . Ireland _aris ing_ou t of th e  sec u rity  s itu a tio n  1969-1992
Year RUC(l) RUCR(2) Army UDR/RIRC3) C iv ilian s  (4) Total
1969 1 - - - 12 13
1970 2 - - - 23 25
1971 11 - 43 5 115 174
1972 14 3 103 26 321 467
1973 10 3 58 8 171 250
1974 12 3 28 7 166 216
1975 7 4 14 6 216 247
1976 13 10 14 15 245 297
1977 8 6 15 14 69 112
1978 4 6 14 7 50 81
1979 9 5 38 10 51 113
1980 3 6 8 9 50 76
1981 13 8 10 13 57 101
1982 8 4 21 7 57 97
1983 9 9 5 10 44 77
1984 7 2 9 10 36 64
1985 14 9 2 4 25 54
1986 10 2 4 8 37 61
1987 9 7 3 8 66 93
1988 4 2 21 12 54 93
1989 7 2 12 2 39 62
1990 7 5 7 8 49 76
1991 5 1 5 8 75 94
1992 2 1 4 2 76 85
T otals 189 98 438 199 2104 3028
(1) Royal U lster Constabulary.
(2) Royal U lster Constabulary Reserve.
(3) U lster Defence Regiment and Royal I r ish  Regiment. The Royal I r is h  Regiment 
was formed out of amalgamation of th e  U lster Defence Regiment and th e  Royal 
I r ish  Rangers on 1 July 1992.
(4) Including members of param ilita ry  o rg an isa tio n s.
Source: Chief Cons ta b le 's  Annual Report 1992. Royal U lster Constabulary, B elfas t 
1993, p.82.
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A s ig n if ic a n t fa c to r  in  the  high level of c iv il ia n  f a t a l i t i e s  in  th e  course 
of 1972 and th e  four subsequent years  was a campaign of random sec ta ria n  
a ssa ss in a tio n s  ca rried  out by members of L oyalis t p a ram ilita ry  o rg an isa tio n s, 
p r in c ip a lly  the  UDA. I t  re su lted  in  the  deaths of hundreds of C atholic 
c iv il ia n s . The p rac tice  of th e  L oyalist p a ra m ilita r ie s  was to  l e t  the  k i l l in g s  
speak fo r them selves and a t  th e  beginning of th e  campaign, claim s of 
re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  p a r tic u la r  murders were ra re ly  made, providing th e  tenuous 
b a s is  of the p o lice 's  i n i t i a l  d e sc rip tio n  of th e  k i l l in g s  as m otiveless.
However, the Catholic community had l i t t l e  d if f ic u l ty  in  d iscern ing  the 
in tim idato ry  in te n t behind the campaign and th e  k i l l in g s  s tro n g ly  re in fo rced  
th e  tren d  towards re s id e n tia l  segregation  as  C atholics fled  to  th e  sa fe ty  of 
th e i r  own ghettoes. Occasionally, Republican p a ra m ilita r ie s  responded in kind 
to  th e  L oyalist campaign. However, publicly , th e  P rov isiona ls  in  p a r tic u la r  
d isdained  sec ta ria n  w arfare, em phasising th a t  th e ir  campaign was d irec ted  
a g a in s t B ritish  im perialism  and not P ro te s tan ts  as such. In fa c t , the 
P ro v isio n a ls ' view of the  c o n flic t disposed them to  suspect B r it is h  involvement 
in  th e  L oyalist campaign. (15)
In i t s  pub lica tions, the  UDA proclaimed th a t  a s ta te  of war ex isted  in  
H orthem  Ireland and described C atholics as being, v ir tu a lly  w ithout exception, 
'on th e  s ide  of murder, te rro rism , in tim idation , and th e  to ta l  d estru c tio n  o f a l l  
l o y a l i s t s ' . (16) From the p erspec tive  of the UDA, P ro te s ta n ts  were a community 
under siege, e n tire ly  r e l ia n t  on th e ir  own resources fo r  su rv iv a l. A fo rcefu l 
s tatem ent of th i s  viewpoint was given in a 1973 UDA p re ss  statem ent:
Ve a re  betrayed, maligned and our fam ilies  liv e  in  constan t 
fea r and m isery. Ve are  a nuisance to  our so -ca lled  a l l ie s
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and have no fr ie n d s  anywhere. Once more in  th e  h is to ry  of 
our people, we have our backs to  th e  w all, fac in g  
ex tinc tion  by one way o r another. This i s  th e  moment to  
beware, fo r  Ulstermen in  th i s  p o sitio n  f ig h t  m erc iless ly  
t i l l  they or th e i r  enemies a re  dead .(17)
At i t s  peak, th e  UDA had 'about 25,000 dues-paying members'. (18) Only a 
sm all m inority  of the  membership were involved in  th e  campaign o f random 
sec ta ria n  a ssa ss in a tio n s . For most, membership meant tak ing  p a r t  in  p a tro ls  
guarding P ro te s ta n t neighbourhoods and p a r tic ip a tio n  in  m ilita ry  parades the  
o rgan isation  staged  to  dem onstrate the  fo rce  a t  i t s  d isposa l. In 1974 th e  mass 
membership of th e  UDA played a key ro le  in  th e  success of the  U ls te r  Vorkers ~ 
Council s t r ik e  by s e tt in g  up road blocks, bu ild ing  barricad es , and otherw ise 
physica lly  d iscouraging people from going to  work. The s t r ik e  brought down the 
pow er-sharing Executive, the  h eart of an am bitious B ritish  e f fo r t  to  achieve a 
settlem en t of th e  northern  Ireland problem through p o li t ic a l  accommodation 
between U nionists and n a tio n a lis ts . L oyalis t h o s t i l i ty  towards th e  se ttlem en t 
focused on the  prov ision  fo r the estab lishm ent Df a Council of Ire land , which 
many P ro te s ta n ts  feared might become a s tepp ing  stone to  a united Ireland .
The fa ilu re  of the  pow er-sharing experim ent was a d ev asta tin g  blow both 
to  B ritish  policy  and to  the  middle ground of p o l i t ic a l  opinion in  n o rthern  
Ireland. In i t s  wake the B ritish  government b r ie f ly  considered th e  option of 
withdrawal before deciding on a fu r th e r  e f fo r t  to  promote p o li t ic a l  
accommodation through th e  e lec tion  of a C o n stitu tio n a l Convention charged w ith 
reaching agreement across the  se c ta ria n  d iv id e  on a new p o li t ic a l  d isp en sa tio n . 
A fter the p red ic tab le  fa ilu re  of the Convention, the  B ritish  government gave up
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fo r  th e  tim e being I t s  a ttem pts to  devolve power to  Northern Ireland  and 
adopted d ire c t  ru le  a s  a long-term  policy , promoting i t  as the form of 
government which was the  le a s t  unacceptable to  both communities.
CriainallsatiQn
The po licy  of d ire c t  ru le  was accompanied by s ig n if ic a n t  changes in  secu rity  
p o licy . Internm ent was ended, so too was th e  p riv ileg e  of sp ec ia l category 
s ta tu s  fo r  p r iso n e rs  whose crim es were p o l i t ic a l ly  m otivated. The government 
a lso  c losed  down the  inciden t cen tres  which had provided a channel of 
communication between the a u th o ritie s  and th e  P rov isional IRA during the  
l a t t e r 's  1975 cea se fire . I t  became the  proclaim ed po licy  of the government th a t  
i t  would not n eg o tia te  with 't e r r o r i s t s '  in  fu tu re . Vhat the  changes amounted 
to  was a po licy  of c rim in a lis in g  p o li t ic a l  violence and playing down the notion 
th a t  n o rth e rn  Ireland  was in  a s ta te  of c iv i l  war th a t  urgently  required a 
p o l i t ic a l  so lu tio n . At the same tim e, prim ary re sp o n s ib li ty  fo r  secu rity  was 
sh if te d  to  th e  po lice  and re lian ce  on troops from the  UK mainland was reduced.
I n i t ia l ly ,  th e  new approach was qu ite  successfu l. I t  met a widespread 
d e s ire  in  both communities fo r a re tu rn  to  norm ality  and a lessen ing  of the  
extreme p o l i t ic a l  tension  th a t  the violence had given r i s e  to . P ro te s ta n ts  in 
p a r tic u la r  f e l t  reassu red  th a t they would nqt be forced in to  a united  Ireland 
a g a in s t th e i r  w ill. That fea r had been a s ig n if ic a n t element in th e  percep tions 
of the  L o y a lis t p a ra m ilita rie s . Another element in  th e  percep tions of L oyalis t 
p a ra m ilita r ie s  was th e  assumption th a t  C atho lics as  a community supported the  
P rov isiona l IRA. This perception a lso  began to  change, in  large p a r t  due to  the  
r i s e  in  1976 o f th e  Peace People, a mass movement demanding an end to  p o li t ic a l
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violence th a t  fo r  a time a ttra c te d  a wide measure of support in  th e  working 
c la s s  ghettoes of both communities. (19)
The changes in  P ro tes tan t percep tions were re fle c ted  in  a sharp  f a l l  in  
th e  level of L o yalis t p a ram ilita ry  violence. Vhereas on Michael McKeown's 
ca lcu la tio n s  L o yalis t p a ra m ilita rie s  were resp o n sib le  fo r  40 per cent of th e  924 
f a ta l i t i e s  between 13 July 1973 and 12 July 1977, they accounted fo r 12 per 
cen t of the f a t a l i t i e s  in the follow ing quadrennlum between 13 July 1977 and 12 
July 1981.(20) The level of Republican violence a lso  f e l l ,  though not as 
sharp ly . That too re flec ted  changes in  Republican perceptions in  response to  
the  change in  th e  B ritish  government's approach. The P ro v isio n a ls ' expectation  
of imminent B r it is h  withdrawal evaporated. As a consequence th e re  was a change 
in  the  s tra te g y  of the P rovisional IRA's campaign, which an in te rn a l s t a f f  
re p o rt explained as  follows: 'Ve must gear ourselves to  Long-Term Armed 
S truggle based on pu tting  unknown men and new re c ru its  in to  a c e ll  
s t r u c tu r e . '(21) This implied a ra d ic a l reo rg an isa tio n  of the  P rov isional IRA 
from i t s  e x is tin g  q u asi-m ilita ry  s tru c tu re  of te r r i to r ia l ly -b a s e d  brigades and 
b a tta lio n s . In p rac tice , the  sw itch to  a c e ll  s tru c tu re  was not fu lly  
achieved. (22)
Preoccupation with su sta in in g  the  campaign on a long-term  b a s is  led to  
e f fo r ts  to  conserve resources. The number of ac tu a l opera tions declined very 
sharp ly . Careful planning went in to  the  opera tions th a t  took p lace so as to  
maximise f a t a l i t i e s  among those the  P rov isiona ls  considered leg itim a te  ta rg e ts ,  
though the  concept of a leg itim ate  ta rg e t i t s e l f  came to  encompass an ever 
wider category of people, wide enough to  ju s t ify  a tta c k s  on o ff-d u ty  o r even 
re t ire d  members of the secu rity  fo rces, U nionist p o li t ic ia n s  as  well as B r itish
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M in iste rs , p riso n  o ff ic e rs , judges, and even commercial co n trac to rs  supplying 
s e rv ic e s  to  the  sec u rity -se rv ic e s . However, th e  somewhat g re a te r  s e le c t iv i ty  of 
both th e  L oyalis t and the  Republican campaigns of violence led to  a f a l l  in  the  
p ro p o rtio n  of c iv ilia n  f a t a l i t i e s  among to ta l  deaths as  a r e s u lt  of th e  
Troubles. There was a lso  a decline in  the  number of innocent c iv i l ia n s  k ille d  
by th e  secu rity  fo rces, both in  absolu te  numbers and as a p roportion  of the  
to t a l  of a l l  those k ille d  by the  secu rity  fo rces . (23)
Eoliticisaticm of the paramilitaries
At th e  same time, the P rov isional IRA and the  UDA both began to  p lace g re a te r  
em phasis on p o lit ic a l  a c tiv ity . In the  case o f th e  UDA, d is illu sionm en t with 
L o y a lis t p o litic ia n s , p a r tic u la r ly  a f te r  the fa ile d  1977 s t r ik e  a g a in s t B r itish  
s e c u r ity  policy , resu lted  in  a decision  by the  leadersh ip  th a t  the  o rg an isa tio n  
should develop i t s  own d is tin c tiv e  p o li t ic a l  p o s itio n  on the  c o n f lic t. To th is  
end, th e  Hew U lster P o li tic a l Research Group was s e t  up in  January 1978. In 
March 1979 i t  published Beyond the  Religious D ivide, arguing th e  case fo r  an 
independent northern  Ireland as a context in  which the  sec ta ria n  d iv is io n s  of 
the  so c ie ty  could be overcome and as  ‘the  only proposal which does no t have a 
v ic to r  or a lo se r '. (24)
However, th e  UDA leadersh ip  found l i t t l e  support fo r  th is  message of 
p o l i t ic a l  accommodation e ith e r  among L o y a lis ts  in  general or even among rank 
and f i l e  members. Despite th is ,  p o li t ic is a t io n  was a re s tra in in g  influence on 
th e  v io le n t a c t iv i t ie s  of th e  UDA throughout th e  1980s. In th e  case o f th e  
P ro v isio n a l IRA, the fa ilu re  of the  o rg an isa tio n  to  gain anything from i t s  1975 
c e a se f ire  led to  the displacem ent of the  Southern leadersh ip  of th e  P ro v isio n a ls  
by n o rth e rn e rs . The change in leadersh ip  was re fle c ted  in  th ree  tre n d s  w ith in
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th e  movement a f te r  1976: secu la risa tio n , ra d lc a lis a tlo n , and p o li t ic is a t io n . (25) 
An e a rly  in d ica tio n  of the  change in  th e  P rovisionals* approach was a speech by 
Jimmy Drumm a t  Bodenstown in June 1977 in  which he warned of th e  danger of 
'th e  iso la tio n  of s o c ia l is t  republicans around th e  armed s tru g g le '. (26)
A major drawback of the policy  of d ire c t ru le  was th a t  in te rn a tio n a lly  i t  
made Northern Ireland  look lik e  a colony, a percep tion  th a t  worked to  th e  
advantage of th e  P rov isionals, while the  con tinuation  of the  P rov isional IRA's 
campaign of violence b lighted  hopes w ithin n o rth e rn  Ireland  of a re tu rn  to  
norm ality . A fu r th e r  d if f ic u lty  fo r  th e  B ritish  government was th a t  
c o n s ti tu tio n a l n a tio n a lis ts  d is lik ed  th e  po licy  o f d ire c t  ru le . The lobbying of 
the  SDLP and th e  I r ish  government generated in te rn a tio n a l p ressu re , p a r tic u la r ly  
from th e  United S ta te s , f a r  a change of policy . I t  came sh o rtly  a f te r  th e  
e lec tio n  of th e  Conservative government in  May 1979.
The government launched a fre sh  p o li t ic a l  in i t ia t iv e  aimed a t  e s ta b lish in g  
a devolved ad m in is tra tio n  in  no rthern  Ireland . To encourage an in te rn a l 
se ttlem en t a c ro ss  the  sec ta rian  d iv ide, the government th reatened  to  impose i t s  
own so lu tio n  i f  the  p a r tie s  fa iled  to  reach an agreement among them selves. But 
the  government’s  b lu ff was called  and the  in i t ia t iv e  fa ile d . To add to  th e  
governm ent's woes, i t  faced a c r i s i s  in  the  p riso n s . As p a rt of th e  po licy  of 
c rim in a lisa tio n , sp ec ia l category s ta tu s  fo r  p riso n e rs  convicted of p o l i t ic a l ly  
m otivated crim es had been abolished. This had led to  p ro te s ts  in  th e  p riso n s . 
In 1980 a number of Republican p riso n e rs  went on hunger s t r ik e  in  support of 
f iv e  demands, including the  r ig h t to  wear th e ir  own c lo th es  and th e  r ig h t  to  
free  a sso c ia tio n  w ithin  the p rison . Their campaign was supported by mass 
p ro te s ts  on th e  s t r e e ts  in  Catholic a reas, underlin ing  th e  fa ilu re  of
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c rim in a lis a tio n  to  achieve i t s  objective of th e  p o l i t ic a l  iso la tio n  of those  
re s o r tin g  to  violence. Indeed, the  p ro te s ts  bore out a p o li t ic s  le c tu re r 's  
warning to  the  government in  1978:
The lim ited  but nonetheless re a l  bond of sympathy between 
the agents of p o li t ic a l  v io lence and a la rg e  p a r t  o f th e
people who support th e ir  ob jec tives but not th e i r  means
w ill be strengthened ra th e r  than  weakened by th e  o f f ic ia l
denial of p o li t ic a l  s ta tu s  of th e  former. (27)
The government's d if f ic u l t ie s  prompted a fu r th e r  change of d ire c tio n . In 
December 1980 a t  a summit between the  B ritish  and I r ish  Prime K in is te rs , the  
two governments agreed to  en ter in to  dialogue on 'the  to ta l i ty  of 
r e la t io n s h ip s '(28) w ithin th e  B ritish  Is le s . The announcement was warmly 
welcomed In te rn a tio n a lly , p a r tic u la r ly  in  the  United S ta te s . However, the  
in i t ia t io n  of the  A nglo-Irish  process did not so lve  th e  p riso n s  c r i s i s  in  
H orthem  Ireland . There was a fu r th e r  hunger s t r ik e  by Republican p riso n e rs  in 
1981, in  th e  course of which ten  h u n g e r-s trik in g  p riso n e rs  died.
The p r iso n e rs ' campaign a ttra c te d  mass sup p o rt from C atholics in  northern
Ire land , i t s  breadth  underlined by the  v ic to ry  of Bobby Sands, the  f i r s t  of the 
h u n g e r-s tr ik in g  p riso n ers , in a by-e lection  in  a parliam entary  constituency  with 
a narrow C atholic  m ajority . Two p riso n e rs  were a lso  e lected  to  th e  I r is h  Dail 
in  a general e lec tion  in the  Republic in  June 1981. However, while the  impact 
of th e  hunger s t r ik e s  on opinion in  the  Republic of Ireland turned out to  be 
tem porary, th e  e ffe c t on Catholic opinion in  n o rth e rn  Ireland proved to  be more 
lo n g -la s tin g . The B ritish  government's handling of the  c r i s i s  a ttra c te d  
g en era lly  adverse comment in te rn a tio n a lly , (29) though the  favourable reac tio n  to
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th e  in i t ia t io n  of the A nglo-Irish  p rocess helped to  lim it the  damage, e sp ec ia lly  
in  th e  United S ta te s , and P residen t Reagan re s is te d  the  p ressu re  fo r  American 
in te rv en tio n  over the issue.
The e le c to ra l success of the  campaign on behalf of Republican p riso n e rs  
persuaded th e  P rov isionals th a t  the  impact of the  campaign of vio lence could be 
enhanced through e lec to ra l p a r tic ip a tio n  by th e  movement’s  p o l i t ic a l  wing, Sinn 
Fein. A fre sh  B ritish  in i t ia t iv e  involv ing  the  e lec tion  of a n o rthern  Ireland  
Assembly in  October 1982 gave the  P ro v isio n a ls  an early  opportunity  to  put 
th e i r  new policy  in to  p rac tice . With 10.1 per cen t of th e  f i r s t  preference vote, 
Sinn Fein achieved an immediate breakthrough, celebra ted  by the  Prov isonals as 
tjie 'b a llo t bomb*.(30) In the  UK general e lec tio n  in  June 1983, Sinn Fein did 
even b e tte r  w ith 13.4 per cent of th e  vo tes in  northern  Ireland , prompting 
specu la tion  th a t  a t  a fu ture e lec tio n  Sinn Fein might overtake th e  SDLP.
However, in  e lec tio n s  in 1984 and 1985 th e re  -was a s l ig h t  decline in  the  Sinn 
Fein vote compared to  1983. Rone the  le s s , th e  challenge th a t Sinn Fein posed 
to  c o n s ti tu tio n a l nationalism  in  the  form of the  SDLP gave a s ig n if ic a n t 
impetus to  th e  A nglo-Irish  p rocess, helping to  pave the  way to  th e  A nglo-Irish  
Agreement of Hovember 1985.
Anglo-Irish. Agreement
The essence of the  A nglo-Irish Agreement was th a t  i t  allowed the  I r ish  
government to  put forward views and p roposa ls  in  re la tio n  to  how northern  
Ire land  was ru led  though the mechanism of an intergovernm ental co u n c il.(31) 
Following th e  Agreement th e re  was a fu r th e r  swing of C atholic opinion tow ards 
the  SDLP and away from Sinn Fein. However, v ir tu a lly  the  e n tire  P ro te s ta n t 
community was opposed to  the  Agreement and th i s  was re fle c ted  in  a p act
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between the  two main Unionist p a r t ie s  to  co -operate  to  b ring  down the  
Agreement. U nionist p ro te s ts  ag a in s t th e  Agreement took the  form of mass 
dem onstrations, c iv i l  disobedience, and shows of s tre n g th , both on th e  s t r e e ts  
and through th e  b a llo t box. In a few areas where some erosion  o f re s id e n tia l 
segregation  had taken place and p a r t ia l ly  mixed e s ta te s  had grown up ou tside  of 
tra d it io n a lly  in teg ra ted  a fflu en t suburbia, th e re  were a number of in s tan ces  of 
C atholics being in tim idated out of th e i r  homes. A number of po lice  o ff ic e rs  
were a lso  forced to  move from th e ir  homes a s  the  Royal U ls te r Constabulary 
(RUC) came under a ttack  from m ilita n t L o y a lis ts  who accused the  po lice  of 
enforcing D ublin's d ik ta t.
The c r i s i s  in  the p risons in  1980 and 1981, th e  e le c to ra l r i s e  of Sinn 
Fein, and th e  A nglo-Irish  Agreement helped to  rev ive  L oyalist susp icion  both of 
C atholics and of the  B ritish  government. The form er was re fle c ted  in  a 
recurrence of a ssa ss in a tio n s  by L oyalis t p a ra m ilita r ie s . These had v ir tu a lly  
ceased during th e  la te  1970s. Despite th e  p o la r isa tio n  of the  two communities, 
the leadersh ip  of the UDA maintained i t s  commitment to  p o li t ic a l  accommodation,
while ju s tify in g  the campaign of the  U lster Freedom F ig h ters  (UFF), a now de
\
guerre used by th e  UDA's own members, as being d irec ted  a t  th e  removal of 
'ac tiv e  Republicans and ac tive  n a tio n a lis ts  who are  try in g  to  overthrow what 
e x is ts  here in  th e  form of a government'. (32) As Andy Tyrie, the  UDA's Supreme 
Commander, pu t i t ,  'the only way to  defeat the  IRA i s  to  te r ro r is e  the 
t e r r o r i s t s ' .  (33) In p rac tice , the  UFF's notion of a leg itim ate  ta rg e t, lik e  th a t  
of the P rov isional IRA, encompasssed a very wide category of people.
Furthermore, th e  police frequently  disputed UFF claim s about th e  Republican 
p aram ilita ry  connections of i t s  v ic tim s.
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However, th e  level of L oyalist p a ra m ilita ry  violence remained low compared 
to  what i t  had been in  th e  mid 1970s. P a rt of th e  reason was th e  
p a ra m ilita r ie s ' experience of being abandoned by U nionist p o li t ic ia n s  when 
P ro te s ta n t fe a rs  of be tray a l by the  B r it is h  government abated a f te r  the  
adoption of th e  policy of d ire c t ru le  in  1976. They feared th a t  they might be 
abandoned yet again i f  th e re  was a fu r th e r  sw itch  in  B ritish  policy  th a t  was as 
favourably received by U nionist p o l i t ic a l  opinion. That p o s s ib il i ty  exercised  a 
s tro n g  influence on the s tra te g y  of th e  p a ra m ilita r ie s . The UDA in  p a r tic u la r  
devoted much of i t s  energ ies to  p rep ara tio n  fo r a 'doomsday' s itu a tio n , while 
p lacing  the onus squarely on the  leaders  of the  two main U nionist p a r t ie s  to  
make i t  c lea r when the moment fo r c iv i l  war had a rriv ed . (34)
At the same time, the  UDA's lack of confidence in  Unionist p o l i t ic a l  
leadersh ip  was fo rcefu lly  expressed by one of the  UDA's leading fig u res  who 
declared: 'I f  some of the p resen t U nionist lead ersh ip  had been in power in  1912, 
Northern Ireland would never have come in to  e x is te n c e .'(35) McMichael was 
a llud ing  to  the  fa c t th a t  the  th re a t of organised violence by the  P ro te s ta n t 
community in U lster in  the  form of th e  U ls te r Volunteer Force (UVF) had 
de terred  the B ritish  government from implementing Home Rule before th e  outbreak 
of the  F ir s t  Vorld Var. 1912 had much th e  same s ig n ifican ce  fo r  U nion ists as 
1916 and the E aster reb e llio n  had fo r n a t io n a lis ts .  Inev itab ly , the  fa c t  th a t  
violence or the  th re a t of violence played such a s ig n if ic a n t ro le  in  the  
c rea tio n  of the  p o lit ic a l  order in  the  two p a r ts  of Ireland has been used by 
both Republican and L oyalist p a ra m ilita r ie s  to  leg itim ise  th e ir  cu rren t 
a c t iv i t ie s .  I t  may fa ir ly  be objected th a t  the  o rig in  of alm ost a l l  p o l i t ie s  can 
u ltim ate ly  be traced  back to  violence o f some kind. However, in  c o n tra s t  to
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Ire land , In the  g rea t m ajority o f cases, th a t  f a c t  has l i t t l e  bearing  e i th e r  on 
the  people's p resen t perception of th e  leg itim acy of the  p o li t ic a l  o rder or on 
th e  nature  of contemporary p o li t ic a l  d iv is io n s .
The fa ilu re  of the  Unionist campaign to  b ring  down the A nglo-Irish  
Agreement through p ro te s ts  in  the  s t r e e t s  forced  the  two main U nionist p a r t ie s  
to  change th e ir  s tra teg y  to  one of seeking to  secure the  abrogation of the  
Agreement through negotia tion . To be c red ib le , th e  new policy required  a 
w illingness on th e  p a rt of the  U nionist p a r t ie s  them selves to  make concessions. 
The po in t was read ily  embraced by th e  lead ersh ip  of the UDA as  v in d ica tin g  i t s  
advocacy of p o li t ic a l  accommodation. In January 1987 the UDA's U ls te r P o li t ic a l  
Research Group published proposals fo r  th e  estab lishm en t of a Northern Ireland  
ad m in is tra tio n , which accepted what th e  two U nionist p a r tie s  had h ith e r to  
re jec ted , pow er-sharing w ith the SDLP.(36>
A ta sk  fo rce  appointed by the two U nionist p a rty  leaders to  examine 
U nionist op tions followed the UDA's lead and repo rted  th a t  many U nion ists would 
be w illing  to  contem plate SDLP p a r tic ip a tio n  in  government provided th e  lin k  
with Dublin was severed. (37) From a very d if fe re n t perspective, Sinn Fein 
published a d iscussion  paper, e n title d  'A Scenario fo r  Peace', in  May 1987.(38)
I t  advocated e lec tio n s  to  an a ll- I r e la n d  C o n stitu tio n a l Conference in  th e  
con tex t of a decla ra tion  of in te n t by B rita in  to  withdraw. The paper argued 
th a t  p a r ti t io n  was a v io la tio n  of the  r ig h t  of se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  as  la id  down 
in  th e  United R ations' 1966 Covenant on C iv il and P o litic a l R ights. This 
in i t ia t iv e  was followed by an exchange of views between Sinn Fein and th e  SDLP 
during 1988. In the course of the  ta lk s ,  th e  SDLP pressed  to  no a v a il fo r  an 
end to  the P rovisional IRA's campaign of v io len ce .(39)
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Indeed, the  summer of 1988 was marked by a resurgence of th e  P rov isional 
IRA's campaign, fuelled  by la rg e  arms and exp losives shipm ents from Libya 
d a tin g  back to  August 1985.(40) On 20 August e ig h t so ld ie rs  died  in  a bomb 
a tta c k  on a bus a t  Ballygawley in  County Tyrone, prompting a w ide-ranging 
review of th e  government's secu rity  policy. In October, the  Home S ecretary , 
Douglas Hurd, announced a ban on th e  broadcasting  of d ire c t  s ta tem en ts  by 
spokespersons fo r Sinn Fein or th e  UDA. However, the  b ro ad caste rs  could s t i l l  
re p o r t th e  words of the  spokespersons and th e  e ffec tiv en ess  of th e  ban was 
reduced fu r th e r by the  employment of a c to rs  to  mouth th e  words of interview ees, 
a s  they ta lked  on film , nevertheless, the  b roadcasting  ban d id  have an 
in h ib itin g  e ffe c t on the  media's coverage of th e  p o li t ic a l  views o f Sinn Fein 
and th e  UDA. This was most apparent in  the  case  of the  UDA. The murder of 
John McHichael in  December 1987 and Andy T y rie 's  re s ig n a tio n  in  March 1988 had 
already  deprived the  UDA of I t s  two most a r t ic u la te  spokesmen.
The ban added to  th e  UDA's p o li t ic a l  m arg in a lisa tio n . Vhlle a candidate of 
th e  p o l i t ic a l  pa rty  d ire c tly  assoc iated  with th e  UDA, th e  U lster Democratic 
Party  <UDP>, won e lec tion  to  the  Derry City Council, th e  UDP lik e  i t s  
p redecessor, the  U lster L oyalist Democratic Party  (ULDP), otherw ise fared  
poorly, securing few votes and l i t t l e  a tte n tio n . Sinn Fein a lso  lo s t  ground 
p o li t ic a l ly . In the  1989 local council e lec tio n s  the  p a rty  lo s t  s e a ts , though 
i t s  ov era ll share  of the  f i r s t  p reference vote f e l l  only s l ig h t ly  compared to  
1985. I t  fared  worse in  th e  e lec tio n s  to  the  European Parliam ent w ith i t s  
can d id a te 's  share  of f i r s t  preference votes fa l l in g  below ten  per cen t. At the  
same tim e, th e re  was a decline in  th e  level of support fo r  P aisley  and the  
Democratic U nionist Party  in  both the  local and European e lec tio n s .
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Brooke In i t ia t iv e
The s h i f t  in  th e  p o lit ic a l  mood was re fle c ted  in  a narrowing o f the  d iffe ren ces  
among the main p a rtie s , p a r tic u la r ly  between th e  P ro te s ta n t O ffic ia l U nionist 
and Democratic Unionist p a r tie s , on th e  one hand, and th e  p a rty  th a t  
represented  a m ajority  of C atholics, th e  SDLP, on the  o ther. This convergence 
encouraged the  Secretary  of S ta te  fo r  IForthern Ireland , Peter Brooke, to  launch 
a fre sh  p o li t ic a l  in i t ia t iv e  in  January 1990. I t s  b a s is  was th a t  th e re  was 
common ground among the c o n s titu tio n a l p a r t ie s  -  the  two U nionist p a r t ie s ,  the  
SDLP, and the  non -secta rian  A lliance p a rty  -  th a t  th ree  s e ts  o f re la tio n sh ip s  
needed to  be addressed in  any nego tia tio n s: th e  re la tio n sh ip  between th e  
communities in  northern  Ireland; re la tio n s  between northern  Ireland  and th e  
Republic of Ireland; and th e  lin k s  between th e  United Kingdom as  a whole and 
the  Republic of Ireland. Despite th i s  measure of agreement, find ing  a formula 
th a t  would perm it formal n eg o tia tions among th e  p a r t ie s  presented considerab le  
d if f ic u lty , esp ec ia lly  in  view of U nionist in s is ten c e  on the  suspension of th e  
operation of th e  A nglo-Irish  Agreement.
I t  took th e  Secretary  of S ta te  over a year to  ge t agreement on the  term s 
fo r  n eg o tia tio n s. He eventually succeeded in  arrang ing  th a t  n eg o tia tio n s  among 
the p a r tie s  would take place in  a gap of 11 weeks between m eetings of the  
intergovernm ental council from the  end of A pril to  mid July 1991. The p rospect 
of ta lk s  among th e  c o n stitu tio n a l p a r t ie s  ra ise d  expecta tions of an end to  20 
years of stalem ate . (41) The breakthrough e lic ite d  from a new umbrella 
o rgan isation  fo r  L oyalist p a ra m ilita rie s , the  Combined L oyalis t M ilita ry  
Command, a commitment to  m aintain a c ea se fire  during th e  duration  of th e  
nego tia tions. However, in  the  event, l i t t l e  p ro g ress  was made and ta lk s  ha iled
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as  h is to r ic  fa ile d  to  liv e  up to  th e i r  b il l in g . Disagreement among th e  p a r t ie s  
on procedural questions held up d iscussion  on th e  su b stan tiv e  issu es  and by the  
tim e the  ta lk s  petered out over the  issue  of th e  resumption of m eetings of th e  , 
in tergovernm ental council there  had been precious l i t t l e  engagement among th e  
p a r t ie s  on any questions of substance. Because of the d i f f ic u l t ie s  they ra ise d  
over procedural issues, U nionists tended to  be blamed fo r the  breakdown of 
n eg o tia tio n s  by much of B ritish  opinion. (4 2 ) '
A second round of ta lk s  among th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l p a r t ie s  was held a f te r  ' 
th e  B r it is h  general e lec tion  in  A pril 1992. These neg o tia tio n s  too ended in  
s ta lem ate , though th e re  was g rea te r engagement w ith Issues of substance in  the  
course of the  ta lk s . In th e  e lec tio n  i t s e l f ,  Sinn Fein su ffered  a fu r th e r  
setback  when i t s  P residen t, Gerry Adams, lo s t  h is  Vest B elfast s e a t. At the  
same tim e, the  potent th re a t the  P rov isional IRA's campaign posed to  th e  B ritish  
economy was demonstrated by a bomb in  the  C ity  of London a day a f te r  the  
B ritish  general e lec tion  which did a b il l io n  pounds' worth of damage. Yet 
d e sp ite  th is ,  w ith in  the  Republican movement I t s e l f ,  th e re  remained Increasing
l
doubts about th e  e ffec tiveness o f th e  P rov isional IRA's campaign of violence. 
These had been made e x p lic it  in  an in terview  given by a member of th e  
P rov isional IRA as fa r  back as 1990 th a t  acknowledged th a t  w hile the  
P rov isional IRA could not be defeated, i t  had become in c reasin g ly  d i f f ic u l t  to  
persuade n a tio n a lis ts  th a t  i t  could w in.(43)
A speech by a leader of Sinn Fein, Jim Gibney, in  June 1992 gave a fu r th e r  
in d ica tio n  of evolution in  p o li t ic a l  a t t i tu d e s  w ith in  the  Republican movement in  
i t s  acknowledgement of the  re a l i ty  of U nionist a sp ira tio n s  and in  i t s  support 
fo r  n eg o tia tio n s. (44) These developments gave encouragement to  th e  holding of
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ta lk s  In 1992 between Sinn Fein and Church, lead e rs , who were seeking to  r 
persuade a l l  th e  p a ra m ilita rie s  to  end th e i r  campaigns of violence. The 
p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  the  B ritish  government i t s e l f  m ight en te r  in to  n eg o tia tio n s  
w ith Sinn Fein a t  some time in  the  fu tu re  was ra ise d  by Peter Brooke In 1989, 
s h o r tly  a f te r  h is  appointment a s  S ecretary  of S ta te  fo r  northern  Ire la n d .<45) 
But while tre n d s  w ithin the Republican movement ra ise d  hopes of movement 
tow ards peace, changes w ithin the  L oyalist p a ra m ilita r ie s  were co n trib u tin g  to  
an e sca la tio n  in  th e ir  campaigns of violence.
The fa ilu re  of the  f i r s t  round of ta lk s  among th e  c o n s titu tio n a l p a r tie s  
was followed by an upsurge in L oyalist p a ra m ilita ry  violence. In 1991 as a 
whole 40 of the  93 deaths as  a re s u l t  of p o l i t ic a l  violence were a ttr ib u te d  to  
L o y a lis t p a ra m ilita r ie s , fa r  and away the h ig h es t level of L oyalis t violence 
s in ce  the  mid 1970s. (46) The esca la tio n  in  L o y a lis t violence continued through 
1992. A la rg e  p a r t  of the explanation was th e  emergence of- a younger and more 
m ilita n t s e t  of leaders in  the UDA. The murder of McHichael and th e  ousting of 
Tyrie were followed by fu r th e r changes in th e  membership of th e  UDA's Inner 
Council, p a r tly  as a re su lt  of a backlash a g a in s t corrup tion  w ith in  th e  
o rg an isa tio n  and p a r tly  as a re s u lt  of the exposure of an agent fo r  M ilita ry  
In te llig en ce  in  a key p o sition  in  th e  o rg an isa tio n . The new leadersh ip  was 
determ ined to  dem onstrate i t s  e ffec tiv en ess  in  comparison w ith the  old guard.
I t s  measure of e ffec tiveness was i t s  capacity  to  match the  violence of the 
P rov isional IRA blow fo r blow. A su b s ta n tia l arms shipment from South A frica 
a t  th e  beginning of 1988 provided th e  L o yalis t p a ra m ilita r ie s  w ith the  
m eans.(47) While KcMichael continued to  be revered , i t  was as a m ilita ry  figu re  
ra th e r  than a s  an advocate of p o li t ic a l  accommodation. In August 1992 the
-  204  -
B rit is h  government responded to  th e  o rg a n isa tio n 's  new m ilitancy  by banning i t .  
That made th e  UDA an ille g a l o rgan isa tion  l ik e  th e  P rovisional IRA,
Vhile in  p rac tice  a considerable number o f the  v ic tim s of L oyalis t 
v io lence continued to  be C atholics with no known asso c ia tio n s  w ith Republican 
p a ra m ilita r ie s , the  fa c t  th a t  the  L o y a lis ts  ta rg e ted  prominent members of Sinn 
Fein and o th e rs  with Republican p a ram ilita ry  connections of one kind or ano ther 
a s  a h igh ly  publicised  p a r t  of th e ir  campaign e l ic i te d  a ' t i t  fo r  t a t '  response 
from Republican p a ra m ilita rie s , including th e  P rov isiona l IRA, which ta rg e ted  
P ro te s ta n ts  i t  accused of Involvement in  the  L o y a lis t campaign. One
consequence of the  war between th e  p a ra m ilita r ie s  was th a t  fewer members of the
se c u rity  fo rces  died as a re s u lt  of the  Troubles in  1991 than in  any year since  
1971. In th e  areas most a ffec ted  by th e  p a ra m ilita ry  war, such as  B elfas t, fe a r 
grew among th e  public a t  la rge  of a re tu rn  to  th e  random sec ta ria n  k i l l in g s  
th a t  had occurred in  the mid 1970s.
Sectarian conflict
The in te n s if ic a tio n  of sec ta rian  c o n flic t in  1991 and 1992 and th e  impasse in  
n eg o tia tio n s  on the fu ture of the province emphasised the  continuing 
in t r a c ta b i l i ty  of the Northern Ireland problem. Vhile th e  number of people in  
each community d ire c tly  involved in  violence has remained a very sm all
p ropo rtion  o f th e  to ta l  population, p o l i t ic a l  v iolence in  Northern Ireland  i s  fa r
from being a fr in g e  phenomenon. Though i t  i s  reasonable  to  c h a ra c te r is e  those  
who support violence as a re la tiv e ly  sm all m inority  in  each community, the  
violence shapes the a t t i tu d e s  and behaviour of th e  two communities in  such 
fundamental ways th a t - it  i s  - im possible to  sep a ra te  the  question of re la tio n s  
between th e  two communities as a whole from th e  issu e  of the violence. One of
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th e  m ain-objections to  applying th e  term, te rro r ism , to  th e  s itu a tio n  i s  th a t  i t  
c a r r ie s  the  Im plication of a pa tho log ical phenomemon th a t  can be divorced from 
ordinary  p o l i t ic s  and leads to  an underplaying of the  pervasive influence of th e  
violence on th e  society* The h ighly  segregated  nature  of the  so c ie ty  
re s id e n tia lly  and educationally , th e  e x tra o rd in a rily  high level of id e n tif ic a tio n  
by ind iv iduals of themselves as P ro te s ta n ts  o r C atholics, (48) and the  alm ost 
complete absence in  the socie ty  of P ro te s ta n t n a t io n a lis ts  or Catholic 
U n ion ists(49) in  p a r t re f le c t  th a t  influence a s  well as providing the  con tex t in  
which se c ta ria n  tensions a re  am plified by p o l i t ic a l  violence.
Vhile the  term, te rro rism , i s  used ac ro ss  the  sec ta ria n  d iv ide  in  northern  
Ireland to  describe  a tro c i t ie s  involving in d isc rim in a te  violence ag a in s t 
c iv ilia n s , i t s  use to  generalise  about the  p o l i t ic a l  violence i s  le s s  common in  
the  socie ty  than  outside i t .  In p o li t ic a l  d iscou rse  i t  tends to  be used to  
demonise the violence of the  o th er community. Because of i t s  id e n tif ic a tio n  
with the language of v i l if ic a tio n  i t  i s  a term  th a t  those who acknowledge th e  
need fo r p o l i t ic a l  accommodation between th e  communities tend to  avoid.
Another reason those  in th e  middle ground of p o l i t ic s  have adopted th e  somewhat 
inappropria te  term , p a ram ilita ry , to  re fe r  to  o rg an isa tio n s  engaged in  violence 
i s  the a sso c ia tio n  of the t e r r o r i s t  lab e l w ith p o li t ic a l  rh e to r ic  ju s tify in g  
re ta lia to ry -v io le n c e  ag a in s t the neighbourhoods from which the  't e r r o r i s t s '  
emanate. In a so c ie ty  in  which fe a rs  abound of an esca la tio n  of violence as  a 
re s u lt  of cycles of re ta lia tio n , th i s  i s  a po ten t considera tion .
The adoption by the middle ground of term inology intended to  defuse 
tension , to  lim it co n flic t, and to  avoid con fron ta tion  re f le c ts  th e  low 
expectations- th a t  e x is t in  the  so c ie ty  of th e  ac tu a l reso lu tio n  of the  c o n flic t.
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The long h is to ry  of s e c ta r ia n  violence has l e f t  legacy of d is t r u s t  between the  
communities th a t  m akes-achieving agreement between re p re sen ta tiv e s  of th e  two 
communities on p o li t ic a l  m atters  very d i f f ic u l t .  I t  i s  compounded by 
uncerta in ty  over Northern Ire lan d 's  ap p ro p ria te  p lace in  the  world, uncerta in ty  
th a t  has been aggravated by the  ending of th e  co lon ia l period. In th e  days of 
empire, sovereign s ta te s  stood a t  th e  p innacle  of a h ierarchy  of d if f e re n t  
p o l i t ic a l  e n t i t le s .  In th is  context n o rth e rn  Ire lan d 's  pecu liar s ta tu s  a s  an 
autonomous p o l i t ic a l  e n tity , cond itiona lly  p a r t  of the United Kingdom but fo r  
most purposes outside the  B ritish  dom estic p o l i t ic a l  system , d id no t mark i t  
out as  a p lace ap art. However, s in ce  th e  end of the  co lon ia l e ra , no rth e rn  
Ire la n d 's  p re sen t s ta tu s  has appeared in c reas in g ly  anomalous in  a world alm ost 
e n tire ly  made up of sovereign s ta te s  w ith fixed  boundaries.
The changes in  E astern  Europe as  a consequence of the  co llap se  of the  
Communist system  co n stitu te  a challenge to  th e  boundaries of a number o f the  
form erly Communist s ta te s .  How th ese  is su es  a re  resolved may well come to  have 
an influence on how northern  Ireland i s  perceived in te rn a tio n a lly . I f  in  the  
Hew Vorld Order secession  from e x is tin g  s ta t e s  i s  recognised a s  a leg itim a te  
ex erc ise  of the  r ig h t  of se lf-d e te rm in a tio n , th e  cond itional nature  of no rthern  
I re la n d 's  membership of the  United Kingdom may seem le ss  anomalous 
in te rn a tio n a lly  j though th e  legitim acy of n o rth e rn  Ireland as  th e  p a rtit io n e d  
p a r t  of an is lan d  6eems lik e ly  to  continue to  be questioned. The in i t i a l  impact 
o f the  resurgence of nationalism  in th e  E ast has been to  enhance u n certa in ty  
over northern  Ire lan d 's  fu ture, though a t  th e  same time ethn ic  c o n f l ic ts  in  
E astern  Europe have made the  northern  Ireland  problem appear le s s  excep tional.
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Indeed, in  some re sp ec ts  th e  various e th n ic  c o n f lic ts  in  E astern  Europe 
and what was form erly th e  Soviet Union provide a b e tte r  model fo r  an 
understanding of the c o n flic t in  Northern Ire land  than  the  notion of te rro r ism . 
Vhile th e  level of violence has been very much lower in  For th e m  Ire land  than 
in , say , Yugoslavia, without the  re s tra in in g  presence of B ritish  au th o rity  the  
p o te n tia l e x is ts  in Forthern  Ireland  of an intercommunal co n flag ra tion  o f 
considerab le , i f  not quite  comparable, p ro p o rtions. A fu r th e r re s tra in in g  fa c to r  
in  th e  case of Forthern Ireland has been the  absence of any s tro n g  e x te rn a l 
in te r e s t  in  the  outcome of the  c o n flic t. Both th e  B ritish  government and the  
government of the  Republic of Ireland  have sought to  contain  th e  c o n f lic t  and 
to  avoid con fron ta tions with each o ther over th e  issue  of F orthern  Ire la n d 's  
fu tu re  c o n s titu tio n a l s ta tu s .
Republican p a ram ilita rie s  have obtained weapons and explosives from Libya 
and a measure of fin an c ia l support from Irish-A m erican o rg an isa tio n s, w hile 
L o y a lis ts  have received arms from South A frica and support from Scotland and 
Canada. However, the sca le  of ex te rn a l involvement has not fundam entally 
a ffec ted  th e  course of the  c o n flic t. I t  i s  a measure of the se rio u sn ess  o f the  
c o n f lic t  in  Forthern  Ireland th a t  even in  the  absence of su b s ta n tia l e x te rn a l 
involvement, th e  ultim ate outcome of the  c o n f lic t  rem ains im possible to  p re d ic t. 
Because of th a t ,  the  p o li t ic a l  e ffec tiv en ess  of violence appears much g re a te r  in 
F orthern  Ire land  than i t  ever could in  a p o l i t ic a l ly  s ta b le  liberal-dem ocracy , 
prov id ing  a sharp  c o n tra s t with the  case of Vest Germany d iscussed  in  th e  la s t  
chap ter.
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Chapter 8 -  Violence. Inequality , and th e Third Vorld 
le v e r before In human h is to ry  has the  g u lf In liv in g  s tan d a rd s  among th e  
d if fe re n t peoples inhab iting  th e  p lan e t been a s  enormous as  i t  i s  today. I t s  
relevance to  th e  subject of th i s  th e s is  i s  th e  common assum ption in  the  
l i te ra tu re  on p o li t ic a l  violence of a  c lo se  lin k  between violence and 
inequality . CD In h is to r ic a l  term s, th e  g rea t d iv ide between r ic h  and poor in 
th e  world i s  re la tiv e ly  recen t. I t  has come in to  being in  a m atte r of 200 
years or so. In 1750 before th e  s t a r t  o f th e  in d u s tr ia l revo lu tion , what i s  
today re fe rred  to  as the  Third Vorld accounted fo r  73 per cen t of world 
manufacturing output, while Europe, Japan, and th e  United S ta te s  toge ther 
accounted fo r  27 per cent. By 1900, Europe, Japan and the  United S ta te s  
accounted fo r  88 per cent of world m anufacturing output. (2) This m assive s h i f t  
of economic power has been re fle c ted  in  liv in g  s tandards. Indeed, the  gap in  
liv in g  stan d ard s  between r ic h  n a tio n s  and poor has grown s te a d ily  wider in  the  
course of the  tw entieth  century.
Global inequality
The Vorld Bank analyses the  economic performance of th e  w orld 's s ta te s  each 
year in  i t s  Vorld Development R eport. I t  d iv ides them in to  th re e  catego ries: 
low-lncome economies, middle-income economies, and high-income economies. The 
Bank's Vorld Development Report 1993 c la s s if ie d  40 coun tries  a s  low-income 
economies. Vhile they rep resen t a m inority  o f th e  w orld 's s ta te s ,  these  
countries contained alm ost 60 per cen t of the  w orld 's population in  1991. 
According to  th e  rep o rt, toge ther they had an average p er capita  income in  1991 
of 350 d o lla rs . By c o n tra s t, th e  re p o r t concluded th a t  the  average p er  capita  
income of the  Bank's 22 high-income economies w ith about 15 per cen t of th e
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w orld 's  population was 21,050 d o lla rs  in 1991, in  o ther words about 60 tim es 
th a t  of th e  low-income economies.<3>
In the  period  1965 to  1990, th e  per capita  Income of th e  high-income 
economies grew by an average of 2.4 per cen t a y e a r .<4> As may e a s ily  be 
ca lcu la ted  from th ese  fig u res , th a t  means th a t  th e  average Increase in  the  per  
capita  income o f the  r ic h  countries each year com fortably exceeded th e  to ta l  
p er  capita  Income of th e  low-income economies. To complete th e  p ic tu re , the  
World Bank's World Development Report 1993 c la s s if ie d  65 co u n tries  a s  middle- 
income economies, w ith an average p er capita  income of 2,480 d o lla rs  in  1991 
and holding approxim ately a quarte r of th e  w orld 's  popu la tion .(5) From th ese  
f ig u res , i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  calcu la te  th a t  the r ic h  co u n tries  of the  world with 
about 15 per cen t of the  w orld 's population secure alm ost 80 per cen t of to ta l  
world Income.
This sca le  of Inequality  is  fa r  g rea te r than th e  level of inequality  in  any 
ind iv idual country, even the  most unequal such a s  B razil o r South A frica. 
Admittedly, th e  a v a ila b il i ty  of inform ation on th e  d is tr ib u tio n  of income w ithin 
co u n trie s  i s  f a r  from s a tis fa c to ry . For example, th e  fig u res  on th e  
d is tr ib u tio n  of household Income given in  th e  World Bank's rep o rt cover only a 
m inority  of co u n trie s  and these  a re  fo r  a v a rie ty  of years. Among th e  
co u n trie s  fo r  which th e re  a re  fig u res , B razil s tan d s  out a s  the  p lace with the  
most unequal d is tr ib u tio n , where the  r ic h e s t  20 per cen t of households received 
67.5 per cen t of to ta l  income in  1989.(6)
I t  has become fashionable in  South A frica i t s e l f  to  re fe r  to  th e  country 
a s  two w orlds, F i r s t  World and Third World. Income in  South A frica i s  
extrem ely unequally d is tr ib u te d  in  term s of race. Thus, Whites com prising 14
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per cen t of th e  population received approxim ately 62 per cen t of to ta l  personal 
income in  th e  country in  1987.(7) However, no t merely i s  economic Inequality  a t  
a g lobal level more extreme than th a t  p rev a ilin g  w ith in  South A frica, but th e re  
seems to  be much le s s  prospect of a ra d ic a l reduction  of g lobal inequality  than  
th e re  i s  of a s h i f t  in  th e  ra c ia l  sh a res  o f Income in  South A frica, even on th e  
assumption th a t  V hites continue to  m aintain  a la rg e  amount of influence under a 
new p o li t ic a l  d ispensation  in  South A frica . For most of the  developing 
coun tries, th e  1980s co n stitu ted  a d is a s tro u s  decade of fa ll in g  liv in g  
stan d ard s , exacerbated by the  debt c r i s i s .  By c o n tra s t, th e  1980s were a 
decade of r i s in g  liv in g  s tandards fo r  th e  r ic h  co u n tries. At th e  same tim e, 
o f f ic ia l  development a ss is tan ce , measured a s  a percentage of th e  Gross N ational 
Product of th e  donor countries, a c tu a lly  6eems to  have declined during the  
course of th e  decade. (8) The p ro sp ec ts  fo r  th e  poor co u n tries  and fo r th e  poor 
generally  during the  1990s seem bleak. In p a r tic u la r , i t  seems unlikely  th a t  
China, contain ing  a f i f th  of the  w orld 's population, w ill achieve in  the  1990s 
th e  exceptional growth r a te s  i t  was ab le  to  achieve during the  1980s.(9) 
Inequality  and in s ta b i l i ty
Economic inequality  between s ta te s ,  Inequality  w ithin  s ta te s ,  and Indeed th e  
re la tio n sh ip  between these  two lev e ls  of in eq u ality  have been examined by 
p o li t ic a l  s c ie n t i s t s  resp ec tiv e ly , a s  a source of p o li t ic a l  d iffe ren ces  between 
s ta te s ,  a s  a cause of violence and p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i ty  w ithin  s ta te s ,  and a s  
an explanation of how the  d iv is io n  of th e  world between r ic h  and poor i s  
m aintained. V hile the  second of th e se  p rov ides th e  most obvious lin k  to  th e  
issu es  under considera tion  in th i s  th e s is ,  each in  fa c t  i s  re lev an t to  th e  
conceptualisation  of p o li t ic a l  violence in  th e  Third Vorld. The American
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p o ll t lc a l  s c ie n t is t ,  Seymour Martin L ipset, examined th e  question o f the  
re la tio n sh ip  of economic development to  democracy in  h is  1959 study of 
p o li t ic a l  behaviour, P o litic a l Man.
His po in t of departure  was the  A ris to te lia n  p roposition  th a t  poverty made 
th e  masses su scep tib le  to  demagoguery and th a t  th e  s e l f - r e s t r a in t  necessary  fo r  
th e  functioning of dem ocratic in s t i tu t io n s  was only p o ssib le  in  a wealthy 
so cie ty . To t e s t  i t ,  he looked a t  the re la tio n s h ip  between various measures of 
affluence and of in d u s tr ia lis a tio n  and th e  s t a b i l i t y  of democracy a s  re fle c ted  
in  th e  longevity  of dem ocratic in s t i tu t io n s  and th e  absence of s ig n if ic a n t 
support fo r  p a r t ie s  opposed to  the  dem ocratic system . He found th a t  th e re  was 
a s trong  c o rre la tio n  between s ta b le  democracy and affluence and a s lm illa r  
re la tio n sh ip  between s ta b le  democracy and a h igh  level of in d u s tr ia l is a t io n .(10)
A second ed itio n  of P o litic a l Man was pub lished  in  1981. In i t  L ipset 
reviewed evidence from the  1970s of the  re la tio n sh ip  between democracy and 
wealth. In p a r tic u la r , he c ited  in  support o f h is  p o s itio n  a study by Larry 
Diamond on th e  c o rre la tio n  between the  ex isten ce  of lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  
in s t i tu t io n s  and p er  capita  incomes. Diamond examined how 31 co u n tries  he 
id e n tif ie d  a s  functioning liberal-dem ocracles were d is tr ib u te d  among 123 
coun tries  in  term s of wealth. He arranged th e  l a t t e r  in to  q u in tile s  according 
to  th e ir  p er  capita  incomes in  1974. All bu t four of th e  democracies f e l l  in to  
th e  two r ic h e s t  q u in tile s , with 19 of th e  dem ocracies in  the  r ic h e s t  q u ln tile  of 
25 coun tries. (11) In sh o rt, h is  study showed a rem arkably high measure of 
co rre la tio n  between democracy and affluence.
However, i t  would be d if f ic u l t  to  re p lic a te  th ese  re s u lts  using  cu rren t 
da ta, as  th e  f a l l  of severa l m ilita ry  d ic ta to rs h ip s  in  L atin  America and th e
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re s to ra tio n  of democracy In a number of Aslan co u n tries  such a s  th e  P h ilip p in es  
and P akistan  during the  course of th e  1980s have increased  th e  number of 
libera l-dem ocracies among th e  poorer n a tio n s  o f th e  world. Admittedly, th e  
d u ra b ility  of many of th ese  new democracies I s  very  much In doubt. Even more 
Im portantly , I t  i s  already apparent th a t  dem ocratic government In many of th ese  
poorer so c ie tie s  has not achieved th e  same degree of e ffec tiv en ess  o r 
legitim acy as  i t  has secured in  th e  r ic h e r  co u n trie s . In p a r tic u la r , th e  
ex istence  of democratic in s t i tu t io n s  has no t prevented th e  emergence or 
p e rs is ten ce  of g u e rr illa  w arfare in  a number o f th ese  coun tries, co n tra ry  to  
Guevara's dictum th a t  g u e rr illa  w arfare was unsusta inab le  in  any country where 
th e re  was even the  semblance of dem ocratic e lec tio n s . (12) Iro n ica lly , i t  i s  in  
a neighbouring s ta te  to  B olivia, Peru, th a t  h is  dictum has been most c le a r ly  
refu ted .
L ip se t's  o rig in a l form ulation of a c o rre la tio n  between affluence and s ta b le  
liberal-dem ocracy remains su b s ta n tia lly  tru e . Of course, c o rre la tio n  i s  no t the  
same a s  cause and the  ex istence  of th e  c o rre la tio n  does not prove th e  
p roposition  th a t  the  fa ilu re  of democracy in  Third Vorld coun tries  i s  due, in  
whole or in  p a r t, to  the s u sc e p tib il i ty  of th e  poor to  demagoguery. In fa c t , 
th i s  explanation of the  c o rre la tio n  has no t proved persuasive, no t le a s t  because 
i t  i s  apparent th a t  what m a tte rs  i s  no t th e  abso lu te  level of affluence but 
re la tiv e  affluence. If  th e  abso lu te  level was th e  determ ining fa c to r  one would 
expect th a t  the  r i s e  of liv in g  s tan d a rd s  during th e  tw en tie th  century  would 
have produced a steady r i s e  in  the  number of s ta b le  democracies. I t  has no t.
Further, th e  cu rren t s h i f t  tow ards democracy in  various p a r ts  of th e  world 
can hard ly  be ascribed  fo r the  most p a r t  to  r is in g  liv in g  s tan d ard s . Rather
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th e  rev erse  Is  so  In most cases, though i t  should a lso  be sa id  th a t  p o l i t ic a l  
ra th e r  them economic fa c to rs  have been th e  main cause o f the  cu rren t tren d . 
However, recogn ition  of the  ex istence  of a  c o rre la tio n  between democracy and 
affluence has I t s e l f  played a p a r t  in  the  demand fo r  democracy. Thus, during 
pro-democracy dem onstrations in  Shanghai in  December 1986, s tu d en ts  repeated ly  
linked th e  demand fo r democracy to  th e  achievement of h igher liv in g  
stan d ard s . (13) The im plication  was th a t  democracy could transform  China in to  a 
wealthy country, a m iracle th a t  i s  alm ost c e r ta in ly  beyond the  capac ity  o f any 
p o li t ic a l  system to  achieve. As th e  case of India 6hows, th e re  i s  l i t t l e  reason  
fo r  supposing th a t  liberal-dem ocracy causes affluence.
Reversing th e  d irec tio n  of causation  and suggesting  th a t  affluence  causes 
s tab le  democracy i s  scarcely  more persuasive . The im perfect na tu re  of th e  
co rre la tio n  suggests  a more complex b a s is  of causation . In p ra c tic e , i t  i s  no t 
easy to  id e n tify  fa c to rs  th a t  m ight form th e  b a s is  of a causal connection 
between affluence and s tab le  democracy, a s  th e re  a re  no very obvious answ ers to  
the  question of where re la tiv e ly  a ff lu e n t s o c ie tie s  w ith s ta b le  l ib e ra l-  
dem ocratic system s d if fe r  from th e  r e s t  of th e  world in  o ther re sp ec ts .
However, i t  i s  c lea r  th a t  these  co u n tries  do d i f f e r  in  two very s ig n if ic a n t  ways 
from so c ie tie s  in  the  Third Vorld and th a t  i s  in  re sp ec t of th e i r  level o f 
in d u s tr ia lis a t io n  and in  th e  r e la t iv e  eq uality  o f th e i r  income d is tr ib u tio n . 
Admittedly, n e ith e r fac to r i s  h e lp fu l in  exp lain ing  th e  d ivergent p o l i t ic a l  
fortunes of V estern and E astern  Europe. I t  i s  p o ssib le  th a t  with th e  end of 
Communism th e re  w ill be g rea te r convergence between Vestern and E astern  
Europe, a t  le a s t  in  outward p o l i t ic a l  forms. But in  any event, one should no t 
expect th e  s ta b i l i ty  or o therw ise of a p a r tic u la r  type of p o li t ic a l  system  to  be
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simply exp licab le  in  term s of the  economic cond itions p rev a ilin g  in  th e  
coun tries  in  question. Of th e  two fa c to rs , in d u s tr ia lis a t io n  and economic 
inequality , th e  la t t e r  i s  the  more obviously re lev an t to  th e  a n a ly s is  of 
p o li t ic a l  cond itions in  th e  Third Vorld.
Despite th e  gaps in  the  Vorld Bank's f ig u re s  fo r  Income d is tr ib u tio n , i t  i s  
evident from th e  inform ation given th a t  a s  a  general ru le , Income i s  d is tr ib u te d  
much more unequally in  th e  Third Vorld than  in  th e  F i r s t .  Thus, on th e  Bank's 
da ta , w ith very few exceptions the  r ic h e s t  10 p e r cen t of households in  the  
V estern libera l-dem ocracles account fo r  a lower share  of to ta l  household Income 
than th e ir  equ ivalen ts in  Third Vorld co u n trie s . (14) As th e  Swedish economist, 
Gunnar Xyrdal, has observed, ' i t  i s  indeed a reg u la r occurrence endowed alm ost 
with th e  d ig n ity  of an economic law th a t  th e  poorer th e  country, th e  g re a te r  
th e  d ifference  between r ic h  and poor'. (15) Income d is tr ib u tio n  i s  by no means 
th e  only way of measuring economic in eq u ality  in  the  Third Vorld.
D is trib u tio n  of land provides ano ther. Indeed, p a r tly  because o f the  
g rea te r a v a ila b il i ty  of da ta  on land d is tr ib u tio n , th e  p o li t ic a l  Im plica tions of 
th i s  aspec t of economic inequality  have been stud ied  ex tensive ly . In an a r t ic le  
in  the  A pril 1964 issu e  of the  jou rnal, Vorld P o li t ic s . Bruce Rue s e t t  examined 
th e  re la tio n sh ip  between land tenure and in s ta b i l i ty ,  using data  fo r  47 
coun tries. He used th ree  d iffe re n t Ind ices to  measure in s ta b i l i ty  and th ree  
d if fe re n t Ind ices to  measure the  eq uality  of land d is tr ib u tio n . The s tro n g e s t 
co rre la tio n  was between deaths from in te rn a l group violence in  th e  period 1950 
to  1962 and th e  Glni index of land d is tr ib u tio n , which measures th e  deviation  
of th e  s iz e  o f farm s from the  average. This showed th a t  'in eq u a lity  of land 
d is tr ib u tio n  does bear a re la tio n  to  p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i ty  but th a t  re la tio n sh ip
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i s  no t a s tro n g  one, and many o ther fa c to rs  must be considered In any attem pted 
exp lana tion1. (16 >
One such fa c to r  was th e  re la t iv e  Importance o f a g ricu ltu re  in  th e  coun try 's  
economy s in ce  where a lte rn a tiv e  sources of w ealth ex is ted  besides ag ricu ltu re , 
in equality  of land d is tr ib u tio n  was un likely  to  be a p o l i t ic a l ly  s e n s itiv e  issu e  
capable of generating  violence. Taking such fa c to rs  in to  account, R ussett put 
forward a more complex hypothesis Including d a ta  on th e  percentage of 
population engaged in  ag ricu ltu re  and th e  income level of the  so c ie ty  and, w ith 
these  and o th er refinem ents, produced a much s tro n g e r c o rre la tio n  between h is  
two prim ary Indices. (17) Subsequent e f f o r t s  to  re p lic a te  K u sse tt's  r e s u lts  
using more recen t data on p o li t ic a l  violence have achieved mixed re s u l ts ,  while 
prompting considerable argument, much of i t  extrem ely tech n ica l, over how 
inequality  of land d is tr ib u tio n , in  p a r tic u la r , may b e s t be measured. (18) At th e  
same tim e, research  co rre la tin g  in eq u ality  in  income d is tr ib u tio n  and p o l i t ic a l  
violence has led to  a debate on which measure of in equality  y ie ld s  the  more 
s ig n if ic a n t r e s u l t s . (19)
Imperialism
A fu r th e r  issu e  th a t needs to  be addressed i s  th e  re la tio n sh ip  between economic 
inequality  w ith in  s ta te s  and in equality  between s ta te s .  I t  forms th e  b a s is  of 
Johan G altung's s tru c tu ra l theory  of im perialism , f i r s t  outlined in  an a r t ic le  in  
th e  Journal of Peace Research in  1971. His p o in t of departure was 'two of th e  
most g la rin g  fa c ts  about th is  world: th e  tremendous inequality , w ith in  and 
between n a tio n s , in almost a l l  a sp ec ts  of human liv in g  conditions; and the  
re s is ta n c e  of th i s  inequality  to  change*.(20) He argued th a t  th e  maintenance of 
inequality  a t  th e  global level could not be explained sim ply by th e  balance of
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m ilita ry  fo rce s  in  the  world. Instead , he suggested th a t  Inequality  was b u ilt  
In to  th e  s tru c tu re  of re la tio n s  betwen r ic h  and poor s ta te s .
His b asic  idea was th a t  th e  r ic h , developed world had been able to  
dominate th e  Third Vorld through th e  estab lishm en t of bridgeheads w ith in  the  
developing co u n tries  them selves. He argued th a t  th e  bridgeheads were provided 
by the  e l i te s  o f the  Third Vorld w ith th e i r  V estern s tan d a rd s  o f liv in g  and 
l if e s ty le . By co n tra s t, the  huge g u lf in  liv in g  s tan d a rd s  between th e  poor in  
the  r ic h  world and the  poor of the  Third Vorld underscored th e i r  lack  of any 
common in te r e s t  in  changing th e  natu re  o f th e  system . He concluded th a t  'only 
im perfect am ateurish im perialism  needs weapons; p ro fessio n a l im perialism  i s  
based on s tru c tu ra l  ra th e r  than  d ire c t  v io le n c e '.(21)
In p ra c tic e , i t  i s  open to  question  whether th e  re la tio n sh ip  between th e  
F ir s t  Vorld and the  e l i te s  in  th e  Third Vorld should be seen a s  p rim arily  a 
p o lit ic a l  a llia n c e  generating in eq u ality  between and w ith in  n a tio n s . In fa c t , i t  
seems more reasonable to  a t t r ib u te  th e  success  of e l i te s  in  th e  Third Vorld in  
securing V estern standards of liv in g  to  th e  operation  of market fo rces  a t  a 
global level, enabling an extrem ely p riv ileg ed  a s  well a s  very narrow se c to r  of 
Third Vorld so c ie ty  to  achieve such liv in g  s tan d a rd s  by i t s  ro le  w ith in  a 
market th a t  th e  mass of th e  population does n o t have access to . Xedlcal 
doctors provide an example of a group th a t  o ften  enjoys a s tandard  of liv in g  
th a t  re f le c ts  th e  high value th a t  i s  placed on such s k i l l s  g lobally , 
no toriously , th e  geographical d is tr ib u tio n  of do c to rs  in  th e  world has an 
inverse  re la tio n sh ip  to  actual medical need.
But however such inequality  a r is e s ,  i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  i t  generates p o li t ic a l  
in te re s ts  and, in  p a rtic u la r , th a t  Third Vorld e l i t e s  have an in te r e s t  in
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ensuring  th a t  no obstac le  Is  put In th e  way o f th e i r  own In teg ra tio n  In to  a 
g lobal d iv is io n  of labour where Incomes a re  determ ined by th e  s tan d a rd s  of th e  
very  r ic h e s t  co u n tries. How fa r  th i s  in te r e s t  can be reconciled  w ith  th o se  of 
so c ie ty  a s  a whole I s  a  m atter o f debate. But th a t  th e re  I s  an In tim ate  
re la tio n sh ip  between th e  global and in te rn a l le v e ls  of in equality  i s  ev iden t 
from how c lo se ly  th e  l i f e s ty le s  of th e  e l i t e s  m irro r those  of th e  r ic h  w ith in  
th e  F i r s t  Vorld.
The in te re s t  of e l i te s  in  th e  Third Vorld in  the  maintenance of th e i r  
access to  a p riv ileg ed  existence economically m ight lead one to  expect a  common 
p o l i t ic a l  approach by th e  e l i te s  to  re la tio n s  w ith  th e  r ic h  n a tio n s  to  underpin 
th e i r  p o s itio n . In p rac tice , the  p o l i t ic a l  s tan ce  of e l i te s  in  d if fe re n t 
co u n trie s  of th e  Third Vorld to - re la t io n s  w ith  th e  F i r s t  Vorld v a rie s  
considerab ly . Their d iffe r in g  s tan ces  can p a r t ly  be explained in  dom estic 
term s. To secure th e ir  p o sition , th e  e l i te s  need a t  le a s t  a modicum of dom estic 
p o l i t ic a l  legitim acy. How th a t  can b e s t be achieved v a rie s  from country  to  
country . Thus, i f  a country only achieved independence a f te r  a v io le n t a n t i ­
co lo n ia l s tru g g le , the  e l i t e 's  room fo r  manoeuvre in  i t s  re la tio n s  w ith th e  
form er co lon ia l power may be lim ited . In such circum stances th e  e l i t e  may give 
i t s  support to  a government pursuing a fo re ign  policy  vigorously independent of 
th e  V est. Further, th e  e l i te  i t s e l f  i s  frequen tly  divided on reg io n a l, e th n ic , or 
o th e r lin e s , according to  the  co u n try 's  p a r t ic u la r  circum stances.
Changing in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic a l  co n d itio n s  have a lso  played a p a r t  in  
causing a l te ra t io n s  in  th e  re la tio n sh ip  between th e  F i r s t  Vorld and Third Vorld 
e l i te s .  During th e  heyday of the  Pax Americana in  th e  1950s and 1960s, th e  
a lleg ian ce  of th e  e l i te s  to  au th o rita ria n  governments proclaim ing th e i r  a n t i -
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Communist c re d en tia ls  in  ju s tif ic a tio n  of th e i r  p o lic ie s  and enjoying th e  
support of Washington formed a ty p ic a l p a tte rn , e sp ec ia lly  in  L atin  America. 
This changed when P residen t C arter made adherence to  human r ig h ts  norms one of 
th e  c r i t e r ia  fo r  American support fo r  any regim e. The consequence was th a t  
a u th o rita r ia n  governments were no longer ab le  to  count on unconditional baching 
from the  United S ta te s  simply through adopting a s tro n g ly  antl-Communlst 
stance . This forced e l i te s  to  recognise th a t  meeting a t  le a s t  th e  form al 
requirem ents of a liberal-dem ocracy, through, fo r  example, th e  holding of 
com petitive e lec tio n s , was necessary  i f  they wished to  secure American support 
in  confron ting  violence from below. The same co n sid era tio n  meant th a t  s ta te s  
were le s s  inc lined  to  abandon lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  forms even in  th e  m idst of 
c iv i l  war. (22) I t  remains to  be seen how th e  demise of Communism w ill a f fe c t  
re la tio n s  between the  F i r s t  Vorld and th e  Third Vorld and how they  are  
concep tualised .
Vestern perceptions
The presum ption th a t  th e re  i s  a lin k  between p o l i t ic a l  violence in  the  Third 
Vorld and economic inequality  has had a powerful Influence on Western 
percep tions of turm oil in  the  Third Vorld. In p a r tic u la r  during th e  1960s, w ith 
th e  fading of Cold War a tt i tu d e s  in  th e  Vest follow ing th e  reso lu tio n  of th e  
Cuban m iss ile  c r i s i s  in  1962, th e re  was a widespread tendency in  th e  V est to  
see th e  p o l i t ic a l  violence in  th e  Third Vorld a s  p a r t  of a more general d riv e  
fo r  g re a te r  so c ia l ju s tic e  in  th e  world. I t  led  to  a rom an tic isa tlon  of th e  
g u e rr illa , in  p a r tic u la r . There was an assum ption th a t  outbreaks o f p o l i t ic a l  
violence and p a rtic u la r ly , ru ra l insurgency, were an in d ica tio n  of th e  p o l i t ic a l  
illeg itim acy  of the  government of th e  country in  which such events occurred.
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The co ro lla ry  was th a t  Western libera l-dem ocracles  by v ir tu e  of th e ir  
proven p o l i t ic a l  legitim acy were immune to  th e  organised p o l i t ic a l  violence 
a ffec tin g  Third Vorld s ta te s .  The discovery tow ards th e  end of th e  1960s th a t  
th e  Vest and W esterners were no t p ro tec ted  by th e  mere ex istence  of l ib e ra l-  
democracy from organised p o li t ic a l  violence, p a r tic u la r ly  c lan d estin e  violence, 
came as  a considerab le  shock to  Vestern pub lic  opinion. By th e  end o f th e  
1970s i f  n o t e a r l ie r ,  opinion had sh if te d  to  th e  ex ten t th a t  i t  became p o ssib le  
to  p resen t V estern libera l-dem ocracles a s  e sp ec ia lly  vulnerable to  te rro r ism , as 
c lan d estin e  violence in  V estern libera l-dem ocracles , o r d irec ted  a t  W esterners 
abroad, was by th is  time in v ariab ly  described . V ith th e  change of perception  
in  re la tio n  to  Vestern v u ln e ra b ility  went a marked hardening of a tt i tu d e s  
towards a l l  form s of an ti-sy stem  violence.
At th e  beginning of th e  age of te rro r ism  in  th e  la te  1960s and ea rly  
1970s, p o l i t ic a l  violence in  th e  Third Vorld was not a s ig n if ic a n t fa c to r  in  the  
in te rp re ta tio n  of the  concept of te rro rism . In i t ia l ly ,  such violence continued 
to  be seen a s  a response to  in equality  or lack  of democracy w ith in  th e  s ta te s  
a ffected  by i t  and was generally  no t called  te rro rism , except by th e  p o l i t ic a l  
a u th o ritie s  in  th e  country concerned. There were two major exceptions to  th i s  
p roposition : violence c a rrie d  out by P a le s tin ian  o rg an isa tio n s  and th e  a tta c k s  
of urban g u e r r i l la s  in  L atin  America on dip lom ats and fo reign  businessmen.
Both had a s ig n if ic a n t Influence on how th e  term , te rro rism , came to  be 
used. In each case the  in te rn a tio n a l o r tra n sn a tio n a l dimension to  th e  violence 
was c e n tra l to  i t s  lab e llin g  as  te rro rism . Thus, i t  was la rg e ly  as  a r e s u l t  of 
h ijack ings th a t  P a lestin ian  c lan d estin e  violence of a l l  k inds came to  be 
labelled  a s  te rro rism . S im ilarly , i t  i s  un like ly  th a t  th e  term, te rro r ism , would
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have been used in re la tio n  to  c lan d estin e  v io lence d irec ted  a g a in s t th e  m ilita ry  
d ic ta to rs h ip  in  B razil, i f  a l l  the  ta rg e ts  of th e  campaign had been B razilian . 
Indeed, given i t s  sm all sca le , i t  seems un like ly  th a t  i t  would have a t tra c te d  
th e  a tte n tio n  of the  Vesterm media a t  a l l  i f  th a t  had been th e  case.
Over th e  la s t  20 years, the  term , te rro r ism , has gradually  come to  be 
app lied  to  a t  le a s t  some of the  in s tan ces  o f dom estic p o l i t ic a l  violence w ith in  
th e  Third Vorld, though th e  use o f th e  term in  th i s  con tex t rem ains fa r  more 
con ten tious than  i t s  employment in  an in te rn a tio n a l con tex t or in  re la tio n  to  
v io lence w ith in  a Vestern liberal-dem ocracy. R eservations about th e  use of th e  
concept a re  re flec ted  in  th e  way i t  i s  applied  in  th i s  con tex t. In p a r tic u la r , 
p e rp e tra to rs  of a c ts  of te rro rism  a re  much le s s  lik e ly  to  be labelled  a s  
t e r r o r i s t s  o r th e  o rg an isa tions re sp o n sib le  ca lled  t e r r o r i s t .  Both th e  fa c to rs  
encouraging the  extension of the  term to  dom estic violence w ith in  th e  Third 
Vorld and th e  reasons fo r  th e  q u a lif ic a tio n s  applied  to  i t s  use m erit 
exam ination.
The s im p lest b a s is  fo r  the  ex tension  of th e  term to  dom estic p o l i t ic a l  
v iolence was th e  Involvement of o rg an isa tio n s  th a t  had c a rrie d  out a c ts  of 
in te rn a tio n a l or tran sn a tio n a l te rro r ism . Thus, by v ir tu e  of th e  involvement of 
groups a sso c ia ted  w ith Fatah such a s  Black September in  h ijack ings and in  o ther 
armed a tta c k s  outside of th e  Kiddle E ast, Fatah i t s e l f  and, Indeed, th e  la rg e r  
um brella o rgan isa tion  of which Fatah was a c e n tra l p a r t ,  th e  P a le s tin e  
L iberation  O rganisation (PLO), a lso  came to  be labelled  a s  t e r r o r i s t .  This 
app lied  to  a l l  forms of violence in  which th e se  o rg an isa tio n s  engaged, even 
a tta c k s  e x p lic it ly  d irec ted  a t  I s ra e l i  m ilita ry  personnel in  a combat s i tu a tio n  
a s  in  c ro ss-b o rd er ra id s . However, th e re  were con tex ts  th a t  s tra in e d  th e
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c re d ib il i ty  of the  app lica tion  of th e  term , t e r r o r i s t ,  to  the  PLO, such as  i t s  
use to  re fe r  to  la rge  PLO m ilita ry  form ations in  Lebanon, since  th e  whole notion 
of thousands of t e r r o r i s t s  runs counter to  assum ptions about th e  nature  of 
te rro rism , p a r tic u la r ly  th e  assumption of i t s  lack  of any p o l i t ic a l  legitim acy.
S im ilarly , th e  term, te r r o r i s t ,  has been applied  by extension  to  the 
domestic p o li t ic a l  violence of various of th e  contending p a r t ie s  in  Lebanon, by 
v ir tu e  of the  involvement o r suspected involvement of groups such as  Hizbollah 
in  h ijack ings and the  tak ing  of hostages. However, in  th i s  case, too, w rite rs  
analysing  th e  p o li t ic a l  s itu a tio n  in  Lebanon in  any depth have tended to  avoid 
th e  term p a r tly  because of i t s  m isleading connotations, but a lso  p a r tly  because 
of the  sim ple recognition  th a t  the emotive overtones of th e  word c o n s titu te  an 
obstac le  to  th e  d isp ass io n ate  assessm ent needed to  convey th e  complexity of 
Lebanon's c o n f lic ts . Lebanon a lso  i l lu s t r a te s  another form of th e  ap p lica tion  
of the  concept by extension and th a t  i s  i t s  ap p lica tio n  to  th e  employment of 
methods asso c ia ted  with te rro rism  in  th e  V est, such as  ca r bombs and the 
a ssa ss in a tio n  of im portant p o li t ic a l  fig u res . The use of such covert methods in  
the  Third Vorld i s  qu ite  commonly re fe rre d  to  a s  te rro rism , while in s tan ces  of 
the  use of such methods are often described  a s  a c ts  of te rro rism .
However, re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r such a c ts  i s  much le s s  lik e ly  to  be 
a ttr ib u ta b le  to  p e rp e tra to rs  who can be lab e lled  a s  t e r r o r i s t s  than  in  s im ila r  
occurrences in  th e  Vest. One reason i s  th a t  in  a Third Vorld con tex t, 
re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  such action i s  much more lik e ly  to  l ie  w ith th e  agents of 
governments than  in  the  Vest. Governments, un like  sm all groups engaged in  
c landestine  violence w ithin Vestern libera l-dem ocracies , generally  do not 
proclaim  public ly  th e ir  re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  such deeds. (23) F urther, th e  s ta te
involved may be a foreign power and not n ecessa rily  th e  s ta te  of th e  t e r r i to r y  
in  which th e  a c t  has taken place. The v u ln e ra b ility  of Third Vorld s ta te s  to  
such covert In terven tion  i s  a s ig n if ic a n t p o in t of d is tin c tio n  between th ese  
s ta te s ,  v ir tu a lly  reg ard less  of Ideology, and V estern libera l-dem ocracies. 
Terrorism and the Third Vorld
In the  In troduction , i t  was pointed out th a t  an im plication  of th e  emotive power 
of th e  term was th a t  i t  applied to  violence th a t  was absolu tely  il le g itim a te . 
Vhereas i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  speak of ju s tif ie d  violence or even leg itim ate  
violence, th e re  can be no question of ju s tif ie d  te rro r ism  or leg itim ate  
te rro rism . The d if f ic u lty  in  judging the legitim acy of government in  many 
Third Vorld s ta te s  contributed  in i t ia l ly  to  a re luctance  to  apply such an 
a b so lu tis t  judgement as the  term, te rro rism , im plies to  an ti-sy stem  violence 
w ithin such a s ta te .
However, th e  wider ex istence of lib era l-dem ocra tic  forms of government in  
the  Third Vorld has to  some degree overcome th i s  re luctance, s in ce  no very 
obvious grounds of p o li t ic a l  p rin c ip le  e x is t  fo r  tre a tin g  such s ta te s  
d iffe re n tly  from liberal-dem ocracies in Vestern so c ie tie s . For some w rite rs , 
therefo re , applying the  term, te rro rism , to  an ti-sy stem  violence of whatever 
kind in  any country with a libera l-dem ocra tic  form of government has been seen 
as a m atter of being co n sis ten t in  th e ir  use of language. For o th e rs , i t  has 
simply been a way of proclaim ing th e ir  f a i th  in  lib e ra l-dem ocra tic  values.
But whatever ju s tif ic a tio n  i s  advanced fo r employing the concept in  th i s  
context, applying the term, te rro rism , to  an ti-sy stem  violence in  Third Vorld 
liberal-dem ocracies has fa r-reach in g  im plica tions fo r  th e  scope of th e  concept. 
In the  case of Vestern liberal-dem ocracies, i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  use th e  term  both
-  226  -
a s  a way of in d ica tin g  th e  Illeg itim acy  of p o l i t ic a l  violence in  circum stances 
where n o n -v io len t means of influencing th e  decision-m akers a re  av a ilab le  to  th e  
o rd inary  c itiz e n  and a s  a way of desc rib in g  a category of c lan d es tin e  methods 
of violence, such a s  bombings and a ssa ss in a tio n . Indeed, th e re  i s  a th ir d  
dimension to  th e  term in th i s  contex t, th e  im plication  th a t  one i s  ta lk in g  about 
a low level o f violence in d ica tiv e  of i t s  lack  of s ig n if ic a n t popular support.
In p ra c tic e , th e re  i s  l i t t l e  c o n f lic t among th e se  d if fe re n t meanings a s  only in  
very exceptional cases, such as Northern Ire land , does organised p o li t ic a l  
v iolence in  a V estern llberal-dem ocracy enjoy anything but m arginal support. 
This fa c to r  and th e  e ffec tiv en ess  of governmental measures to  m aintain  law and 
o rder in  such so c ie tie s  alm ost au tom atically  d ic ta te  th e  employment of 
c lan d estin e  methods of violence- and th e  low level of any campaign of violence.
This un ity  o f meanings simply does not e x is t  in th e  Third Vorld. In 
re a l i ty , th e  cap ac ity  of a s ta te  to  m aintain law and order i s  more a function  of 
th e  level of economic development in  a so c ie ty  than  i t  i s  a re f le c tio n  of th e  
type of p o l i t ic a l  system. Llberal-dem ocracy has proved l i t t l e  more successfu l 
than o ther forms of p o lit ic a l  system  in  overcoming the  re la t iv e  weakness of th e  
s ta te  in  many Third Vorld so c ie tie s . V ldespread defiance of c e n tra l government 
i s  no t merely p o ssib le  in  a Third Vorld llberal-dem ocracy. I t  i s  
commonplace. (24) Indeed, i t  may reasonably  be argued th a t  the  norms of 
llberal-dem ocracy  make the  s ta t e 's  ta sk  of e s ta b lish in g  i t s  au th o rity  more 
d i f f ic u l t  s in ce  they Impose r e s t r a in ts  on th e  means th a t  may be employed by th e  
s ta te  to  uphold i t s  au tho rity . These r e s t r a in t s  s tre tc h  th e  capac ity  of 
government in  an in d u s tr ia lised  so c ie ty  to  preven t d iso rd e r. The b e lie f  th a t  
llberal-dem ocracy  was an obstac le  to  both na tio n -b u ild in g  and th e  c rea tio n  of
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e ffec tlv e  au th o rity  was one reason why so many form er colonies abandoned 
lib e ra l-dem ocra tic  forms a f te r  independence.
Vhere lib era l-dem ocra tic  forms have been re ta in ed  or revived, whether in  
deference to  V estern opinion or because of an indigenous commitment to  such a 
system of government, th e  s ta te  has frequen tly  been a f f l ic te d  by p o l i t ic a l  
violence. Both th e  nature  of the  violence and th e  level has varied  
considerably . The methods of violence have by no means been confined to  
c landestine  operations and in  some cases c iv i l  war provides the  only app o site  
d esc rip tio n  of i t s  level. Yet th a t  has not prevented Western jo u rn a lis ts , 
p o litic ia n s , and academics from c h a rac te ris in g  p o l i t ic a l  violence in  th ese  
so c ie tie s  a s  te rro rism , though th e re  has been enough confusion w ith in  th e  Vest 
over the  appropria teness of using the  term in  such a lien  con tex ts a s  to  p reven t 
the  emergence of a c lea r consensus on when th e  concept should be used.
If  th e  form of government m atte rs  above a l l  e lse , then presumably th e  
term, t e r r o r i s t ,  can be applied to  any group engaged in  fig h tin g  th e  system , 
even i f  i t  i s  the  s ize  and charac te r of an army and c landestine  violence p lays 
a t r i v ia l  ro le  in  i t s  operations. To add to  th e  confusion, i t  i s  in ev itab ly  the  
case th a t  c iv il ia n s  who perceive them selves to  be on th e  opposite s id e  to  an
army, whether i t  i s  a g u e rr illa  army, th e  army of th e  s ta te ,  or th e  army o f a
p a rtic u la r  re lig io u s  or e thn ic  community as  in  th e  Lebanon, w ill fe e l them selves 
te r ro r ise d  by such a force, lending v e ris im ilitu d e  to  th e  use of th e  word, 
te rro rism .
Thus, in  a chapter on the  urban g u e rr i l la  in  L atin  America, R ichard
G illesp ie  makes th e  claim in  a footnote th a t  'th e  only im portant in su rg en t 
movement in  Latin  America which ind ispu tab ly  p ra c tic e s  te rro rism  i s  th e  neo-
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Maoist Sendero Luminoso in  P e ru '.(25) The argument p resen ted  in  th e  chap ter 
i t s e l f  i s  th a t  urban g u e rrilla  w arfare as  i t  was c a rr ie d  out by groups such as 
th e  Tupomaros i s  d is tin g u ish ab le  from te rro r ism  by v ir tu e  of being more 
d isc rim in a te  and p red ic tab le . (26) Yet in  term s of th e  methods employed, th e  
Tupomaros and th e  o ther urban g u e rr i l la s  bear a f a r  c lo se r  resemblance to  
groups such a s  th e  I ta lia n  Red Brigades or th e  Vest German Red Army Faction 
than  do th e  ru ra l  g u e rr illa s  of Sendero Luminoso. F urther, i t  i s  d if f ic u l t  to  
escape th e  f a c t  th a t  the  a c t iv i t ie s  of th e  L atin  American urban g u e rr illa s  
them selves played a considerable ro le  in  shaping contemporary percep tions of 
th e  concept of te rro rism .
However, th e  c o n flic t among th e  d if fe re n t c r i t e r ia  fo r  c h a rac te ris in g  
p o l i t ic a l  v iolence does allow considerab le  la ti tu d e  to  any w rite r  to  argue th a t  
th i s  or th a t  campaign of violence w ithin  th e  Third Vorld should or should no t 
be ch a rac te rised  as te rro rism . The spread of lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  forms in  th e  
Third Vorld has helped to  s treng then  the  case of those  arguing fo r an ex tensive 
in te rp re ta tio n  of the  concept, allow ing, fo r  example, ru ra l  g u e rr i l la s  to  be 
labelled  a s  t e r r o r i s t s .  The lin e  of argument commonly advanced i s  th a t  the  
illeg itim acy  of any kind of p o li t ic a l  violence w ith in  th e  con tex t of a l lb e ra l-  
democracy prov ides a ju s tic a tio n  fo r using th e  label, te rro r ism , reg a rd le ss  of 
the  p a r t ic u la r  methods of violence employed. I t  has been applied  no t ju s t  to  
th e  Sendero Luminoso but to  s e p a ra t is t  groups such as  th e  L iberation  Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in  S ri Lanka. But i f  i t  i s  ap p ro p ria te  to  apply th e  term 
in th e  con tex t of d eb ilita ted  libera l-dem ocracies  unable to  e s ta b lish  th e ir  w rit 
over la rg e  a reas  of the  te r r i to r y  under th e i r  ju r isd ic tio n , i t  becomes a sh o r t 
s tep  to  apply i t  to  any group employing any method of organised violence
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ag a in s t what one considers to  be a leg itim a te  government, whatever th e  
ch arac te r of th e  p o li t ic a l  system in th e  country  in  question. In p ra c tice , th i s  
has allowed th e  lab e llin g  of v io len t movements to  become a m atter of name- 
c a llin g , re f le c tin g  one's own p a r tic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  prejudices and p references. 
Name-calling
Thus, during th e  1980s many on th e  l e f t ,  broadly  sym pathetic to  th e  S andanistas 
in  th e ir  confron ta tion  with the United S ta te s , ca lled  th e  Contras operating  in  
Nicaragua te r r o r i s t s .  (27) S im ilarly , UNITA <Unlao Facional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola -  National Union fo r  th e  T otal Independence of Angola) has been 
ch arac te rised  a s  a  'pseudo-Insurgency'(28) because of th e  support and arms 
UNITA received from P re to ria . Admittedly, th e  Contras d id  not f i t  th e  c la s s ic  
s tereo type  of a g u e rr illa  a s  a f is h  opera ting  in  a sea of peasant d isco n ten t, 
but a t  th e  same tim e they bore l i t t l e  resem blance to  the  s tereo ty p e  of a 
t e r r o r i s t  as a masked gunman. A ju s t i f ic a t io n  often  given fo r th e  label i s  th a t  
the  Contras ca rried  out a tro c i t ie s  a g a in s t th e  c iv il ia n  population. I f  th a t  
c r i te r io n  were to  be widely used as a b a s is  of c a llin g  o rg an isa tio n s  t e r r o r i s t ,  
many conventional arm ies involved in  f ig h tin g  insurgencies would a lso  m erit 
th is  d esc rip tio n . In c o n tra s t to  the  C ontras, UNITA with a s tro n g  base among 
th e  Ovlmbundu people of Angola c lea rly  d id  (and does) f i t  the  c r i t e r ia  of a 
ru ra l g u e rr illa  movement.
Indeed, i t  i s  ty p ica l of a number of such movements in  A frican s ta te s  in  
which e th n ic ity  ra th e r  than c la s s  has been th e  major determ inant of th e  
movement's popular support. These range a c ro ss  th e  ideo log ical spectrum, though 
in the  case of some of these  movements, th e i r  ideo log ical stance  i s  la rg e ly  a 
function of th e i r  ex ternal sources of sup p o rt and w ill vary according to
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ex ternal circum stances. Thus, before the  co llapse  of Portuguese co lo n ia l ru le , 
the  Ideology of UNITA was M aoist. (29) During th e  1980s UNITA consciously  
c u ltiv a ted  an image of being 'p ro-V estern ' in  i t s  Ideology and achieved a 
measure of success in  persuading th e  media to  describe  i t  in  th ese  term s, 
d esp ite  th e  fa c t  th a t  the  ac tua l p o li t ic a l  behaviour of th e  movement in  th e  
zones i t  co n tro lled  Included th e  burning a liv e  of p o l i t ic a l  opponents in  th e  
manner of w itches. (30)
From th e  o ther end of the  p o li t ic a l  spectrum, a number of re ference  works 
on te rro rism  have labelled  both th e  South Vest A frica People's O rganisation  
(SVAPO) and the  African N ational Congress of South A frica (ANC) a s  t e r r o r i s t  
o rg an isa tio n s. (31) An example i s  th e  inclusion  of SVAPO and th e  ANC in  a l i s t  
of 'ac tiv e  t e r r o r i s t  groups' in  Terrorism  as  S tate-Sponsored Covert V arfare  by 
Pay Cline and Yonah Alexander, (32) w rite rs  widely regarded as ex p erts  in  th e  
f ie ld  of te rro rism . The l i s t in g  of SVAPO among t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n s  i s  qu ite  
ex trao rd inary  a t  a number of lev e ls . Not merely was South A frican ru le  in  th e  
te r r i to r y  of South Vest A frica unambiguously ille g itim a te  in  term s of th e  
estab lish ed  in te rn a tio n a l norm of se lf-de term ination , making i t  a c lea rc u t case 
of co lon ia l ru le , i t  had ac tu a lly  been declared to  be i l le g a l in  1971 in  an 
Advisory Opinion of the  In te rn a tio n a l Court of Ju stic e . This followed th e  
decision o f th e  United Nations General Assembly to  withdraw th e  League of 
Nations mandate under which South Africa had ruled th e  te r r i to r y  s in ce  th e  end 
of the  F i r s t  Vorld Var.
The nature  of SVAPO's campaign from th e  o u tse t had been one of ru ra l  
g u e rr illa  w arfare and i t  had been evident a t  an early  s tag e  of th e  c o n f l ic t  th a t  
SVAPO enjoyed widespread popular support in  th e  a reas  where i t  was f ig h tin g .
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In response th e  South African government had mounted la rg e  sca le  m ilita ry  
operations both w ithin the  te r r i to r y  and in  Angola. A c tiv itie s  generally  
assoc iated  w ith te rro rism  such as  urban bombings or a tta c k s  on fo re ig n ers  
played very l i t t l e  p a r t in  SVAPO's campaign. This i s  no t to  s a n i t is e  th e  nature  
of th e  c o n f lic t, which was marked on both s id e s  by ac tio n s  th a t  ran  c lea rly  
con trary  to  th e  Geneva Conventions on th e  conduct of war and by lo s s  of l i f e  
fa r  exceeding th a t  of those k ille d  g lobally  in  a l l  a c ts  of in te rn a tio n a l 
te rro rism  s in ce  1968. I t  i s  sim ply to  underline the  p o in t th a t  th e  lab e llin g  of 
SVAPO as  a t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isation  had l i t t l e  b a s is  in  th e  methods th e  
o rgan isa tion  used. (33)
I t  i s  a lso  evident th a t  th e  lab e l was no t based on any judgement a s  to  the  
degree of popular support th e  o rg an isa tio n  enjoyed. In p a r tic u la r , i t  seems 
very unlikely  th a t  Cline and Alexander included SVAPO in  th e ir  l i s t  out o f a 
s incere  but m istaken b e lie f th a t  th e  o rgan isa tion  enjoyed only lim ited  backing 
from the  people of Vamlbia. In fa c t , SVAPO's v ic to ry  in  th e  e lec tio n s  in  1989 
to  the  c o n s titu en t assembly in  JTamlbla when i t  won 57 per cen t of th e  vote was 
not tre a te d  by th e  Vestern media as  a su rp ris in g  outcome. (34) The key issu e  
fo r Cline and Alexander c lea rly  was th e  f a c t  th a t  SVAPO received support from 
the  Soviet Union and i t s  a l l ie s .  Given V estern re luctance  to  support any 
movement th a t  used violence of any kind ag a in s t Vhite ru le , such lin k s  were 
hardly  su rp ris in g .
At th e  same time, they presented  elem ents on th e  r ig h t  w ith a p re te x t fo r  
supporting th e  continuation of Vhite ru le  in  southern A frica in  th e  name of 
anti-Communism. The African n a tio n a lis t  movements in  th ese  co u n tries  were no t 
called  t e r r o r i s t  in  the  b e lie f th a t  th ese  movements d id  not rep re sen t the
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m ajority  of th e  population In th ese  co u n tries . Consequently, c a llin g  them 
te r r o r i s t ,  no tw ithstanding  th e ir  s tro n g  claim  to  rep re sen t a m ajority  of th e  
population, c a rried  the  im plication  of approval of th e  continued den ial of 
p o li t ic a l  r ig h ts  to  th e  m ajority  of the  population . The muted concern over th a t  
im plication on th e  r ig h t  can be seen a s  re f le c tin g  a measure of ambivalence 
over th e  ending of th e  co lon ial e ra , a re lu c tan ce  to  accept fu lly  th e  legitim acy 
of th e  p o s t-co lo n ia l order, and h o s t i l i ty  to  th e  ad d itio n a l demands of 
n a t io n a lis ts  in  th e  Third Vorld fo r  a g re a te r  share  of th e  w orld 's wealth.
However, th e  im plication  of support fo r  V hite supremacy was one reason 
why the  more lib e ra l  sec tio n s  of opinion in  South A frica were re lu c ta n t to  c a l l  
the  AFC or even i t s  m ilita ry  wing t e r r o r i s t ,  <35) d esp ite  the  fa c t  th a t  one 
component of i t s  armed stru g g le  had been urban bombings th a t  c le a rly  f i t  most 
people's conception of a c ts  of te rro rism . And while th e  declared policy  of the  
AFC was to  avoid c iv ilia n  c a su a ltie s  in  such bombings, in  p rac tice , c iv il ia n s  
were k ille d  and injured in  the  a tta c k s . The fa c t  th a t  Vhite l ib e ra ls  recognised 
th e  AFC's p o li t ic a l  legitim acy did no t preven t them from condemning these  
ta c t ic s .  Vhile urban bombings were re la tiv e ly  in frequent and were no t a major 
or even p a r tic u la r ly  s ig n if ic a n t source of p o l i t ic a l  violence in  South A frica 
during th e  1980s, they provided the  American S ta te  Department w ith a p re te x t 
fo r  including th e  AFC in  i t s  'worldwide overview of o rgan izations th a t  engage 
in te rro r ism '. (36)
The emphasis the  S ta te  Departm ent's 1989 re p o rt, P a tte rn s  of Global 
Terrorism . gave to  th e  AFC's lin k s  w ith th e  South A frican Communist Party  and 
th e  support i t  received from th e  Soviet Union provided an in d ica tio n  of the  
American government's p r io r i t ie s  in  re sp ec t of the  AFC, though th e  negative
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p ic tu re  given of th e  AHC was q u a lified  by th e  observation  th a t  th e  o rgan isa tion  
had n o t a ttach ed  American in te r e s t s .<37) The case  of th e  PLO p a ra l le ls  in  some 
re sp e c ts  th a t  of the  AFC. The in s is ten c e  of th e  I s ra e l i  r ig h t  and those 
sym pathetic  to  them in  th e  Vest on continuing  to  c a l l  th e  PLO a t e r r o r i s t  
o rg an isa tio n , even a f te r  A ra fa t's  sp e c if ic  repud ia tion  of the  use o f t e r r o r i s t  
methods in  December 1988, stemmed le s s  from scep tic ism  about A ra fa t 's  s in c e r ity  
than  i t  was a d e s ire  to  deny a l l  p o l i t ic a l  leg itim acy no t ju s t  to  th e  PLO but to  
th e  P a le s tin ia n s  as  a people e n ti t le d  to  ex e rc ise  th e  r ig h t  of s e l f -  
determ ination  in  some shape or form.
P rec ise ly  because th e  element o f propaganda in  th e  use of th e  term s, 
te rro r ism  and te r r o r i s t ,  i s  so evident in  cases  lik e  these , w r ite rs  o r 
newspapers seeking to  p resen t an objective a n a ly s is  of the  s i tu a tio n  tend to  
avoid th e i r  use. (36) Another fa c to r opera ting  a g a in s t th e  use of th e  term s in  
th e  co n tex t of the  Third Vorld i s  the  f a c t  th a t  th e  Vestern media devotes very 
l i t t l e  space to  the  coverage of events in  th e  Third Vorld and only s i tu a tio n s  
th a t  Involve very high lev e ls  of p o li t ic a l  vio lence tend to  be rep o rted  in  any 
depth. But in  s itu a tio n s  of turm oil where th e re  i s  a g re a t deal of overt 
v io lence tak in g  place, i t  becomes d i f f ic u l t  to  is o la te  p a r tic u la r  in c id en ts  a s  
a c ts  o f te rro r ism  in th e  sense th a t  th e  term  i s  generally  understood in  th e  
Vest and to  d is tin g u ish  i t s  occurrence from o th e r forms of vio lence. Even in  
th e  V est, when c landestine  violence e x is ts  alongside o ther forms o f violence 
such a s  r io t in g , th e re  i s  d is in c lin a tio n  to  use th e  term , te rro r ism , a s  a 
g en era lised  d esc rip tio n  of the  c lan d estin e  violence because of i t s  a sso c ia tio n  
w ith a la rg e r  problem of p o li t ic a l  v iolence th a t  has to  be addressed 
p o l i t ic a l ly .
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In the  Third Vorld, inform ation about th e  circum stances in  which people 
have died i s  often extremely scan ty  and often  re p o rts  of serious in c id en ts  
involving la rg e  lo ss  of l i f e  provide l i t t l e  more inform ation than  rough 
estim ates of th e  numbers k ille d  in  the  episode. An example i s  provided by the  
rep o rtin g  of intercommunal violence between Hutu and T utsi in  August 1988.
Hews of th e  c o n flic t was brought f i r s t  by T u tsi refugees to  neighbouring 
Rwanda, then by a much la rg e r group of Hutu refugees w ith h o rr ify in g  s to r ie s  of 
a r e p r is a l  m assacre by th e  Tutsi-dom inated armed fo rces. E stim ates of the  
numbers k ille d  ranged from 5,000, a figu re  given by Burundi's fo reign  m in is te r, 
to  24,000.(39) This was by no means th e  f i r s t  episode of th is  type  in  Burundi.
The k i l l in g s  in  Burundi in  August 1988 a lso  i l lu s t r a te  well a general 
problem of using the  term, te rro rism , in  a Third Vorld context. The te r r o r  f e l t  
by those  who fled  to  neighbouring s ta te s  in  fe a r  of th e ir  liv e s  would seem to  
provide ex ce llen t grounds fo r using th e  term , te rro r ism , as  a d e sc rip tio n  of 
what they experienced, ye t th e ir  experiences could hard ly  be fu r th e r  removed 
from th e  con tex t in  which the  term i s  used in  th e  Vest. The huge d ifferen ce  in  
liv in g  s tan d a rd s  between F ir s t  Vorld and Third Vorld, underlined a t  the  
beginning of th i s  chapter, i s  a lso  re fle c ted  in  very la rg e  d iffe ren ces  in  l i f e  
experiences.
Fear of the  Third Vorld
In comparison with the  turm oil th a t  a f fe c ts  th e  Third Vorld, p o l i t ic a l  violence 
in Vestern so c ie tie s  or a tta ck s  on V esterners ou tside th e ir  own so c ie tie s  
remains a very t r i v i a l  problem, nev erth e less , i t  rem ains f a r  e a s ie r  fo r  most of 
the  consumers of the  Vestern mass media th a t  dominate global communications to  
em pathise w ith victim s of the l a t t e r  than w ith those  of the  form er. This comes
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out very s tro n g ly  in  the  l i te ra tu re  on te rro r ism  i t s e l f .  Charles Keg ley opens a 
study of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  with the  follow ing f ic tio n a l example:
P ictu re  yourse lf a passenger on an in te rn a tio n a l f l ig h t  
from Few York to  London. Without warning, th e  p i lo t  
announces th a t  gunmen claim ing to  rep resen t th e  Third 
World L iberation  Army have seized con tro l of th e  a i r c r a f t  
and Intend to  hold you and th e  o th er passengers hostage 
u n til  th e ir  demands a re  met by th e  governments of th e  
Forth A tlan tic  Treaty O rganization. Moreover, the  p i lo t  
announces th a t  th e  commandos have declared th a t  the  
fa ilu re  to  receive  compliance w ith th e ir  demands w ill 
re s u lt  in  the  death  of th e  e n tire  crew and passengers. (40) 
While Kegley Invents th e  idea of a 'Third World L iberation Army', he makes 
no suggestions a s  to  what th e  demands of such a group might be. I t  i s  perhaps 
unnecessary fo r  him to  do so, as  th e  d iv ide between th e  F i r s t  and Third World 
provides such wide scope fo r  th e  generation o f demands. At th e  same tim e, 
th e re  appears to  be l i t t l e  p o s s ib il i ty  of a defusing of Forth-South ten sio n s  
since  i t  i s  by no means c lea r how the  gap between th e  r ic h  and poor n a tio n s  of 
the  world can be prevented from growing, l e t  alone be reduced. Indeed, i t  can 
be argued th a t  i t  i s  th e  very absence of any obvious p o li t ic a l  or economic 
so lu tion  to  th e  problem of g lobal inequality  which generates fe a r  w ithin th e  
a fflu en t world o f a v io len t reac tio n  in  th e  Third World th a t  w ill c ro ss  in to  th e  
F ir s t  World i t s e l f .
The growth of the extreme r ig h t  in  Europe re f le c ts ,  in  p a r t ,  re c e p tiv ity  to  
the  argument th a t  immigration from th e  Third World f a c i l i ta te s  th e  s p il l-o v e r
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in to  th e  Vest of th e  p o li t ic a l  problems of th e  poor na tio n s , Including th a t  of 
p o li t ic a l  violence. The argument i s  frequen tly  presented in  term s of a m edical 
metaphor of th e  spread of d isease . I t  i s  an analogy th a t  f in d s  p len ty  of 
echoes in  th e  l i te ra tu re  on te rro r ism . Keg ley  i s  a s tr ik in g  example.
Since the  1960s, a c ts  of in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  have
recurred w ith s u f f ic ie n t frequency fo r  te rro r ism  to  r i s e
s tead ily  on th e  g lobal agenda. Regarded as  a chron ic  
condition p o te n tia lly  o f epidemic p ro po rtions, i t  has 
commanded increasing  resources to  combat. As th e  
a f f l ic tio n  has contagiously  spread, i t  has changed from a 
problem once overwhelmingly id e n tif ie d  with obscure 
in su rre c tio n is ts  in  remote a reas  to  one th a t  today m ight 
s t r ik e  anyone, any p lace. (41)
Vhlle such alarmlsm i s  hard ly  ju s t if ie d  by th e  ac tu a l th re a t  to  l i f e  and 
limb th a t  in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  poses to  th e  c itiz e n s  o f th e  Vest, i t  does 
provide a re la tiv e ly  easy means of persuading read ers  of th e  s ig n ific an ce  of
the  sub jec t. I t  derives c re d ib il i ty  both from th e  high p r io r i ty  given to  th e
need to  f ig h t th e  scourge of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  by Vestern p o li t ic ia n s  and 
from the  ex tensive  coverage a c ts  of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  a t t r a c t  from th e  
mass media. The a tte n tio n  th a t  in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  receives i s  in  s t r ik in g  
c o n tra s t to  i t s  level. Compared to  c iv i l  c o n f lic ts  in  th e  Third Vorld, th e  
numbers k ille d  in  in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  a re  m iniscule. However, th e  is su e s  
a re  not e n tire ly  separa te .
P a rt of th e  fe a r  of in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  deriv es  from concern th a t  
in s ta b i l i ty  in  th e  Third Vorld w ill give r i s e  to  violence across n a tio n a l
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boundarles. There a re  s u ff ic ie n t examples of a connection between th e  two 
lev e ls  o f violence to  lend c re d ib il i ty  to  such concern. The Lebanese c iv i l  war 
between 1975 and 1991 provides th e  most c le a r-c u t case of th e  lin k . This 
a spec t of th e  Lebanese c o n flic t Is  d iscussed  fu r th e r  In the  nex t ch ap te r. But 
th e  ex istence  o f examples of such a lin k  should not obscure th e  f a c t  th a t  in  
th e  v a s t  m ajority  of cases, th e re  has been re la tiv e ly  l i t t l e  s p i l l-o v e r  from 
p o li t ic a l  violence w ithin Third Vorld s ta te s  in to  the  in te rn a tio n a l arena.
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Chapter 9 -  The In te rn a tio n a l Dimensions of Terrorism
As we have already noted, most s e ts  of s t a t i s t i c s  on g lobal te rro r ism  are  
lim ited  to  in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism . The generally  accepted d e fin itio n  of 
'in te rn a tio n a l ' in  th i s  context i s  th a t  th e  te rro rism  involves th e  c itiz e n ry  o r 
te r r i to r y  of more than one country. Thus, on th i s  in te rp re ta tio n , th e  murder of 
an American so ld ie r  based in  Vest Germany by Germans would count a s  an a c t  of 
in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism , provided of course th e  k i l le r s  had an id e n tif ia b le  
p o li t ic a l  motive. (1) The kidnapping of an I ta lia n  businessman by urban 
g u e rr i l la s  in  Argentina would a lso  fin d  i t s  way in to  the  s t a t i s t i c s  on 
in te rn a tio n a l te r ro r ism . (2) Another example m ight be th e  k i l l in g  of a South 
A frican ex ile  in  France by a South A frican death  squad, (3) though the  is su e  of 
s ta te  involvement com plicates th e  issu e  in  th i s  case, a s  does th e  absence o f a 
claim of re sp o n s ib il ity . The d if f ic u lty  of g e ttin g  inform ation on dom estic 
te rro rism  in  well over 200 d iffe re n t p o l i t ic a l  e n ti t ie s ,  approxim ately 175 of 
which a re  sovereign independent s ta te s ,  i s  o ften  given as  a ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  
confining th e  fig u res  to  in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism . However, th e  reasons fo r  the  
exclusion of dom estic te rro rism  in tru th  go much deeper than th e  problem of 
co llec tin g  th e  data .
P o li t ic a l  contex t a f fe c ts  the  judgement of whether an a c t of p o l i t ic a l  
violence should be labelled  one of te rro r ism . Simply to  label a c ts  of v iolence 
d irec ted  a g a in s t governments as  te rro rism  would be to  give a b lanket 
endorsement to  th e  legitim acy of the  p o l i t ic a l  s ta tu s  quo in every country, 
reg a rd le ss  o f e ith e r  th e  ideology of those  in  power o r th e  regim e's d u ra b ility . 
Even a r e s t r ic te d  d e fin itio n  of what types o f violence to  include in  th e  
category o f te rro r ism  provides only a p a r t ia l  answer to  the  problem, s in ce
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however such a l i s t  was constructed , p a r tic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  con tex ts  would suggest 
th a t  th e  l i s t  was e ith e r  too  broad or too narrow. Vhile th e re  i s  a wide 
consensus in  th e  Vest on th e  legitim acy of th e  libera l-dem ocracies  in  the  
in d u s tr ia lis e d  world, which might perm it c ro s s  country comparison of dom estic 
te rro r ism  in  these  s ta te s ,  such a consensus would be very d i f f ic u l t  to  achieve 
in  re sp e c t Df th e  d iverse  p o li t ic a l  system s of th e  Third Vorld.
The adm ission th a t  one's fig u res  depend on th e  p o l i t ic a l  judgements one 
makes about p a r tic u la r  s itu a tio n s  has q u ite  n a tu ra lly  no t been a course th a t  
has commended i t s e l f  to  those  working in  th e  f ie ld  of com piling s t a t i s t i c s  on 
te rro r ism . However, the  d if f ic u l ty  of judging th e  legitim acy of d if fe re n t ty p es  
of regim e and th e  problem of co lle c tin g  th e  da ta  a re  n o t the  only reasons fo r  
the  exclusion  of domestic te rro rism . The presum ption i s  th a t  most cases of 
te rro r ism  have in te rn a tio n a l dimensions. V ilklnson has argued th a t  te rro r ism  
i s  'in h e ren tly  in te rn a tio n a l in  ch a rac te r ' and th a t  i t  i s  'very hard  to  fin d  a 
pure case  o f in te rn a l terrorism *. (4) This i s  a t  le a s t  p a r tly  due to  the  
d isp o s it io n  to  a ttach  the label of te rro rism  to  p o l i t ic a l  v iolence th a t  c ro sse s  
in te rn a tio n a l boundaries and d is tu rb s  th e  peace of th e  s ta b le  l ib e ra l-  
dem ocracies of th e  in d u s tr ia lise d  world.
In te rn a tio n a l norms
The em phasis on compiling data  on in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  a lso  c a r r ie s  the  
im plica tion  th a t  the illeg itim acy  of the  violence in  question p a r tly  derives 
from i t s  in te rn a tio n a l ch arac te r. Involving fo re ig n e rs  o r the  te r r i to r y  of 
another country in  a b a ttle  fo r co n tro l of th e  s ta te  i s  generally  seen as a 
v io la tio n  of th e  normative l im its  on such a s tru g g le  fo r  power. I t  i s  a 
co ro lla ry  of another norm, th a t  s ta te s  should no t involve them selves in  the
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domestic a f f a i r s  of o ther coun tries. <5) This norm p laces fo re ig n ers  in  th e  
p o sitio n  of innocent bystanders. By th e  same token, making use of another 
s ta t e 's  te r r i to r y  co n s titu te s  a v io la tio n  of i t s  n e u tra lity . Of course, a l l  t h i s  
presupposes both th a t  i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  draw a reasonably c lea r  d is t in c tio n  
between th e  domestic a f f a i r s  of th e  s ta te  and i t s  ro le  in  the  in te rn a tio n a l 
system, which i s  a leg itim ate  concern of o th e r s ta te s ,  and th a t  th e  norm of 
non-involvement in  the domestic a f f a i r s  of o ther s ta te s  i s  su ff ic ie n tly  
generally  adhered to , th a t  fo re ig n e rs  or fo reign  te r r i to r y  do no t appear to  
c o n s titu te  leg itim ate  ta rg e ts .
Both th ese  p ropositions have been s tro n g ly  con tested  by groups th a t  have 
ju s tif ie d  a ttack in g  fo re igners  o r extending th e ir  c o n f lic t w ith domestic 
coun terparts  to  foreign so il .  Indeed, i f  one were to  assume th a t  te rro rism  
embodied some form of ideology, then th e  contention  th a t  fo reign  in te re s ts  
co n stitu te  an ille g itim a te  prop of lo ca l power s tru c tu re s  might be taken to  be 
one of i t s  key assum ptions. As we saw in  Chapter 5, a fea tu re  of many groups 
th a t  have a ttra c te d  the  label of t e r r o r i s t  i s  th e  a sse r tio n  th a t  they a re  
engaged in  a s tru g g le  ag a in s t im perialism . However, a n ti- im p e r ia l is t  groups 
which engage in  p o lit ic a l  violence are  fa r  from being alone in  th e i r  trea tm en t 
of the  d is tin c tio n  between the  dom estic and fo reign  a f f a i r s  of th e  s ta te  as  
a r t i f i c i a l .  S ta te s , espec ia lly  th e  most powerful s ta te s ,  have Increasing ly  taken 
the  view th a t  they have a leg itim ate  fo re ign  policy  in te re s t  in  th e  outcome of 
domestic c o n f lic ts  which ju s t i f ie s  th e i r  in te rv en tio n  in  such c o n f lic ts .
Further, th e  argument th a t th e  n o n -in terven tion  norm should be overridden in  
cases of g ro ss  v io la tio n s  of human r ig h ts  has a ttra c te d  increasing  support. (6) 
At i t s  most extensive, in te rven tion  tak es  th e  form of overt m ilita ry  ac tion ,
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including th e  d ispatch  of tro o p s to  the  te r r i to r y  In question. Below th a t  
level, In terven tion  may take th e  form Df covert action , involv ing  forms of 
violence such a s  a ssa ss in a tio n s  and bombings th a t a re  very commonly labelled  
te rro rism  when c a rrie d  out by su b -s ta te  groups.
The overlapping of th e  methods of covert w arfare and th o se  of te rro r ism  
ra is e s  th e  question of whether a c le a r  d is tin c tio n  can be drawn between them.
If  covert w arfare i s  tre a ted  as  a species of te rro rism , then i t  becomes much 
more d if f ic u l t  to  claim th a t  te rro r ism  a t  an in te rn a tio n a l level i s  a novel 
development s in ce  covert w arfare has been a fea tu re  of in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s  
since  tim e immemorial. At the  beginning of th e  age of te rro r ism , two fa c to rs  
appeared to  d is tin g u ish  the  new violence from covert w arfare. F i r s t ly ,  i t  was 
perpetra ted  by members of su b -s ta te  groups and not d ire c tly  by th e  agen ts of 
any s ta te .  Secondly, while employing c lan d estin e  methods, th e  p e rp e tra to rs  were 
eager to  secure p u b lic ity  fo r th e i r  cause and even fo r  th e i r  o rg an isa tio n . By 
c o n tra s t, the  covert w arfare waged by s ta te s  was ra re ly  conducted w ith an eye 
fo r such n o to rie ty .
Transnationalism
The involvement of su b -s ta te  groups in  violence a t  an in te rn a tio n a l level 
formed the  main focus of an a ly s is  in  th e  1970s and was encapsulated in  th e  
descrip tion , tra n sn a tio n a l te rro rism , tr a n s n a t io n a l ' was a term used to  
describe a c t iv i t ie s  th a t  crossed the  boundaries of s ta te s ,  but which did no t 
involve the  s ta te  a s  an in s t i tu t io n . Thus, a c o n tra s t was drawn between 
'in te rn a tio n a l' re la tio n s  and 'tra n sn a tio n a l' re la tio n s , w ith th e  form er confined 
to  in te r - s ta te  re la tio n s . An example of the  usage of th e  term th a t  was common 
in  the  1970s was the  desc rip tio n  of m u lti-n a tio n a l companies as  tra n sn a tio n a l
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corpora tions, which was sometimes shortened to  TECs. The growing volume of 
so c ia l in tercourse  acro ss  na tio n a l boundaries th a t  was independent of th e  s ta te  
a ttra c te d  considerable a tte n tio n  and th e  general s ig n ifican ce  of 
transnatlonali6m  as  evidence of th e  increasing  interdependence of s ta te s  was a 
sub ject which was ho tly  debated w ithin  th e  academic d isc ip lin e  of in te rn a tio n a l 
re la tio n s . (7)
On the  one hand, proponents of th e  s ig n ifican ce  of tran sn a tio n a lism  argued 
th a t  Interdependence was e rasin g  th e  d is tin c tio n  between domestic and 
in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic s . On th e  o ther hand, th e i r  c r i t i c s  s tre sse d  th e  continuing 
primacy of the s ta te  in  re la tio n  to  maintenance of sec u rity . On th e  whole, th e  
c r i t i c s  got the b e tte r  of th e  argument because interdependence d id  not have the  
dram atic p o lit ic a l  consequences th a t  some of th e  proponents p red ic ted . In 
p a r tic u la r , the  n a tio n -s ta te  has no t become obso lete , nor has th e  p o li t ic a l  
power of m ulti-na tional companies begun to  match th e i r  s ize  in economic term s. 
The fa ilu re  of these  p red ic tio n s  has tended to  obscure th e  fa c t  th a t  the  
consequences of the  growth of interdependence have, none the  le s s , been 
profound.
i
Of these, perhaps the  most s ig n if ic a n t has been th e  erosion of the  
autonomy of the  s ta te  in  economic m atte rs . The p o li t ic a l  impact of th i s  
erosion has varied. In general, i t  has tended to  s tren g th en  ra th e r  than  to  
weaken the  p o li t ic a l  appeal of na tionalism . This i s  d e sp ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  
Interdependence has tended to  make the  p u rsu it of p o lic ie s  of economic 
nationalism  both more d if f ic u l t  and much more co s tly . In the  Vest th i s  has 
re su lted  in  g rea te r emphasis on m arket-o rien ted  economic p o lic ie s , whatever th e  
ideological complexion of th e  government in power in  a p a r tic u la r  country. But
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the  g re a te s t impact has been on the  co u n trie s  of Eastern  Europe where i t  has 
contributed  to  th e  sh a tte rin g  of th e  Communist system.
P o li tic a l violence a t  th e  in te rn a tio n a l level can a lso  be viewed as  th e  
product of the  growth of interdependence among na tions, a s  the  term , 
tra n sn a tio n a l te rro rism , suggests. Indeed, one can tra c e  the  p o li t ic a l  evolu tion  
of violence from below as predom inantly lo ca l in  scope p r io r  to  th e  French 
revolu tion; impinging more and more on n a tio n a l p o l i t ic s  during th e  two hundred 
years following th e  revolution; and f in a lly  operating  a t  an in te rn a tio n a l level 
in the  tw en tie th  century when su b -s ta te  groups acquired the  capacity  and, ju s t  
as im portan tly , th e  m otivation to  in tervene a t  th i s  lev e l. This evolution can 
i t s e l f  be linked both to  the  increasing  p o r ta b il i ty  of th e  m ateria l in strum ents 
of violence and to  the  g rea tly  enhanced m obility  of i t s  human agents. Powerful 
explosives such a s  Semtex th a t  a re  d i f f ic u l t  to  d e tec t, so p h is tica ted  e lec tro n ic  
tim ing devices, and ligh t-w eigh t autom atic weapons number among the  
instrum ents, while the  ubiquity and ease of a i r  tra v e l means th a t  th e re  a re  few 
major c i t i e s  in  th e  world th a t  a re  more than  a day a p a r t in tra v e llin g  tim e. I f  
th is  seems to  be no more than a statem ent of the  obvious, something th a t  people 
in the  Vest have come to  take fo r granted, i t  i s  worth re f le c tin g  th a t  p r io r  to  
the 1960s, tra v e l beyond na tiona l borders was confined to  a tin y  m inority  of 
the  population even w ithin the  a ff lu e n t in d u s tr ia lis e d  world, except in  th e  
spec ia l con tex ts  of m igration and war.
The p ic tu re  th a t  the concept of tra n sn a tio n a l te rro rism  presented was of a 
challenge to  the  in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic a l  system  by su b -s ta te  groups, a challenge 
made p o ssib le  by the  shrinking  of th e  world through th e  spread of modem 
communications. P a lestin ian  groups such as  th e  Popular Front fo r  th e  L ibera tion
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of P a le stin e  (PFLP) and Black September seemed to  f i t  th i s  p ic tu re  w ell. The 
P a le s tin ian s  them selves stood out a s  perhaps th e  leading example of a community 
th a t  had m issed out on the  process of s ta te  form ation th a t  took p lace in  th e  
Third Vorld a s  a re s u lt  of deco lon isation . They had paid  th e  p r ic e  fo r  the  
understandable d e sire  of th e  in d u s tr ia lis e d  world to  accommodate Jewish demands 
fo r th e  c rea tio n  of a Jewish s ta te  in  the  wake of th e  Holocaust. The r e s o r t  of 
P a le stin ian  groups to  forms of violence such a s  h ijack ing  and hostag e-tak in g  
could be seen both as  a response to  th e  defea t of th e  Arab s ta t e s  during th e i r  
1967 war w ith Is ra e l and a s  a p ro te s t  a g a in s t the  e x is tin g  in te rn a tio n a l o rder.
The log ic  o f d irec tin g  violence a t  in te rn a tio n a l ta rg e ts  was th a t  th e  
P a le s tin ia n s ' demand fo r  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  depended on change in  th e  
in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic a l  system i t s e l f  and th a t  i t  was only through ac tio n  a t  
th is  level th a t  the  a tte n tio n  of th e  world was lik e ly  to  be drawn to  th e  p lig h t 
of the  P a le s tin ian s  as  a s ta te le s s  na tion . The weakness of t h i s  ra tio n a le  fo r  
violence was th a t  securing th e  a tte n tio n  of th e  world by no means guaranteed 
i t s  sympathy. Indeed, the  use of violence a s  a means of a t tr a c t in g  a tte n tio n  i s  
inheren tly  r isk y  since, un less such violence appears to  be linked to  o ther, more 
leg itim ate  ends, i t  i s  lik e ly  to  repel ra th e r  than  a t t r a c t  sympathy. In 
p a r tic u la r , as  a means of generating  support fo r  th e  P a le s tin ian  cause, 
h ijack ings and hostage-tak ing  soon became counter-productive, a s  th e  PLO i t s e l f  
seems to  have recognised from th e  mid 1970s, though only in  December 1988 did 
the PLO leader, Yasser A rafat, issu e  th e  unequivocal repudiation  of te rro r ism  
sought by th e  United S ta te s  as  a condition fo r  dialogue with th e  
o rgan isa tion . (8) And in the  event, d ire c t  dialogue between th e  PLO and the  
United S ta te s  proved sh o rt- liv e d . In May 1990, I s ra e l i  fo rces fo iled  an a tta ck
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on a Tel Aviv beachfront by members of th e  P a le s tin ian  L iberation  Front <PLF), 
an o rgan isa tion  a f f i l ia te d  to  th e  PLO. When A rafat fa ile d  to  tak e  action  
a g a in s t the  PLF over th e  a tta ck , the  United S ta te s  government suspended i t s  
dialogue w ith th e  PLO. A S ta te  Department re p o r t noted th a t  th e  PLF's a tta ck  
was ca rried  out 'with su b s ta n tia l a ss is tan c e  from L ibya '.(9)
Stale., sponsorship
The emphasis placed on th e  ro le  th a t  s ta te s  played in  supporting  violence by 
su b -s ta te  groups was one of the  reasons why th e  concept of tra n sn a tio n a l 
te rro rism  became le s s  and le ss  used during th e  1980s. Concern over s ta te  
sponsorship  of te rro rism  was re fle c ted  in  th e  passage of le g is la tio n  in the  
United S ta te s  in  1979 requ iring  th e  S ecretary  of S ta te  to  impose san c tio n s  on 
coun tries  which he considered had repeatedly  provided support fo r  a c ts  of 
in te rn a tio n a l te r ro r ism .<10) Such s ta te s  were named in  a l i s t  s e n t annually to  
Congress. S ta te s  could be added to  or su b trac ted  from th e  l i s t  a t  any tim e. 
They became known as the  ' t e r r o r i s t  s ta te s '.  In theory , a d is t in c tio n  could be 
made between s ta te s  which sponsored su b -s ta te  groups and s ta te s  which 
them selves d ire c tly  p a rtic ip a ted  in  covert w arfare, but in  p ra c tic e  the  
d is tin c tio n  became somewhat b lu rred . Thus, Forth  Korea was on th e  S ta te  
Department's l i s t ,  p rin c ip a lly  because of the  involvement of i t s  own agents in  
a c ts  of in te rn a tio n a l te r ro r ism .<11)
The notion of a 't e r r o r i s t  s t a t e ' should no t be confused w ith  th e  notion of 
's ta te  te rro r ism ', which i s  generally  applied in  th e  f i r s t  in s tan ce  to  a regim e's 
overt use of te r ro r  on a la rge  sca le  w ithin a dom estic contex t. The S ta te  
Department has a t  le a s t  been co n s is te n t in  d is tin g u ish in g  between th e  two 
notions. Thus, violence w ithin th e  s ta te  w ithout an in te rn a tio n a l dimension i s
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not taken Into  consideration  in  the  compiling of i t s  l i s t .  For example, i t s  
re p o rts  concern them selves w ith th e  sanctuary  th a t  Saddam Hussein has given to  
the  Kurdish Vorkers Party , which operates in  Turkey, and not h is  trea tm en t of 
th e  Kurds in s id e  Iraq.
N evertheless, the  lim ita tio n s  of th e  S ta te  Departm ent's l i s t  remain very 
considerable. On the  b a s is  of th e  types of support th a t  the  S ta te  Department 
uses to  ju s tify  Including p a r tic u la r  co u n tries  on i t s  l i s t ,  such as  provid ing  
sa fe  havens to  su b -s ta te  groups engaged in  te rro r ism , i t  would be p o ss ib le  to  
make out a case fo r  th e  Inclusion of a very la rg e  number of cou n tries , 
espec ia lly  given i t s  broad d e fin itio n  of te rro r ism  as  'prem editated , p o l i t ic a l ly  
motivated violence perpe tra ted  a g a in s t noncombatant ta rg e ts  by subnational or 
clandestine  a g e n ts '.(12) F urther, 'noncombatant' in  th i s  context includes 
unarmed or o ff-du ty  m ilita ry  personnel and even armed personnel in  some 
con tex ts. In p rac tice , whether a country i s  l is te d  as a ' t e r r o r i s t  state*  i s  a t  
le a s t  as much a re fle c tio n  of th e  s ta te  of th a t  coun try 's  re la tio n s  w ith th e  
United S ta te s  as  i t  i s  of i t s  ac tua l behaviour. The 1989 re p o rt, P a tte rn s  of 
Global T errorism , noted th a t  'the  United S ta te s  has m aintained i t s  form al 
designation of s ix  countries as s ta te  su p p o rte rs  of te rro rism  -  Cuba, Iran , 
Libya, North Korea, South Yemen, and S y r ia '.(13) Vhile th e  re p o rt provided 
inform ation to  ju s t ify  the  inclusion  of each of th ese  co u n tries  on th e  l i s t ,  i t s  
d iscussion  of s ta te-sp o n so red  te rro rism  was no t confined to  th e se  co u n trie s  and 
the  re p o rt as a whole gave inform ation th a t  could re a d ily  have been used to  
include many more coun tries on th e  l i s t .
In th is  resp ec t, a notable om ission from th e  l i s t  was Iraq . I t  had been 
removed from the  l i s t  in  1982. I t  was re in s ta te d  in  September 1990, follow ing
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the  Iraq i invasion of Kuwait. (14) In th e  course of th e  1988 P res id e n tia l 
e lec tio n  campaign, th e  om ission of South A frica from th e  l i s t  was ra ise d  by th e  
Democratic candidate. A fter giving accounts o f a number of a tta c k s  on members 
of the  AFC outside  South A frica in  th e  course of th e  year, th e  1988 re p o r t from 
the  S ta te  Department on p a tte rn s  of g lobal te rro rism  noted th a t  'th e  US 
Government has expressed serio u s  and repeated  concern to  the  South A frican 
Government about the  inc id en ts  of c ro ss-b o rd e r violence*. (15) This c r i t ic is m  of 
the  South A frican government was balanced by reference  to  the  fa c t  th a t  th e  
s tru g g le  a g a in s t apartheid , 'although la rg e ly  nonvio len t', had a lso  re su lted  in  
'some a c ts  of te rro r ism '. The re p o rt went on to  c r i t i c i s e  the  fa ilu re  of th e  
AFC to  take  action  ag a in s t members who v io la ted  i t s  policy  of not ta rg e tin g  
c iv il ia n s  and noted 'the  US Government has s tro n g ly  counseled the  AFC a g a in s t 
fu r th e r  a c ts  of violence of th is  n a tu re '. (16)
Selfzdefence
The re la tiv e ly  sm all number of s ta te s  designated  as 't e r r o r i s t  s t a t e s ' i s  in  
p a r t due to  a re luctance to  extend th e  number of coun tries  to  which th e  United 
S ta te s  would be obliged to  apply tra d e  san c tio n s . But i t  i s  a lso  a re f le c tio n  
of the  fa c t  th a t  s ta te s  can plead se lf-d e fen ce  as a ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r  covert 
w arfare by th e ir  agents. That theme runs through th e  S ta te  Department re p o r ts ' 
d esc rip tio n  of operations ca rried  out by I s ra e l , including such ac tio n  as  th e  
abduction of a prominent Hizbollah c le r ic , Sheikh Obeid, in  1989. During th e  
Reagan A dm inistration, th e re  was s tro n g  endorsement of the  s tep s  taken by 
Is ra e l to  f ig h t  te rro rism  in  lin e  w ith i t s  own commitment to  fo rcefu l ac tio n  
ag a in s t te rro r ism  d irec ted  a t  the  United S ta te s  or a g a in s t American c itiz e n s .
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A change of tone i s  evident in  th e  1991 S ta te  Department re p o rt, which i s  
more c r i t i c a l  of I s ra e l 's  ac tio n s  than  any of th e  e a r l ie r  re p o rts . However, th e  
theme of ju s t if ie d  se lf-defence  rem ains prom inent. I t  notes:
Is ra e li  c o u n te r te r ro r is t  e f fo r t s  continue to  ta rg e t  
countries aid ing , harboring , o r fa il in g  to  in h ib i t  
te r r o r i s t s .  I s ra e l i  m ilita ry  fo rce s  have launched 
preemptive and r e ta l ia to ry  a i r s t r ik e s  ag a in s t suspected 
t e r r o r i s t  in s ta l la t io n s  in  neighboring Lebanon and have 
occasionally  detained Lebanese n a tio n a ls  in  an a ttem pt to  
thw art a tta ck s . (17)
The c h a rac te risa tio n  of I s ra e l i  ac tio n s  c o n tra s ts  most sharp ly  w ith th e  
designation  of s im ila r  s o r ts  of c ro ss-b o rd er opera tions ca rried  out by th e  
Soviet-backed Afghan government in th e  course of th e  1980s a s  in te rn a tio n a l 
te rro rism , even when e x p lic itly  d iscussing  th e  ta rg e tin g  of 'antiregim e . 
f ig h te rs '.  (18)
But i f  s ta te  involvement makes i t  hard  to  draw a c le a r  d is t in c tio n  in  
theory between te rro rism  and co u n ter-te rro rism , in  p ra c tic e  th e  Reagan 
A dm inistration seemed to  have l i t t l e  d if f ic u l ty  in  deciding which governments 
were i t s  enemies, p a r tic u la r ly  in  th e  con tex t of th e  'Second Cold V ar'(19) of 
the  early  1980s, and designating  th e ir  ac tio n s  accordingly . I t  met l i t t l e  
re s is ta n c e  in  defin ing  the  issue  of in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  in  term s th a t  f i t t e d  
in  w ith i t s  wider foreign policy  ob jectives from a pub lic  whose prime concern 
qu ite  n a tu ra lly  was te rro rism  th a t  p resen ted  a th re a t  to  the  Vest or to  
V esterners. The Reagan A dm inistration used th e  issu e  to  reshape th e  p r io r i t i e s
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of American foreign  policy . Thus, sh o rtly  a f te r  tak ing  o ffice  a s  S ecre tary  of 
S ta te , Alexander Haig announced:
In te rna tiona l te rro r ism  w ill take th e  p lace of human
r ig h ts  as our concern, because i t  i s  th e  u ltim a te  abuse of
human r ig h ts . And i t ' s  tim e i t  be addressed w ith g re a te r  
c la r i ty  and g rea te r e ffec tiv en ess  by Western n a tio n s  and 
the United S ta te s  a s  w e ll.(20)
C la rity  was provided by the  emphasis placed on s ta te  sponsorsh ip , while Haig's 
cas tig a tio n  of th e  Soviet Union fo r t ra in in g , funding, and equipping t e r r o r i s t s  
elevated the  issue  to  one of s tra te g ic  concern.
I t  was a perspective  echoed in  a number of books on te rro r ism  published
during the  1980s. (21) Chalmers Johnson a ttr ib u te d  the  change in  American 
perceptions of th e  nature of te rro rism  to  th e  holding of American diplom ats as 
hostages in  Tehran between 1979 and 1981. He concluded: 'I t  became c lea r  th a t  
much of the  te rro rism  of the  1970's  was n o t tran sn a tio n a l but in te rn a tio n a l, a 
form of su rroga te  w arfare in  an In te rn a tio n a l system in  which open w arfare had 
become too dangerous.'(22) That in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  was an instrum ent of 
the  foreign  policy  of c e r ta in  s ta te s  became the  new orthodoxy. In 1986, th e  
American Ambassador to  th e  United R ations, C harles L ich tenste in , a sse rted  
simply th a t  'a l l  te rro rism  i s  in  fa c t  s ta t e  te r ro r ism ’.(23)
Western response
L ich ten ste in 's  a sse rtio n  coincided w ith one of th e  h ighpo in ts o f Western 
concern over th e  issue  of te rro rism , prompted by a s e r ie s  of ou trages. In June 
1985 a Trans World A irlines (TWA) Boeing 727 was hijacked by members of 
Islam ic Jihad on a f l ig h t  from Athens to  Rome. They d iverted  th e  f l ig h t  to
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B eirut. I t  took p ro trac ted  neg o tia tio n s  through in te rm ed iaries  to  secure th e  
re le ase  of th e  passengers and crew, some of whom were held hostage fo r  two 
weeks. Their ordeal a ttra c te d  huge media a tte n tio n . One passenger, a d iver in  
the  US JTavy, was murdered by th e  h ijack ers  a t  an early  stage . In the  same 
month, an Air India Boeing 747 exploded in  m id -a ir over th e  A tlan tic , w ith th e  
lo ss  of 329 liv e s . Suspicion immediately f e l l  on Sikh s e p a ra t is ts .
In August a car bomb k illed  two Americans in  a US Air Force base in Vest 
Germany, an a tta c k  carried  out by th e  Bed Army Faction. In September, members 
of a P a le s tin ian  o rgan isation , Force 17, murdered th ree  I s ra e l is  on a yacht in  
Larnaca marina, Cyprus. Their claim th a t  th e  th ree  were Hossad agents was 
denied by Is ra e l. That was followed in  October by th e  h ijacking  of an I ta lia n  
c ru ise  sh ip , A chille Lauro. during which an American in  a w heelchair was 
murdered. In December, 19 people died in  co-ord inated  a tta c k s  on El A1 check­
in  desks a t  a irp o r ts  in  Borne and Vienna. In A pril 1986, four passengers died 
when a bomb blew a hole in  the  6ide of a TVA Boeing 727 on a f l ig h t  from Borne 
to  Athens. Three days la te r  an American so ld ie r  and a Turkish woman died and 
204 people were injured in  a bomb a tta c k  on a Vest B erlin  discotheque.
This a tta ck  was followed by American m ilita ry  ac tio n  ag a in s t Libya. In 
ju s tify in g  th e  bombing of T ripo li and Benghazi, P residen t Beagan d isclosed  th e  
con ten ts of communications between T rip o li and the  Libyan People's Bureau in  
East B erlin , which, he argued, suggested th a t  agents of th e  Libyan s ta te  had 
been involved in  th e  discotheque bombing. L ater in  th e  same month, A pril 1986, 
El A1 secu rity  s t a f f  a t  Heathrow a irp o r t  thw arted an a ttem pt to  smuggle a bomb 
on board a f l ig h t  to  Is rae l. Police a rre s te d  a Jordanian, Hezar Hindawi, who 
im plicated diplom ats in  the  Syrian Embassy in  London in  th e  a ttem pt. (24)
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The su b jec t of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  was d iscussed  a t  a summit of th e  
leading in d u s tr ia l  nations of the  world in  Kay 1986. A d ec la ra tion  was issued , 
re f le c tin g  cu rren t opinion on the  issue. l o t  su rp ris in g ly , i t  placed a lo t  of 
emphasis on th e  question of s ta te  sponsorsh ip . I t  began:
Ve, th e  heads of s ta te  or government of seven major 
democracies and th e  re p re se n ta tiv e s  of the  European 
Community, assembled here in  Tokyo, s tro n g ly  rea ffirm  our 
condemnation of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  in  a l l  i t s  form s, 
of i t s  accomplices and of those, Including governments, 
who sponsor and support i t .  Ve abhor the  Increase  in  th e  
level of such te rro rism  since  our l a s t  meeting [in  Kay 
1985 in  Bonn], and in  p a r tic u la r  i t s  b la ta n t and cy n ica l 
use as  an instrum ent of government policy. Terrorism  has 
no ju s tif ic a tio n . I t  sp reads only by the use of 
contem ptible means, ignoring  th e  values of human l i f e ,  
freedom, and d ig n ity . I t  must be fought re le n tle s s ly  and 
w ithout compromise. (25)
The sta tem en t went on to  name Libya as a sponsor of in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism , 
providing re tro sp e c tiv e  ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r th e  American ra id  on T rip o li and 
Benghazi.
Even a t  th e  time i t  was issued, th e  lim ita tio n s  o f th is  persp ec tiv e  on the  
problem of te rro rism  were apparent. In a piece published in 1986, Adam R oberts 
used the  paragraph quoted above as the b a s is  fo r  a w ide-ranging c r itiq u e  o f 
V estem  po licy . In p a rtic u la r , he questioned whether iso la tin g  't e r r o r i s t  
s ta te s ',  th e  course of action  urged by th e  summit, was a s  easy a so lu tio n  to  the
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problem a s  i t  appeared, po in ting  out th a t  'th e  s ta te  which engages in  support 
fo r  one t e r r o r i s t  cause may i t s e l f  be a valued p a rtn e r in  some o th er a c t iv i t ie s  
-  not ju s t  in  tra d e , but a lso  in  m a tte rs  re la tin g  to  in te rn a tio n a l secu rity , even 
in  the  co n tro l of some forms of te rro r ism '. (26) Further, he argued th a t  
'preoccupation w ith the  idea of th e  " te r r o r i s t  s ta te "  as  the  fans e t  arigo  of 
te rro rism  may serve  to  obscure the  o ther causes of th i s  phenomenon'. <27) In 
fa c t, events them selves underlined th e  d if f ic u l ty  of try in g  to  make s ta te s  
accountable fo r th e  v io len t ac tio n s  of su b -s ta te  groups.
Western impotence when th e  TWA a i r l in e r  had been hijacked to  B eirut in  
June 1985 was not th e  re s u l t  of the  re la tio n sh ip  of th e  h ija ck e rs  to  any 
t e r r o r i s t  s ta te ,  but ra th e r  a consequence of th e  weakness of th e  Lebanese 
a u th o ritie s . The incapacity  of th e  Lebanese s ta te  meant th a t  i t  could not 
reasonably be held responsib le  fo r  most of th e  a c ts  of p o l i t ic a l  violence th a t  
occurred w ithin  i t s  boundaries. By th e  tim e of th e  Tokyo summit, a number of 
fo re igners  had been kidnapped in  Vest B eirut, including, among o th e rs , an 
American jo u rn a lis t , Terry Anderson; an American academic, Thomas Sutherland; 
and a B ritish  jo u rn a lis t , John McCarthy. They were to  become household names 
before th e ir  re le ase  in  1991, as th e  fa te  of Western hostages in  Lebanon 
increasing ly  came to  preoccupy Western governments, media, and public .
Hostages, in-Lebanon
The issu e  of fo reign  p o li t ic a l  hostages in  Lebanon underlined th e  com plexity of 
the re la tio n sh ip  between s ta te s  and s u b -s ta te  groups engaged in  violence. 
Lebanese so cie ty  was deeply divided among a number of d if fe re n t re lig io u s  
communities. When th e  country became independent in  1943, the  lead ers  of th e  
d iffe re n t communities agreed on a complex formula fo r  th e  rep resen ta tio n  of the
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communities w ithin  the  p o li t ic a l  system. X odernisation and demographic change 
slowly undermined th e  b a s is  of accommodation among th e  communities. The f i r s t  
breakdown occurred in  1958 when an a ttem pt by th e  C h ris tian  X aronite P residen t 
to  a lig n  the  country with th e  Vest, co n tra ry  to  th e  JTational Pact agreed in  
1943, provoked a re v o lt by Xuslims. Equilibrium  was re s to red  by th e  Commander 
of th e  Armed Forces, General Chehab, who refused  to  allow th e  army to  be used 
on th e  s id e  of th e  X aronltes.
A fter he was elected  P residen t h im self, Chehab sought to  s tren g th en  th e  
s ta te  as  a fo rce  th a t  could stand  above th e  s o c ie ty 's  d iv is io n s . However, in  
1970 a reg ional clan  leader was elected  P res id en t and he destroyed th e  system 
th a t  Chebab had created . Lebanon never recovered. The s t a r t  of Lebanon's 
second c iv i l  war i s  generally  dated from A pril 1975 and a m assacre of 27 
P a le s tin ian s  on a bus ambushed by X aronite gunmen. The episode re fle c ted  th e  
importance of th e  P a lestin ian  presence in Lebanon and Xaronite reac tio n  to  i t  
as a cause of th e  country 's  s lid e  in to  c iv i l  war. A fter the  f i r s t  A rab -Is rae li 
war in  1948-9, 100,000 P a lestin ian  refugees s e t t le d  in  Lebanon. Their numbers 
grew fu r th e r  a f te r  the  1967 A rab -Israe li war and th e  1970 expulsion of th e  PLO 
from Jordan. By 1975, th e re  were 350,000 P a le s tin ian s  in Lebanon, c o n s ti tu tin g  
about 10 per cen t of the  country 's  population. The X aronltes regarded th e ir  
presence a s  a d e s ta b ilis in g  fo rce  w ithin th e  country th a t  d is tu rbed  th e  balance 
of power among the  d iffe re n t communities. At th e  same tim e, th e  use of 
Lebanese te r r i to r y  by th e  PLO as  a launching pad fo r a tta c k s  on northern  Is ra e l 
was tu rn ing  Lebanon in to  a ta rg e t fo r  I s ra e l i  r e ta l ia t io n . The hands of th e  
Lebanese s ta te  were tie d  by the  1969 Cairo Agreement, which obliged Lebanon to  
support th e  P a lestin ian  cause.
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But th e re  were a lso  o th er fa c to rs  fu e llin g  c o n f lic t w ithin Lebanon.
Muslims now co n stitu ted  a c le a r  m ajority  of th e  population, but had fewer 
re p re se n ta tiv e s  w ith in  th e  p o li t ic a l  system than  C h ris tian s  under th e  r ig id  and 
outdated formula used to  determ ine p o l i t ic a l  rep re sen ta tio n  of th e  communities. 
The enormous g u lf between r ic h  and poor was a fu r th e r source of c o n f lic t. The 
main c o n te s ta n ts  in  th e  f i r s t  phase of c iv i l  war were a righ t-w ing  X aronite-led  
grouping, th e  Lebanese Fron t, and a le ft-w in g , mainly Muslim grouping, th e  
R ational Movement. In A pril 1976 Syrian tro o p s  intervened a t  th e  request of 
Lebanon's M aronite P residen t. In 1975 and 1976 50,000 people died in  th e  c iv i l  
war. Syrian  in te rv en tio n  had fa iled  to  end th e  c o n flic t, but a t  th e  same tim e, 
I s ra e l  became in c reas in g ly  d istu rbed  by th e  extension of Syrian influence.
In 1978 th e  I s r a e l is  moved in to  southern  Lebanon, withdrawing a f te r  th e  
estab lish m en t of th e  United Rations Interim  Force in  Lebanon (URIFIL) to  s to p  
P a le s tin ian  in cu rs io n s  in to  Is ra e l from Lebanon. In 1982 Is ra e l mounted a fu l l -  
sca le  invasion  on th e  assum ption th a t  ending th e  PLO's m ilita ry  presence in  
Lebanon would destroy  th e  o rg an isa tio n 's  p o l i t ic a l  influence in  th e  occupied 
t e r r i t o r i e s .<28) A fter I s ra e l i  troops besieged B eirut, a m ultina tional fo rce  
composed p r in c ip a lly  of American and French tro o p s  was estab lish ed  to  superv ise  
th e  w ithdraw al of the  PLO from B eirut. Adding to  the  catalogue of ex te rn a l 
in te rv e n tio n s  was th e  presence of revo lu tionary  guards from Iran , re f le c tin g  the  
influence of I ra n 's  Islam ic revolu tion  on th e  Shia Muslim population of Lebanon, 
th e  la rg e s t  and poorest of th e  coun try 's  confessiona l communities.
The im pact of th e  a r r iv a l  of a l l  th ese  fo reign  fo rces  on Lebanon's c iv i l  
war in ev itab ly  made them ta rg e ts  of v io lence from those  who f e l t  d isadvantaged 
by th e i r  presence. In th i s  context th e  high-m inded m otives th a t  outside  powers
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put forward to  ju s tify  th e ir  in te rv en tio n  in  Lebanon u n su rp ris ing ly  counted fo r 
very l i t t l e .  Violence ag a in s t fo re ig n e rs  took a v a rie ty  of forms. One was 
bombings. In April 1983, th e  American embassy in  B eirut was bombed k i l l in g  60 
people, while in  October sim ultaneous a tta c k s  by su ic ide  truck-bom bers on th e  
headquarters of the American m arines and th e  b arracks of French p ara tro o p ers  
k ille d  241 American and 58 French servicemen. In Fovember, the  I s ra e l i  
m ilita ry  headquarters in  Tyre were s tru ck  by th e  su ic ide  bombers. S ix ty  died 
in  th a t  a tta ck . In September 1984, nine died when th e  American embassy in  
Beirut was attacked  once again.
However, th e  foreign powers were no t sim ply th e  v ic tim s of bomb a tta c k s .
In a number of cases they were d ire c tly  or in d ire c tly  responsib le  fo r  such 
outrages them selves. In Karch 1985, a m assive ca r bomb outside th e  o ff ic e s  of 
a Hlzbollah leader, Sheikh F ad la llah , k ille d  80 people and injured another 256, 
many of them women and ch ild ren  who had been worshipping a t  a nearby mosque. 
Sheikh F ad la llah  escaped unharmed. He was th e  ta rg e t  of the  bombing which th e  
Washington Post reported had been c a rrie d  out a t  th e  behest of th e  C entral 
In te lligence  Agency (CIA) apparen tly  in  revenge fo r  th e  October 1983 a tta c k  on 
the American marines. (29) Hizbollah (the P arty  of God) draped a banner reading  
'The work of the  United S ta te s ' over th e  ruined b u ild in g s .(30)
Another form th a t  violence a g a in s t fo re ig n e rs  took was hostage-tak ing .
I ts  f i r s t  v ic tim s, excluding local P a le s tin ian s  and Syrians, were th ree  Iran ian s , 
two of whom were diplom ats. They were kidnapped by a Maronite m ili t ia , th e  
Lebanese Forces, in  July 1982. In 1991 an I s r a e l i  in te llig en ce  re p o rt concluded 
th a t  they had been murdered sh o rtly  a f te r  th e i r  capture. The abduction of th e  
Iran ians was followed in  th e  same month by th a t  of David Dodge, th e  ac tin g
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P residen t of the  American U niversity  of B eiru t. His abduction was linked to  
th a t  of the  Iran ians. He was re leased  a year la te r  w ithout exp lanation , though 
i t  did emerge th a t  he had been held in  Iran  fo r  p a r t  of h is  c a p tiv ity . 
R esponsib ility  fo r  h is  abduction was claimed by Islam ic Jihad, which turned  out 
sim ply to  be one of H izbollah 's many d o b s  de guerre. The next abductions were 
in  1984. In th e  course of th e  year an American academic, a French con stru ctio n  
engineer, the  CIA's s ta tio n  ch ie f in  B eirut, an American p asto r, a B ritish  
re p o rte r, and an American re p o rte r  were taken hostage.
A wave of kidnapping followed the  a ttem pt on Sheikh Fadlallah ; another the  
American bombing of Libya. Vhen th e  l a s t  of th e  Western hostages, two German 
aid  workers who had o rig in a lly  been abducted in  Kay 1989, were re leased  in  June 
1992, some 80 fo re ig n ers  had been kidnapped. Some were held only b r ie f ly . A 
sm all number even 'managed to  escape from th e i r  cap to rs . O thers died o r were 
murdered in  c a p tiv ity , though th e  p roportion  of foreign  cap tives who met th i s  
fa te  was very much sm aller than the  f a t a l i t i e s  among th e  thousands of Lebanese 
and P a le s tin ian s  abducted during the  c iv i l  war. Kany of them were murdered 
soon a f te r  th e ir  capture. The fo re ig n ers  who remained in  c a p tiv ity  fo r  a period 
of years, such as the  American re p o rte r, Terry Anderson, who was abducted in  
March 1985 and only released  in  December 1991, a ttra c te d  the most p u b lic ity .
The appalling  conditions in  which hostages were held added to  public  concern 
over th e i r  p lig h t.
Neg o tia tio n s
The hostage c r i s i s  presented Western governments with a dilemma. Doing nothing 
conveyed an Im pression of impotence, an appearance of weakness which enhanced 
the v u ln e ra b ility  of th e ir  in te re s ts  to  a tta ck . Since Western m ilita ry  fo rces
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had been driven out of Lebanon in  1984 by th e  su ic ide  truck-bom bers, m ilita ry  
In terven tion  to  rescue the  hostages was not a r e a l i s t i c  option. Public policy  
th a t  th e re  should be no concessions made to  te rro rism  ruled out d ire c t  d ea ls . 
That l e f t  as  th e  only option, seeking th e  a ss is ta n c e  of th ird  p a r t ie s  in  a 
p o sitio n  to  influence th e  behaviour of th e  k idnappers. However, th e  legitim acy 
of th i s  option depended on governments' being ab le  to  m aintain th a t  th e re  was a 
c lea r  d is t in c tio n  between such th ird  p a r tie s  and th e  kidnappers them selves. 
Otherwise, any rewards fo r th e  th ird  p a r tie s  would look lik e  ju s t  another form 
of su rrender to  te rro rism .
The emphasis th a t  V estem  policy-m akers had put on s ta te  sponsorsh ip  of 
te rro rism , and p a rtic u la r ly  in  the  case of th e  United S ta te s  on th e  ro le  played 
by Iran and Syria , made th e ir  p o s itio n  more d i f f ic u l t .  When th e  Iran-C ontra 
scandal, involving the  sa le  of American arms to  Iran  and the  siphoning of the  
proceeds to  reb e ls  in  Nicaragua, broke in  November 1986, th e  Reagan 
A dm inistration was widely condemned fo r breaching i t s  own p recep ts  on 
in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism , because Ira n 's  use of i t s  influence w ith Hizbollah to  
secure th e  re lease  of th ree  Americans formed p a r t  of th e  deal. France a lso  
d e a lt w ith Iran  to  secure re lease  of hostages. (31)
In the  l ig h t  of the rh e to ric  of V estem  governments on the  sub jec t of 
te rro rism , such dealings understandably gave r i s e  to  considerable  public 
cynicism . And Vestem  governments them selves were la rg e ly  to  blame fo r  public  
m isperception of Hizbollah as  simply a su rroga te  of th e  Iranian government. In 
fa c t, th e  fa ilu re  of Iran 's  P residen t Rafsanjani to  achieve h is  objective of 
ending the  hostage c r i s i s  by th e  c lose  of 1990 underlined the  Independence of 
the  Lebanese p a ra m ilita rie s , notw ithstanding  th e  c lo se  Ideological and o ther
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t ie s  between Hizbollah and Iran, in  p a r tic u la r . The ca tastrophe  th a t  b e fe ll 
Lebanon as  a r e s u l t  of foreign  in te rv en tio n  in  i t s  c iv i l  war provided th e  
various Lebanese fac tio n s  with ample reasons o f th e i r  own fo r h o s t i l i ty  tow ards 
fo re igners . Vhereas in  most c iv i l  c o n f lic ts , fe a r  of provoking fo reign  
in te rven tion  c o n s ti tu te s  a reason fo r  r e s t r a in t  by contending fa c tio n s , th a t  
consideration  hard ly  applied in  Lebanon. The ex ten t of foreign  involvement in  
Lebanon was th e  re fle c tio n  of a number of fa c to rs : th e  s tra te g ic  importance of 
the Kiddle E ast, the  In ten s ity  of com petition among d if fe re n t powers fo r  
influence in th e  region, and the extreme weakness of th e  Lebanese s ta te  i t s e l f .  
By in te rn a tio n a lis in g  the  c o n flic t, th ese  la rg e r  fa c to rs  contributed  in d ire c tly  
to  the c rea tio n  of the  hostage c r i s i s .  By th e  same token, changes in  
in te rn a tio n a l alignm ents in  the  region as a r e s u l t  of th e  end of th e  Cold Var 
and of the  1991 Gulf Var were fa c to rs  co n trib u tin g  in d ire c tly  to  i t s  re so lu tio n . 
Plracy_analpgy.
Vhile the  case of the Lebanese hostages dem onstrated a l l  too c lea rly  th e  
su p e rf ic ia li ty  of tre a tin g  in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  a s  an aspect of th e  fo reign  
policy of h o s t i le  s ta te s ,  the  way in  which the  issu e  was interwoven with 
re la tio n s  between s ta te s  underscored the  lim ita tio n s  of the  notion of 
tran sn a tio n a l te rro rism . F urther, th e  concept was alm ost an oxymoron in  the  
context of th e  perspective  on in te rn a tio n a l re la t io n s  w ith which th e  term , 
tra n sn a tio n a l, was associated . That persp ec tiv e  emphasised the  benign e ffe c ts  
of interdependence in  reducing th e  b a r r ie r s  between peoples and in  encouraging 
a process of harm onisation. An analogy adopted a t  th e  beginning of the  age of 
te rro rism  in re la tio n  to  h ijacking provided a le s s  d isco rd an t d e sc rip tio n . Vhen 
i t  was f i r s t  proposed, in October 1969, th a t  th e  issu e  of h ijacking  be put on
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th e  agenda of th e  United fiat ions General Assembly, i t  was under th e  t i t l e ,  
'P iracy in  th e  A ir '.(32)
In fa c t, the  term, a i r  p iracy , became a synonym fo r h ijack ing . I t  seemed 
an a p t analogy. Both h ijack ers  and p ira te s  made use of spaces th a t  lay  outside 
th e  ju r isd ic tio n  and co n tro l of s ta te s .  They a lso  both exploited  p o l i t ic a l  
d ifferences between s ta te s  to  escape capture and punishment. One could even 
po in t to  in s tan ces  of s ta te  sponsorsh ip  of p iracy  analagous to  th e  lin k s  th a t  
sometimes ex isted  between s ta te s  and h ijack ers . E lizabeth  l ' s  encouragement of 
p iracy  ag a in s t Spanish f le e ts  and colonies in  th e  la te  s ix teen th  century 
provided the  best-known example. (33) Both h ijack ers  and p ira te s  frequen tly  
took hostages.
The main d ifference  between h ijack ers  and p ira te s  was th a t  th e  form er 
generally  had a p o li t ic a l  motive fo r th e i r  ac tio n s , while the  motive fo r  p iracy  
was commonly personal enrichm ent. However, th e  d is tin c tio n  between the  
p o li t ic a l  nature of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  and th e  crim inal natu re  of p iracy  
can be overdrawn. Increasing ly , the  term , te rro r ism , i s  being applied  to  th e  
v io len t a c t iv i t ie s  of crim inal o rg an isa tio n s  such a s  th e  Mafia, as  well a s  to  
personally  m otivated a c ts  of h ijack ing , while th e  label of p ira te s , or even more 
commonly, ban d its , was applied in  the  p a s t to  groups pursuing p o li t ic a l  as  well 
as simply crim inal aims.
Take, fo r  example, th e  case of th e  Chinese p ira te s  who kidnapped four 
o ff ic e rs  of th e  B ritish  merchant navy from a sh ip  anchored o ff a p o rt in  
Japanese-occupied Manchuria in  1933.(34) The f i r s t  of th e ir  ransom le t t e r s  
demanded arms: 100 l ig h t machine guns, 3,000 Japanese r i f l e s ,  120 German r i f l e s ,
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and 20 heavy trench  m ortars, and supp lies  of ammunition fo r th e se  item s. I t  
explained why as  follows:
The reason why we want th ese  th in g s  i s  so le ly  because 
Japan has occupied th e  te r r i to r y  of th e  Three E astern  
Provinces, so th a t  th e  people have been driven  out.
Koreans a lso  own and c u ltiv a te  th e  region of Ying-K'ou and 
Tien-chuangt'ai in  th e  Three E astern  Provinces. Ve Chinese 
cannot endure th i s  and burn w ith resentm ent: the  people 
are forced to  become b an d its . The Chinese do not 
w illing ly  become b an d its : i t  i s  so le ly  because your League 
of Nations speaks no t of r ig h t  p rin c ip le s . (35>
Eventually, a f te r  p ro trac ted  n eg o tia tio n s, drawing in  th e  Japanese and th e i r  
Chinese c l ie n ts ,  and the payment of a re la tiv e ly  sm all monetary ransom, which 
B ritish  o f f ic ia ls  ra tio n a lised  as  'a g ran t in  a id  of expenses in c u rre d ',(36) the 
o ff ic e rs  were re leased . In the  same way, France and Germany paid  'expenses', 
though these  were measured in m illions of d o lla rs , to  secure th e  re lease  of 
n a tio n a ls  held a s  hostages in Lebanon. (37)
The analogy between p iracy  and in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  can be developed 
fu r th e r . P iracy flourished  in cond itions of in te rn a tio n a l d iso rd e r, whether a t  a 
lo ca l, reg iona l, or global level. For example, th e  period from 1400 to  1700,
coinciding with the  seaborne expansion of Europe, was a heyday of p iracy .
A fter build ing overseas empires, Portugal and Spain faced challenges to  th e i r  
p o s itio n  from o ther European m aritim e powers, in  p a r tic u la r  from France,
England, and th e  Netherlands. P ira te s  both exp lo ited  th e  enm ities among th e  
m aritim e powers and were exploited by th e  powers them selves. Competition fo r
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Influence among the  powers was p a r tic u la r ly  in tense  in  C entral America and th e  
Caribbean. The is land  colony of Jamaica was one of th e  main cen tres  of th e  
buccaneers, as  the  p ira te s  in  th is  area  were known and even a f te r  th e  1670 
Treaty Df Madrid between England and Spain, Jamaica continued to  provide a sa fe  
haven fo r  buccaneers. However, the  spread of p iracy  to  o ther a reas, 
p a r tic u la r ly  th e  establishm ent of p ira te  se ttlem en ts  in  th e  Indian Ocean where 
they had access to  the  Asian shipping ro u tes , th rea tened  the  commercial 
in te re s ts  of th e  powers. At the  same tim e, th e  g lobal reach of p iracy  made i t  
*too dangerous to  be supported by any nation  as  a policy  ag a in st i t s  
r iv a ls '.  (38) The to lerance th a t  s ta te s  showed tow ards p iracy  during th e  period 
of seaborne expansion ceased, a change symbolised by th e  passage in  England in  
1700 of an 'Act fo r the  More E ffectual Suppression of P ira c y '.(39)
A somewhat s im ila r case can be made in  re sp ec t of in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism . 
The f i r s t  in te rn a tio n a l conventions on te rro rism  were d rafted  ag a in s t the  
backdrop of th e  unstable in te rn a tio n a l cond itions in  Europe during th e  1930s. 
The p resen t 'age of te rro r ism ' i s  usually  dated from th e  la te  1960s. I t  
coincided more or le ss  with the s t a r t  of the  p o s t-co lo n ia l age. But ju s t  as 
im portan tly  i t s  onset came a t  a time when i t  was ev ident th a t  the  Cold Var 
s tru c tu re s  th a t  had given the  world a decade of alm ost unparalleled  peace and 
p ro sp e rity  were breaking down. In p a r tic u la r , th e  b ip o la r s tru c tu re  of th e  
in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic a l  system was beginning to  fra c tu re . The war in  Vietnam 
emphasised th e  lim its  of the  Pax Americana, while the  S ino-Soviet s p l i t  
underlined the  lim its  of Communism as  a m onolithic fo rce . The waning power of 
the super-pow ers was a stim ulus to  a l l  manner of challenges to  the  s ta tu s  quo. 
Vhere p o li t ic a l  movements arose th a t  challenged th e  in te re s ts  of one or o ther
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of the  super-powers, i t  was hardly su rp ris in g  th a t  they a ttra c te d  support from 
the  r iv a l  super-power or from o ther s ta te s  seeking to  break th e  super-pow ers' 
duopoly. The re la tio n sh ip  between opposition  movements and fo reign  powers took 
a number of form s and the  c loseness of such re la tio n sh ip s  a lso , of course, 
varied  very considerably.
Terror networks
During th e  la te  1960s and through much of th e  decade of the  1970s, th e  reaso n s 
fo r th e  r i s e  of opposition movements tended to  be th e  focus of p o l i t ic a l  
an a ly s is . Inev itab ly , those  Instances where opposition  to  the  s ta tu s  quo 
re su lted  in  p o li t ic a l  violence which s p i l t  ac ro ss  in te rn a tio n a l boundaries 
tended to  a t t r a c t  most a tte n tio n . In th e  1980s w ith th e  demise of de ten te , 
conservative  p o li t ic a l  an a ly s ts  and th e  Reagan A dm inistration la tched  on to  the  
issue  of s ta te  sponsorship  of violence, t re a tin g  th e  re la tio n sh ip  which e x is ted  
between a number of v io len t su b -s ta te  groups and th e  Soviet Union or c o u n trie s  
a llie d  to  the  Soviet Union a s  evidence of a co -o rd inated  t e r r o r i s t  a s s a u lt  on 
Western in te re s ts .
The weakness of such an a ly s is  was th a t  i t  fa ile d  to  explain  the  ex is ten ce  
of numerous v io len t groups th a t  qu ite  obviously could no t be f i t t e d  in to  such a 
framework. And, in  fa c t, by focusing on righ t-w ing  groups, le ft-w in g  c r i t i c s  of 
S te rlin g  and of the  Reagan A dm inistration were ab le to  co n stru c t a p ic tu re  of 
an a lte rn a tiv e  te r ro r  network th a t  emanated from Washington ra th e r  than 
Moscow.(40) But even two te r ro r  networks ra th e r  than  one l e f t  much 
unexplained. In re a li ty , th e  im plication  th a t  e i th e r  Washington o r Moscow could 
con tro l events in  th is  way was im plausible. For years  Western governments gave 
extensive support to  the  Mujahedin in  Afghanistan, but th a t  has no t enabled
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them to  ex erc ise  much influence over th e  c o n flic t among the  Afghan re s is ta n c e  
groups th a t  has a risen  since the  f a l l  of the  old regime.
Indeed, s ta te  support fo r  v io len t movements in  o th e r coun tries  or 
operating  in te rn a tio n a lly  i s  more commonly a sign  of weakness than  of s tre n g th , 
given th e  d if f ic u lty  of exercising  Influence through such means. Further, as  
generally  speaking such support i s  a v io la tio n  of th e  in te rn a tio n a l norms, such 
as  th e  norm on non-in tervention  in  th e  domestic a f f a i r s  of o ther s ta te s ,  i t s  
prevalence may be taken as  a sign  of d iso rd e r w ithin th e  in te rn a tio n a l 
p o li t ic a l  system . But th a t  i s  perhaps too s ta te -c e n tr ic  a perspective . The 
source of the  in s ta b i l i ty  i s  provided by th e  a c t iv i t ie s  of the  v io len t s u b -s ta te  
groups them selves, which fo r the  most p a r t  were not c rea ted  by s ta te s ,  even i f  
they derive some support from some s ta te s .
In p a r tic u la r , the notion th a t most, l e t  alone, a l l ,  in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism  
is  s ta te  te rro rism , i s  very wide of the  mark. I t  i s  a lso  easy to  exaggerate th e  
problem of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism , while underestim ating the  d if f ic u l ty  of 
g e ttin g  agreement on what i t  encompasses. For a l l  the  a tte n tio n  th a t  V estern 
governments have lavished on the  issue, on th e ir  own ca lcu la tio n s , the  numbers 
k ille d  in  in te rn a tio n a l t e r r o r i s t  in c id en ts  a re  m iniscule. (41) The fea r th a t  
in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  aroused in the  la te  1960s and early  1970s must be seen 
a t  le a s t  in  p a r t  ag a in st the  backdrop of the  s ta b i l i ty  th a t  p revailed  w ith in  
most V estern liberal-dem ocracies during th e  1950s. 
ffew Vorld Disorder
Despite the  rep resen ta tio n  of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  a s  a form of covert 
w arfare a g a in s t the  Vest, the  demise of th e  Communist system in  E astern  Europe 
and th e  Soviet Union has prompted few p red ic tio n s  of th e  ending of the  age of
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te rro rism . This i s  no t because the  demise of th e  Soviet Union i s  perceived a s  
making no d ifference  to  v io len t sub-groups th a t  previously had Ideo log ical or 
o ther t i e s  with Moscow, but ra th e r  because i t  i s  recognised th a t  while the  
ending of b ip o la r ity  may con tribu te  to  th e  re so lu tio n  of some c o n f l ic ts  and 
lead to  a d e -esca la tio n  in  o thers , i t  has c rea ted  new sources of I n s ta b i l i ty  in  
th e  world which a re  lik e ly  to  generate v io lence acro ss  na tional f ro n tie r s .  This 
has led some to  fe a r a growth of te rro rism  in  the  wake of the  co llap se  of 
Communism. (42)
Indeed, i t  i s  a lready  apparent th a t  th e  Mew World Order seems lik e ly  to  be 
an e ra  of in s ta b i l i ty .  The break-up of th e  Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia have 
destroyed the  in te rn a tio n a l anathema a g a in s t secessionism , ra is in g  a question 
mark over the  su rv iv a l of a number of s ta t e s  a s  s in g le  e n t i t le s  w ith in  the  
in te rn a tio n a l p o l i t ic a l  system . At th e  same tim e, questions of human r ig h ts  and 
m inority  r ig h ts  have tended to  erode th e  norm of non-in terven tion  in  th e  
dom estic a f f a i r s  of s ta te s ,  making i t  more d i f f ic u l t  to  m aintain th e  d is tin c tio n  
between domestic and in te rn a tio n a l a f f a i r s  in  th e  con tex t of v io le n t c o n flic t.
I f  on occasion, com petition between the  super-pow ers was a spur to  th e ir  
in te rv en tio n , more commonly b ip o la rity  acted  as a r e s t r a in t  ag a in s t 
in te rv en tio n , whether by ind iv idual s ta te s  o r co lle c tiv e ly  through the  United 
R ations.
The more p reva len t in te rven tion  becomes, th e  g rea te r must be th e  danger of 
another s itu a tio n  l ik e  th a t  in  Lebanon during the  1980s. But th e  end of th e  
Cold Var a lso  holds out the  hope th a t  g lobal accord on issu es  such as  te rro rism  
may be e a s ie r  to  achieve, perm itting  e ffe c tiv e  action  ag a in s t some of th e  forms 
of violence most c lo se ly  associated  w ith th e  concept. This i s  one of th e  issu es
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addressed in  th e  next chap ter on s tra te g ie s  o f co n tro l, which examines various 
ways in  which te rro rism  has been tack led  in  both an in te rn a tio n a l and a 
dom estic context.
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Chapter IQ -  S tra teg ie s  of Control
The debate in  th e  l i te ra tu re  about what should be done to  con tro l 
te rro rism  re f le c ts  V estem  assum ptions about what the  concept encompasses and 
V estern p r io r i t ie s  in  re sp ec t of i t s  suppression  perhaps more sharp ly  than  any 
o ther a spec t of th e  subject. The debate i s  div ided in to  two p a r ts . One p a r t  
concerns th e  issu e  of how libera l-dem ocracies should respond to  te r r orism  in  a 
dom estic con tex t. (1) This debate h inges on th e  question of whether l ib e ra l-  
democracies can meet the  th re a t posed by te rro r ism  w ithout undermining th e i r  
own foundations through, fo r  example, th e  adoption of measures th a t  v io la te  
fundamental p rin c ip le s  of th e  ru le  of law. However, th e  debate su ffe rs  from a 
s ig n if ic a n t lim ita tio n . I t  has not been conducted w ith reference to  the  
cond itions th a t  e x is t  ac ro ss  the  spectrum of libera l-dem ocracies, in  o ther 
words, in  re sp ec t of any p o lity  in  which th e  government i s  chosen through a 
process of com petitive e lec tio n s  involving two o r more p a r tie s .
Im p lic itly  ra th e r  than  e x p lic itly , i t  has been conducted alm ost exclusively  
in  re la tio n  to  th e  s tab le  liberal-dem ocracies of the  a ff lu e n t V estem  world, 
which fo r  the  most p a r t a re  b lessed  w ith a high degree of p o li t ic a l  consensus. 
In such so c ie tie s  because th e re  a re  widely perceived to  be extensive 
op p o rtu n ities  fo r  the  peaceful p u rsu it of p o l i t ic a l  ends, th e re  i s  l i t t l e  popular 
support fo r , or to le rance  of, the  use of any form of p o l i t ic a l  violence. The 
lack of legitim acy of v io len t methods in  th e se  circum stances perm its th e  
adoption of a very wide d e fin itio n  of te rro r ism . Indeed, i t  may sim ply be 
equated w ith any form of organised violence. <2> Irv ing  Howe provides a 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  statem ent of th i s  p o s itio n :
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In a socie ty  where a reasonable  (which i s  n ecessa rily  to  
say, an im perfect) measure of freedom to  speak and 
organize i s  ava ilab le , we must regard  i t  a s  u t te r ly  
im perm issible to  r e s o r t  to  t e r r o r i s t  methods o r to  give 
the  s l ig h te s t  encouragement to  them... And i t  [te rro rism ] 
is  wrong because m in o ritie s  in  a dem ocratic so c ie ty , a s  
long as  th e ir  freedom to  d is s e n t i s  la rg e ly  p ro tec ted , do 
not have th e  r ig h t  to  impose th e i r  w ill upon th e  m ajority  
through violence. (3)
At th e  tim e th is  piece was published, 1976, th e  s ta b le  libera l-dem ocracies 
of th e  Vest formed a high proportion  of a l l  such p o li t ie s .  That i s  no longer 
th e  case. Since the  co llapse  of Communism in  E astern  Europe in  1989, the  
lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  model has become the  predom inant form of government in  most 
p a r ts  of th e  world. The consequence i s  th a t  lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  p o l i t ic a l  
in s t i tu t io n s  a re  now frequently  to  be found in  so c ie tie s  marked by a high 
degree of d iv is io n  and s t r i f e  and where the  legitim acy of the  p o lity  i s  open to  
question. To label p o li t ic a l  violence in  such circum stances of p o l i t ic a l  
in s ta b i l i ty  as  te rro rism  i s  now more c le a rly  seen a s  running th e  r i s k  of 
lending moral support to  Incumbents who have lo s t  th e i r  legitim acy or to  one 
s id e  or o ther in  communal co n flic t.
The co llapse  of p o li t ic a l  au th o rity  th a t  has taken place in  a number of 
so c ie tie s  th a t  have recen tly  adopted th e  lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  model has underlined 
th e  danger of genera lis ing  about the  legitim acy of p o l i t ic a l  violence in  
libera l-dem ocracies on th e  b a sis  of th e  circum stances th a t  e x is t  in  wealthy 
so c ie tie s  w ith long e s tab lish ed  and widely accepted system s of dem ocratic
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acco u n tab illty . ITowhere I s  th is  more ev iden t than  in  th e  rep ub lics  th a t  
form erly made up the  Soviet Union. This is su e  i s  d iscussed  fu r th e r  below.
The o ther p a r t  concerns the  co n tro l of te rro r ism  in  an in te rn a tio n a l 
con tex t. Here th e  focus i s  on preven ting  v io lence by su b -s ta te  groups th a t  
c ro sses  the  boundaries between s ta te s ,  by v ir tu e  of th e  fa c t  th a t  the  v ic tim s 
a re  c itiz e n s  of a d iffe re n t s ta te  to  th a t  of th e  p e rp e tra to rs  o r because the  
violence i s  c a rrie d  out outside th e  realm  of any s ta te ,  fo r  example in  a 
h ijacking , or in  a s ta te  d if fe re n t from th a t  o f e ith e r  p e rp e tra to r  or v ic tim . 
That i s  to  say, i t  i s  on th e  con tro l of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  a s  d iscussed  in  
th e  l a s t  chap ter, extending to  the  ro le  of s ta t e s  in  supporting such groups and 
in  a few cases to  ac tio n s  by agents o f th e  s ta t e  I t s e l f .  In add ition , th e  
question of how s ta te s  should deal w ith fu g it iv e s  accused of carry ing  out a c ts  
of te rro rism  in  a domestic context in  ano ther ju r isd ic tio n  forms an im portan t 
aspect of th e  debate about the  co n tro l of te rro r ism  in  an in te rn a tio n a l con tex t. 
That provides one link  between the  dom estic and th e  in te rn a tio n a l context.
In fa c t, th e  two a re  linked in  a number of ways. Thus, ac tion  which i s  
categorised  as  in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism , a p a r t from a c ts  p e rpe tra ted  ou tside  the  
ju r isd ic tio n  of any s ta te , alm ost in v a riab ly  c o n s ti tu te s  a v io la tio n  of the  
crim inal law of th e  s ta te  in  which i t  has been committed and th e re fo re  f a l l s  
with i t s  dom estic ju risd ic tio n . Thus, in  th e  f i r s t  in stance , th e  co n tro l of 
te rro rism  is  a m atter fo r the  s ta te  in  th e  ex erc ise  of i t s  re sp o n s ib il ity  to  
m aintain public  order w ithin  i t s  own realm . This provides a convenient 
s ta r t in g  p o in t fo r  considering s t r a te g ie s  fo r  th e  co n tro l of te rro r ism  in  both 
a domestic and an in te rn a tio n a l con tex t.
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Three s tra te g ie s
In response to  th re a ts  to  public order w ith in  i t s  own boundaries, th e re  a re  
th ree  broad s tra te g ie s  which a s ta te  can pursue. They are  c rim in a llsa tio n , 
suppression , o r accommodation.(4) The f i r s t  involves tre a tin g  a l l  a c ts  of 
violence a s  a th re a t  to  public  order th a t  needs to  be d e a lt w ith in  term s of 
th e  o rd inary  p rocesses of law, so th a t  p o l i t ic a l ly  m otivated a c ts  of v iolence 
a re  tre a ted  on a par with a c ts  c a rried  out fo r  o ther motives. All o ffenders are  
regarded as  crim inal, w ith re s is ta n c e  to  th e  notion th a t  p o li t ic a l ly  m otivated 
offenders should be regarded any d if fe re n tly  from those  not claim ing such 
m otivation. Where a s ta te  i s  pursuing a s tra te g y  of c rim in a llsa tio n , th e  
a u th o ritie s  frequen tly  c a s t  doubt on whether th e re  i s ,  in  fa c t, any d iffe ren ce  
between those claim ing p o li t ic a l  m otivation and common c rim ina ls  by suggesting  
th a t  claim s of p o li t ic a l  m otivation a re  used a s  a cover fo r c rim in a lity .
The aim i s  to  m arginalise v io len t o rg an isa tio n s  and deny them any 
p o li t ic a l  legitim acy fo r  th e ir  ac tio n s . A s ig n if ic a n t  advantage of th e  s tra te g y  
of c rim in a llsa tio n  i s  i t s  adherence to  an im portan t p rin c ip le  of the  ru le  of 
law, th e  equal treatm ent of people under th e  law. I t s  main disadvantage from 
the  p erspec tive  of the  a u th o ritie s  i s  th a t  i t  p laces l im its  to  th e  s ta t e 's  
reac tio n  to  d iso rder. Mere c rim in a lity  ra re ly  provides any s ta te  w ith the  
ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r  tak ing  fa r-reach in g  emergency measures to  deal with d iso rd er.
A common c r itic ism  of c rim in a llsa tio n  as  a s tra te g y  i s  th a t  i t  i s  a po licy  
d irec ted  a t  th e  containment of p o li t ic a l  vio lence, ra th e r  than i t s  e lim ination .
The s tra te g y  of suppression, unlike th a t  of c rim in a llsa tio n , tends to  play 
up the  ex istence  of p o li t ic a l  m otivation fo r a c ts  of violence. I t  does so not 
to  excuse th e  p e rp e tra to rs  of such a c ts , bu t on th e  co n tra ry  to  emphasise the
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th re a t  th e i r  a c tio n s  pose to  the  s ta te  so  a s  to  ju s t ify  harsher ac tio n  a g a in s t 
them than  a g a in s t c rim ina lly  m otivated o ffenders . A s tra teg y  of suppression  
often  Involves such p ra c tic e s  as de ten tion  w ithout t r i a l ,  th e  im position of 
c o lle c tiv e  punishments, and the banning o f p o l i t ic a l  o rgan isa tio n s; a c tio n s  th a t  
a re  implemented by the  executive w ithout re fe rence  to  the  ju d ic ia ry . However, 
few governments employing such a s tra te g y  f a i l  to  make use of th e  a u th o rity  of 
th e  law to  cloak suppressive p o lic ie s  in  an aura of legitim acy.
Thus, th e  burden of Imposing draconian punishm ents, such a s  th e  death  
penalty , fo r  p o li t ic a l ly  motivated offences usually  f a l l s  on the  co u rts .
F urther, under a  s tra teg y  o f suppression , i t  i s  common fo r non-v io len t 
behaviour, which would be perm itted  in  an o rd inary  liberal-dem ocracy, such as  
membership of a trad e  union or p a r tic ip a tio n  in  a dem onstration, to  be made 
i l le g a l  and fo r  such p ro h ib itio n s  tD be enforced through the  co u rts . I t  should 
be noted th a t  th i s  form of c rlm in a lisa tlo n  has nothing in  common w ith the  
s tra te g y  of in s is t in g  th a t  p o li t ic a l  m otivation i s  not a re lev an t fa c to r  in  the  
judgement of v io len t breaches of th e  law. The aim of a s tra te g y  of suppression  
i s  to  b ring  a sw ift end to  a c ts  of p o l i t ic a l  violence so th a t  the  re ­
estab lishm en t of order provides i t s  own ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  the  methods used.
Ideally , th e  re tu rn  of peace should perm it th e  government to  l i f t  
emergency p ro v is io n s , w hile the p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  they could be re-im posed, i f  
requ ired , a c ts  a s  a d e te rre n t ag a in s t fu r th e r  v iolence. An obvious d isadvantage 
of a s tra te g y  of suppression i s  th a t  i t  exposes the  government to  in te rn a tio n a l 
c r itic ism  over th e  v io la tio n  of in te rn a tio n a l human r ig h ts  norms th a t  such 
s t r a te g ie s  in v ariab ly  e n ta i l .  At th e  same tim e, the  disadvantage of ra is in g  the 
sp ec tre  of a se rio u s  th re a t  to  i t s  p o s itio n  to  ju s t ify  a  s tra te g y  of suppression
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i s  th a t  i t  i s  lik e ly  to  d e tra c t from th e  government's legitim acy in  th e  eyes of 
th e  ou tside  world. A case in  p o in t was th e  handling of s e p a ra t is t  violence by 
th e  Canadian government under P ie rre  Trudeau in  th e  ea rly  1970s. By Invoking 
emergency powers the  government accorded g re a te r  s ig n ifican ce  to  th e  a c t iv i t ie s  
of v io len t Quebec n a tio n a lis ts  than  th e i r  number ever m erited.
The th ird  option i s  a s tra te g y  of accommodation. Like th e  s tra te g y  of 
suppression , i t  involves tak ing  account of the  p o li t ic a l  m otivations of v io le n t 
law -breakers, bu t to  ju s tify  more len ien t, no t h a rsh er trea tm en t of the  
offenders. However, how law -breakers a re  d e a lt with rem ains secondary in  th e
s tra te g y  to  th e  treatm ent of th e  underlying causes of th e  v iolence. These a re  
usually  located  in  the  leg itim ate  g rievances of a p a r tic u la r  community. Thus,
measures to  outlaw d iscrim ination , th e  in i t ia t io n  of a ffirm a tiv e  action  
programmes, and increased governmental expenditure to  reduce deprivation  and 
unemployment, where th a t  i s  seen as  a major fa c to r, form ty p ic a l in g red ien ts  of 
a s tra te g y  of accommodation. Accommodation may a lso  involve c o n s ti tu tio n a l 
in i t ia t iv e s ,  such as d ecen tra lisa tio n  of power to  a reg ion , or o ther s tep s  to  
enhance the  community's rep resen ta tio n  in  th e  p o li t ic a l  system . The 
estab lishm ent of a Basque reg ional parliam ent in  Spain a f te r  F ranco 's death 
provides an example.
Vhereas a government pursuing a s tra te g y  of suppression  i s  content w ith 
securing  th e  compliance of the  populace, a s tra te g y  of accommodation aims a t  
achieving th e  consent of th e  governed. Reform of th e  sec u rity  fo rces, through 
such measures a s  increasing  the  re p re sen ta tio n  of a lien ated  groups and 
enhancing th e  accoun tab ility  of the  sec u rity  fo rces  to  th e  communities they 
po lice , i s  o ften  a necessary  s tep  in  th i s  con tex t. The commonest c r itic ism  of
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th e  s tra te g y  of accommodation I s  th a t  i t  i s  a form of appeasement, which w ill 
encourage o ther a lienated  groups to  r e s o r t  to  violence as  a way of seeking 
re d re ss  of th e i r  grievances. A disadvantage of th e  s tra teg y  i s  th a t  i t  may 
provoke a backlash from th e  m ajority  of th e  population th a t  In c reases  r a th e r  
than  reduces th e  danger th a t  d iso rd e r p re se n ts  to  th e  government. Further, i t  
i s  a d i f f ic u l t  s tra teg y  to  implement in  th e  con tex t of the  p o l i t ic a l  and 
economic c o n s tra in ts  th a t  cu rren tly  e x is t  in  most so c ie tie s  on increasing  
governmental expenditure. In p a r tic u la r , th e  achievement of fu l l  employment 
seems beyond th e  reach of alm ost a l l  governments in  th e  world economy as  i t  i s  
p re sen tly  organised.
I t  should be emphasised th a t  th e se  s t r a te g ie s  a re  not m utually exclusive, 
though a policy  made up of elem ents of each fo r dealing  with th e  same problem 
would be lik e ly  to  lack coherence. However, a t  d if fe re n t tim es, th e  same 
government may pursue each of these  s t r a te g ie s  and i t  may apply each of them 
to  d if fe re n t con tex ts. For example, I s ra e l i  governments have employed 
s tr a te g ie s  of accommodation in dealing w ith u n re s t Inside  the  dominant Jewish 
community, while applying a s tra teg y  of suppression  to  P a le s tin ian  violence.
For th e  most p a r t, te rro rism  i s  d e a lt w ith in  th e  con tex t of th e  f i r s t  two 
s tra te g ie s .  A government i s  unlikely to  deal len ien tly  w ith v io lence i t  
d esc rib es  as  te rro rism . However, one can p o in t to  cases where violence has 
been tre a te d  len ien tly  th a t  has subsequently been labelled  as te rro r ism . The 
re luctance  of th e  m ilita ry  and of the  ju d ic ia ry  to  a c t  ag a in s t rig h t-w in g  
violence in  th e  Veimar Republic provides an example. (5) Whether a s tra te g y  of 
c rim in a lisa tio n  or suppression i s  chosen to  co n tro l te rro rism  has profound 
im plica tions no t merely because of i t s  e f fe c t  on sec u rity  po licy , but because of
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i t s  impact on so c ie ty 's  conception of th e  natu re  and s ig n ifican ce  of te rro r ism . 
However, i f  a s tra teg y  of suppression  i s  pursued fo r a sh o rt period , i t s  impact 
on th e  so c ie ty  i s  lik e ly  to  be lim ited .
Under a s tra teg y  of c rlm in a llsa tlo n , th e  postu re  o f the  a u th o r it ie s  i s  th a t  
t e r r o r i s t s ,  l ik e  crim ina ls , c o n s ti tu te  a very sm all p roportion  of th e  population, 
whose ac tio n s  a re  opposed by th e  overwhelming m ajority  of a l l  sec tio n s  of 
public  opinion. In sh o rt, i t  i s  assumed th a t  t e r r o r i s t s  lack any p o l i t ic a l  
legitim acy w ith in  the  so c ie ty . The s tro n g ly  negative overtones of th e  term  
underpin th e  p resen ta tio n  of th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  a s  fundam entally a n ti- s o c ia l .  In 
th i s  con tex t, the  c h a rac te risa tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  violence as  te rro r ism  a ffo rd s  
th e  a u th o r itie s  l i t t l e  ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r draconian measures, s in ce  the  
im plication  of th e  use of the  term i s  th a t  th e  p e rp e tra to rs  a re  a m arginal 
group w ithout popular support in  th e  so c ie ty  and th u s  no t a major p o l i t ic a l  
th re a t  to  the  socie ty . The main exception to  th is ,  beloved of w rite rs  in  the  
f ie ld , i s  th e  scenario  of a country being blackm ailed by a sm all group armed 
with a nuclear device. (6)
But in  most s itu a tio n s  to  describe  p e rp e tra to rs  of violence as  t e r r o r i s t s  
is  to  a s s e r t  th a t  the government i s  in  co n tro l and th a t  th e re  has been no 
general breakdown of law and order. Of th e  meanings of te rro rism  described  in 
chap ter 2, i t  f i t s  b est th e  notion of te rro rism  a s  th e  lowest level of v io le n t 
p o li t ic a l  c o n flic t. The B ritish  governm ent's use of term , te rro r ism , in  th e  
con tex t of Northern Ireland  provides an example of t h i s  usage, though B r it is h  
governments have not been wholly com fortable w ith th e  lim its  on th e i r  response 
to  p o l i t ic a l  violence implied by a s tra te g y  of c rim in a lisa tio n . However, 
a t t r ib u tin g  violence to  tin y  numbers of t e r r o r i s t s  on both s id e s  of the
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se c ta ria n  d iv ide  does perm it th e  government to  convey th e  im pression th a t  most 
people in  B erth e ra  Ireland lead normal liv e s  and th a t  th e  s i tu a tio n  does not 
m erit the  in tru s iv e  concern of the  r e s t  of th e  world.
The im p lica tions of a s tra te g y  of suppression  a re  very d if fe re n t. In th i s  
context, th e  use of th e  term, te rro rism , i s  designed to  up th e  an te , p rec ise ly  so 
as  to  ju s t ify  exceptional measures. The s tro n g ly  negative overtones of th e  term 
a re  used to  suggest the  ex istence o f a th re a t  to  so c ie ty  of a to ta l ly  d if fe re n t 
order of magnitude from mere c rim in a lity . T e rro r is ts  a re  p resen ted  as  demonic 
ra th e r  than  as  sim ply a n ti-s o c ia l .  Under th e  s tra te g y  of c rlm ln a lisa tio n , th e  
lin k  between th e  t e r r o r i s t s '  lack of support and th e i r  lack of p o l i t ic a l  
legitim acy i s  c ru c ia l. The one follow s from th e  o ther. However, th a t  a lso  
makes i t  d i f f ic u l t  to  p ro jec t te rro rism  a s  a major th re a t  to  th e  so c ie ty . Vhere 
a s tra te g y  of suppression i s  pursued, th e  lin k  between legitim acy and support 
i s  often  broken. Indeed, the  support enjoyed by t e r r o r i s t s  i s  o ften  emphasised 
as  a way both of magnifying the  th re a t  th a t  they pose and of ju s tify in g  
measures th a t  have a co llec tiv e  impact on th e  communities from which the  
t e r r o r i s t s  a re  drawn. Acknowledgement of th e  support th e  t e r r o r i s t s  enjoy does 
not confer legitim acy on them sin ce  the  legitim acy of th e  p o li t ic a l  a sp ira tio n s  
of th e  communities from which they emanate a re  denied. Indeed, th e  nexus 
between the  two i s  emphasised to  deny legitim acy to  both.
Vhereas under a s tra teg y  of c rim in a llsa io n , th e  use of th e  term s, 
te rro rism  and t e r r o r i s t s ,  ac tua lly  p laces r e s t r a in ts  on th e  response of th e  
a u th o r itie s  to  p o li t ic a l  violence, th e ir  use in  the  con tex t of a s tra te g y  of 
suppression c re a te s  a clim ate in  which in d isc rim in a te  violence a g a in s t members 
of a community perceived as  h o s tile  can be ju s t if ie d  in  th e  name of counter-
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te rro r ism . In th i s  s itu a tio n , one person 's  c o u n te r - te r ro r is t  may be another 
p e rso n 's  t e r r o r i s t .  In th e  most extreme in stan ces, th e  o ther s id e  of th e  coin 
of a n t i - t e r r o r i s t  operations may be e thn ic  cleansing .
Lebanon and co un ter-te rro rism
In h is  book on Lebanon, P ity  th e  g a t Ion. Robert F isk  e n title d  h is  chap ter on the  
m assacre of P a le s tin ian s  a t  Sabra and C hatila  in  September 1982,
'T e r r o r i s ts '. (7) The t i t l e  arose out of h is  conviction th a t  th e  very  word, 
t e r r o r i s t s  'had helped to  b ring  about th i s  a tro c i ty ' and he headed the  chap ter 
w ith a statem ent in  ju s tic a tio n  of th e  m assacre by a P halang ist p a r tic ip a n t in  
th e  k ill in g s :  'Pregnant women w ill give b ir th  to  te r r o r i s t s ;  th e  ch ild ren  when 
they grow up w ill be t e r r o r i s t s ' .  (8) He g ives a g raphic  d esc rip tio n  of the  
savage and in d iscrim ina te  massacre of the  in h ab itan ts  of the  two refugee camps 
which was ca rried  out in  fu l l  view of the  occupying I s ra e li  army by th e  members 
of C h ris tian  m ili t ia s , th e  Phalange and Haddad's Army of Free Lebanon. The 
m ilitiam en had been allowed in to  the  camps by th e  I s ra e l is  fo r  th e  purpose of 
'flu sh ing  out t e r r o r i s t s ' .  (9)
F isk 's  account shows how in  th e  Imagination of th e  I s ra e l i  so ld ie rs  and 
th e ir  C h ris tian  m ilit ia  a l l ie s ,  the  no tions of t e r r o r i s t s ,  t e r r o r i s t  suspec ts, 
and t e r r o r i s t  population merged together. He d escribes how I s ra e l i  so ld ie rs  a t  
th e  en trance to  C hatila, even though they them selves had become enveloped in  
th e  stench  of th e  massacre in s id e  the  camp, continued to  take cover from 
phantom te r r o r i s t s ,  so gripped were they by th e  notion th a t  demons ra th e r  than 
p o v e rty -s trik en  and h e lp le ss  refugees, who were now m ostly dead, occupied th e  
camp. Vith perhaps pardonable overstatem ent in  th e  circum stances, F isk 
concluded:
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For the  I s r a e l is  -  fo r  Sharon and Begin and th e ir  s o ld ie rs  
-  'te r ro r is t*  d id  not have th e  sane  connotations a s  i t  does 
elsewhere. In Europe and America, in  many Asian cou n tries , 
even in th e  Soviet Union, th e  word 'terrorism * evokes 
images of h ijack ings, bombs p lan ted  in  re s ta u ra n ts  or 
schools or a irp o r ts ,  th e  murder o f c iv il ia n s  on p lanes, 
buses, t r a in s ,  o r sh ip s. But in  Is ra e l , 'te r ro r is t*  means 
a l l  P a le stin ian  Arabs -  and very o ften , a l l  Arabs -  who 
oppose Is ra e l in  word or deed. Loren Jenkins used to  
re fe r  to  'the  c a re le ss  deprecia tion  of meaning' th a t  th e  
I s ra e l is  Imposed on th e  word, claim ing th a t  th i s  d is to r te d  
th e  r e a l i ty  of te rro rism . But i t  was no t 'c a re le ss '.  I t  
was d e lib e ra te . (10)
Yet as  th e  dem onstrations in  Is ra e l ag a in s t the  war in  Lebanon 
underscored, by no means a l l  I s ra e l is  shared Sharon 's or Begin's a tt i tu d e s  
towards P a le s tin ian s . For were, o r are , th e ir  a t t i tu d e s  by any manner of means 
simply confined to  I s ra e l is  or, fo r  th a t  m atter, th e  members of Lebanese 
m ili t ia s . But F isk  was r ig h t  to  recognise th a t  th e  term , te rro rism , had 
d iffe re n t connotations in  d if fe re n t p o li t ic a l  con tex ts. There was a la rge  
d ifference  between the  connotations of te rro rism  in  V estem  Europe, where in  a 
domestic con tex t, a t  le a s t, i t  was fo r  th e  most p a r t  a fr in g e  phenomenon being 
combated by s tra te g ie s  of c rim in a llsa tlo n  and in  th e  Kiddle East, where i t  was 
a re f le c tio n  of much deeper schism s, was perceived as a  much g rea te r th re a t ,  
and prompted a fa r  more aggressive  response.
In much of th e  l i te ra tu re  on te rro r ism , th e  d ifferen ce  tends to  be masked 
by th e  inc lusion  of Is ra e l among V estem  llbera l-dem ocracies. In th i s  
l i te ra tu re , the  th ir d  of th e  meanings of te rro rism  id e n tif ie d  in  ch ap te r 2, th a t  
of an a tta ck  on th e  Vest and on V estem  values, Including a commitment to  
liberal-dem ocracy, tends to  predominate. I t  may be argued th a t  n e ith e r  the  
lim ited  p o li t ic a l  r ig h ts  of the  I s ra e l i  Arab m inority  nor even th e  s itu a tio n  
which has p revailed  in  th e  occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  c o n s ti tu te s  a s u f f ic ie n t  b a s is  
fo r  challenging th e  ca teg o risa tio n  of Is ra e l a s  a lib e ra l-d em o cra tic  p o lity . 
N evertheless, Is ra e l i s  c lea rly  not a liberal-dem ocracy  of th e  same type th a t  
e x is ts  in  th e  s ta b le , consensual p o li t ie s  of V estem  Europe. Unlike, say,
Sweden, Holland, or France, Is rae l i s  a deeply divided so c ie ty  in  which each
community tends to  perceive a t  le a s t  elem ents of th e  o th er a s  h o s t i le  to  i t s
very ex istence  and th i s  fundamentally co lours responses in  each community to  
th e  whole question of te rro rism . Vhile th e  dark  shadow of th e  Holocaust i s  a 
fa c to r  exacerbating  the  fe a rs  of I s ra e l i  Jews, Is ra e l i s  by no means unique a s  a
deeply divided so c ie ty  and with th e  spread  of liberal-dem ocracy to  so c ie tie s  in
Eastern  Europe frac tu red  by re lig io u s  o r e th n ic  d iv is io n s , p o la r is a tio n  of such 
p o li t ie s  in  th i s  way has become alm ost commonplace.
Principles of extradition
The d if fe re n t conceptions of te rro rism  underlying th e  approaches of 
c rim in a llsa tlo n  and suppression a re  a lso  to  be found in  an in te rn a tio n a l 
context. In i t ia l ly , the  main concern o f governments in  re sp ec t of violence by 
su b -s ta te  groups outside th e ir  own ju r isd ic tio n  was to  shore up th e  d is tin c tio n  
between th e  dom estic and in te rn a tio n a l realm s. This was re f le c te d  in  th e  
gradual evolution of a general p r in c ip le  of non-in terven tion  in  th e  dom estic
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c o n f lic ts  of o ther coun tries. The advantage to  s ta te s  of such a postu re  was 
th a t  I t  gave th e  contending p a r t ie s  In dom estic d isp u tes  an Incen tive  no t to  
extend th e i r  c o n flic t to  the  in te rn a tio n a l realm . Vhen in te rn a tio n a l co­
operation  to  combat crime was form alised through e x tra d itio n  t r e a t ie s ,  th e  
p r in c ip le  of non-in terven tion  in  dom estic c o n f lic ts  was enshrined through the  
inc lusion  in  the  t r e a t ie s  of a clause excluding p o li t ic a l  o ffenders from th e  
scope of ex trad itio n . The Franco-Belglan ex tra d itio n  agreement of 1834 
e s tab lish ed  th e  precedent, which o th ers  followed. However, an a ttem pt on th e  
l i f e  of Hapoleon III in  1855 led to  a m odification of th e  term s of th e  p o l i t ic a l  
exception c lause so as  to  make the  murder o r attem pted murder of a head of 
s ta te  or immediate fam ily an e x trad itab le  crime. (11)
B ritish  le g is la tio n  of 1870 simply provided th a t  'no person i s  to  be 
surrendered i f  h is  offence i s  of a p o li t ic a l  c h a ra c te r ',(12) which was enshrined 
as  th e  b a s is  of the  p o li t ic a l  offence exception clause in  numerous e x tra d itio n  
t r e a t ie s  between B rita in  and o ther coun tries. The meaning of 'offence of a 
p o li t ic a l  c h a rac te r ' was c la r if ie d  by the  High Court in  London in  1891. The 
case involved the  murder of a member of the  local government during a reb e llio n  
in  a Swiss canton. The judges la id  down two sim ple ru le s : th e  ex istence  of 
se rio u s  d istu rbances in  th e  p o lity  in  question and a c le a r  connection between 
the  offence fo r  which e x trad itio n  was being sought and th e  d is tu rbances. On 
th i s  b a s is , th e  e x trad itio n  of Angelo C astionl from B rita in  to  th e  canton of 
Ticino was refused.
Three years la te r  th e  High Court added a g lo ss  to  i t s  judgement in  th e  
C astionl case by allowing the  e x tra d itio n  of a French a n a rch is t, Theodor 
Meunler, who was wanted fo r  the bombing of a P a ris  cafe  which had h ille d  two
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c iv il ia n s . The c en tra l argument of th e  judgement was th a t  a n a rc h is ts  were the  
enemies of a l l  governments and thus d id  no t meet th e  requirem ent of being 
contenders fo r  p o li t ic a l  power w ith in  th e  s ta te .  (13) One could perhaps regard  
th e  a ttem pts to  lim it th e  scope of p o l i t ic a l  asylum by th e  a u th o r itie s , ju d ic ia l 
and executive, a s  an ea rly  form of in te rn a tio n a l co-operation  on te rro r ism  since  
a ssa ss in a tio n s  of heads of s ta te  and a n a rc h is t violence formed a la rg e  p a r t  of 
19th century conceptions of what c o n stitu ted  te rro rism .
The issu e  of te rro rism  as  such was considered by a se r ie s  of in te rn a tio n a l 
conferences on th e  u n ifica tio n  of penal law during th e  early  1930s. A 
d e fin itio n  of te rro rism  was proposed and i t  was recommended th a t  a c ts  th a t  f e l l  
w ithin  the  scope of the  d e fin itio n  should be excluded from th e  p ro tec tio n  of 
p o li t ic a l  offence exception clauses in  e x tra d itio n  t r e a t ie s .  However, no th ing  
came of th i s  recommendation. Following th e  a ssa ss in a tio n  of the  King of 
Yugoslavia and th e  French foreign  m in is te r  by C roatian n a tio n a lis ts  in  
M arseilles in  1934, th e  League of R ations took up the  issue , prompted 
p a rtic u la r ly  by the  tran sn a tio n a l dim ensions of th e  k il l in g s  in  M arse ille s. The 
Council of th e  League e s tab lish ed  a committee of ex p erts  to  study th e  problem. 
The re s u lt  of th e  committee's work was an in te rn a tio n a l conference in  1937 to  
approve th e  te x ts  of two Conventions on th e  sub ject, one on the  p reven tion  and 
punishment of te rro rism  and the  o th er on th e  estab lishm ent of an in te rn a tio n a l 
crim inal court. (14) N either Convention came in to  fo rce . In the  co n tex t o f th e  
tim es, th e  issu e  of tran sn a tio n a l te rro r ism  by su b -s ta te  groups was a low 
p r io r i ty  fo r  most coun tries.
Indeed, only one country, India, ac tu a lly  completed the  p rocess of 
ra tify in g  th e  two Conventions. However, th e  two Conventions a re  no t q u ite
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fo rg o tten . In p a r tic u la r , th e  idea of an in te rn a tio n a l crim inal co u rt to  t r y  
h ijack ers  and o th ers  whose crimes take p lace in  the  in te rn a tio n a l arena has had 
many su p p o rte rs  over th e  years since  the  end of the  Second Vorld Var.(15> But 
th e  c e n tra l emphasis placed in  th e  f i r s t  of th e  1937 Conventions on a tta c k s  on 
heads of s ta te  s t r ik e s  a  s l ig h tly  odd chord today in  th e  l ig h t  o f th e  post-w ar 
debate on th e  m orality  of a ssa ss in a tin g  H itle r, even though outlawing such 
a tta c k s  has been a p e rs is te n t  fea tu re  of s ta te  endeavour in  th i s  f ie ld .
Responses to hijacking and hostage-taking
In th e  f i r s t  two post-w ar decades, the  issu e  of te rro rism  had a low p r io r i ty . 
Indeed, use of the  term , te rro rism , was re la tiv e ly  uncommon in  th i s  period . I t  
cropped up in  a 1954 D raft Code of Offences ag a in s t th e  Peace and Security  of 
Mankind, prepared by th e  In te rn a tio n a l Law Commission fo r  th e  United H atlons 
General Assembly, though not acted on .(16) I t  i s  noteworthy th a t  th e  con tex t of 
i t s  re ferences to  te rro r ism  was s ta te  Involvement in  the  dom estic subversion of 
th e  government of another country. Vhile a considerable number o f h ijack ings 
of commercial a i r c r a f t  took place in  the  course of th e  two decades, p a r tic u la r ly  
in th e  ea rly  1960s between Cuba and F lorida, th e re  was l i t t l e  in c lin a tio n  to  
label th ese  a s  te rro rism .
The change in a t t i tu d e s  towards hijacking  came when h ijack ers  s ta r te d  to  
th rea ten  the  liv e s  of th e  crew and passengers fo r  purposes o ther than  d iv e rtin g  
the  a i r c r a f t  to  a d if fe re n t d estin a tio n . However, th e re  was a tig h ten in g  of the  
law in  re sp ec t of a i r  tra n sp o r t in  advance of th e  onset of th e  age of 
te rro rism . The 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offences and C ertain  Other Acts 
Committed on Board A irc ra ft provided th a t  th e  ju r isd ic tio n  over a plane in  
f l ig h t  lay w ith the  country where th e  a i r c r a f t  was re g is te red  and la id  down
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ru le s  fo r  dealing  with offenders Including h ija ck e rs . I t  was followed by 
fu r th e r measures in th i s  sphere during the  'age of te rro r ism ': th e  1970 Hague 
Convention fo r  the  Unlawful Seizure of A irc ra ft; th e  1971 Montreal Convention 
fo r  th e  Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against th e  Safety  of C iv il Aviation; an 
addendum to  th e  Montreal Convention in  February 1988 to  include a tta c k s  on 
passengers a t  a irp o r ts  a s  well as on board a i r c r a f t ;  and th e  1991 Convention of 
the  Marking of P la s tic  Explosives fo r  D etection. (17)
In a s im ila r  way, th e  1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic R elations and 
the  1963 Convention on Consular R elations, which in s is te d  not merely on th e  
in v io la b ility  of d iplom atic agents, but a lso  th e i r  fam ilies  and supporting  s ta f f  
and reaffirm ed  th e  re sp o n slb lity  of the  receiv ing  s ta te s  to  p ro te c t them, were 
followed by th e  1969 Mew York Convention on S pecial M issions and th e  1973 
Convention on th e  Prevention and Punishment o f Crimes a g a in s t In te rn a tio n a lly  
Protected  Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. This included heads of s ta te ,  
heads o f government, and foreign m in is te rs  in  th e  category of p ro tec ted  
persons. However, th e re  was not quite  such an obvious precedent from before 
th e  la te  1960s fo r  the  1979 In te rna tiona l Convention a g a in s t th e  Taking of 
Hostages, though A rtic le  3 of the  Third Geneva Convention fo r th e  P ro tec tion  of 
C iv ilian  Persons in  Time of Var forbade th e  tak in g  of hostages in  any armed 
c o n flic t. The 1979 Convention was arguably th e  most im portant of a l l  the  
Conventions dealing  with a p a rtic u la r  category of a c tio n s  w ith in  th e  broad area 
of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism , since i t  went fu r th e s t  in  e s ta b lish in g  a 
g en era llsab le  normative p rinc ip le .
The Convention defined the offence of h o s tag e-tak in g  as th e  tak in g  o f a 
person in  o rd er to  compel a th ird  p a rty , such a s  a fo reign  s ta te ,  to  do o r omit
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doing something by th rea ten ing  p h ysica l harm to  th e  hostage. (16) I t  obliged 
s ta te s  ra tify in g  th e  Convention to  penalise  any person committing such an 
offence in  an in te rn a tio n a l context. H ostage-taking w ithout an in te rn a tio n a l 
element by reason of th e  n a tio n a lity  of the  p e rp e tra to r  or v ictim  or th e  p a rty  
to  whom demands were d irec ted  lay outside  th e  scope o f th e  Convention. Vest 
Germany had proposed th e  drawing up of such a Convention in  1976 and th e  issu e  
was re fe rre d  to  a sp ec ia l committee. The actua l approval of the  Convention by 
th e  General Assembly followed in  th e  wake of th e  seizu re  of th e  American 
Embassy in  Iran .
Responses to  te rro rism  in  general
The advantage of Conventions which d e a lt with a p a r tic u la r  category of ac tio n s  
was th a t  they obviated th e  need fo r  an agreement on a general d e f in itio n  of 
te rro rism . Further, s ta te s  were no t obliged to  accept th a t  th i s  o r th a t  ac tion  
outlawed in  a Convention was an a c t  o f te rro rism , merely th a t  i t  should be 
p roh ib ited . This was an im portant considera tion  fo r  s ta te s  fe a rfu l th a t  th e  
lab e llin g  of p a rtic u la r  ac tio n s  a s  te rro rism  would be used to  leg itim ise  
in te rv en tio n  in  the  name of coun ter-te rro rism . N evertheless, th e re  have been 
a ttem pts w ith in  the  framework of th e  United Nations to  e s ta b lish  a general 
consensus on th e  issue  of te rro rism . In 1972 follow ing the  a tta ck  on I s ra e l i  
a th le te s  a t  th e  Munich Olympics, th e  Secretary-G eneral of th e  United N ations, 
Kurt Valdheim, asked th e  General Assembly to  consider th e  issu e  of te rro r ism .
At th e  o u tse t of th e  debate, th e  United S ta te s  pu t forward a d ra f t  
Convention fo r  th e  Prevention and Punishment of C ertain  Acts of In te rn a tio n a l 
T errorism .(19) The American proposal was opposed by Third Vorld s ta te s ,  who 
were concerned th a t  p a r t  of the  purpose of th e  d ra f t  was to  d e tra c t  from th e
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legitim acy of th e  use of violence by groups f ig h tin g  fo r  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  in  
th e  con tex t of co lon ial o r m inority  ru le , which had recen tly  been affirm ed by 
th e  United N ations. The reso lu tio n  th a t  th e  General Assembly adopted in  
December 1972 re flec ted  th e i r  concern. I t  p laced a s tro n g  emphasis on th e  
legitim acy of th e  s tru g g le  of n a tio n a l lib e ra tio n  movements, while agreeing to  
th e  estab lishm ent of an Ad Hoc Committee on In te rn a tio n a l Terrorism  to  make 
recommendations to  ta ck le  th e  problem, including i t s  underlying c au se s .(20)
From th e  perspective  of th e  s t r a te g ie s  of c rim in a llsa tlo n , suppression , and 
accommodation, th e  various Conventions on p a r tic u la r  ca teg o ries  of ac tio n s  
represen ted  th e  approach of c rim in a llsa tlo n . The approach favoured by Third 
Vorld s ta te s ,  p a r tic u la r ly  when th e  issu e  was f i r s t  debated and th e  main focus 
was on h ijack ings and hostage-tak ing  by P a le s tin ian  fac tio n s , can re a d ily  be 
ch arac te rised  a s  one of accommodation. However, w ith th e  recogn ition  of the  
legitim acy of P a le stin ian  demands fo r  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n , a t  le a s t  w ith in  th e  
Occupied T e rr ito r ie s , th e re  has been g re a te r  acceptance w ithin  th e  Third Vorld 
of the  need to  c rim in a lise  c e r ta in  types of v iolence. This was re f le c te d  a t  the  
1985 General Assembly sessio n  in  th e  passage, w ith Third Vorld support, of 
re so lu tio n s  s tro n g ly  condemning p a r tic u la r  forms of te rro rism  and urging s ta te s  
to  r a t i f y  the  re lev an t Conventions. (21) The V estem  response has tended to  
s h i f t  uneasily  between c rim in a llsa tlo n  and suppression . In seeking support fo r  
measures to  combat in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism , V estem  s ta te s  have generally  
emphasised th e  illeg itim acy  of c e r ta in  kinds of ac tio n s , re g a rd le ss  o f th e ir  
p o li t ic a l  motive, a stance  ty p ic a l of a s tra te g y  of c rim in a llsa tlo n .
That approach i s  a lso  re fle c ted  in  such c o lle c tiv e  agreements among 
V estern s ta te s  a s  the  1977 European Convention on th e  Suppression of Terrorism ,
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an in i t ia t iv e  o f the  Council of Europe. A rtic le  1 of th e  European Convention 
provides th a t  fo r  th e  purposes of e x tra d itio n  none Df th e  offences i t  l i s t s  
should be regarded as  p o li t ic a l  offences. The l i s t  includes offences w ith in  the  
scope of th e  Hague and Montreal Conventions, a se rio u s  offence Involving an 
a tta ck  on in te rn a tio n a lly  p ro tec ted  persons, kidnapping, h o stage-tak ing , and any 
offence 'involving th e  use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, autom atic firearm  or 
l e t t e r  or p a rce l bomb i f  th is  use endangers p e rso n s '.(22) Attempting to  c a rry  
out such offences or ac tin g  as  an accomplice was a lso  l is te d . A rtic le  2 
provided th a t  governments might perm it e x tra d itio n  in  serio u s  cases of vio lence 
not l is te d  under A rtic le  1, but in  th e  l ig h t  of o ther p rov isions of th e  
Convention, JToemi Gal-Or argues th a t  'a p ra c tic a l  use of A rtic le  2 seems ra th e r  
un like ly '. (23)
However, even in  re la tio n s  w ith o th e r V estem  s ta te s ,  governments have 
found some of th e  im plications of a s tra te g y  of c rim in a llsa tlo n  n o t to  th e i r  
lik in g  and have favoured a more p o l i t ic a l  approach, one of th e  advantages of 
which from a governmental perspective  has been to  reduce th e  influence of th e  
co u rts  on th e  p rocess. C r it ic s  of th e  1977 European Convention argued th a t  the  
l i s t  of offences outlined in  A rtic le  1 had not been defined with s u f f ic ie n t 
rigour and th a t  th e  s tandard  i t  s e t  was app licab le  only w ith in  th e  con tex t of a 
liberal-dem ocracy and, they might have added, a s ta b le  liberal-dem ocracy , s in ce  
one of th e  concerns of th e  c r i t i c s  was th a t  i t  d id  no t draw a su f f ic ie n tly  
c lea r  d is t in c tio n  between g u e rr illa  w arfare and te r ro r is m .(24) Yet in  
comparison w ith domestic le g is la tio n , such a s  the  B ritish  Prevention of 
Terrorism  Act, which t r e a t s  a l l  v iolence fo r  p o li t ic a l  ends a s  te rro r ism , (25) 
th e  scope of th e  Convention was lim ited . The re s u l t  has been th a t  a number of
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ap p lica tio n s  th a t  B rita in  has made to  European co u n tries  fo r th e  e x tra d itio n  of 
in d iv id u a ls  accused of t e r r o r i s t  offences under B ritish  law have been re jec ted  
on th e  grounds th a t  the  offence, fo r  example, possession  of weaponry, lay  
ou tside  th e  scope of the  Convention.
At th e  same time, th e  approach of th e  Convention to  the  d e fin itio n  of 
te rro r ism , w ith i t s  emphasis on forms of vio lence th a t  th rea ten  th e  liv e s  of 
innocent bystanders, whether in te n tio n a lly  o r a s  th e  p red ic tab le  consequence of 
the  use of a p a r tic u la r  weapon, i s  broadly in  lin e  with the  evolution of 
ju d ic ia l in te rp re ta tio n s  of th e  p o li t ic a l  offence exception. As a r e s u l t  of 
concern over te rro rism , judges in many V estern co u n tries  have tended to  take  a 
much narrow er view of th e  p o li t ic a l  offence exception in  e x tra d itio n  cases than 
they d id  before the  issue  of te rro rism  came to  th e  fo re . However, th e  fa c t  th a t  
ex tra d itio n  has become e a s ie r  between V estem  co u n tries, because of the  tren d  in  
ju d ic ia l in te rp re ta tio n  of what c o n s ti tu te s  a  p o l i t ic a l  offence, has a ttra c te d  
fa r  le s s  a tte n tio n  than cases where fo r  one reason or another e x tra d itio n  has 
been refused .
Doherty case
A good example i s  the  outrage in  B rita in  th a t  greeted United S ta te s  D is tr ic t  
Judge John S prizzo 's  decision not to  allow th e  e x tra d itio n  in  1984 of a member 
of th e  P rov isiona l ERA, Joe Doherty. Doherty had fled  to  th e  United S ta te s  
following h is  escape from prison  in  Northern Ireland  where he was serv ing  a 
l i f e  sentence a f te r  being convicted fo r th e  murder of a cap ta in  in  th e  Special 
Air Serv ices (SAS). Doherty was a member of a P rov isional IRA Active Service 
Unit (ASU) th a t  had s e t  out to  ambush a m ilita ry  convoy. The a u th o r it ie s  had 
gained advance knowledge of the  attem pt and had s e n t in  a u n it o f th e  SAS to
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take  th e  P rovisional ASU by su rp ris e . The SAS operation went awry because of a 
fa ilu re  to  id en tify  the  c o rre c t en trance to  th e  house in  which th e  ASU was 
ensconced. In the  ensuing shoo t-ou t between th e  SAS u n it and th e  ASU, th e  
o ff ic e r  in  charge of th e  SAS u n it was k ille d . Sprizzo argued th a t  th e  ex istence  
of a p o l i t ic a l  c o n flic t in  Northern Ireland and th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  offence was 
committed in  th e  course of the  c o n f lic t d id n o t in  them selves c o n s ti tu te  
s u ff ic ie n t grounds fo r  refu sing  ex tra d itio n  a s  'not every a c t  committed fo r  a 
p o li t ic a l  purpose or during a p o l i t ic a l  d istu rbance  may or should p roperly  be 
regarded as  a p o lit ic a l  o ffense '. (26>
In p a rtic u la r , he a sse rte d  th a t  the  law required  th a t  'no a c t  be regarded 
as p o li t ic a l  where the  nature  of th e  a c t i s  such as  to  be v io la tiv e  of 
in te rn a tio n a l law, and in c o n sis te n t with in te rn a tio n a l s tan d ard s  of c iv il is e d  
conduct'. (27) As an example, he gave the  p lacing  of a bomb in  a pub lic  p lace. 
But he concluded th a t  D oherty's ac tio n s  did no t f a l l  in to  th is  category and 
refused th e  ap p lica tio n  fo r  h is  e x tra d itio n . In response to  the  Sprizzo 
judgement, th e  B ritish  and American governments drew up a new E x trad itio n  
Treaty in  1985. I t  eventually  secured passage through th e  United S ta te s  Senate 
in July 1986, a f te r  P residen t Reagan appealed to  Senators to  rec ip ro ca te  B ritish  
support fo r th e  bombing of Libya in  A pril th a t  year.
The T rea ty 's  ex tensive l i s t  of offences fo r  which the  plea of p o l i t ic a l  
offence would no longer provide a defence a g a in s t e x tra d itio n  was Intended to  
cut th e  co u rts  out of th e  process of determ ining what co n stitu ted  te rro r ism  and 
to  prevent th e  p o s s ib il i ty  of a re p e titio n  of the  Doherty case. The 
governments' p u rsu it of Doherty continued and in  1992, Doherty was re tu rned  to  
Northern Ireland  to  serve  h is  sentence, not a s  a re s u l t  of a p rocess of
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e x tra d itio n , but a f te r  deporta tion  on the  grounds of i l le g a l  en try  to  the  United 
S ta te s . By th i s  tim e, Doherty's case  had become a cause celebre  and h is  p lea  to  
be granted  asylum had a ttra c te d  widespread p o l i t ic a l  support w ith in  the  United 
S ta te s . (28)
The Doherty saga i s  re f le c tiv e  of a much more general tendency fo r V estem  
governments to  seek co n tro l over th e  handling of th e  problem of te rro r ism , so 
th a t  th e  b a t t le  a g a in s t te rro rism  accords w ith  th e ir  own p o l i t ic a l  p r io r i t ie s .  
Governments th a t  fee l them selves th rea tened  by p a r tic u la r  campaigns of 
p o li t ic a l  vio lence a re  esp ec ia lly  prone to  t h i s  tendency, which s h i f t s  th e  
emphasis from a s tra te g y  of c rim in a llsa tlo n  to  one of suppression . The e f fe c t  
has been to  undercut th e  e f fo r ts  being made by a number of o rg an isa tio n s  to  
e s ta b lish  th e  b a s is  fo r  a un iversal consensus on what c o n s ti tu te s  te rro rism , 
and i s  unacceptable in  th e  context of any c o n flic t.
International humanitarian law
In 1977 under th e  aeg is of th e  In te rn a tio n a l Committee of the  Red Cross (ICRC), 
two ad d itio n a l p ro toco ls  to  the  1949 Geneva Conventions on th e  laws of war 
were adopted to  extend th e  scope of in te rn a tio n a l hum anitarian law to  cover 
g u e rr illa  w arfare. The f i r s t  p ro toco l expands th e  laws governing in te rn a tio n a l 
wars and co lon ia l c o n flic ts . The second pro toco l ap p lie s  to  n o n -in tem a tio n a l 
armed c o n f lic ts  between a s ta t e 's  armed fo rce s  and d is s id e n t fo rces  operating 
under resp o n sib le  command and ex erc is in g  co n tro l of p a r t  of th e  s ta t e 's  
te r r i to ry .  (29) S itu a tio n s  of 'in te rn a l d is tu rbances and te n s io n s '(30) are 
sp e c if ic a lly  excluded from the  scope of th e  pro toco l.
This lim ita tio n  in  th e  a p p lic a b ili ty  of in te rn a tio n a l hum anitarian law to  
v io len t c o n f lic ts  prompted H ans-Peter Gasser, a legal ad v ise r to  th e  ICRC, to
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d ra f t  a code of conduct, w ith the  aim of prom oting g rea te r re sp ec t fo r  human 
values in  such s itu a tio n s . (31) At the  same tim e, human r ig h ts  o rg an isa tio n s , 
such a s  Amnesty In te rn a tio n a l and H elsinki Vatch, increasing ly  came to  
recognise during th e  course of the  1980s th a t  bodies o ther than governments and 
s ta te s  were frequen tly  responsib le  fo r se rio u s  v io la tio n s  of human r ig h ts  and 
they now include c r i tic ism  of the  conduct of p a ram ilita ry  bodies ou tside  the  
co n tro l of s ta te s  and governments in  th e ir  re p o r ts . A fu r th e r in i t ia t iv e  in  
th i s  f ie ld  was th e  1990 D eclaration of Minimum Humanitarian S tandards, pu t 
forward by a group of exp erts  working under th e  auspices of th e  In s t i tu te  of 
Human E igh ts in  Turku/Abu in  Finland. I t  i s  Intended th a t  th e  s tan d a rd s  should 
bind governments a s  well a s  o ther bodies.
For example, A rtic le  6 of the D eclaration outlaws 'a c ts  o r th r e a ts  of 
violence th e  prim ary purpose or foreseeable e f fe c t  of which i s  to  spread  te r r o r  
among th e  population '. (32) A reason why in te r e s t  in  th ese  in i t ia t iv e s  has been 
lim ited  may sim ply be th e  problem of enforcing such a standard  even i f  i t  
became an accepted p a r t  of in te rn a tio n a l law. In fa c t, th i s  i s  a general 
d if f ic u lty  of in te rn a tio n a l law in a world of sovereign s ta te s .  Compliance 
depends on th e  s ta te s  them selves. That a p p lie s  to  a l l  th e  Conventions dealing 
w ith p a r tic u la r  types of violence and even to  th e  European Convention on the  
Suppression of Terrorism . I t  a lso  provides s ta t e s  w ith the  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  
tak ing  u n ila te ra l ac tion  of th e ir  own ag a in s t su b -s ta te  groups or even o ther 
s ta te s  they hold resp o n sib le  fo r a c ts  of te rro r ism  a g a in s t th e ir  c itiz e n s .
However, th e  r e s o r t  from time to  tim e of th e  V estem  powers to  th e  use of 
force , to  co u n ter-te rro rism , can only p a r tly  be explained by th e  d i f f ic u l t ie s  of 
enforcing in te rn a tio n a l law. This cm  be i l lu s t r a te d  by th e  case o f Libya. As
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a r e s u l t  o f th e  in v estig a tio n  in to  the  d estru c tio n  of Pan Am F lig h t 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, two Libyan in te ligence  agen ts  were Ind ic ted  by th e  American 
and B r i t is h  a u th o ritie s . The bombing k ille d  270 people, o f whom 189 were 
Americans. A French m ag istra te  accused four Libyans o f re s p o n s ib il i ty  fo r  
ano ther a tro c i ty ,  the  destru ctio n  of UTA F lig h t 772 over th e  Chad-Niger border 
in  September 1989, in  which 170 people died. The American, B ritish , and French 
governments demanded th a t  the  accused Libyans be handed over fo r  t r i a l  in  the  
V est. Their demands were backed up by the  th re a t  of economic san c tio n s , which 
were imposed through th e  United N ations S ecurity  Council when Libya fa ile d  to  
comply.
In th e  process, L ibya's read iness  to  prosecute th e  agen ts I t s e l f  in  
accordance w ith the  Montreal Convention, which i t  had r a t i f ie d ,  was simply 
d isregarded . This prompted some c r itic ism  of th e  ac tio n  of th e  V estem  
governments as  i t s e l f  con trary  to  in te rn a tio n a l law. (33> Admittedly, th e  sca le  
of th e  two a tro c i t ie s  fo r  which the  Vestem  powers a re  seeking re d re ss  might 
make a concern with legal te c h n ic a litie s  appear pedan tic . None the  le s s , th e  
f a c t  th a t  th e  V estem  powers have chosen to  use th e ir  new-found influence over 
th e  d ec is io n s  of the  Security  Council no t to  c rea te  a mechanism fo r  the  
enforcem ent of th e  Conventions, but to  pursue an agenda outside th e  Conventions 
does no t augur well fo r  a global s tra teg y  of c r im in a llsa tlo n  in  th e  con tex t of 
th e  New Vorld Order. In defence of the  V est's  ac tio n s , i t  can be argued th a t  
th e i r  ob jective  remains the  completion of a leg a l p rocess , in  th e  face of 
g re a te r  provocation than ex isted  when P residen t Reagan ordered th e  bombing of 
T rip o li and Benghazi in  April 1986, in  which 63 people died. (34) However, the  
susp ic ion  has no t e n tire ly  been d isp e lled  th a t  th e  manner in  which th e  V estem
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governments have pursued th e  case a g a in s t Libya has been d ic ta ted  by p o li t ic a l  
considera tions and not simply by a d e sire  fo r  ju s tic e .
Question of p ro p o rtio n a lity
One reason why in  general there  may be a re luctance on th e  p a r t  o f th e  V estem
powers to  pursue a course based on law in  dealing w ith th e  problem of
in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  i s  the  lim ita tio n s  th a t  the  p rin c ip le  of p ro p o rtio n a lity  
would place on th e i r  ac tio n s . One of th e  most ex trao rd inary  a sp ec ts  of th e  'age 
of te rro r ism ' and a ju s tif ic a tio n  fo r p lacing  th e  notion in  in verted  commas has 
been th e  ex ten t to  which th e  th re a t of in te rn a tio n a l te rro rism  h as been 
exaggerated, to  th e  po in t where th e  fea r of te rro rism  has had a s ig n if ic a n t 
impact on g lobal p a tte rn s  of tourism , most p a r tic u la r ly  on th e  numbers of
Americans c rossing  th e  A tlan tic  to  v i s i t  Europe in  any one year. I t  i s  worth
focusing on th e  American case, s in ce  i t  p rovides the  most s tr ik in g  example of 
d isp roportion  between th e  perception of th re a t  and i t s  a c tu a lity  and between 
challenge and response. Further, much of th e  l i te ra tu re  on in te rn a tio n a l 
te rro rism  tak es  the  view th a t  Americans a re  th e  n a tio n a lity  most th rea tened  by 
th e  phenomenon.
In 1987 th e  S ta te  Department published a document giving d e ta i ls  of a l l  
le th a l t e r r o r i s t  ac tio n s  ag a in st Americans in  th e  period 1973 to  1986.(35) The 
re p o rt in te rp re ts  'le th a l t e r r o r i s t  a c tio n ' loosely  to  include th e  death of any 
American abroad as  a re s u l t  of p o l i t ic a l  o r group violence outside of ac tua l 
war. For example, Latin American drug t r a f f ic k e r s  number among 'th e  most 
prominent t e r r o r i s t  groups involved in  le th a l anti-Am erican a t t a c k s '. (36) In 
th e  period a s  a whole, according to  th e  re p o rt, 440 Americans were k ille d  in  
le th a l t e r r o r i s t  ac tio n s. Over h a lf  th e  to ta l  died in  a s in g le  in c id en t, 241
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m arines k ille d  In the  su ic id e  bombing of th e i r  b arracks in  B eirut in  October 
1983.
The re p o r t breaks down th e  fig u res  in to  p riv a te , d ip lom atic, m ilita ry , and 
o ther government. F a ta l i t ie s  among p riv a te  c it iz e n s  numbered ju s t  138. In th e  
period covered by th e  re p o rt, th e  most le th a l Inc iden t involving American 
p r iv a te  c itiz e n s  was th e  d estru c tio n  of an A ir India je t  over th e  A tlan tic  in  
June 1985, in  which 19 Americans died. R esponsib ility  fo r  the  bomb a tta ck  was 
a ttr ib u te d  to  Sikh s e p a ra t is ts .  From th e  pe rsp ec tiv e  of th e  p e rp e tra to rs , th e  
Americans were alm ost c e r ta in ly  in c id en ta l v ic tim s of an a tro c ity  d irec ted  a t  
th e  Indian government. But even where Americans were d e lib e ra te ly  ta rg e ted , 
th e re  was a very wide ideo log ical d iv e rs ity  in  th e  o rg an isa tio n s  resp o n sib le , 
from th e  £1 Salvador R ational Guard to  th e  Abu Ridal O rganisation, the  
P a le s tin ian  group which heads S ta te  Department l i s t s  of t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n s  
th a t  th rea ten  Americans. However, th e  ro le  th a t  righ t-w ing  groups have played 
in  th e  death t o l l  of Americans abroad has ra re ly  been acknowledged in  re p o r ts  
dealing  w ith te rro r ism . Thus, follow ing the  abduction of an American 
m issionary nurse in  Mozambique by th e  antl-Communlst Mozambique R ational 
R esistance (RERAMO), th e  S ta te  Department re p o rt, P a tte rn s  of Global Terrorism : 
1987. noted: 'RERAMO has not d ire c tly  a ttacked  US In te re s ts , but Americans who 
tra v e l in  Mozambique could become in ad v erten t v ic t im s '.(37) The main focus of 
th e  re p o r ts  i s  overwhelmingly on groups seen a s  America's ideo log ical enemies.
Both th e  exaggeration of th e  t e r r o r i s t  th r e a t  and i t s  Id e n tif ic a tio n  w ith 
p a r tic u la r  p o li t ic a l  enemies a re  fea tu res  one would expect to  fin d  a sso c ia ted  
w ith a s tra te g y  of suppression and th e  c a l l  of th e  American S ecre tary  of S ta te , 
George Shultz, in  1984 fo r  the  United S ta te s  'to  consider means of ac tiv e
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prevention, pre-em ption, and re ta lia tio n *  (38) c lea rly  f i t s  in  w ith th a t  approach. 
However, in  p rac tice , th e  United S ta te s  has not adopted a c o u n te r - te r ro r is t  
s tra te g y  th a t  matches th e  aggressive  p o lic ie s  th a t  have been pursued in  term s 
of th i s  ju s t if ic a t io n  by reg ional powers such as  Is ra e l and South A frica. The 
explanation i s  p a r tly  to  be found in  disagreem ent w ith such a policy  w ith in  the  
p o li t ic a l  leadersh ip , (39) but i t  i s  a lso  p a rtly  to  be found in  th e  d if f ic u l ty  of 
pursuing such a policy in  an in te rn a tio n a l context w ithout th e re  being a r i s k  
of g re a te r  in s ta b i l i ty  a s  a consequence. Vhile Is ra e l and South A frica have 
been able to  reconcile  th e  d e s ta b ilis a tio n  of neighbouring co u n tries  w ith th e ir  
in te re s ts ,  in s ta b i l i ty  w ith in  a g lobal framework could no t be reconciled  w ith 
American in te re s ts .
Another considera tion  i s  th e  e ffec tiv en ess  of e x is tin g  measures. Thus, i t  
can be argued th a t  actual fig u res  of deaths as  a re s u l t  of in te rn a tio n a l 
te rro rism  a re  not a tru e  measure of th e  th re a t th a t  V estern so c ie tie s  face  or 
have faced as  they do no t take in to  account a tta ck s  prevented or d e terred  by 
the  ac tio n s  of governments. The p o in t i s  d if f ic u l t  to  evaluate s in ce  i t  i s  
q u ite  im possible to  suggest what m ight have happened, fo r  good o r i l l ,  i f  
V estern governments had pursued d if fe re n t p o lic ie s . Hut by looking a t  a few 
examples of th e  ending of campaigns of violence by sm all groups, some l ig h t  may 
be shed on th e  issue. This i s  th e  ta sk  undertaken in  th e  next chap ter.
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Chapter 11 -  How Campaigns of Violence End
In the  l a s t  chap ter, d if fe re n t s ta te  s tr a te g ie s  fo r  the co n tro l of 
p o li t ic a l  violence carried  out by su b -s ta te  groups were examined. I t  was 
pointed out th a t  where a s tra te g y  of accommodation i s  followed, p o l i t ic a l  
violence by su b -s ta te  groups i s  unlikely  to  be labelled  te rro rism , w ith th e  
p o ssib le  exception of sp e c if ic  a tro c i t ie s .  By c o n tra s t, under a s tra te g y  of 
suppression, a very wide d e fin itio n  of te rro rism  tends to  p rev a il so th a t  th e  
term is ,  in  p rac tice , synonymous w ith any form of p o li t ic a l  violence p erp e tra ted  
by enemy bodies. A common assumption of s tr a te g ie s  of suppression i s  th a t  
campaigns of te rro rism  can only be brought to  an end by e ffec tiv e  suppression , 
though in  siege so c ie tie s , a more p e ss im is tic  assum ption i s  lik e ly  to  p rev a il of 
a never-ending s tru g g le  w ith th e  fo rces  of e v il in  a h o s tile  environment. <1> 
Peace in  th i s  context i s  regarded as  a tem porary lu l l  before the  s ta t e 's  enemies 
launch a fre sh  a ssa u lt. Here e te rn a l v ig ilance  i s  seen as  a requirem ent of 
su rv iv a l.
Even in  so c ie tie s  where te rro r ism  i s  not seen as an e te rn a l p o li t ic a l  
th re a t, a demonic p ic tu re  of te rro r ism  and t e r r o r i s t s  may p rev a il, s ince  
people's image of te rro rism  n a tu ra lly  tends to  be based on th e  most outrageous 
of a tro c i t ie s .  Since demons can only be stopped by being destroyed, the  
consequence i s  a reinforcem ent of th e  assumption th a t  campaigns of te rro r ism  
can only be ended by e ffec tiv e  co u n ter-te rro rism  or even 'te r ro r is in g  the  
te r r o r is t* .(2) Of course, very high levels  of s ta te  coercion may be successfu l 
in  suppressing  violence by sm all groups. Examples a re  the  suppression  in  th e  
1970s of th e  Montoneros in  Argentina and th e  Tupomaros in  Uruguay. But th ese  
examples a lso  show how high the  c o s t of th e  s tra te g y  of suppression can be. In
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th ese  two cases of m ilita ry  ru le  and m assive human r ig h ts  v io la tio n s , th e  cure 
was c lea rly  worse than th e  d isease . (3) That i s  one reason why th e  question of 
a lte rn a tiv e  endings to  campaigns of te rro rism  i s  worth examining.
In th is  chap ter, a number of cases  of th e  ending of campaigns of p o l i t ic a l  
violence w ill be examined. The a n a ly s is  w ill be based mainly on s i tu a tio n s  th a t  
th e  author i s  fam ilia r w ith, South A frica in  th e  1960s and F orthern  Ire land  in  
th e  1970s. However, reference w ill a lso  be made to  th e  s itu a tio n s  examined by 
Je ffrey  Ian Ross and Ted Robert Gurr in  th e ir  1989 a r t ic le ,  'Vhy Terrorism  
S u b sid es ',(4) as  well as very b r ie f ly  to  th e  Basque case. The phrase,
'campaigns of p o li t ic a l  v io lence', ra th e r  than simply te rro rism  i s  used because 
the  question of whether some of th e  campaigns d iscussed  should be c h a rac te rised  
as t e r r o r i s t  i s  a m atter over which th e re  i s  d ispu te , even w ithin  th e  l i te r a tu r e  
on te rro rism . (5)
In her sem inal essay, 'On Violence', Hannah Arendt argued th a t  'v iolence, 
being instrum enta l by nature, i s  ra tio n a l to  the  ex ten t th a t  i t  i s  e ffe c tiv e  in  
reaching the  end th a t  must ju s tify  i t ' . (6) To put th e  po in t another way, 
success or, a t  any ra te , the  p rospect of success i s  c ru c ia l to  th e  
le g itim isa tio n  of violence. In the  case of p o li t ic a l  violence th i s  means th a t  
the  assum ptions ju s tify in g  the p o l i t ic a l  goal i t s e l f  and providing th e  a n a ly s is  
of how th a t  goal i s  to  be achieved a re  of v i ta l  s ig n ifican ce  in  i t s  
le g itim isa tio n . I t  i s  by no means co inciden ta l th a t  te rro r ism  ten d s to  be 
viewed both as  one of the  le a s t  leg itim ate  forms of p o li t ic a l  violence and a s  
one of the  le a s t  su ccess fu l.(6) The end ju s tify in g  the  means i s  a necessary  
condition fo r th e  leg itim isa tio n  of violence, but th a t  leaves p len ty  of room fo r 
argument about the  value of the  end being pursued and th e  p ro p o rtio n a lity  of
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th e  means. Of course, i t  i s  very much e a s ie r  to  apply such judgements to  
p a r tic u la r  s i tu a tio n s  with the  b en efit o f h in d s ig h t than  i t  i s  to  a rr iv e  a t  such 
conclusions in  th e  m idst of a c o n flic t. And as  von Clausewltz put i t ,  'th e  
s ta te  of circum stances from which an event proceeded can never be placed before 
th e  eye of th e  c r i t i c  exactly  a s  i t  lay  before th e  eye of the  person a c t in g '.<8) 
n ev erth e le ss , A rendt's conception of v iolence a s  instrum ental p rovides a useful 
y a rd s tick  fo r  examining the  evolution of campaigns of violence, w ith th ese  
s t r ic tu r e s  in  mind.
South A frica in  the  1960s
The year 1960 was a watershed in  th e  post-w ar h is to ry  of South A frica. At th e  
beginning of th e  year, the  South A frican Prime M inister, Hendrik Verwoerd, 
announced th a t  th e re  would be a referendum of (White) v o te rs  on whether th e  
country should become a Republic. This was followed in  February by a v i s i t  to  
South A frica by the  B ritish  Prime M in ister, Harold Macmillan, who spoke of 
deco lon isa tion  as 'a wind of change' sweeping ac ro ss  th e  African co n tin en t. His 
speech had an Immense impact in  South A frica because i t  underlined th e  ex ten t 
to  which th e  country was proceeding in  policy  term s in  th e  opposite  d ire c tio n  
to  i t s  p r in c ip a l ex ternal a lly . E xternal c r i t ic is m  of South A frica 's  p o lic ie s  
gave added s ig n ifican ce  to  the  p o l i t ic a l  m ob ilisa tion  tak ing  p lace among th e  
A frican population.
This had been given a fu r th e r  impetus by th e  com petition fo r influence in 
the  tow nships between the  African N ational Congress (AFC) and th e  Pan- 
A fr ic a n is t Congress (PAC). The AFC dated back to  1912. The PAC had been 
formed in  1959 following the  defeat of a ttem p ts  by th e  A frica n is t s tra n d  of 
opinion to  take  over con tro l of th e  AFC in  1958. The A frica n is ts  were opposed
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to  the  AFC's policy  of co-operation  w ith o th e r o rgan isa tions and p a r tic u la r ly  
what they saw a s  the  undue influence of V hite ra d ic a ls  in  th e  Congress A lliance. 
At i t s  conference in December 1959, th e  AFC decided on a major campaign over 
the  issu e  of the  pass laws, which co n tro lled  th e  movement of th e  A frican 
population w ith in  th e  country and p a r tic u la r ly  in to  th e  urban a reas . I t  was 
intended th a t  th e  campaign should reach a clim ax in  A pril 1960. Fot to  be 
outdone, the  PAC called  on i t s  su p p o rte rs  to  p resen t them selves w ithout passes 
outside police s ta t io n s  on 21 March 1960. The in ten tio n  was to  make th e  pass 
laws unworkable by f i l l in g  th e  gaols.
In one of th e  dem onstrations on th a t  day an unexpectedly la rg e  crowd of 
some 5,000 gathered outside a p o lice  s ta t io n  in  th e  township of S harpev ille  in 
the Transvaal. The s ize  and crush of th e  crowd panicked the  con tingen t of 
police sen t to  deal with th e  p ro te s t  and th e  po lice  opened f i r e  k i l l in g  69 
people and in ju ring  178.(9) In th e  afterm ath  of S harpeville , which a ttra c te d  
massive coverage in  the  w orld 's p re ss , th e  PAC and the  AFC ca lled  fo r  a day of 
mourning fo r th e  v ictim s on 28 March and fo r  A fricans to  s tay  away from work 
on th a t  day, a dem onstration th a t  was p a r tic u la r ly  e ffec tiv e  in  Johannesburg, 
Cape Town, and Port Elizabeth. In response to  th e  c r i s i s  the  government 
tem porarily  suspended th e  operation of th e  p a ss  laws. I t  a lso  banned public 
meeting through much of the  country and introduced le g is la tio n  to  enable i t  to  
outlaw th e  AFC, the  PAC, and any o rg an isa tio n  th a t  the  government deemed as  
having been formed to  fu r th e r th e i r  aims. The banning of the  AFC and the  PAC 
immediately followed the  passage of the  le g is la tio n .
On 30 March, the  day when some 30,000 A fricans led by P h ilip  Kgosana, a 
u n iv e rs ity  studen t and member of th e  PAC, marched on Parliam ent in  Cape Town,
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the  government took the  fu r th e r s te p  of decla ring  a s ta te  of emergency, under 
the  regu la tions of which over 10,000 p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv is t s  were detained . On 1 
A pril the Security  Council, meeting in  emergency sessio n , passed a reso lu tio n  
ca llin g  on th e  South A frican government to  abandon ra c ia l  d isc rim in a tio n . On 9 
A pril, th e re  was an a ttem pt on th e  l i f e  of Verwoerd by a m entally unstab le  
White farm er ac ting  on h is  own.
These events not su rp ris in g ly  had a powerful impact on th e  confidence of 
foreign in v esto rs  in  the  s ta b i l i ty  of th e  South A frican p o l i t ic a l  system . The 
lo ss  of confidence was re fle c ted  in  th e  movement of c a p ita l out of th e  
coun try .(10) A fter th e  banning of th e  AFC and the  PAC, a number of prominent 
African n a tio n a lis ts  proposed the  holding of an 'a l l - in ' conference in  
Pieterm aritzburg in  March 1961. S hortly  before the  conference, 13 of the  
o rgan isers  were a rre s ted  and charged w ith fu rth e rin g  th e  aims of th e  AFC. They 
were eventually acqu itted  on appeal. Despite th e i r  a r r e s t ,  th e  conference went 
ahead. I t s  main demand was th a t  th e  government should in i t i a te  th e  holding of 
a F ational Convention rep re se n ta tiv e  of the  e n tire  population of South A frica to  
be held before the  country became a Republic on 31 May. If  th e  government 
refused to  accede to  th i s  demand th e  conference called  on Blacks and 'a l l  
dem ocratic Whites' to  s tag e  mass dem onstrations in  opposition  'to  a regime 
which i s  bringing South A frica to  d is a s te r '.  (11)
A F ational Action Council was e s tab lish ed  to  pursue these  demands. I t s  
sec re ta ry  was Felson Mandela. In May the  Council d is tr ib u te d  thousands of 
le a f le ts  ca llin g  on Blacks to  s tay  a t  home during th e  period from 29 to  31 May 
in  p ro te s t a t  the  change to  a Republic w ithout th e ir  consent. The government 
responded by issu ing  a w arrant fo r Mandela's a r r e s t .  The Council d id  not enjoy
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th e  support of the  PAC which d is tr ib u te d  le a f le ts  in  a number o f c i t i e s  
opposing th e  stay-aw ay . nonetheless, th e  stay-aw ay in i t i a l ly  a t tra c te d  a 
considerab le  measure of support, but co llapsed  in  the  face of th e  s tro n g  
measures taken by th e  po lice  and army to  break th e  s t r ik e .
A fter th i s  fa ilu re , th e  conclusion th a t  th e  outlawing of th e  main A frican 
n a tio n a lis t  o rg an isa tio n s  had e ffe c tiv e ly  c losed  o ff th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of change 
through campaigns of mass c iv il  disobedience seemed i r r e s i s t ib l e  to  much of the  
lead ersh ip  of the  AFC. African n a tio n a lis ts  as  well as  some of th e
governm ent's Vhlte opponents began to  consider the  option of p o l i t ic a l  violence.
Three o rg an isa tio n s  employing p o li t ic a l  v iolence emerged w ith in  a year of th e  
change in  th e  coun try 's  s ta tu s  to  a Republic. The most s ig n if ic a n t was 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Zulu fo r  The Spear of th e  R ation), a lso  known a s  MK. (12) MK 
was formed by members of the  AFC, but th e  o rg an isa tio n  a lso  had c lo se  t ie s  to  
the  South A frican Communist Party  (SACP). This was la rg e ly  a legacy of the  
involvement of Communists in  the  m u lti- ra c ia l Congress A lliance in  th e  1950s. 
MK, unlike th e  AFC i t s e l f  a t  th i s  tim e, was m u lti- ra c ia l in  com position. Poqo 
(Xhosa fo r  'on ly ' or 'pure ') was a loosely  organised in su rrec tio n a ry  movement 
re c ru ited  from su p porte rs  of the  PAC. The th ir d  grouping was a sm all 
o rg an isa tio n  of, fo r  the most p a r t, White l ib e ra ls .  I t  was o rig in a lly  called  the  
F ationa l Committee of L iberation (FCL), but was re-named the  A frican R esistance
Movement (ARM), by which i t  i s  b e tte r  known.
At h is  t r i a l  in  1964, Felson Mandela gave a very fu l l  account of MK's 
form ation in  Fovember 1961 and th e  reasons fo r  the  adoption of th e  s tra te g y  of 
v iolence. He argued th a t  the  fa c t  th a t  th e  government had met non-violence by 
fo rce  and had barred  a l l  channels of peaceful p ro te s t l e f t  A frican n a tio n a lis ts
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with no choice but to  embark on v io len t form s o f p o lit ic a l  s tru g g le . The o ther 
main reason Mandela gave fo r th e  adoption of p o li t ic a l  violence was th a t  'un less 
responsib le  leadersh ip  was given to  can a lise  and con tro l the  fe e lin g s  of our 
people, th e re  would be outbreaks of te rro r ism  which would produce an in te n s ity  
of b it te rn e s s  and h o s t i l i ty  between th e  various races  of th i s  country*. (13) He 
id en tified  four p o ssib le  forms of violence.
There i s  sabotage, th e re  i s  g u e rr illa  w arfare, th e re  i s  
te rro rism  and th e re  i s  open revolution. Ve chose to  adopt 
th e  f i r s t  method and to  exhaust i t  before tak in g  any o ther 
decision . In th e  l ig h t  o f our background th e  choice was a 
lo g ica l one. Sabotage d id  no t involve lo ss  of l i f e ,  and i t  
offered the  b est hope fo r  fu tu re  race  re la tio n s . (14)
The f i r s t  s e r ie s  of HK a tta c k s  took p lace  on 16 December 1961, th e  Day of 
the  Covenant, a n a tiona l holiday ce leb ra tin g  th e  v ic to ry  of th e  V oortrekkers 
over the  Zulus a t  th e  b a t t le  of Blood River in  1837. They re su lted  in  damage 
to  a number of government o ff ices  in  various p a r ts  of th e  country and to  an 
e le c tr ic a l  transform er in  Port E lizabeth . The bombings were accompanied by the 
d is tr ib u tio n  of a f ly e r. This read in  p a rt:
Ve of Umkhonto Ve Sizwe have always sought -  as th e  
lib e ra tio n  movement has sought -  to  achieve l ib e ra tio n , 
w ithout bloodshed and c iv i l  c lash . Ve do so s t i l l .  Ve 
hope -  even a t  th i s  la te  hour -  th a t  our f i r s t  a c tio n s  
w ill awaken everyone to  a re a liz a tio n  of the  d is a s tro u s  
s itu a tio n  to  which th e  R a tio n a lis t policy i s  lead ing . Ve 
hope th a t  we w ill b ring  th e  Government and i t s  su p p o rte rs
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to  th e ir  senses before i t  i s  too la te , so th a t  both 
Government and i t s  p o lic ie s  can be changed before m atte rs  
reach th e  desperate  s tag e  of c iv i l  war. (15)
There were some 200 XK a tta c k s  in  the  next 18 months. In th e  main, th e se  
adhered to  th e  policy of th e  n a tio n a l high command to  avoid any ac tio n  th a t  
m ight re s u l t  in  the  lo ss  of l i f e .  However, th e re  were a s ig n if ic a n t number of 
exceptions; ac tio n s  such a s  the  bombing of beer h a lls  th a t  did r i s k  liv e s  
(though in  f a c t  no-one was k ille d  in  these  a tta c k s )  and a tta ck s  on policemen 
and inform ers. Most of th e  breaches of policy  took place in F o rt E lizabeth  and 
Durban and, Lodge argues, 'in d ica ted  considerab le  in d isc ip lin e  a s  w ell as  
enthusiasm  fo r  violence among Umkonto members in  both p laces '. (16)
The p o li t ic a l  impact of MK's sabotage campaign was re la tiv e ly  s l ig h t .
Much of th e  damage to  property  was su p e rf ic ia l and th e  campaign received 
'scan ty  p re ss  coverage '.(17) However, th e  campaign did provide th e  government 
w ith the  p re te x t fo r the  in troduction  of draconian secu rity  le g is la tio n . Much 
of th e  campaign was d irec ted  from a headquarters on a farm outside 
Johannesburg and MK suffered  a c rip p lin g  blow when po lice  ra ided  th e  farm in 
July 1963 and a rre s ted  17 people under th e  new p ro v is io n s  th a t  enabled th e  
po lice  to  de ta in  suspects fo r  90 days w ithout charge.
In re tro sp e c t, c r i t i c s  have viewed MK's r e s o r t  to  sabotage as  a su ic id a l 
policy  th a t  was bound to  end in  defeat and th e  aim of MK of p u ttin g  p re ssu re  on 
the  government to  change course through a c ts  of violence has appeared to  many 
w r ite rs  on th i s  period as  naive or disingenuous and sometimes both. (18) In How 
Long w ill South Africa Survive?, published in  1977, R.V.Johnson argued th a t  the 
r ig h t  s tra te g y  fo r  African n a tio n a lis ts  a f te r  th e  banning of th e  AMC and th e
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PAC would have been 'to  l ie  low and attem pt to  m aintain some presence, perhaps 
even some o rgan isa tio n , w ithin th e  co u n try '.<19) Lodge argues th a t  such a 
s tra te g y  would have 'd isc red ited  th e  leadersh ip  in  th e  eyes of th e  most 
en erg e tic  and competent a c t i v i s t s ' .<20) In th i s  connection, i t  i s  worth 
em phasising th a t  in  th e  early  1960s th e re  were high expecta tions among a wide 
c ro s s -s e c tio n  of opponents of th e  government th a t  th e  country would achieve 
m ajority  ru le  in  a re la tiv e ly  sh o r t period of tim e as  they s im p lis t ic a lly  
ex trapo la ted  th e  consequences of deco lon isation  in  th e  r e s t  of A frica to  South 
A frica. In fa c t , few of th e  government's c r i t i c s  thought th a t  Verwoerd's policy  
of extending and in ten s ify in g  th e  operation of aparth e id  would prove 
su sta in ab le .
In p a r tic u la r , i t  was a common view th a t  reform  would be forced on the  
government a s  a re s u l t  of the  economic co st of ap arth e id . As i t  turned out, 
th e re  was a long boom in  the  economy in the  1960s from about 1963. However, 
in  th e  1970s growth slowed to  below the  r a te  of population growth and th is  was 
a fa c to r  in  th e  government's p a r t ia l  s h i f t  away from Verwoerd's b lu ep rin t fo r  
ap artheid . MK's s tra te g y  was based on the assum ption th a t  sabotage and the  
p o l i t ic a l  message th a t  went with i t  of continuing A frican re s is ta n c e  to  
ap arth eid  would lead to  a co llapse  of fo reign  confidence in  South A frica and 
th a t  th e  economic consequences of th e  coun try 's  iso la tio n  would persuade the  
Vhite e le c to ra te  to  tu rn  ag a in st the  government. In th e  l ig h t  of the  f l ig h t  of 
c a p ita l from South A frica a f te r  S harpev ille , i t  seemed a p lau sib le  scenario .
Vith th e  b en efit of h indsigh t, i t  i s  ev iden t th a t  Mandela and th e  o ther 
lead ers  of th e  AHC, including those  lik e  Luthuli who ca lled  fo r economic 
san c tio n s  a g a in s t South A frica, overestim ated th e  s tre n g th  of l ib e ra l  a n t i -
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apartheid  opinion in  the Vest and both the  w illingness of th e  in te rn a tio n a l 
community to  go beyond rh e to ric a l c r i t ic is m  of apartheid  and i t s  ac tua l 
capacity  to  e ffe c t change w ithin  th e  Republic. Another weakness of th e  
campaign was, a s  Ben Turok, a member of MK, has put i t ,  th a t  ' i t  d id  no t r a is e  
the level of ac tion  of th e  masses them selves1. (21) F urther, the  campaign 
appeared to  lack much p o li t ic a l  resonance w ith the  mass of th e  population, 
except perhaps, iro n ica lly , a t  the  tim e of th e  t r i a l  of those caught as  a re s u lt  
of the  Rivonia ra id . By co n tra s t, th e  p o l i t ic a l  id e n tif ic a tio n  of a considerab le  
sec tion  of the  Black population w ith oppositiona l violence was very ev iden t in 
the c r i s i s  th a t  engulfed South A frica in  th e  mid 1980s.
The leaders  of MK them selves were by no means e n tire ly  b lind  to  th e  
p o s s ib il ity  th a t  a campaign of sabotage might not have the  desired  p o l i t ic a l  
re su lt . Indeed, th e  I n i t ia l  Vhite response to  th e  launch of the  campaign was 
viewed by MK 'w ith anx ie ty ', according to  Mandela.(22) P repara tions began as 
early  as  1962 fo r tra in in g  fo r g u e rr i l la  w arfare a s  the  next phase of th e  
campaign. One of the  documents seized by th e  police a t  Rivonia outlined  a plan 
fo r th e  in f i l t r a t io n  of g u e rr illa  bands in to  a number of ru ra l a reas  considered 
su itab le  fo r  th i s  purpose. The f i r s t  a ttem p ts to  in f i l t r a t e  g u e rr i l la s  in to  
South A frica were made through Botswana and Rhodesia in  1967 and 1968. Hone 
of the  g u e rr i l la s  reached South A frica .(23) However, MK did su rv ive  in  ex ile .
Poqo's campaign of violence was very d if fe re n t from th a t  of MK. C entral 
d irec tio n  over members of Poqo was weak. Much of the  in i t ia t iv e  fo r  v iolence 
came from below, espec ia lly  in the  Cape, where Poqo a t tra c te d  a considerab le  
following among m igrant workers, who were p a r tic u la r ly  h a rsh ly  a ffec ted  by the  
functioning of th e  pass laws. Poqo v io lence was in  fa c t  fa r  more ex tensive
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than  th a t  of MK and had a g rea te r impact on Vhite opinion. Recruitment in to  
Poqo began in  th e  second h a lf  of 1961 a t  a tim e when th e  old leadersh ip  of th e  
PAC was in  the  process of being d isplaced by more ra d ic a l elem ents in  th e  lower 
ranks. The s ty le  Poqo adopted i s  conveyed by a le a f le t  d is tr ib u te d  in  Xhosa in 
December of th a t  year, which read, in  p a rt:
A frica w ill be free  on January 1 s t. The V hite people s h a ll  
su ffe r, the  Black people s h a ll ru le . Freedom comes a f te r  
bloodshed. Poqo has s ta r te d . I t  needs a re a l  man. The 
Youth has weapons so you need no t be a fra id . The PAC says 
th is .  <24)
By th e  middle of 1964, by which tim e much of the  impetus behind th e  movement 
had been exhausted, although some Poqo a c tiv ity  took place as  la te  as 1968 and 
1969, 202 members of Poqo had been found g u ilty  of murder, 12 of attem pted 
murder or conspiracy to  murder, 395 of sabotage, 126 of leaving th e  country 
i l le g a lly , and 820 of le s s e r  crim es, according to  government f ig u re s .(25)
In 1962 the  PAC estab lish ed  i t s  headquarters in  Maseru in  what was then 
th e  B r it is h  colony of Basutoland. From th e re  the  o rgan isation  under i t s  Acting 
P residen t, Potlake Leballo planned a general up ris ing  fo r 1963. This was in  an 
a ttem pt to  f u l f i l  an e a r l ie r  PAC prophesy th a t  'independence' would be achieved 
in  1963. The planning of the  u p ris in g  was e x tra o rd in a rily  incompetent. In 
p a r tic u la r , Leballo gave the  a u th o ritie s  p r io r  warning of the  u p ris in g  by 
announcing i t  in  advance a t  a p re ss  conference. L is ts  of members of Poqo held 
a t  Maseru f e l l  in to  the  hands of th e  police and before the  day of the  u p ris in g  
3,000 Poqo suspects  had been a rre s te d . Rot su rp ris in g ly , nothing much came of 
th e  u p ris in g . Leballo 's plan called  fo r  sim ultaneous a tta c k s  on po lice  s ta t io n s ,
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accompanied by th e  general s lau g h ter of V hltes. In p rac tice , much of the  ac tua l 
violence ca rried  out by Poqo sprang from p a r tic u la r  lo ca l s i tu a tio n s , though i t s  
ch arac te r was on occasion not a lto g e th er d is s im ila r  from what Leballo had 
planned on a much la rg e r sca le .
An example i s  provided by the  in su rrec tio n  th a t  occurred in  P aarl on 22 
Fovember 1962. On th a t  day, approxim ately 250 young men from th e  m igrant 
w orkers' h o s te ls  in  the  township of Hbekweni marched on the  sm all town of 
P aarl. They were armed with a v a rie ty  of rudim entary weapons such as axes and 
pangas. Once they had reached th e  town, they s p l i t  in to  two groups. One group 
was to  a tta ck  th e  police s ta t io n , th e  o ther th e  p riso n . The in te n tio n  was to  
secure th e  re lease  of men a rre s ted  in  e a r l ie r  po lice  ra id s . The frequency of 
such ra id s  was p a r t  of the  background to  th i s  in su rrec tio n . Forewarned of th e  
m archers' approach, the  police equipped w ith s ten  guns and r i f l e s  repulsed the  
a tta ck  on the  s ta t io n . In th e ir  f l ig h t  some of those  who had taken p a r t in  the  
a tta ck  on th e  po lice  s ta t io n  met up w ith m archers s t i l l  heading tow ards th e  
p r is o n .
The a ttem pt to  proceed to  the  p riso n  was abandoned and in s tead  the  
m archers launched an ind iscrim ina te  a tta ck  on nearby Vhite re s id e n ts , k il l in g  
two people and wounding th ree  o th e rs . Five m archers were k ille d  and 14 wounded 
in  th e  course of these  events. In p rep ara tio n  fo r  th e  a ttack , a number of th e  
men had paid fo r  s c a r if ic a tio n  of th e i r  foreheads, an operation they believed 
would make them invulnerable to  th e  po lice . (26) In fa c t , Poqo shared  many of 
the  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of a m illenn ia l movement in  i t s  expecta tions of th e  ra d ic a l 
transfo rm ation  of the  ex is tin g  order brought about by action  in  which magic 
played a p a r t.
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All but a few of the  f i f ty  or so  members of th e  ARM were Whites. Many of 
them were members of the  L iberal P arty , though th e re  were a lso  a few le ft-w in g  
c r i t i c s  of the  SACP. They were predom inantly in te lle c tu a ls , academics, and 
s tu d en ts . The English language U n iv e rs itie s  of th e  V itw atersrand and Cape Town 
were the  main re c ru itin g  grounds fo r  members, although th e re  were a lso  a few 
members in  Durban and Port E lizabeth . Like MK, th e  aim of the  ARM was to  fo rce  
a change in  the  d irec tio n  of government po licy  through a campaign of 
sabotage.C27) The ARM campaign was ac tu a lly  launched before th a t  of MK. In 
October 1961 on th e  eve of the  V hite general e lec tio n , members of th e  group 
d isrup ted  the  e le c tr ic i ty  supp lies to  th e  northern  suburbs of Johannesburg 
through bringing  down a pylon carry ing  power lin e s . They a lso  d isru p ted  th e  
telephone se rv ice  and burnt down one of th e  o ff ic e s  of the  Department of Bantu 
A dm inistration and Development. In a policy  s im ila r  to  th a t  of MK, ARM ta rg e ts  
were carefu lly  chosen to  avoid the  p o s s ib i l i ty  of in ju ry  or lo ss  of l i f e .
The ARM was a t  i t s  most ac tiv e  during 1963, though i t  was a lso  in 1963
»
th a t  th e  po lice  began to  break th e  back of th e  movement through th e  'cracking* 
of su spec ts  held under the  90 day deten tion  law which came in to  e f fe c t  in  May 
th a t  year. According to  Lodge, by 1964 members of th e  Cape group 'had begun to  
argue the  f u t i l i t y  of an urban-based campaign of sabotage favouring in s tead  the 
co nstruction  of linkages with th e  ru ra l  p o p u la tio n '.(28) However, i t  i s  
d i f f ic u l t  to  see how the  ARM could have played any ro le  in  the  in i t ia t io n  of 
ru ra l  g u e rr illa  w arfare. By the  middle of 1964 most members of th e  ARM were in  
gaol or had fled  th e  country. At th i s  s tage , one of th e  few members s t i l l  a t  
la rg e  placed a bomb in  the  concourse of Johannesburg's c en tra l ra ilw ay  s ta t io n .
A warning was phoned to  th e  po lice  15 minutes before th e  bomb went o ff  and a t
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h is  t r i a l  John H arris  claimed th a t  he had n o t intended to  cause in jury  but to  
s tag e  a sp ec tacu la r dem onstration. In th e  event, one person died in  the  
explosion and 14 o thers  were Injured. This episode <on 24 July 1964) 
e ffec tiv e ly  marked th e  end of th e  ARK.
Of the  th re e  groups th e  ARK most c lo se ly  resem bles th e  s tereo type  of a 
t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isa tion  to  be found in  th e  general l i te r a tu re  on te rro rism , 
notw ithstanding  i t s  o rig in a l commitment to  avoid lo ss  of l i f e .  The ARK‘s  ro o ts  
in  s tuden t p o l i t ic s  provides an obvious po in t of comparison with v io len t groups 
in  the  United S ta te s  and Europe. I t  f i t s  th e  p ic tu re  of te rro rism  presented in  
Richard Rubenstein 's Alchemists of Revolution w ell, p a r tic u la r ly  h is  notion of 
te rro rism  as  th e  'iso la ted  in te l le c tu a l 's  dream of e f f ic a c y '.(29) Rubenstein 
argues th a t  te rro r ism  is  a product of a c r i s i s  of so c ia l d isconnection and he 
advocates th e  involvement of d isa ffec ted  In te lle c tu a ls  in  mass m obilisa tion  fo r  
change as  an an tid o te  to  the  tem ptation of te rro rism . In South A frica in  th e  
early  1960s, r e s o r t  to  violence was le s s  a b s tra c tly  a reactio n  to  th e  outlawing 
of mass movements.
S u p e rfic ia lly , th e  ending of th e  th ree  campaigns seems a s tra ig h tfo rw ard  
case of the e ffec tiv en ess  of tough secu rity  measures, including to r tu re , in 
combating p o li t ic a l  violence and th i s  was a common perception. For example, 
the  heading of th e  b r ie f  account of th e  period in th e  F acts  on F ile  volume on 
P o li tic a l Terrorism  i s  'S tern action  curbs te r ro r is m '.<30) C erta in ly , the  90 day 
detention  law played a p a r t in  th e  success of the  po lice  ag a in s t both KK and 
the  ARK. However, government sec u rity  measures were a lso  a fa c to r  in  prompting 
violence. This was most obviously th e  case in  some of th e  sem i-spontaneous 
in s tan ces  of Poqo violence. R egardless of th e  measures th e  government had
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taken in  th e  secu rity  sphere, i t  i s  un likely  th a t  e ith e r  MK or th e  ARM would 
have p e rs is te d  w ith campaigns of sabotage in to  the  la te  1960s. Doubts 
developed in  both o rgan isationa  about the  u t i l i t y  of th e i r  campaigns th a t  were 
independent of th e  secu rity  measures taken by th e  government.
I t  i s  s ig n if ic a n t th a t  the  ARM, which a s  an o rgan isa tion  was formed round 
a commitment to  use violence ra th e r  than a s e t  of p o li t ic a l  alms o r a 
p a r tic u la r  p o li t ic a l  philosophy, should have fa ile d  to  in s t i tu t io n a l is e  i t s e l f .
I t  d isappeared without tra c e , having no appeal to  new generations of ra d ic a l 
s tuden ts  who saw no prospect of th e  government being moved from e x is tin g  
policy by symbolic a c ts  of violence. This was much more im portan t than any 
d e te rren t e ffe c t of th e  government's ac tio n s  ag a in s t members of th e  ARM. In 
any event, eschewing violence as a means of securing p o l i t ic a l  change did not 
p ro tec t p o li t ic a l  d is se n te rs  from th e  a tte n tio n s  of th e  po lice , a s  th e  fa te  of 
Steve Biko in  1977 was to  i l lu s t r a te  in  the  most extreme form. Preventing the  
emergence of any challenge to  ap artheid  was more im portan t to  th e  government 
than stopping  p o li t ic a l  violence as such. The key to  th e  su rv iv a l of MK was 
i t s  lin k s  w ith a la rg e r p o li t ic a l  movement w ith widespread in te rn a tio n a l 
support. I t  could w ait fo r the p o li t ic a l  environment to  change.
Forthem Ireland in the 1970s
northern  Ireland in  th e  1970s may seem an odd case to  choose to  i l lu s t r a te  the  
theme of how campaigns of violence end, since  the  p rov ince 's  most obvious 
fea tu re  has been the  d u ra b ility  of p o li t ic a l  violence s in ce  th e  onset of the  
p resen t Troubles in 1968. However, w ithin th i s  overa ll p a tte rn , th e re  have been 
some s ig n if ic a n t in s tan ces  of campaigns of v iolence ending or changing in  
ch arac te r. The most im portant case  of a campaign of violence coming to  an end
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was the  announcement of a c ea se fire  by th e  O ffic ia l I r is h  Republican Army (IRA) 
on 29 May 1972. The cease fire  was not com pletely unconditional. The O ffic ia l 
IRA 'reserved  th e  r ig h t to  to  a c t  in  se lf-d e fen ce  and to  defend a re as  a ttacked  
by B ritish  tro o p s or "sec tarian  fo rces" '. (31) And, in  p rac tice , O ffic ia l IRA 
violence did not end to ta l ly  w ith th e  c ea se fire .
In p a r tic u la r , the  o rgan isa tion  was drawn in to  feuding w ith o ther
Republican groups, e spec ia lly  in  th e  mid 1970s when former O ffic ia ls  h o s ti le  to
the c ea se fire  defected to  form what was to  become the  I r ish  F a tio n a l L iberation  
Army (IFLA). Michael McKeown a tt r ib u te s  sp e c if ic  re sp o n s ib il ity  to  th e  O ffic ia l 
IRA fo r  15 deaths in  h is  study of the  2,400 f a t a l i t i e s  in  Northern Ireland  
a r is in g  from th e  Troubles in  th e  period from July 1969 to  July 1984.(32) In 
the  same period, 26 members of th e  O ffic ia l IRA were k ille d . (33) The most 
serious a c t of violence fo r  which the  O ffic ia l IRA claimed re sp o n s ib il ity  was an 
explosion a t  th e  headquarters of th e  Parachute Regiment a t  A ldershot in
February 1972 in  which seven people died. This was th e  O ffic ia ls ' response to
'Bloody Sunday' in  January when B ritish  tro o p s  had opened f i r e  on an i l le g a l 
c iv i l  r ig h ts  march in  Londonderry, k illin g  13 dem onstrators.
The O ffic ia l IRA was a product of th e  changes th a t  had taken place in  
Republican th ink ing  in th e  the 1960s as  a r e s u l t  of th e  fa ilu re  of th e  IRA's 
border campaign. Much of e x is tin g  Republican ideology was abandoned and the  
movement came under the influence of le ft-w in g  in te lle c tu a ls  in th e  Republic who 
a ttr ib u te d  the  Republican movement's fa ilu re s  to  iso la tio n  from th e  p o l i t ic a l  
concerns of ord inary  people and advocated community p o l i t ic s  as th e  way 
forward. This p re sc rip tio n  was read ily  pursued in  th e  South. I t s  im plica tions 
fo r  th e  Forth  were more problem atic because of i t s  sec ta ria n  d iv is io n s  so th a t
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the new s tra te g y  was adapted to  meet th e  circum stances of Northern Ire land  w ith 
some d if f ic u lty . Vhat emerged was a s tud iously  moderate and re fo rm is t s e t  of 
po lic ies  w ith th e  long-term  aim of overcoming th e  se c ta ria n  d iv is io n s  in  the  
North. In p a r tic u la r , Republicans were urged to  p a r tic ip a te  in  th e  c iv i l  r ig h t s  
movement th a t  was developing in  th e  North. Consequently, they were s tro n g ly  
represented a t  th e  form ation of th e  Northern Ireland  C iv il R ights A ssociation 
(NICRA) in  February 1967.
In fa c t, th e  s tren g th  of th e i r  presence helped to  arouse L oyalis t fe a rs  
th a t  the  c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement in  i t s  various m an ifesta tions was sim ply a 
Republican conspiracy ag a in st Northern Ireland  in  a new guise. The 
ra d ic a lisa tlo n  of the  c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement in  1968 and 1969 as  a r e s u l t  o f the  
violence th e  dem onstrators encountered fu r th e r fue lled  U nionist susp ic ion  th a t  
c iv il  r ig h ts  had a l l  along been a d e lib e ra te  ta c t ic  to  d e s ta b ilis e  th e  province, 
though in  fa c t  th e  v io len t tu rn  of events in th e  North came as a considerab le  
shock to  the  Southern leadersh ip  of th e  Republican movement and th e  upsurge in  
sectarian ism  th a t  accompanied th e  violence ran  d ire c tly  counter to  th e i r  aim of 
unifying th e  P ro te s tan t and C atholic working c la s s  as  th e  f i r s t  s tag e  in  a 
long-term  s tra te g y  fo r achieving a united s o c ia l is t  Ireland .
In re tro sp e c t, the  hopes placed on th e  development of c la s s  p o l i t ic s  
appear naive. However, a t  the tim e, i t  seemed much more in  tune w ith th e  
general tren d  of p o li t ic s  in  th e  North and th e  r e s t  of th e  world than  did 
tra d it io n a l Republicanism. The c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement w ith i t s  em phasis on 
reform w ithin  th e  context of Northern Ireland was i t s e l f  in  p a r t a product of 
so c ia l and economic changes th a t  were eroding sec ta ria n  d iv is io n s . But th i s  
process was reversed  by the  v io len t reac tio n  of some P ro te s ta n ts  to  th e
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dem onstrations of th e  c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement. By the  tim e th a t  B r it is h  tro o p s 
a rriv ed  on th e  s t r e e ts  of B elfast in  August 1969, they were welcome to  
C atho lics not merely as a symbol of W estm inster's p o li t ic a l  involvement but 
a lso  as  a defence ag a in s t L oyalist mobs.
The fa ilu re  of th e  IRA to  defend C atholic areas ag a in s t L o y a lis t a tta c k s  
re fle c ted  both th e  o rg an isa tio n 's  weakness in  th e  c i ty  and i t s  lack  of m ilita ry  
preparedness as  a consequence of th e  Republican movement's new p o l i t ic a l  
d ire c tio n . In C atholic ghettoes th a t  had borne th e  b run t of th e  L oyalis t 
backlash, d e ris iv e  slogans appeared th a t  IRA stood fo r 'I  Ran Away'.(34) 
T ra d it io n a lis ts  opposed to  the  changes th a t  had taken place in  th e  p o lic ie s  of 
th e  Republican movement a f te r  the  fa ilu re  o f th e  border campaign regarded th ese  
events as  a v ind ica tion  of th e ir  c r itic ism  Df th e  leadersh ip . M atters came to  a 
head a t  a meeting of the  IRA's Army Convention in  December 1969, where the  
movement s p l i t  in  two. The m inority  opposed to  th e  e x is tin g  lead ersh ip  broke 
away to  form th e  P rovisional Army Council, p roviding th e  lead ersh ip  of what 
consequently became known as th e  P rov isional IRA. The IRA i t s e l f  was re s ty led  
the  O ffic ia l IRA. The s p l i t  between P ro v isio n a ls  and O ffic ia ls  was rep lica ted  
in  Sinn Fein, th e  p o li t ic a l  wing of th e  Republican movement.
The issu e  th a t  trig g ered  th e  s p l i t  was th e  d e sire  of the  e x is tin g  
lead ersh ip  to  drop the  p rin c ip le  of absten tionism  (embodying th e  Republican 
movement's re jec tio n  of th e  legitim acy of in s t i tu t io n s  stemming from p a r ti t io n )  
in  order to  f a c i l i ta te  involvement in  e lec tio n s . This rep resen ted  a log ica l 
development of the  movement's p a r tic ip a tio n  in  community p o l i t ic s  in  the  South. 
I t  was by no means the  only issue  th a t  div ided th e  two s id es . The P rov isiona ls  
a lso  complained of the  influence of Marxism on th e  O ffic ia l leadersh ip . (35)
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Further, they were c r i t i c a l  of th e  O ffic ia l le ad e rsh ip 's  support fo r  the  
re te n tio n  of th e  Stormont parliam ent in  n o rth e rn  Ireland . That re fle c ted  the  
le ad e rsh ip 's  continuing attachm ent to  the  idea of build ing working c la s s  un ity  
w ith in  th e  con tex t of th e  reform  of northern  Ire lan d 's  e x is tin g  in s t i tu t io n s .
For a l l  th e  O ff ic ia ls ' ta lk  of B ritish  im perialism  as an enemy, th e ir  
s tra te g y  depended on the  leverage W estminster had acquired as  th e  re s u l t  of the  
d isp atch  of B ritish  tro o p s ac tin g  a s  a c a ta ly s t  fo r  change in  the  sec ta ria n  
ch arac te r of the  n o rth 's  p o li t ic s .  While, by c o n tra s t, the  log ic  of P rov isional 
ideology pointed towards the  u t i l i ty  of con fron ta tion  with the  B ritish  army, the  
popu larity  of the  army in  C atholic areas meant th a t  th i s  did not happen 
immediately. The a lien a tio n  of th e  Catholic population from th e  B ritish  army 
took p lace in  s tag es . In March 1970, a g a in s t th e  advice and appeals of local 
C atholic p o lit ic ia n s , Orangemen were perm itted  by the  a u th o ritie s  to  march 
through a C atholic area of B elfast. I t  was in ev itab le , in  the  l ig h t  of the  mood 
among C atholics, th a t  th e  local population would re a c t v io len tly  to  th i s  d isp lay  
of L o yalis t trium phalism . This brought C atholic r io te r s  d ire c tly  in to  c o n f lic t 
w ith the  B ritish  army. The confron tation  led to  th e  whole e s ta te  being engulfed 
in CS gas. An even more im portant tu rn ing  p o in t in  the  re la tio n s  between the  
C atholic community and the  army was the F a lls  Road Curfew in July 1970 during 
which th e  army ca rried  out house-to-house arms searches of the  Lower F a lls , a 
poor working c la s s  C atholic neighbourhood, in  an exceptionally  b ru ta l 
manner. (36) Iro n ica lly , the  area was a stronghold  a t  th is  time of th e  O ffic ia l 
IRA. The P rov isiona ls  were the  p o lit ic a l  b en e fic ia rie s  of both th ese  episodes.
When internm ent was introduced in  August 1971 as a response to  the 
P ro v is io n a ls ' bombing offensive, which had been roundly condemned by the
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O ffic ia ls  as sec ta ria n  and an ti-w orking  c la s s  because i t  destroyed jobs, the  
la rg e ly  in ac tiv e  O ffic ia ls  figured  d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly  among those  a rre s te d  in  
the  in i t i a l  swoops. This was p a r tly  because many of th e  P rov isiona ls  were new 
to  p o l i t ic s  and unknown to  the  po lice , unlike o lder Republicans involved in  th e  
c iv i l  r ig h ts  movement. The in ten se  h o s t i l i ty  of th e  C atholic community as  a 
whole tow ards internm ent was re fle c ted  in  a sharp  e sca la tio n  in  th e  level of 
violence. I t  was the  period when the  O ffic ia l IRA was a t  i t s  most ac tiv e .
Among th e  v ic tim s of i t s  campaign was a U nionist p o litic ia n , Senator B arnh ill, 
who was murdered in December 1971. This was an u n c h a rac te ris tic  ac tion  fo r 
the  O ffic ia l IRA. As D illon and Lehane noted in  th e ir  1973 book on se c ta ria n  
k i l l in g s  in  Northern Ireland , 'th e  O ffic ia l IRA hard ly  fig u res  a t  a l l  in  th e  
c iv il ia n  a s s a s s in a t io n s '.(37)
In a statem ent in The United Irishm an a f te r  the  in troduction  of 
internm ent, th e  O ffic ia l IRA continued to  emphasise a po licy  of re la tiv e
r e s t r a in t ,  though the  statem ent concluded w ith a note of aggressive  in te n t. I t
declared:
Our policy  is ,  and has been, to  defend the  people wherever 
and whenever they a re  a ttacked  by the fo rces  of reac tio n . 
... Ve have co n s is te n tly  eschewed a l l  s e c ta r ia n  ac tio n s  
and sen se less  a c ts  of bravado. ... Our u n its  w ill no t take 
action  designed to  a lie n a te  any sec tion  of th e  working 
c la ss , nor w ill they allow them selves to  be provoked in to  
sen se less  con fron ta tions a g a in s t th e  superio r weapons and
numbers of the  B ritish  Army, who can only be defeated by
p o li t ic a l  re s is ta n c e  combined w ith g u e rr illa  ac tion . (38)
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'G uerrilla  a c tio n ' amounted in  p rac tice  to  th e  mounting of a tta c k s  on members of 
the  sec u rity  fo rces. In May 1972, the  O ffic ia l IRA murdered a so ld ie r  in  th e  
I r ish  Rangers, home on leave in  Londonderry from Germany. The k i l l in g  prompted 
stro n g  local p ro te s ts  and was instrum ental in  th e  O ff ic ia ls ' announcement of a 
c ea se fire  on 29 May 1972. There were a few in c id en ts  a f te r  th is ,  but i t  was 
e ffec tiv e ly  th e  end of the  campaign.
Three a sp ec ts  of the  end to  the  O ffic ia l IRA's campaign are  worth 
em phasising. F ir s t ly , from an h is to r ic a l  perspec tive , i t  i s  apparent th a t  th e  
involvement of the  O ffic ia l Republican movement in  violence was la rg e ly  an 
ab erra tio n , running counter to  th e  movement's ideo log ical am bition to  forge 
un ity  between P ro te s ta n t and C atholic workers in  northern  Ireland . In th e  ea rly  
years of th e  Troubles, anti-Communism blinded th e  a u th o r itie s  to  th e  p ra c tic a l 
s ig n ifican ce  of th i s  am bition. Secondly, the  movement's involvement in  v iolence 
through i t s  m ilita ry  wing, the  O ffic ia l IRA, had a permanent e ffe c t on how i t  
was perceived, one e ffe c t of which was to  expose those  asso c ia ted  w ith the  
movement to  violence long a f te r  th e  O ffic ia l IRA had ceased to  be ac tiv e ly  
engaged in  v iolence. At the  same time, the  lin k  w ith th e  O ffic ia l IRA severely  
circum scribed th e  capacity  of th e  Workers P arty  (the successor of O ffic ia l Sinn 
Fein) to  appeal to  P ro tes tan t v o te rs  in Northern Ireland , no tw ithstanding  th e  
p a r ty 's  w illin g n ess  to  work w ithin a Northern Ireland  framework acceptable to  
U nionists. Engagement in  violence, even on a re la tiv e ly  sm all sca le , does seem 
to  rep re sen t th e  cro ssing  of a th resho ld  w ith lo n g -la s tin g  consequences.
Thirdly , an ex ternal account of the  sequence of events leading to  the  
ending of th e  O ffic ia l IRA's campaign th a t  discounted th e  ro le  of ideology might 
suggest the  conclusion th a t  internm ent had put th e  o rgan isa tion  out of business.
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In the  case of t e r r o r i s t  o rgan isations, i t  i s  p a r tic u la r ly  tem pting when 
campaigns of violence end following the  adoption of draconian measures by th e  
a u th o ritie s , to  argue th a t  they have ended because of such measures. The very 
use of the  term , t e r r o r i s t ,  im plies a judgement th a t  th e  o rgan isation  in 
question lacks p o li t ic a l  legitim acy. That makes i t  d i f f ic u l t  to  acknowledge th e  
ro le  of the  le g itim isa tio n  of violence in  th e  o rg a n isa tio n 's  behaviour, though 
th is  i s ,  of course, an e n tire ly  separate  issu e  from an ex ternal view of i t s  
legitim acy.
Basque case
Ju st a s  the  Republican movement s p l i t  in to  P ro v isio n a ls  and O ffic ia ls  a t  th e  
s t a r t  o f R orthem  Ire lan d 's  p resen t Troubles, so th e  Basque n a tio n a lis t  group, 
ETA, divided in to  ETA <K ilita r ) and ETA (P o litico -K i 11 tar) on th e  eve of S pa in 's  
t ra n s i t io n  to  democracy. ETA (PM) accepted th e  p ro p o sitio n  th a t  the  new 
p o li t ic a l  d ispensa tion  in  Spain required the  o rg an isa tio n  to  modify the  s tra te g y  
i t  was pursuing to  achieve the  goal of Basque independence, so as  to  take 
advantage of th e  opportun ities  democracy presen ted  fo r p o li t ic a l  m ob ilisa tion . 
Following th is  log ic , ETA (PM) eventually ended i t s  campaign of violence in  
1981 a f te r  th e  attem pted righ t-w ing  coup a g a in s t the  e lected  Spanish government 
in  February of th a t  year. Negotiations between th e  Spanish government and ETA
(PM) followed. The re s u lt  was the policy of reinsercion  ( re - in te g ra tio n ) .
Under th is  policy  imprisoned members of ETA (PM), provided they had not been 
convicted of d e lito  de sangre (crimes of blood) were re leased  on prom ising not 
to  r e s o r t  to  p o li t ic a l  violence in fu ture.
Under a second phase of the policy  o f rein sercion , members of both wings
of ETA who had fled  Spain were given pardons and allowed to  re tu rn  to  the
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country on th e  same promise not to  re s o r t  to  p o l i t ic a l  violence in  fu ture.
About 300 members of the  two wings of ETA have been re - in te g ra te d  in to  so c ie ty  
in  th i s  way.(39) While violence has not come to  an end in  the  Basque reg ion  of 
Spain, i t  has declined. The policy  of reinsercion  has enjoyed th e  support of 
a l l  of Spain 's p o li t ic a l  p a r tie s  with the  exception of Herri Batasuna, the  p a rty  
a llie d  to  ETA U iili ta r ) . In c o n tra s t to  th e  I ta l ia n  policy  of leniency to  
rep en tan t t e r r o r i s t s ,  the Spanish policy did no t req u ire  those seeking re ­
in teg ra tio n  to  repudiate  th e ir  p a s t involvement in , or support fo r , violence.
This put th e  emphasis fo r  changed behaviour on changed p o li t ic a l  circum stances. 
In sh o rt, th e  Spanish s ta te  based i t s  policy  on a recognition  of th e  
instrum ental ch arac te r of th e  violence of i t s  opponents. A m erit o f both th e  
Spanish and th e  I ta lia n  p o lic ie s  was th a t  th e  p o lic ie s  provided a way out fo r  
those who had been drawn in to  involvement in  violence in  the  expectation  of 
e ffec tin g  p o li t ic a l  change and had rea lised  th e i r  m istake.
United S ta te s  and Canada
In th e ir  1989 a r t ic le ,  Ross and Gurr provide evidence th a t  oppositional 
te rro rism  in  both the  United S ta te s  and Canada reached a peak in  th e  la te  1960s 
and ea rly  1970s. Their broad d efin itio n  of oppositiona l te rro rism  includes 
a tta c k s  on property . In ju s tif ic a tio n  they p o in t out:
In the  U.S., a l l  of the  nineteen bombings claimed by th e  
Veather Underground were ta rg e ted  ag a in s t p roperty . In 
Canada, le ss  than a te n th  of th e  166 v io len t a tta c k s  known 
to  have been carried  out by Quebec s e p a ra t is ts  had human 
ta rg e ts  or v ictim s. (40)
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A graph of dom estic t e r r o r i s t  events in  Canada between 1960 and 1985 shows two 
peaks. The f i r s t  was in 1961 and arose out of a c o n f lic t in a t in y  Russian 
re lig io u s  se c t, th e  Doukhobors. The a c t iv i t ie s  of the  Doukhobor Sons of Freedom 
included the  dynamiting of an e le c tr ic a l power pylon in  B ritish  Columbia in  
1962, but were not of la s tin g  s ign ificance . The second peak was over the  
period 1968 to  1971 and arose  out of o rg an isa tio n s  supporting Quebec 
separatism . The most im portant of the v io len t s e p a ra t is t  groups was th e  FLQ.
A b r ie f  h is to ry  of i t s  campaign was given in  Chapter 4 and th e re  i s  no need to  
repeat th a t  here.
Ross and Gurr analyse the  decline o f th e  o rgan isa tion  in  term s of four 
fa c to rs : pre-em ption, deterrence, burn-out, and backlash. Vhile they  accept th a t  
secu rity  measures, such as  the  invoking of th e  Var Keasures Act in  October 
1970, made a con tribu tion  to  the ending of th e  campaign, they argue th a t  
p o li t ic a l  fa c to rs  played a more im portant ro le  in  the  FLQ's decline, p a r tic u la r ly  
the  backlash to  the  murder of P ierre  Laporte in  1970.(41)
In c o n tra s t to  Canada, p o li t ic a l  te rro rism  in  the  United S ta te s  in  the  
same period was in sp ired  by a very d iverse  range of causes, including the  
s ta tu s  of Blacks, Puerto Rican nationalism , V hite supremacy, and left-w ing  
revo lu tion . In s p ite  of th is  d iv e rs ity , Ross and Gurr fin d  a s im ila r  p a tte rn  of 
subsidence. They give fig u res  showing th a t  th e  number of f a t a l i t i e s  from 
p o lit ic a l  te rro rism  reached a peak of 24 a year in  th e  la te  1960s, fa ll in g  to  
th ree  a year in  the  1980s. Vhile again acknowledging th e  co n trib u tio n  of p re ­
emption and deterrence, they argue th a t  p o li t ic a l  fa c to rs  were more im portant, 
with backlash the  p rin c ip a l fa c to r, re f le c tin g  a change in  th e  clim ate  of public  
opinion.
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The "me decade" of the  1970s was a period of p o li t ic a l  
consolidation  and retrenchm ent, accompanied by widespread 
public opposition to  th e  advocacy of ra d ic a l so c ia l change 
and sharp  resentm ent a g a in s t groups making extreme 
demands and using d is ru p tiv e  or v io len t ta c t ic s .  (42>
As evidence of the  g rea te r Importance of p o l i t ic a l  fa c to rs , they c i te  the 
h is to ry  of the  Weather Underground. The end of i t s  campaign was th e  re s u lt  of 
a decision  in  1975 by a m ajority of i t s  members to  abandon te rro r ism . The 
decision  can hard ly  be a ttr ib u te d  to  the e ffec tiv en ess  of secu rity  measures 
a g a in s t th e  o rgan isation , since none of i t s  a c t iv i s t s  had been a rre s ted  during 
i t s  campaign of bombing between 1970 and and 1974.(43)
Conclusion
From the  cases examined b rie fly  in th is  chap ter, i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  suggest a 
few g e n e ra lisa tio n s  about the  ending of campaigns of violence, including 
te rro rism . F ir s t ly ,  a negative conclusion can be drawn. The examples examined 
do not bear out th e  common assumption th a t  te rro r ism  can only be rooted out by 
the  s ta t e 's  adoption of draconian measures. Indeed, s ta te  coercion may ac tu a lly  
be counter-productive, even in a domestic con tex t, where such a s tra te g y  faces 
fewer o b stac les  than i t  does in an in te rn a tio n a l con tex t. For example, in  th e  
case of Northern Ireland, the  in troduction  of in ternm ent re su lted  not merely in  
a sharp  increase  in  the  level of violence, but in  a much h igher level of support 
in both communities fo r those re so rtin g  to  violence.
Secondly, although th e re  is  obvious d if f ic u l ty  in  iso la tin g  th i s  fa c to r  
from o th e rs , th e  assum ptions v io len t groups make about th e  lik e ly  consequences 
of th e i r  campaigns do seem to  have an im portant bearing on whether and in  what
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form any campaign w ill continue. I f  events f a ls i fy  a group's theory  of change, 
th e re  i s  a re a l p rospect th a t  the  group w ill s top  engaging in  violence, 
d is in te g ra te , o r modify i t s  behaviour to  accord with a changed view of the  
world. In A rendt's term s, t e r r o r i s t  o rg an isa tio n s  by and la rge  do behave 
ra tio n a lly , using violence instrum en ta lly . This may seem a paradox, given th e  
asso c ia tio n  of te rro r ism  w ith fa ilu re . However, in  tim es of uncerta in ty  or in  
p o li t ic a l ly  unstab le  so c ie tie s , ca lcu la tio n s  about the  consequences of violence 
are  su ff ic ie n tly  d if f ic u l t  th a t  members of sm all groups can be persuaded of th e  
p o ten tia l u t i l i t y  of violence. (44) Times of u n certa in ty  w ill tend to  a r is e  a t  
d if fe re n t tim es in  d if fe re n t so c ie tie s  as a r e s u l t  of domestic developments.
But tim es of uncerta in ty  a re  lik e ly  to  a r is e  a t  the  same tim e in  d if fe re n t 
so c ie tie s  when th e i r  source l ie s  in  developments w ithin the  in te rn a tio n a l 
p o li t ic a l  system. This po in t w ill be taken up in  the  conclusion.
Thirdly, an im portant fa c to r  in  the  d u ra b ility  of any campaign of violence 
i s  whether a group using violence i s  able to  in s t i tu t io n a lis e  i t s e l f  p o li t ic a l ly . 
This i s  more lik e ly  to  be achieved by securing th e  commitment of fo llow ers to  
p a r tic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  objectives ra th e r  than sim ply th e ir  support fo r  the  use of 
violence. In th e  case of groups th a t  a re  not p o li t ic a l ly  in s ti tu tio n a lis e d , th e  
a r r e s t  of members of the  group may simply end the campaign a t  a s tro k e . 
However, where any group has become in s ti tu tio n a lis e d  and able to  draw in  fre sh  
re c ru its  from new generations, secu rity  measures (unless extreme) may only be 
able to  lim it ra th e r  than stop  violence. The context in  which a campaign of 
te rro rism  is  most lik e ly  to  end i s  i f  i t  proves im possible even fo r  the 
p a r tic ip a n ts  to  e s ta b lish  i t s  relevance to  th e  p o li t ic a l  ends used to  ju s t ify  i t .
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F ina lly , what the  cases discussed in  th i s  chap ter underline i s  th a t  
whatever c r i te r ia  one might use to  d is tin g u ish  te rro r ism  from o th er forms of 
violence, th e re  i s  l i t t l e  reason fo r supposing th a t  te rro rism , uniquely of forms 
of violence, can be understood without reference  to  th e  u se rs ' percep tions of 
i t s  u t i l i t y .  But once ca lcu la tio n s  of u t i l i t y  form p a r t  of the  a n a ly s is , they  
tend to  undermine the  a b so lu tis t  judgement im plied when the  term , te rro r ism , i s  
employed.
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Chapter 12 -  Conclusion; The End of  Terrorism ?
The te rn ,  te rro r ism , continued to  be widely used in  the  early  1990s.
Indeed, i t  was appropria ted  by a l l  manner of causes to  apply to  many d if fe re n t 
types of violence, some of which, such as dom estic violence w ith in  th e  home, had 
no claim to  a p o li t ic a l  purpose. But the  very perm issiveness w ith which th e  
term was used can be seen as  a s ign  of the  concep t's  d is in te g ra tio n , a lo s s  of 
coherence th a t  in  th e  long run i s  lik e ly  to  rob th e  notion of an age of 
te rro rism  of continuing meaning. At th e  same tim e, th i s  incoherence i s  a lso  an 
obstac le  to  speculation  about an end to  the  age of te rro rism . In any event, i t  
would seem d is t in c t ly  odd to  speak in  these term s when th e  sources of violence, 
p a r tic u la r ly  p o li t ic a l  violence, in  the  world seem to  have m ultip lied  so 
d ram atically  in  th e  wake of th e  co llap se  of Communism in  Eastern  Europe and 
the  Soviet Union. Yet th i s  m u ltip lica tion  of th e  sources of v iolence i t s e l f  
poses a problem fo r the  concept of te rro rism . On th e  one hand, th e  concept 
appears well su ited  to  evoking th e  horror rep resen ted  by e th n ic  c leansing , fo r  
example. On th e  o ther hand, i t  i s  d if f ic u l t  to  deny th e  u t i l i ty  of violence or 
i t s  Instrum ental ju s tif ic a tio n  in  many of th e  c o n f lic ts  th a t  have erupted since  
the  B erlin  w all came down.
This d u a lity  i s  re fle c ted  in  what might be seen a s  co n trad ic to ry  responses 
of the  in te rn a tio n a l community to  th e  c iv i l  war in  th e  former Yugoslavia: th e  
in ten tio n  to  t r y  those  responsib le  fo r  a t ro c i t ie s  fo r  war crim es and a 
preparedness to  nego tia te  and bargain  with p o l i t ic a l  leaders  on whose behalf 
the  a t ro c i t ie s  were being committed. Ju s tif ic a tio n  can read ily  be advanced fo r  
both responses, w ith ju s tic e  fo r the  v ic tim s demanding th e  f i r s t  and both the  
r e a l i t ie s  of power on the  ground and the  na tu re  o f a deeply divided so c ie ty
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compelling th e  second. The f i r s t  accords w ith th e  p rin c ip le s  th a t  evolved fo r  
dealing  w ith te rro r ism . The second does not, c le a r ly  running counter to  one of 
th e  most c le a r ly  enunciated p re sc rip tio n s  of th e  age of te rro r ism , th a t  th e re  
should be no neg o tia tio n s  w ith t e r r o r i s t s  and no d ea ls  done th a t  would reward 
th e i r  c rim inal a c ts .< l)
Vhat gave th i s  precept c re d ib il i ty  was th e  comparison of te rro rism  w ith 
blackm ail, w ith  th e  same lesson  th a t  su rrender in  one Instance encouraged th e  
commission of more such crim es. So s tro n g ly  did th i s  notion become es tab lish ed  
th a t  p o li t ic ia n s  would volunteer on te lev is io n  th a t  they had signed d ec la ra tio n s  
requesting  th a t  no nego tia tions be conducted w ith th e  p e rp e tra to rs  in  the  event 
of th e i r  being taken hostage. C onservatives p a r tic u la r ly  came to  see th i s  a s  
th e  m orally and p o li t ic a l ly  co rrec t response to  th e  th re a t  of te rro r ism . Both 
M argaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were asso c ia ted  w ith the  notion  of 
unyielding re s is ta n c e  to  th e  demands of t e r r o r i s t s ,  w ith th e ir  s tan ce  on th i s  
issu e  being favourably compared with th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  predecessors on both th e  
le f t  and r ig h t .  This was one reason why th e  Iran-C ontra scandal posed such a 
th re a t  to  P res id en t Reagan's repu ta tion . <2)
Vhile i t  may reasonably be argued th a t  th e  concept of te rro r ism  was 
lo sing  i t s  coherence even before the  co llapse  of th e  Communist system in 
Eastern  Europe and th e  Soviet Union, the  end of th e  b ip o la r system th a t  ex is ted  
between 1945 and 1989 represented  a q u a lita tiv e  change in  th e  natu re  of th e  
in te rn a tio n a l p o l i t ic a l  system with im portant im p lica tions fo r  th e  concept of 
te rro r ism . In re tro sp e c t, i t  seems th a t  th e  b ip o la r e ra  was a period  of 
rem arkable s ta b i l i ty ,  p a r tic u la r ly  fo r  the  a ff lu e n t libera l-dem ocracies  of th e  
Vest, though d iso rd e r increased in th e  l a t t e r  p a r t  o f th e  e ra , w ith th e
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weakening of th e  re la t iv e  power of th e  super-pow ers. Because th e  dominant 
fe a tu re  of th e  period was th e  r iv a lry  between th e  system 's two super-pow ers, 
th e  United S ta te s  and th e  Soviet Union, th e  whole era  now tends to  be re fe rre d  
to  a s  one of Cold Var, though th i s  d e sc rip tio n  i s  not e n tire ly  accura te , s in ce  
re la t io n s  between th e  two super-pow ers flu c tu a ted  between periods of antagonism 
and of deten te.
This q u a lif ic a tio n  i s  p a r tic u la r ly  im portan t in  re la tio n  to  th e  age of 
te rro r ism , s in ce  i t s  onset more or le s s  coincided w ith th a t  of de ten te  in  th e  
la te  1960s. Some w rite rs  on te rro r ism  p o s ited  a more or le s s  d ire c t  lin k  
between th e  two. (3) The c ru d est form of t h i s  argument was th a t  deten te  
rep resen ted  a period of appeasement of Soviet Communism by th e  V est and th a t  
by dem onstrating V estem  weakness i t  encouraged th e  launch of a t e r r o r i s t  
o ffensive  a g a in s t th e  Vest to  e x tra c t fu r th e r  concessions. (4) An obvious 
d if f ic u l ty  w ith th i s  view, among very many o th e rs , i s  th a t  th e  onset of th e  age 
of te rro r ism  s l ig h t ly  preceded the  era  of d e ten te , no t th e  o ther way round a s  
t h i s  view would seem to  requ ire .
However, i t  i s  p o ssib le  to  p o s it  a more su b tle  connection between th e  two. 
In Chapter 5 i t  was argued th a t  th e  beginning of th e  age of te rro r ism  was 
linked  to  th e  s t a r t  of th e  p o s t-co lo n ia l e ra . R esort to  v iolence by sm all 
groups was explained, in  p a r t, in  term s of th e  t r a n s i t io n a l  c h a rac te r  of th e  
period . At th e  same tim e, i t  was argued th a t  th e  construction  of th e  notion  of 
te rro r ism  by opponents of th i s  violence in  i t s  various m an ifesta tio n s  was an 
attem pt to  draw a lin e  between th i s  violence and th e  violence o f successfu l 
n a t io n a lis t  movements during the  co lon ia l e ra . But a fu r th e r  m otivation fo r  the  
co n stru c tio n  of th e  notion of te rro rism  was th e  weakening of th e  anti-Communlst
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consensus th a t  had prevailed  In V estem  so c ie tie s  during th e  1950s. This can 
be dated to  th e  reso lu tio n  of th e  Cuban m iss ile  c r i s i s  in  1962, which, because 
th e  Soviet Union backed down, g rea tly  reduced fe a r  w ith in  th e  V est of Soviet 
aggression . From a conservative perspective  th e  waning of th e  fe a r  of Soviet 
Communism had negative im plica tions fo r  the  maintenance of so c ia l d is c ip lin e  
w ith in  V estem  so c ie ty . The notion of te rro r ism  offered  the  p ro sp ec t th a t  a 
new consensus m ight be estab lish ed  round th e  th re a t  of te rro rism  and th a t  i t  
m ight o ffe r  a f re sh  b a s is  fo r  demanding conform ity of thought, whether in  th e  
media o r in  th e  u n iv e rs itie s . (5)
The w ritin g s  of Paul V ilkinson provide a p a r tic u la r ly  s t r ik in g  example of 
such a u th o r ita r ia n  impulses, a s  i l lu s tra te d  by th e  follow ing e x tra c t  quoted by 
S tohl:
In democracies our government and in te llig e n c e  agencies 
should make a p r io r i ty  of examining th e  development o f 
u n iv e rs ity  bases of recru itm en t by the  t e r r o r i s t  
o rgan izations operating in  th e i r  region. And they  should 
have c lo se  lia iso n  with th e  academic a u th o r itie s  known to  
be sym pathetic to  th e  ta sk  of p ro tec tin g  fre e  s o c ie tie s  in 
order to  e l i c i t  th e ir  co -operation  in  avoiding re c ru itin g  
to  u n iv e rs ity  s ta f f  people who a re  lik e ly  to  a c t  a s  
t e r r o r i s t  agents and p ropagand ists . I t 's  an ongoing 
business. As one man or woman i s  not given tenure , 
another one comes along who looks a l l  r ig h t ,  who has been 
f i t te d  out with a l l  th e  ap p ro p ria te  q u a lif ic a tio n s , but 
re a lly  i s  p rim arily  working fo r  a t e r r o r i s t  o rgan ization .
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Thus, p a r t  of th e  war a g a in s t te rro rism  has to  be fought 
out In the  sem inar and le c tu re  rooms of th e  u n iv e rs it ie s  
of th e  Western world: i t  i s  l i te r a l ly  a s tru g g le  fo r  th e  
souls of th e  young. (6)
N egotiating w ith t e r r o r i s t s
The lin k  between the  waning of th e  Communist th re a t  and the  waxing of th e  
t e r r o r i s t  th r e a t  i s  fu r th e r  underscored by th e  issu e  of n ego tia tion . The b e lie f  
th a t  i t  was a m istake to  nego tia te  w ith th e  lead ers  of th e  Soviet Union because 
they could n o t be tru s te d  to  keep th e i r  word was a c e n tra l p recep t of American 
fo reign  policy  through much of th e  Cold War, an aspec t of th e  po licy  of 
containm ent s tro n g ly  c r i t ic is e d  by Henry K issinger in  h is  account of the  f i r s t  
term of th e  Hixon Presidency. (7) The con tex t i s  app rop ria te  s in ce  th e  p recep t 
was overturned from the  o u tse t of ITixon's Presidency by h is  commitment to  an 
era  of n eg o tia tio n s. But i f  the  precept had lo s t  i t s  c re d ib i l i ty  in  the  f ie ld  of 
re la tio n s  between the  super-pow ers, te rro r ism  provided a new f ie ld  fo r  i t s  
ap p lica tio n .
This did no t happen in s ta n tly . The in i t i a l  impulse of V estem  governments 
faced by th e  kidnapping of diplom ats or the  tak in g  hostage of c iv i l ia n s  was to  
n eg o tia te  w ith th e  p e rp e tra to rs  and to  make concessions to  secure th e  re le ase  
of th e  v ic tim s. There was c r itic ism  of th i s  response, but i t  was muted in  th e  
absence of a lte rn a tiv e  courses of ac tion . I t  took th e  c rea tio n  of s p e c ia l is t  
fo rces  or th e  tra in in g  of ex is tin g  fo rces  in  a new ro le  to  provide V estem  
governments w ith the  option of a ttem pting  to  rescue hostages by fo rce . Once 
th i s  was in  p lace, th e  previous response became anathem atised much in  th e  way 
th a t  during th e  Cold Var th e  conduct of n eg o tia tio n s  w ith th e  Soviet Union o r
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w ith th e  Chinese Communist leaders during th e  Second Vorld Var came to  be 
anathem atised .
However, th e  t e r r o r i s t  th re a t was never q u ite  ab le to  work th e  same magic 
on V estern so c ie ty  as  th e  Communist th re a t  had done. At th e  h e a r t of th e  Cold 
Var system was the  fa c t  th a t  the  perception  of Soviet Communism a s  a th re a t  
functioned as  a source o f s ta b i l i ty  w ithin  V estern socie ty  by p lacing  lim its  on 
th e  scope of p o li t ic a l  d iscourse  and p ro te s t .  (8) Vhile the  onset of th e  age of 
te rro r ism  was symptomatic of increased d iso rd e r w ithin  the  in te rn a tio n a l 
p o l i t ic a l  system , i t s  l im its  were a s ig n if ic a n t  influence on percep tions of th e  
violence. An im portant fa c to r  in  th e  c h a ra c te r is a tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  violence as  
te rro r ism  was th e  ex istence of a la rge  d is tan ce  between means and ends. The 
r e s o r t  to  co v ert violence in  the  cause of an ti-im p eria lism  by sm all groups on 
th e  p o l i t ic a l  fr in g e  of V estern socie ty  epitom ised th i s  s itu a tio n . The means a t  
th e i r  d isp o sa l appeared u t te r ly  out of p roportion  to  what seemed, in  so f a r  as  
they could be understood a t  a l l ,  to  be utopian goa ls. Even th e  reduced 
s ta b i l i ty  of V estern so c ie ty  and of the  s tru c tu re  of in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s  
made a mockery of the  revolu tionary  rh e to r ic  in  which they engaged.
In fa c t, m arg inality  was p ra c tic a lly  w ritten  in to  the  notion of te rro rism  
i t s e l f .  The consequence was th a t  while the  violence of t e r r o r i s t s  appeared 
grotesque and evoked h o rro r in  much th e  same way th a t  mass m urderers or s e r ia l  
k i l l e r s  d id , i t  d id  not lend i t s e l f  to  th e  c rea tio n  of an a n t i - t e r r o r i s t  
ideo log ical consensus, d esp ite  the  e f fo r t s  of a number of w rite rs  to  c rea te  one. 
Vhile V estern so c ie tie s  took s tep s  to  deal w ith the  physica l th r e a t  posed by 
t e r r o r i s t  vio lence, such as  the  searching  of luggage and passengers a t  a irp o r ts ,  
th e  goals of t e r r o r i s t s  were perceived a s  too  d iffu se , too varied , and sim ply
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too  I r ra t io n a l  to  provide th e  b asis  fo r an ideolog ical response ak in  to  a n t i ­
communism.
M arginality  did not reduce the inconvenience created  by th e  th re a t of 
te rro r ism , nor d id  i t  p revent the c reation  of c lim ates of fe a r  a t  p a r tic u la r  
junctu res in  p a r tic u la r  so c ie tie s , but i t  d id  lim it  i t s  p o l i t ic a l  sa lience . Even 
ra is in g  th e  sp ec tre  of t e r r o r i s t s  armed with a nuclear device could not in fuse  
co u n te r-te rro rism  with a p o lit ic a l  m ission going beyond th e  tak in g  of tech n ica l 
p recau tions to  reduce th e  r is k  of such an even tua lity . There were and are  some 
so c ie tie s  where th e  f ig h t ag a in st te rro rism , in v ariab ly  from a p a r tic u la r  source 
ra th e r  than  in  general, became imbued with such a sense of m ission.
Is ra e l i s  an example. South Africa another. In I s ra e l 's  case , the  PLO was 
anathem atised a s  a t e r r o r i s t  o rganisation . In South A frica 's  th e  AHC. But in  
both cases, th e  search fo r  a p o litic a l se ttlem en t through neg o tia tio n  has 
n ecess ita ted  th e  unwinding of these p o s itio n s . This has proved a d if f ic u l t  
p rocess in  both so c ie tie s , given the legacy of p a s t rh e to r ic  and th e  p o l i t ic a l  
s tre n g th  of those  opposed in  any case to  a se ttlem en t. In many of the  new 
e th n ic  c o n f lic ts  in  Eastern  Europe and the  former Soviet Union, th e  notion of 
te rro r ism  with i t s  overtones of absolute illeg itim acy  has helped to  underscore 
the  p o rtray a l of the  enemy in  demonic term s, making s t i l l  more d i f f ic u l t  th e  
achievement of any accommodation between communities.
However, ou tside  of th e  actual so c ie tie s  in  the  g rip  of c o n f lic t ,  the 
c re d ib i l i l ty  of th e  notion of te rro rism  has been undermined by th e  sca le  of 
in s ta b i l i ty  th a t  has charac te rised  the  p o s t-b ip o la r  world. This i s  because i t  
has brought to  the  fo re  th e  instrum ental value of violence. A tro c itie s  c a rrie d  
out by Serbs in  the  former Yugoslavia have a ttra c te d  world-wide condemnation,
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but a t  the  sane t in e  the  connection between th e  a tro c i t ie s  and th e  p o l i t ic a l  
goals of th e  Serbs has been qu ite  obvious. Indeed, th e re  has been a ln o s t  a s  
much emphasis on th e  illeg itim acy  of th e  goal o f the  c rea tion  of a G reater 
S erb ia as  th e re  has been on the  v io len t means being used to  achieve i t .  In 
general th e  c lo se r  th e  re la tio n sh ip  between means and goals, th e  more lik e ly  
debate w ill revolve round th e  legitim acy of th e  goals. Only th e  most 
objectionable of goals a re  capable of evoking a s  negative a reac tio n  a s  th e  
means employed.
Consequently, where th e  Instrum ental purpose of violence i s  both c le a r  and 
th e  violence i s  perceived a s  having a reasonable p rospect of achieving i t s  aim, 
th e re  may be a re la tiv e ly  muted reac tio n  to  th e  most h o r r if ic  even ts. This in  
p a r t  exp lains why public reac tio n  to  in c id en ts  in  which sm all numbers of people 
a re  k ille d  in  covert violence ca rried  out by fr in g e  groups may be more in ten se  
than  i t  i s  to  th e  carnage wrought by c iv i l  war. A fu r th e r reason i s  th a t  
whereas a bombing can take  place anywhere, a c iv i l  war, Involving th e  complete 
breakdown of a country 's  p o li t ic a l  system , i s  sp e c if ic  to  the country where i t  
occurs. Thus, i t  may be e a s ie r  fo r  an American to  empathise w ith th e  v ic tim s 
of a bombing in , fo r example, London than w ith th e  v ic tim s of c iv i l  war in  th e  
form er Yugoslavia.
Crumbling of in te rn a tio n a l norms
F urther, a b so lu tis t  judgements in  re sp ec t of g oa ls  have become more d i f f ic u l t  
w ith th e  crumbling of th e  in te rp re ta tio n  of in te rn a tio n a l norms such a s  s e l f -  
determ ination and non-in terven tion  th a t  p revailed  before the f a l l  of Communism. 
Iro n ica lly , th e re  was a la rg e r  measure of agreement in  the  in te rn a tio n a l 
community on, fo r  example, the  illeg itim acy  of secession  in  an id eo lo g ica lly
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dlvlded world than  th e re  p re sen tly  e x is ts  in  th e  p o s t-b ip o la r  world. The 
c ru c ia l ro le  th a t  such p a s t agreement played in  underpinning s ta b i l i ty  in  th e  
in te rn a tio n a l p o l i t ic a l  system i s  only now becoming apparent. The absence of a 
consensus on th e  in te rp re ta tio n  of norms such as  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n  makes s t i l l  
more d i f f ic u l t  judgements on p o li t ic a l  violence, because of th e  lin k  th a t  has 
been forged in te rn a tio n a lly  between the  question of th e  legitim acy of v io lence 
and the  issu e  of se lf-d e te rm in a tio n . How th a t  lin k  co lours people 's pe rcep tio n s  
i s  encapsulated by the  much quoted aphorism: 'one man's t e r r o r i s t  i s  ano ther 
man's freedom f ig h te r '.  The cu rren t uncertain ty  over how th e  p rin c ip le  o f s e l f -  
determ ination ought to  be in te rp re ted  and what i t s  l im its  are , g ives the
t
aphorism 's re la tiv ism  added ju s tif ic a tio n .
The recogn ition  of C roatia and Slovenia by th e  in te rn a tio n a l community 
marked the  end of the  anathema ag a in s t secession so p a in fu lly  upheld in  A frica 
in  th e  cases o f Katanga and B iafra. I t  a lso  meant th e  end of th e  p o s t-c o lo n ia l 
in te rp re ta tio n  of th e  norm of se lf-de term ination , so c e n tra l an asp ec t of th a t  
in te rp re ta tio n  was th e  re jec tio n  of the legitim acy of secession . The 
pronouncements of the  major powers provide some clues a s  to  what in  broad 
ou tline  the  con ten t of a new norm might be. They suggest th e  r ig h t  of 
secession  w ill be lim ited  to  p re -e x is tin g  su b -un its  of s ta te s ,  w ith th e  fu r th e r  
cond itions th a t  th e  r ig h t  i s  exercised through the  b a llo t  box and th a t  
p rov ision  i s  made by th e  seceding e n tity  to  p ro tec t th e  r ig h ts  of m in o ritie s , 
p a r tic u la r ly  any m inority  th a t  i s  produced by the  p rocess of secession  i t s e l f .  
Rejected w ill be the  carving out of new p o lit ic a l  e n t i t ie s  through th e  use o f 
force,
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But whether such a new norm w ill a t ta in  th e  c re d ib il i ty  of th e  old  norm i s  
open to  doubt. In p rac tice , i t  i s  hard to  see many s ta te s ,  except those  
weakened by p o li t ic a l  revo lu tion  or war, g iv ing  v o te rs  th e  opportunity  to  opt 
fo r  th e  secession  of th e i r  region and in  such cases, lim itin g  th e  r ig h t  of 
secession  i s  lik e ly  to  prove e x tra o rd in a rily  d i f f ic u l t  w ithout ex tensive  and 
c o s tly  in te rv en tio n  by th e  in te rn a tio n a l community. Further, few m in o ritie s  are  
lik e ly  to  be reassu red  by th e  promise of p ro tec tio n  fo r th e ir  r ig h ts  in  the  
con tex t of th e  e thn ic  m ob ilisa tion  th a t  se c e ss io n is t movements engage in .
These con sid era tio n s  mean th a t  even i f  i n i t i a l ly  rooted in  th e  e le c to ra l 
p rocess, secession  w ill have a high p ropensity  to  give r i s e  to  violence. The 
weaker th e  c re d ib i l i ty  of in te rn a tio n a l norms on these  issu es , th e  more lik e ly  
i t  i s  th a t  th e  outcome w ill be determined by th e  balance of fo rce s  w ith in  
s ta te s  and th a t  th e  in te rn a tio n a l community w ill be compelled to  recognise  (and 
thereby  u ltim ate ly  leg itim ise ) whatever has been created  on the  ground, even i f  
vio lence has played a la rg e  ro le  in  i t s  determ ination.
P resent in s ta b i l i ty  and uncerta in ty  about th e  fu tu re  make i t  d i f f ic u l t  to  
p re d ic t th e  outcome of th e  use of p o li t ic a l  violence in  c iv i l  c o n f l ic ts .  The 
fa c t  th a t  the  in te rn a tio n a l community may in  th e  end be compelled to  accept the  
p o li t ic a l  r e s u l ts  of the successfu l use of violence m ilita te s  a g a in s t th e  
ap p lica tio n  of th e  term, te rro r ism , in  such s itu a tio n s , as does th e  fa c t  th a t  
most of th i s  v iolence i s  tak ing  p lace w ith in  a dom estic or a t  le a s t  narrow ly 
reg ional con tex t. The a sso c ia tio n  of te rro rism  with a low level o f violence, 
one of th e  th re e  meanings of the  term explored in  Chapter 2, i s  in  p a r t  sim ply 
a re f le c tio n  of th e  sim ple fa c t  th a t  th e  lower th e  level of c o n f lic t, th e  g re a te r  
th e  c e r ta in ty  th a t  the  use of p o li t ic a l  violence w ill f a i l  to  achieve i t s  goals.
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Sim ilarly , th e  meaning of te rro rism  as v io lence ag a in s t th e  Vest was 
p a r tly  b u ttressed  by confidence th a t  such v io lence did  not pose a th r e a t  to  th e  
very ex istence  of th e  Vest. In theory , a norm ative approach to  th e  d e fin itio n  
of te rro rism  i s  le s s  dependent on th e  perceived d u ra b ility  of p o li t ic a l  
in s t i tu t io n s . In p rac tice , e s tab lish in g  p ro h ib itio n s  on c e rta in  form s of 
violence a s  being w ithout hum anitarian c o n s tra in ts  i s  lik e ly  to  be more 
d i f f ic u l t  a g a in s t a backdrop of a high level o f in s ta b i l i ty  and un certa in ty .
All th i s  does no t mean th a t th e  term , te rro r ism , w ill cease to  be used. 
Rather, lik e  the  term im perialism , i t  w ill continue to  be widely used, but i t s  
power and resonance i s  lik e ly  to  d im inish, a s  i t s  coherence has done. This i s  
by no means to  argue th a t  th e  age of te rro rism  has been w ithout consequence. 
Many of the  phenomena th a t  were encompassed under th e  term a re  lik e ly  to  be a 
continued source of concern. S im ilarly , many of th e  measures th a t  were adopted 
to  combat p a r tic u la r  forms of te rro rism  a re  lik e ly  to  remain in  p lace. In 
p a r tic u la r , i t  can confiden tly  be p red ic ted  th a t  passengers and th e i r  baggage 
w ill continue to  be sub jec t to  secu rity  checks a t  a irp o r ts .  I t  a lso  seems 
probable th a t  continued e f fo r ts  w ill be made to  s treng then  co-operation  among 
s ta te s  so as to  make i t  more d if f ic u l t  fo r  sm all groups to  take advantage of 
gaps between d if fe re n t ju r isd ic tio n s . In fa c t , th e  p rospects  fo r  th e  successfu l 
outlawing of p a r tic u la r  forms of in te rn a tio n a l te rro r ism , such a s  h ijack ing , a re  
good. The o ther s id e  of th a t  coin i s  th a t  s ta t e s  perceived as sponsoring  
groups engaged in  covert violence ac ro ss  in te rn a tio n a l boundaries w ill continue 
to  be Iso la ted .
The in te n s if ic a tio n  of global economic interdependence provides ideal 
cond itions fo r  th e  operation across s ta te  boundaries of sm all groups engaged in
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covert v iolence. The ease of a i r  tra v e l has increased  th e  n o b ili ty  of those  
engaged in  violence as  well a s  aid ing  th e  estab lishm ent of tra n sn a tio n a l 
networks ready to  support such violence. This p rocess i s  s e t  to  continue. 
Indeed, w ith g lo b a lisa tio n  con tribu ting  to  a decline  in  th e  legitim acy of 
t e r r i t o r i a l  democracy, (9) th e re  i s  every reason to  expect an expansion of th e  
numbers o f such networks. However, th e  d isp a ra te  ideo log ical sources of th e se  
networks a re  lik e ly  to  continue to  be a b a r r ie r  to  th e  con stru ctio n  of an a n t i ­
t e r r o r i s t  Ideology. For example, s ig n if ic a n t as  th e  ro le  of Islam ic 
fundamentalism may prove to  be a s  one of th e  in s p ira tio n s  fo r  sm all group 
covert violence, i t  seems very un likely  th a t  i t  w ill prove to  be so dominant as 
to  perm it th e  construction  of an ideology around re s is ta n c e  to  i t s  ob jectives.
In any event, th e  m ultitude of challenges th a t  e x is t  to  th e  s ta b i l i ty  of th e  
in te rn a tio n a l p o li t ic a l  system makes i t  un likely  th a t  th e  world w ill remain p re­
occupied w ith th e  covert violence of sm all groups, even i f  i t  i s  a common 
occurrence. F urther, i t  would be wrong to  d iscount th e  impact of in te rn a tio n a l 
co-operation  in  th i s  area and i t s  capacity  to  l im it  th e  form such violence 
tak es .
Orig ins of th e  age of te rro rism
However th e  most persuasive b a s is  fo r suggesting th a t  th e  capacity  of te rro r ism  
to  hold so c ie ty  in  th r a l l  may be lim ited  in  fu tu re  i s  to  be found in  
considera tion  of why i t s  Impact on the  Vest was so g re a t in  th e  la te  1960s. In 
th is  con tex t, th e re  i s  a need to  d is tin g u ish  between th e  d iffe r in g  experiences 
of various so c ie tie s . In p a r tic u la r , the  American experience was somewhat 
d if fe re n t from th a t  of V estern European so c ie tie s . The 1960s were a tu rb u len t 
period in  th e  United S ta te s . That was not th e  case in  V estern Europe p r io r  to
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th e  events of Kay 1968. But in  both Eorth America and V estem  Europe, i t  was 
an e ra  of affluence following a long period of continuous economic growth. 
K ateria l contentm ent was underpinned by fu l l  employment. At th e  same tim e, 
fe a r  of nuclear war had waned. I t  was no t su rp ris in g  th e re fo re  th a t  the  period  
was infused w ith a s p i r i t  of optimism. I t  was a lso  an e ra  of hedonism, 
encapsulated in  th e  B ritish  phrase, the  swinging s ix t ie s .  The onset of th e  age 
of te rro rism  in  th e  form of h ijack ings, kidnapping, and bombings rep resen ted  a 
considerable  jo l t  to  the  assum ptions of th e  tim es, challenging th e  p rev a ilin g  
b e lie f  in  th e  in n a te  goodness of human nature .
Vhat compounded the  impact was th e  fusing  to g e th er of a number of 
d if fe re n t s tra n d s  of p o li t ic a l  violence in  the  construction  of th e  notion of 
te rro rism : th e  v a r ie tie s  of te rro r ism s  d iscussed  in  Chapter 4. In p a r tic u la r , 
th e  rh e to r ic  of an ti-im peria lism  gave the  d iffe re n t s tra n d s  of violence th e  
appearance of a un ity  of purpose. That magnified the  Impact of each. In fa c t , 
th e  appearance was deceptive, as the  d if fe re n t tra je c to r ie s  followed by violence 
in  Latin  America, by Middle Eastern violence, by violence on th e  fr in g e  of 
Vestern so c ie ty , and by e thn ic  c o n flic t, such a s  th a t  in  no rthern  Ireland , were 
to  show. Vith th e  passage of time, th e re  has been a growing apprecia tion  th a t  
th e  various s tra n d s  -  and th e ir  la te r  ad d itio n s  -  had d ivergen t sources. 
Consequently, a n a ly s is  increasing ly  re fle c ted  the  recognition  th a t  while in  some 
cases t e r r o r i s t  violence was an element in  a much la rg e r  c o n flic t, in  o th e rs  i t  
was a fr in g e  phenomenon. The l i te ra tu re  on te rro rism  has strugg led  to  
e s ta b lish  p o in ts  in  common among the  various te rro r ism s , but w ith only lim ited  
success. That has helped those who have wished to  app ro p ria te  th e  powerful 
emotive fo rce  of the  term and apply i t  to  forms of violence which they wish to
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condemn, to  do ju s t  th a t. These ex tensions and attem pted ex tensions of th e  
term have made th e  boundaries of th e  concept even vaguer.
H elther conspiracy th eo rie s , such a s  th a t  developed by C la ire  S te rlin g , nor 
th e  p o rtray a l of te rro rism  as  a sp ec ia l, p a tho log ica l form of p o l i t ic a l  violence 
has provided a persuasive b a s is  fo r  the  development o f an overarching a n a ly s is  
of th e  concept. Thus, in  p rac tice , the  a n a ly s is  of p a r tic u la r  campaigns of 
te rro rism  or p o li t ic a l  violence has fo r the  most p a r t  been more productive than 
the  a ttem pts a t  g en era lisa tio n  about te rro rism  p e r  se. That i s  re fle c ted  in  the  
fa c t  th a t  many of the  b e tte r  works in th e  f ie ld  o f th e  study of te rro r ism  
c o n s is t of c o lle c tio n s  in  which th e  ind iv idual co n trib u tio n s  analyse d if fe re n t  
s i tu a tio n s  w ith l i t t l e  reference to  each o th e r .<10)
Indeed, i t  i s  fa r  from c lea r th a t  the  use of th e  term , te rro rism , adds much
to  th e  a n a ly s is  these  co llec tio n s  contain . Often th e re  i s  l i t t l e  d iffe ren ce  in
th e  a n a ly s is  of, fo r example, th e  IForthern Ireland  c o n f lic t, by w rite rs  who use
the  term and by those who eschew i t s  use. This i s  p a r tic u la r ly  tru e  of
a n a ly s is  of p o l i t ic a l  violence w ith in  the  s ta te ,  where th e  function  of th e  term , 
te rro r ism , i s  o ften  l i t t l e  more than a label of d isapproval. This i s  not to  
decry such a lim ita tio n  s in ce  the  attem pt to  use th e  term to  reach conclusions 
about how th o se  using the  violence view the  u t i l i t y  of th e ir  ac tio n s  i s  o ften  
wrong-headed. Hot su rp ris in g ly , those engaged in  p o l i t ic a l  violence tend to  
have a ra th e r  d if fe re n t perspective  on th e ir  purposes and m otivations than  do 
those  committed to  the  suppression of th e  violence a s  te rro rism . Recognition 
of th i s  r e a l i ty  does not requ ire  an acceptance of th e  view of th e  world held by 
those  engaged in  violence, though i t  does req u ire  th a t  i t  be given a p lace in  
any se rio u s  explanation of th e ir  ac tio n s. A common weakness in  th e  l i te r a tu re
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on te rro r ism  rem ains the  a ttem pt to  derive m otives from the  consequences of th e  
ac tio n s  analysed.
However, th e  term, te rro rism , would not have the  resonance i t  does, nor 
would th e  notion of an age of te rro rism  have th e  fo rce  th a t  i t  does, i f  i t  were 
sim ply a lab e l of d isapproval. That i s  c le a re s t  in  an in te rn a tio n a l con tex t. 
Vith good reason , episodes w ith an in te rn a tio n a l dimension tend to  dominate 
chronologies of te rro rism . Of th ese , th e  s in g le  event to  be most c lo se ly  
id e n tif ie d  w ith the  dawn of the  age of te rro r ism  was th e  h ijack ing  of an El A1 
a i r l in e r  by th e  Popular F ront fo r  L iberation  of P a le s tin e  CPFLP) in  July 1968.
I t  was f a r  from being the  f i r s t  h ijack ing  of a plane. These went back 
p ra c tic a lly  to  th e  s t a r t  of commercial av ia tio n . I t  was no t even th e  f i r s t  tim e 
th a t  in te rn a tio n a l t ra v e lle r s  were taken hostage to  a d v e rtise  a p o l i t ic a l  cause. 
In January 1961, a group of opponents of th e  S alazar d ic ta to rsh ip  seized a 
Portuguese luxury lin e r  c ru is in g  in  the  Caribbean. They sa iled  th e  sh ip  to  
Recife in  B razil where they surrendered to  th e  a u th o r i t ie s .<11) The lim ited  
impact of the  seizure  of th e  sh ip , Santa M aria, d esp ite  the  hopes of th e  
p e rp e tra to rs  to  a t t r a c t  world-wide p u b lic ity  to  th e i r  cause, s tan d s  in  marked 
c o n tra s t to  th a t  of the  f i r s t  PFLP hijacking .
Vhat th e  PFLP was able to  ex p lo it was th e  a r r iv a l  of a g lobal audience, 
made p o ssib le  by the  revolu tion  in  communications. In fa c t, in te rn a tio n a l 
te rro rism  can be seen as one of th e  f i r s t  f r u i t s  of g lo b a lisa tio n . Violence 
s p il l in g  a c ro ss  s ta te  boundaries was not a new phenomenon, nor had t r a v e l le r s  
been immune to  violence c a rrie d  out by sm all groups in  th e  p a s t. The holding 
of hostages a lso  has a long h is to ry . The new element was th a t  w ith th e  a r r iv a l  
of mass tra v e l, a large p a r t  of th e  new g lobal audience could envisage
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them selves a s  th e  v ic tim s of a hijacking drama. Thus, c itiz e n s  of s ta b le  
libera l-dem ocracies  enjoying a la rge  measure of sec u rity  suddenly saw 
them selves a s  p o te n tia l ta rg e ts  of p o li t ic a l  v io lence. The concept of te rro r ism  
gave expression  to  th e ir  sense of shock and outrage a t  th i s  transfo rm ation .
That i s  to  say , th e  age of te rro rism  o rig in a ted  in  th e  V estem  p u b lic 's  
d iscovery of i t s  v u ln e rab ility  to  p o li t ic a l  v io lence emanating from o ther 
so c ie tie s . Once made, th e  discovery cannot be unmade. That exp lains the  
d if f ic u lty  of id en tify in g  an end to  the age o f te rro r ism , even though th e  shock 
of d iscovery has begun to  wear o ff and th e  ac tu a l dangers from th e  various 
sources of vio lence th a t  have fa llen  under th e  banner of te rro rism  have begun 
to  be put in to  perspective .
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Appendix 1
Convention fo r  th e  prevention and punishment of te r ro r ism . .
opened fo r s ig natu re  a t  Geneva on 16 November 1937
Being desirous of making more e ffec tiv e  th e  prevention and punishment of 
te rro rism  of an in te rn a tio n a l charac te r,
Vho, having communicated th e ir  fu l l  powers, which were found in  good and 
due form, have agreed upon the  follow ing p ro v is io n s:
A rtic le  1
1. The High C ontracting P a rtie s , reaffirm ing  th e  p r in c ip le  of in te rn a tio n a l law 
in  v ir tu e  of which i t  i s  th e  duty o f every S ta te  to  re fra in  from any a c t 
designed to  encourage t e r r o r i s t  a c t iv i t ie s  d ire c ted  a g a in s t another S ta te  and to  
prevent th e  a c ts  in  which such a c t iv i t ie s  tak e  shape, undertake as  h e re in a f te r  
provided to  prevent and punish a c t iv i t ie s  of t h i s  natu re  and tD co llab o ra te  fo r  
th i s  purpose.
2. In th e  p re sen t Convention, the  expression  "ac ts  of te rro rism " means crim inal 
a c ts  d irec ted  ag a in s t a S ta te  and intended o r calcu la ted  to  c rea te  a s ta te  of 
te r ro r  in  th e  minds of p a r tic u la r  persons, o r a  group of persons o r th e  general 
public.
A rtic le  2
Each of th e  High C ontracting P a rtie s  s h a ll ,  i f  th i s  has not a lready been 
done, make th e  following a c ts  committed on h is  own te r r i to r y  crim inal offences 
i f  they a re  d irec ted  ag a in s t another High C ontracting  Party  and i f  they 
c o n s ti tu te  a c ts  of te rro rism  w ithin  th e  meaning of A rtic le  1:
(1) Any w ilfu l a c t causing death or grievous bodily harm or lo s s  of 
l ib e r ty  to :
(a> Heads of S ta te s , persons ex erc is in g  th e  p rerogatives of the  head of 
th e  S ta te , th e ir  he red ita ry  or designated  successors;
(b) The wives or husbands of th e  above-mentioned persons;
(c) Persons charged with public  fu nc tions o r holding public p o s itio n s  
when the  a c t i s  d irec ted  a g a in s t them in  th e ir  public capacity .
(2) Wilful d estruction  of, or damage to , public  p roperty  or p roperty  
devoted to  a public  purpose belonging to  o r sub jec t to  the  au th o rity  of another 
High C ontracting  Party.
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(3) Any w ilfu l a c t calcu lated  to  endanger the  liv e s  of members of th e  
public.
<4> Any attem pt to  commit an offence fa ll in g  w ith in  the  foregoing 
p rov isions of th e  p resen t A rtic le .
(5) The manufacture, obtain ing, possession , or supplying of arms,
1 ammunition, explosives or harmful substances w ith a view to  the  commission in  
any country whatsoever of an offence fa l l in g  w ithin  th e  p resen t A rtic le .
A rtic le  3
Each of th e  High Contracting P a rtie s  s h a ll  make th e  follow ing a c ts  
crim inal offences when they are committed on h is  own te r r i to r y  w ith a view to  
an a c t o f te rro rism  fa l l in g  w ithin A rtic le  2 and d irec ted  ag a in s t another High 
C ontracting Party , whatever the  country in  which the  a c t of te rro r ism  i s  to  be 
ca rried  out:
(1) Conspiracy to  commit any such ac t;
(2> Any incitem ent to  any such a c t, i f  successfu l;
(3) D irect public incitem ent to  any a c t mentioned under heads (1), (2) or
(3) of A rtic le  2, whether the  incitem ent be successfu l or not;
(4) V ilfu l p a r tic ip a tio n  in  any such ac t;
(5) A ssistance, knowingly given, tow ards the  commission of any such a c t.
A rtic le  4
Each of th e  offences mentioned in  A rtic le  3 s h a ll  be tre a te d  by th e  law as 
a d is t in c t  offence in  a l l  cases where th is  i s  necessary  in  order to  prevent an 
offender escaping punishment.
A rticle  5
Subject to  any sp ec ia l p rov isions of n a tio n a l law fo r the  p ro tec tio n  of 
the  persons mentioned under head (1) of A rtic le  2, o r of the  p roperty  mentioned
under head (2) of A rtic le  2, each High C ontracting P arty  sh a ll  provide the  same
punishment fo r  the  a c ts  s e t  out in  A rtic le s  2 and 3, whether they be d irec ted  
ag a in s t th a t  o r another High C ontracting Party .
A rtic le  6
1. In co u n tries  where th e  p rin c ip le  of th e  in te rn a tio n a l recogn ition  of 
previous convictions i s  accepted, fo reign  convictions fo r  any of th e  offences 
mentioned in  A rtic le s  2 and 3 w ill, w ith in  th e  conditions p rescribed  by
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dom estic law, be taken in to  account fo r  the  purpose of e s ta b lish in g  h ab itu a l 
c rim in a lity .
2. Such conv ictions w ill, fu rth e r, in  the  case of High C ontracting P a rtie s  
whose law recognizes fo reign  convictions, be taken in to  account, w ith o r w ithout 
sp ec ia l proceedings, fo r  the  purpose of imposing, in  th e  manner, provided by 
th a t  law, in c ap a c itie s , d isq u a lif ic a tio n s  or in te rd ic tio n s  whether in  th e  sphere 
of public or of p riv a te  law.
A rtic le  7
In so f a r  as  p a r tie s  c iv i le s  a re  adm itted under the  dom estic law, fo reign  
p a r tie s  c iv i le s ,  including, in  proper cases, a High C ontracting P arty , s h a l l  be 
e n title d  to  a l l  r ig h ts  allowed to  n a tio n a ls  by th e  law of the  country in  which 
th e  case i s  t r ie d .
A rtic le  8
1. Without prejudice to  th e  p rov isions of paragraph 4 below, th e  offences s e t  
out in  A rtic le s  2 and 3 s h a ll  be deemed to  be included as  e x tra d itio n  crim es in 
any e x tra d itio n  tre a ty  which ha£ been, or may h e re a fte r  be, concluded between 
any of th e  High C ontracting P a rtie s .
2. The High C ontracting P a rtie s  who do not make e x trad itio n  co nd itiona l on the 
ex istence  of a t re a ty  s h a ll  henceforward, w ithout prejudice to  th e  p ro v is io n s  of 
paragraph 4 below and sub ject to  re c ip ro c ity , recognize the  offences s e t  out in 
A rtic le s  2 and 3 as  e x tra d itio n  crim es as between them selves.
3. For th e  purposes of th e  p resen t A rtic le , any offence sp ec ified  in  A rtic le s  2 
and 3, i f  committed in  th e  te r r i to r y  of the High C ontracting P arty  a g a in s t whom 
i t  i s  d irec ted , sh a ll  a lso  be deemed to  be an e x tra d itio n  crime.
4. The ob lig a tio n  to  g ra n t e x tra d itio n  under th e  p resen t A rtic le  s h a ll  be 
sub ject to  any cond itions and lim ita tio n s  recognized by the  law or th e  p ra c tic e  
of the  country to  which ap p lica tio n  i s  made.
A rtic le  9
1. When the  p rin c ip le  of the e x tra d itio n  of n a tio n a ls  i s  not recognized by a 
High C ontracting  Party , n a tio n a ls  who have re tu rned  to  th e  te r r i to r y  of th e i r  
own country a f te r  the commission abroad of an offence mentioned in  A rtic le s  2 
or 3 s h a ll  be prosecuted and punished in  the  same manner as i f  th e  offence had
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been committed on th a t te r r i to r y ,  even in  a case where the  offender has 
acquired h is  n a tio n a lity  a f te r  th e  commission of th e  offence.
2. The p rov isions of th e  p re sen t a r t ic le  s h a ll  not apply i f ,  in  s im ila r
circum stances, th e  e x trad itio n  of a fo reigner cannot be granted.
A rtic le  10
Foreigners who are  on th e  te r r i to r y  of a High C ontracting Party  and who 
have committed abroad any of the  offences s e t  out in  A rtic le s  2 and 3 s h a l l  be 
prosecuted and punished a s  though th e  offence had been committed in  th e  
te r r i to ry  of th a t  High C ontracting Party , i f  th e  follow ing cond itions a re  
fu lf i l le d  -  namely, th a t:
(a> E x trad ition  has been demanded and could not be granted  fo r  a reason 
not connected w ith th e  offence i t s e l f ;
(b> The law of th e  country of refuge recognizes th e  Ju risd ic tio n  of i t s
own courts  in  re sp ec t of offences committed abroad by fo re ig n e rs ;
(c) The fo reigner i s  a n a tio n a l of a country which recognizes th e  
ju risd ic tio n  of i t s  own co u rts  in re sp ec t of offences committed 
abroad by fo re ig n ers .
A rtic le  11
1. The p rov isions of A rtic le s  9 and 10 sh a ll a lso  apply to  offences re fe rre d  
to  in  A rtic les  2 and 3 which have been committed in  the  te r r i to r y  of th e  High 
C ontracting Party  ag a in st whom they were d irec ted .
2. As regards th e  ap p lica tion  of A rtic le s  9 and 10, th e  High C ontracting  
P a rtie s  do not undertake to  pass a sentence exceeding th e  maximum sentence 
provided by th e  law of the  country where the offence was committed.
A rtic le  12
Each High C ontracting Party  s h a ll take on h is  own te r r i to r y  and w ith in  the 
lim its  of h is  own law and ad m in is tra tiv e  o rgan ization  th e  measures which he 
considers appropria te  fo r  th e  e ffe c tiv e  prevenion of a l l  a c t iv i t ie s  c o n tra ry  to  
the  purpose of th e  p resen t Convention.
A rtic le  13
1. V ithout prejudice to  th e  p ro v isions of head (5) of A rtic le  2, th e  carry in g , 
possession  and d is tr ib u tio n  of f ire -a rm s, o ther than  sm ooth-bore sp o rtin g -g u n s, 
and of ammunition sh a ll be subjected to  regu la tion . I t  s h a ll  be a punishable
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offence to  tra n s fe r ,  s e l l  o r d is tr ib u te  such arms or m unitions to  any person 
who does not hold such licence or make such d ec la ra tio n  as  may be requ ired  by 
domestic le g is la tio n  concerning the  possession  and carry ing  of such a r t ic le s :  
th i s  sh a ll  apply a lso  to  the  tra n s fe r ,  s a le  or d is tr ib u tio n  of explosives.
2. M anufacturers of f ire -a rm s, o th e r than  smooth-bore sp o rtin g  guns, s h a ll  be 
required to  mark each arm with a s e r ia l  number or o ther d is t in c t iv e  mark 
perm itting  i t  to  be id en tified ; both m anufacturers and r e ta i l e r s  s h a ll  be 
obliged to  keep a re g is te r  of th e  names and addresses of purchasers.
A rtic le  14
1. The follow ing a c ts  sh a ll  be punishable:
(a) Any fraudulent manufacture o r a l te ra t io n  of p a ssp o rts  or o ther 
equivalent documents;
(b) Bringing in to  th e  country, obtain ing  or being in  possession  of 
such forged or fa ls if ie d  documents knowing them to  be forged or 
fa ls if ie d ;
*
(c) Obtaining such documents by means of fa ls e  d ec la ra tio n s  or documents;
(d) V ilfu lly  using any such documents which a re  forged o r f a ls i f ie d  or 
were made out fo r  a person o ther than  th e  bearer.
2. The w ilfu l issue  of p assp o rts , o th e r equivalent documents, or v is a s  by 
competent o f f ic ia ls  to  persons known no t to  have th e  r ig h t  th e re to  under the  
laws or reg u la tio n s  applicable, w ith th e  object of a s s is t in g  any a c t iv i ty  
con trary  to  th e  purpose of the p re sen t Convention, sh a ll  a lso  be punishable.
3. The p ro v isions of the  p resen t A rtic le  s h a ll  apply ir re sp e c tiv e  of the  
national or fo reign  ch arac te r of th e  document.
A rtic le  15
1. R esults of th e  in v estig a tio n  of offences mentioned in  A rtic le s  2 and 3 and 
(where th e re  may be a connexion between the  offence and p rep ara tio n s  fo r  an a c t 
of te rro rism ) in  A rtic le  14 sh a ll  in  each country, sub jec t to  th e  p ro v is io n s  of 
i t s  law, be cen tra lized  in  an app ro p ria te  se rv ice .
2. Such se rv ice  sh a ll  be in  c lose con tac t:
(a) V ith th e  police a u th o ritie s  of th e  country;
(b) Vith th e  corresponding se rv ice s  in  o ther coun tries.
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3. It-sh a ll-fu rth e rm o re  b ring  to ge ther a l l  Inform ation calcu la ted  to  f a c i l i t a te  
the  prevention and punishment of th e  offences mentioned In A rtic le s  2 and 3 and 
(where th e re  may be a connexion between th e  offence and p rep a ra tio n s  fo r  an ac t 
of te rro r ism ) in  A rtic le  14; i t  s h a ll ,  as  f a r  a s  p o ssib le , keep in  c lo se  con tac t 
w ith th e  Jud ic ia l a u th o ritie s  of th e  country.
A rticle  16
Each serv ice , so  f a r  a s  i t  considers i t  d e s irab le  to  do so, s h a ll  n o tify  to  
th e  se rv ice s  o f th e  o ther coun tries, g iv ing  a l l  necessary  p a r tic u la rs : -
(a) Any a c t mentioned in  A rtic les  2 and 3, even i t  i t  has no t been 
ca rried  in to  e ffe c t, such n o tif ic a tio n  to  be accompanied by 
d esc rip tio n s , copies and photographs;
(b) Any search  fo r, any prosecution, a r r e s t ,  conviction o r expulsion of- 
persons g u ilty  of offences d e a lt w ith in  th e  p resen t Convention, the  
movements of such persons and any p e rtin e n t inform ation w ith regard  - 
to  them, as well a s  th e ir  d e sc rip tio n , f in g e r -p r in ts  and photographs;
(c) Discovery of documents, arms, app liances or o ther ob jects  connected 
with offences mentioned in  A rtic le s  2, 3, 13 and 14.
A rtic le  17
1. The High -Contracting P a rtie s  s h a ll  be bound fo execute l e t t e r s  of req u est 
re la tin g  to  offences re fe rre d  to  in  the  p re sen t Convention in  accordance w ith 
th e ir  dom estic law and. p ra c tic e  and any in te rn a tio n a l conventions concluded or 
to  be concluded by them.
2. The transm ission  of le t te r s  of req u est s h a ll  be effected :
(a) By d ire c t  communication between th e  ju d ic ia l a u th o ritie s ; j
(b> By d ire c t  correspondence between th e  M in isters of Ju s tic e  o f th e  two 
coun tries;
(c> By d ire c t  correspondence between th e  au th o rity  of th e  country  making 
the request and the  M inister of J u s tic e  o f th e  country to  which the  
request i s  made;
(d) Through the  diplom atic or consu lar re p re se n ta tiv e  of th e  country  
making the  request in the  country to  which the  request i s  made; th i s  
rep re sen ta tiv e  sh a ll  send th e  l e t t e r s  of request, e i th e r  d ire c t ly  or 
-through the  M inister fo r  Foreign A ffa irs f to  the  competent ju d ic ia l -
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a u th o rity  or to  the  a u th o rity  ind ica ted  by th e  Government of th e  
country to  which the  request i s  made and s h a ll  rece ive  the  papers 
c o n s ti tu tin g  th e  execution o f th e  le t te r s  of req u est from th i s  
au th o rity  e ith e r  d ire c tly  o r through the  M inister fo r  Foreign A ffa irs .
3. In cases (a> and (d), a copy of th e  l e t t e r s  of request s h a ll  always be sen t 
sim ultaneously to  th e  M inister of Ju s tic e  o f the  country to  which ap p lica tio n  i s  
made.
4. Unless o therw ise agreed, the l e t t e r s  o f request s h a ll  be drawn up in  the  
language of th e  a u th o rity  making th e  request, provided always th a t  the  country  
to  which th e  req u est i s  made may req u ire  a tra n s la t io n  in  i t s  own language, 
c e r tif ie d  c o rre c t by th e  au th o rity  making th e  request.
5. Each High C ontracting  Party s h a ll  n o tify  to  each of th e  o th e r High 
C ontracting P a r tie s  th e  method or methods of transm ission  mentioned above 
which he w ill recognize fo r  the le t t e r s  of request of th e  l a t t e r  High 
C ontracting P arty .
6. U ntil such n o tif ic a tio n  i s  made by a High C ontracting Party , h is  e x is tin g  
procedure in  regard  to  l e t t e r s  of request s h a ll  remain in  force.
7. Execution of le t t e r s  of request s h a ll  no t give r i s e  to  a claim  fo r 
reimbursement o f charges or expenses of any nature whatever o th e r than 
expenses o f ex p erts .
8. ITothing in  th e  p resen t a r t ic le  s h a ll  be construed as  an undertaking on the  
p a r t  of the  High C ontracting P a rtie s  to  adopt in  crim inal m a tte rs  any form or 
methods of p roof co n tra ry  to  th e ir  laws.
A rtic le  18
The p a r tic ip a tio n  of a High C ontracting  Party  in th e  p re sen t Convention 
s h a ll  not be in te rp re te d  a s  a ffec tin g  th a t  P a rty 's  a tt i tu d e  on th e  general 
question of th e  l im its  of crim inal ju r isd ic tio n  as a question o f in te rn a tio n a l 
law.
Source:. Robert A .Friedlander, Terrorism : Documents of In te rn a tio n a l and Local 
Control -  Volume 1. Oceana P ub lica tions, Dobbs Ferry, Mew York 1979, pp.253-258.
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Appendix,., 2
Convention fo r the, suppression of unlawful seizure o f .a i r c r a f t .  The 
Hague. December 1970
PREAMBLE
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS COM VERT IOI
CONSIDERING th a t  unlawful a c ts  of se izu re  or exercise  of co n tro l of 
a i r c r a f t  in  f l ig h t  jeopardize the sa fe ty  of persons and property , se rio u sly  
a ffe c t the  operation of a i r  se rv ices , and undermine the  confidence of th e  
peoples of th e  world in th e  sa fe ty  of c iv i l  av ia tion ;
CONSIDERING th a t th e  occurrence of such a c ts  i s  a m atter of grave concern; 
CONSIDER IMG th a t, fo r  the purpose of d e te rrin g  such a c ts , th e re  i s  an 
urgent need to  provide app ropria te  measures fo r  punishment of offenders;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
A rtic le  I
Any person who on board an a i r c r a f t  in  f l ig h t:
(a) unlawfully, by force o r  th re a t th e reo f, or by any o ther form of 
in tim idation , se izes, or exerc ises  co n tro l of, th a t  a i r c ra f t ,  o r a ttem p ts  to  
perform any such a c t, or
(b) is  an accomplice of a person who perform s or attem pts to  perform any 
such ac t
commits an offence (here inafte r re fe rred  to  as  "the offence").
A rtic le  II
Each C ontracting S ta te  undertakes to  make th e  offence punishable by severe 
p en a ltie s .
A rtic le  III
1. For the  purposes of th i s  Convention, an a i r c r a f t  i s  considered to  be in 
f l ig h t  a t  any tim e from the  moment when a l l  i t s  ex te rn a l doors a re  closed 
following embarkation u n til  the moment when any such door i s  opened fo r  
disem barkation. In the  case of a forced landing, the  f l ig h t  s h a ll  be deemed to  
continue u n til the  competent a u th o ritie s  take over the  re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  the  
a i r c r a f t  and fo r  persons and property  on board.
2. This Convention sh a ll not apply to  a i r c r a f t  used in  m ilita ry , customs or 
po lice  se rv ices .
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3. This Convention s h a ll  apply only i f  the  place of ta k e -o ff  or th e  p lace of 
actual landing of the  a i r c r a f t  on board which th e  offence i s  committed i s  
s itu a ted  outside the  te r r i to r y  of th e  S ta te  of r e g is tra t io n  of th a t  a i r c r a f t ;  i t  
s h a ll  be im m aterial whether th e  a i r c r a f t  i s  engaged in  an in te rn a tio n a l or 
domestic f l ig h t .
4. In th e  cases mentioned in  A rtic le  V, th is  Convention s h a ll  no t apply i f  the  
p lace of ta k e -o ff  and the  place of actua l landing of th e  a i r c r a f t  on board 
which the  offence i s  committed a re  s itu a ted  w ith in  th e  te r r i to r y  of th e  same 
S ta te  where th a t  S ta te  i s  one of those  re fe rred  to  in  th a t  A rtic le .
5. N otw ithstanding paragraphs 3 and 4 of th is  A rtic le , A rtic le s  VI, VII, VIII, 
and X s h a ll  apply whatever the  p lace of ta k e -o ff  o r th e  p lace of ac tu a l landing 
of th e  a ir c r a f t ,  i f  the  offender or th e  alleged offender i s  found in  th e  
te r r i to ry  of a S ta te  o ther than  th e  S ta te  of r e g is tra t io n  of th a t  a i r c r a f t .
A rtic le  IV
1. Each C ontracting S ta te  s h a ll  take  such measures a s  may be necessary  to  
e s ta b lish  i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over 'the  offence and any o ther a c t of violence 
ag a in st passengers or crew committed by the  alleged offender in  connection with
the offence, in  the  following cases:
(a> when the  offence i s  committed on board an a i r c r a f t  re g is te re d  in  th a t
S tate ;
Cb) when the  a i r c r a f t  on board which th e  offence i s  committed lands in 
i t s  te r r i to r y  with th e  alleged  offender s t i l l  on board;
(c) when the  offence i s  committed on board an a i r c r a f t  leased w ithout 
crew to  a lessee  who has h is  p rin c ip a l place of business or, i f  th e  lessee  
has no such place of business, h is  permanent residence, in  th a t  S ta te .
2. Each C ontracting S ta te  s h a ll likew ise take such measures as  may be 
necessary to  e s ta b lish  i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over the  offence in  th e  case where the  
alleged offender i s  p resen t in  i t s  te r r i to r y  and i t  does not e x tra d ite  him 
pursuant to  A rtic le  VIII to  any of th e  S ta te s  mentioned in  paragraph 1 of th is  
A rtic le .
3. This Convention does not exclude any crim inal ju r isd ic tio n  exercised  in  
accordance w ith na tiona l law.
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A rtic le  V
The C ontracting S ta te s  which e s ta b lis h  jo in t  a i r  t ra n s p o r t  opera ting  
o rgan iza tions o r in te rn a tio n a l operating  agencies, which operate a i r c r a f t  which 
a re  sub jec t to  jo in t or in te rn a tio n a l re g is tra t io n  sh a ll , by ap p ro p ria te  means, 
desig n a te  fo r  each a i r c r a f t  the  S ta te  among them which s h a ll  ex erc ise  th e  
ju r isd ic tio n  and have th e  a t tr ib u te s  of th e  S ta te  of re g is tra t io n  fo r  th e  
purpose of th is  Convention and s h a ll  give no tice  th e reo f to  th e  In te rn a tio n a l 
C iv il Aviation O rganization which sh a ll  communicate th e  no tice  to  a l l  S ta te  
P a r tie s  to  th i s  Convention.
A rtic le  VI
1. Upon being s a t is f ie d  th a t  th e  circum stances so w arrant, any C ontracting 
S ta te  in  the  te r r i to r y  of which th e  offender or the  alleged offender i s  p resen t, 
s h a l l  take  him in to  custody or take o ther measures to  ensure h is  presence. The 
custody and o ther measures s h a ll  be as provided in  th e  law of th a t  S ta te  but 
may only be continued fo r such tim e as  i s  necessary  to  enable any crim ina l or 
e x tra d itio n  proceedings to  be in s titu te d .
2. Such S ta te  s h a ll immediately make a p relim inary  enquiry in to  th e  fa c ts .
3. Any person in  custody pursuant to  paragraph 1 of th is  A rtic le  s h a ll  be 
a s s is te d  in  communicating immediately w ith th e  n eares t app ro p ria te  
re p re se n ta tiv e  of the  S ta te  of which he i s  a n a tiona l.
4. When a S ta te , pursuant to  th is  A rtic le , has taken a person in to  custody, i t  
s h a l l  immediately n o tify  th e  S ta te  of re g is tra t io n  of th e  a i r c r a f t ,  th e  S ta te  
mentioned in A rtic le  IV, paragraph 1(c), th e  S ta te  of n a tio n a lity  of th e  
detained  person and, i f  i t  considers i t  adv isab le , any o ther in te re s te d  S ta te s  
of th e  fa c t  th a t  such person i s  in  custody and of the  circum stances which 
w arran t h is  deten tion . The S ta te  which makes th e  prelim inary  enquiry 
contem plated in  paragraph 2 of th is  A rtic le  s h a ll  promptly re p o rt i t s  fin d in g s  
to  th e  sa id  S ta te s  and s h a ll in d ica te  whether i t  in tends to  ex erc ise  
ju r isd ic tio n .
A rtic le  VII
The C ontracting S ta te  in  th e  te r r i to r y  of which th e  alleged offender i s  
found sh a ll ,  i f  i t  does not e x tra d ite  him, be obliged, w ithout exception 
whatsoever and whether or not th e  offence was committed in  i t s  te r r i to r y ,  to
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submit th e  case  to  i t s  competent a u th o ritie s  fo r  th e  purpose of prosecution .
t
Those a u th o r it ie s  sh a ll  take  th e ir  decision in  th e  same manner as  in  the  case  
of any o rd inary  offence of a serious nature under th e  law of th a t  S ta te .
A rtic le  VIII
1. The offence sh a ll be deemed to  be included as  an e x tra d ita b le  offence in  any 
e x tra d itio n  t r e a ty  e x is tin g  between C ontracting S ta te s . C ontracting S ta te s  
undertake to  include th e  offence a s  an e x tra d ita b le  offence in  every ex tra d itio n  
tre a ty  to  be concluded between them.
2. I f  a C ontracting  S ta te  which makes ex tra d itio n  cond itiona l on th e  ex istence  
of a tre a ty  receives a request fo r ex trad itio n  from another C ontracting S ta te  
with which i t  has no ex trad itio n  tre a ty , i t  may a t  i t s  option consider th i s  
Convention as  th e  legal b a s is  fo r ex trad itio n  in  re sp ec t of th e  offence. 
E x trad ition  s h a l l  be subject to  th e  other co n d itions provided by th e  law of the  
requested S ta te .
3. C ontracting S ta te s  which do not make e x tra d itio n  cond itiona l on the  
ex istence of a tre a ty  s h a ll  recognize the  offence as  an ex tra d ita b le  offence 
between them selves subject to  the  conditions provided by the  law of the 
requested S ta te .
4. The offence s h a ll  be tre a ted , fo r  the  purpose of e x tra d itio n  between 
C ontracting S ta te s , as i f  i t  had been committed no t only in  th e  p lace in  which 
i t  occurred but a lso  in  th e  te r r i to r ie s  of th e  S ta te s  required  to  e s ta b lish  
th e ir  ju r isd ic tio n  in accordance w ith A rtic le  IV, paragraph 1.
A rtic le  IX
1. Vhen any of the  a c ts  mentioned in  A rtic le  1(a) has occurred or i s  about to  
occur C ontracting S ta te s  sh a ll take a l l  ap p ro p ria te  measures to  re s to re  co n tro l 
of the  a i r c r a f t  to  i t s  lawful commander or to  p reserv e  h is  co n tro l of th e  
a i r c ra f t .
2. In the  cases  contemplated by th e  preceding paragraph, any C ontracting S ta te  
in  which th e  a i r c r a f t  or i t s  passengers or crew a re  p re sen t s h a ll  f a c i l i t a te  the  
continuation  of the  journey of the  passengers and crew a s  soon as p rac ticab le , 
and s h a ll  w ithout delay re tu rn  the a i r c r a f t  and i t s  cargo to  th e  persons 
law fully e n ti t le d  to  possession.
-  358 -
A rtic le  X
1. C ontracting S ta te s  s h a ll  affo rd  one another th e  g re a te s t measure of 
a ss is tan c e  in  connection w ith crim inal proceedings brought in  re sp ec t of th e  
offence and o th e r a c ts  mentioned in  A rtic le  IV. The law of the  S ta te  requested  
sh a ll  apply in  a l l  cases.
2. The p rov ision  of paragraph 1 of th is  A rtic le  s h a ll  no t a f fe c t o b lig a tio n s  
under any o ther tre a ty , b i la te ra l  or m u ltila te ra l, which governs or w ill govern, 
in  whole or in  p a r t, mutual a ss is tan c e  in  crim inal m atte rs .
A rtic le  XI
Each C ontracting S ta te  sh a ll in  accordance w ith i t s  n a tio n a l law re p o rt to  
th e  Council of the  In te rn a tio n a l C iv il Aviation O rganization a s  promptly as 
p o ssib le  any re lev an t inform ation in  i t s  possession  concerning:
(a) the  circum stances of the offence;
(b) the  ac tio n  taken pursuant to  A rtic le  IX;
(c) the  measures taken in  re la tio n  to  th e  offender or th e  alleged
*
offender, and, in  p a rtic u la r , th e  re s u lts  of any ex tra d itio n  proceedings or 
o ther leg a l proceedings.
A rtic le  XII
1. Any d ispu te  between two or more C ontracting S ta te s  concerning the  
in te rp re ta tio n  o r ap p lica tion  of th is  Convention which cannot be s e t t le d  through 
n ego tia tion , s h a ll ,  a t  th e  request of one of them, be subm itted to  a rb itra tio n .
If- w ithin  s ix  months from the  date  of the  request fo r  a rb i tra t io n  the  P a r tie s  
are unable to  agree on the  organization of th e  a rb i tra t io n , any one of those 
P a rtie s  may re fe r  the  d ispu te  to  the  In te rn a tio n a l Court of Ju s tic e  by request 
in  conform ity w ith the  S ta tu te  of the  Court.
2. Each S ta te  may a t  th e  time of signatu re  or r a t i f ic a t io n  of th i s  Convention 
or accession th e re to , declare th a t  i t  does no t consider i t s e l f  bound by th e  
preceding paragraph. The o ther C ontracting S ta te s  s h a ll  not be bound by the  
preceding paragraph w ith resp ec t to  any C ontracting S ta te  having made such- a 
reserv a tio n .
3. Any C ontracting S ta te  having made a re se rv a tio n  in  accordance w ith th e  
preceding paragraph may a t  any tim e withdraw th i s  re se rv a tio n  by n o tif ic a tio n  
tD th e  D epositary Governments.
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Article XIII
1. This Convention sh a ll  be open fo r  s ig natu re  a t  The Hague on 16 December 
1970, by S ta te s  p a r tic ip a tin g  in th e  In te rn a tio n a l Conference on A ir Law held a t  
The Hague from 1 to  16 December 1970 (here in a fte r re fe rred  to  a s  The Hague 
Conference). A fter 31 December 1970, the  Convention sh a ll  be open to  a l l  S ta te s  
fo r  s ig n a tu re  in  Moscow, London and Washington. Any S ta te  which does no t s ig n  
th i s  Convention before i t s  en try  in to  force in  accordance w ith paragraph 3 of 
th i s  A rtic le  may accede to  i t  a t  any time.
2. This Convention s h a ll be subject to  r a t i f ic a t io n  by the  s ig n a to ry  S ta te s . 
Instrum ents of r a t i f ic a t io n  and instrum ents of accession s h a ll  be deposited 
w ith the  Governments of th e  Union of Soviet S o c ia lis t  Republics, th e  United 
Kingdom of Great B rita in  and Northern Ireland , and th e  United S ta te s  of America, 
which a re  hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Convention sh a ll  en ter in to  force th i r ty  days following th e  date of the
deposit of instrum ents of ra tif ic a tio n  by ten  S ta te s  s ig n a to ry  to  th is
*
Convention which p a rtic ip a ted  in The Hague Conference.
4. For o ther S ta te s , th is  Convention sh a ll e n te r in to  fo rce on the  date of 
en try  in to  fo rce  of th is  Convention in accordance w ith paragraph 3 of th i s  
A rtic le , o r th i r ty  days following the  date of deposit of th e ir  instrum ents of 
r a t i f ic a t io n  o r accession, whichever is  la te r .
5. The D epositary Governments sh a ll promptly inform a l l  s ig n a to ry  and acceding 
S ta te s  Df th e  date  of each signature, the  date  of d ep o sit of each instrum ent of 
r a t i f ic a t io n  or accession, the date of en try  in to  force of th i s  Convention, and 
o ther n o tices.
6. As soon as  th i s  Convention comes in to  fo rce , i t  s h a ll  be re g is te re d  by the  
D epositary Governments pursuant to  A rtic le  102 of the  C harter of th e  United 
Nations and pursuant to  A rtic le  83 of th e  Convention on In te rn a tio n a l C iv il 
Aviation (Chicago, 1944).
A rticle  XIV
1. Any C ontracting  S ta te  may denounce th is  Convention by w ritten  n o tif ic a tio n  
to  the  D epositary Governments.
2. Denunciation sh a ll take e ffec t s ix  months following the  date  on which 
n o fif ic a tio n  i s  received by the Depositary Governments.
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I I  VITRESS VHEREOF th e  undersigned P len ip o ten tia rie s , being duly 
au thorised  th e re to  by th e i r  Governments, have signed th i s  Convention.
DORE a t  The Hague, th i s  s ix teen th  day of December, one thousand nine 
hundred and seventy, in  th re e  o rig in a ls , each being drawn up in  four au then tic  
te x ts  in the  English, French, Russian and Spanish languages.
Source: Robert A .Frledlander, Terrorism : Documents of In te rn a tio n a l and Local 
Control -  Volume 2 . Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry , Hew York 1979, pp.101-105.
S ta te s  s ig n in g  and/or ra tify in g  th e  Convention were recorded in  an annex to  the
Report of the  UR Secretary-G eneral on the  sub jec t in September 1983, reproduced
in  Yonah Alexander (ed.), In te rn a tio n a l Terrorism : P o li t ic a l  and Legal Documents.
M artinus R ijhoff, Dordrecht, R etherlands 1992, pp.199-201. By th e  tim e of the
re p o rt, 126 s ta te s  has signed and/or r a t i f ie d  th e  Convention, including such
s ta te s  as Iran , Iraq, Libya, and Syria .
*
Appendix J3
Convention fo r the  Suppression of unlawful a c ts  a g a in s t th e  sa fe ty  of 
civ il aviation, .Montreal, September 1971 
The S ta te  P a r tie s  to  th is  convention
CORSIDERIRG th a t  unlawful a c ts  ag a in s t th e  sa fe ty  of c iv i l  av ia tio n  
jeopardize th e  sa fe ty  of persons and property , se rio u sly  a ffe c t th e  operation  of 
a i r  se rv ices , and undermine the  confidence of th e  peoples of th e  world in  the  
sa fe ty  of c iv i l  av iation ;
CORSIDERIRG th a t  th e  occurrence of such a c ts  i s  a m atter of grave concern; 
CORSIDERIRG th a t, fo r  the purpose of d e te rrin g  such a c ts , th e re  i s  an 
urgent need to  provide app rop ria te  measures fo r  punishment of offenders;
Have agreed as follows:
A rtic le  1
1. Any person commits an offence i f  he unlaw fully and in ten tio n a lly :
(a) perform s an a c t of violence a g a in s t a person on board an a i r c r a f t  in  
f l ig h t  i f  th a t  a c t i s  lik e ly  to  endanger th e  sa fe ty  of th a t  a i r c r a f t ;  or
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(b) d estro y s  an a i r c r a f t  in  se rv ice  or causes damage to  such an a i r c r a f t  
which renders  i t  incapable of f l ig h t  or which i s  lik e ly  to  endanger i t s  
sa fe ty  in  f l ig h t;  or
(c> p laces or causes to  be placed on an a i r c r a f t  in  se rv ice , by any means 
whatsoever, a device or substance which i s  lik e ly  to  destroy  th a t  a i r c r a f t ,  
or to  cause damage to  i t  which renders i t  incapable of f l ig h t ,  o r to  cause 
damage to  i t  which i s  lik e ly  to  endanger i t s  sa fe ty  in  f l ig h t;  or 
Cd) d estro y s  or damages a i r  navigation f a c i l i t i e s  o r in te r fe re s  w ith 
th e ir  operation , i f  any such a c t i s  lik e ly  to  endanger the  sa fe ty  of 
a i r c r a f t  in  f lig h t;  or
(e) communicates inform ation which he knows to  be fa lse , thereby 
endangering the sa fe ty  of an a i r c r a f t  in  f l ig h t.
2. Any person a lso  commits an offence i f  he:
(a) a ttem p ts to  commit any of the offences mentioned in  paragraph 1 of 
th is  A rtic le ; or
*
(b) i s  an accomplice of a person who commits or a ttem pts to  commit any 
such offence
A rtic le  2
For the  purposes of th i s  Convention:
(a) an a i r c r a f t  i s  considered to  be in  f l ig h t  a t  any time from th e  moment 
when a l l  i t s  ex tern al doors a re  closed following embarkation u n ti l  the  
moment when any such door i s  opened fo r disem barkation; in  th e  case of a 
forced landing, the  f l ig h t  s h a ll  be deemed to  continue u n til  the  competent 
a u th o r itie s  take over the  re sp o n s ib il ity  fo r  the  a i r c r a f t  and fo r persons 
and property  on board;
(b> an a i r c r a f t  i s  considered to  be in  se rv ice  from the  beginning of the  
p re f lig h t p repara tion  of the  a i r c r a f t  by ground personnel or by th e  crew 
fo r a sp e c if ic  f l ig h t  u n til  tw enty-four hours a f te r  any landing; th e  period 
of se rv ice  sh a ll , in  any event, extend fo r  the  e n tire  period during which 
the a i r c r a f t  i s  in  f l ig h t  as  defined in  paragraph <a) of th i s  A rtic le .
A rtic le  3
Each C ontracting S ta te  undertakes to  make the  offences mentioned in  
A rtic le  1 punishable by severe p en a ltie s .
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A rtic le  4
1. This Convention s h a ll  not apply to  a i r c r a f t  used in  m ilita ry , customs or 
po lice  se rv ice s .
2. In th e  cases  contemplated in  subparagraphs (a), <b), (c) and <e> of 
paragraph 1 of A rtic le  1, th is  Convention s h a ll  apply, irre sp e c tiv e  of whether 
th e  a i r c r a f t  i s  engaged in  an in te rn a tio n a l o r domestic f l ig h t ,  only i f :
(a> th e  p lace of ta k e -o ff  o r landing, ac tu a l or intended, Df the  a i r c r a f t  
i s  s i tu a te d  outside the  te r r i to r y  of the  S ta te  of re g is tra t io n  of th a t  
a i r c r a f t ;  o r
(b> th e  offence i s  committed in  the  te r r i to r y  of a S ta te  o ther than  the  
S ta te  of re g is tra t io n  of the  a i r c r a f t .
3. N otw ithstanding paragraph 2 of th i s  A rtic le , in  th e  cases contem plated in  
subparagraphs (a), Cb), <c) and (e) of paragraph 1 of A rtic le  1, th is  Convention 
sh a ll  a lso  apply i f  the  offender or the  alleged offender i s  found in  the  
te r r i to r y  of a S ta te  o ther than th e  s ta te  of r e g is tr a t io n  of th e  a ir c r a f t .
4. Vith re sp e c t to  the  S ta te s  mentioned in  A rtic le  9 and in  th e  cases 
mentioned in  subparagraphs <a), (b), <c) and (e) of paragraph 1 of A rtic le  1, 
th is  Convention sh a ll  not apply i f  th e  p laces re fe rre d  to  in  subparagraph (a> 
of paragraph 2 of th is  A rtic le  a re  s itu a ted  w ith in  the  te r r i to r y  of the  same 
S ta te  where th a t  S ta te  i s  one of those  re fe rred  to  in  A rtic le  9, un less th e  
offence i s  committed or the  offender or alleged offender i s  found in  th e  
te r r i to r y  o f a S ta te  o ther than th a t  S ta te .
5. In th e  cases contemplated in  subparagraph <d> of paragraph 1 of A rtic le  1, 
th is  Convention s h a ll  apply only i f  the  a i r  nav igation  f a c i l i t i e s  a re  used in  
in te rn a tio n a l a i r  navigation.
6. The p ro v is io n s  of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of th i s  A rtic le  s h a ll  a lso  apply 
in  th e  cases contem plated in paragraph 2 of A rtic le  1.
A rtic le  5
1. Each C ontracting  S ta te  sh a ll take  such measures a s  may be necessary  to  
e s ta b lish  i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over th e  offences in  th e  follow ing cases:
(a> when th e  offence is  committed in  th e  t e r r i to r y  of th a t  S tate ;
(b) when th e  offence is  committed ag a in s t or on board an a i r c r a f t  
re g is te re d  in  th a t  S tate;
-  363 -
(c) when th e  a i r c r a f t  on board which th e  offence i s  committed lands in  
i t s  t e r r i to r y  w ith th e  alleged offender s t i l l  on board;
(d) when th e  offence i s  committed a g a in s t or on board an a i r c r a f t  leased 
w ithout crew to  a lessee  who has h is  p rin c ip a l p lace of business o r, i f  
th e  le ssee  has no such place of business, h is  permanent residence, in  th a t  
S ta te .
2. Each C ontracting  S ta te  sh a ll likew ise take such measures as  may be 
necessary  to  e s ta b lis h  i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over th e  offences mentioned in  A rtic le  1 
paragraph 1 <a), (b) and (c), and in  A rtic le  1, paragraph 2, in  so f a r  as th a t  
paragraph re la te s  to  those  offences, in  the  case  where th e  a lleged  offender i s  
p resen t in  i t s  te r r i to r y  and i t  does no t e x tra d ite  him pursuant to  A rtic le  8 to  
any of th e  S ta te s  mentioned in paragraph 1 of th i s  A rtic le .
3. This Convention does not exclude any crim inal ju r isd ic tio n  exercised  in  
accordance w ith n a tio n a l law.
A rtic le  6
1. Upon being s a t is f ie d  th a t  the  circum stances so w arrant, any C ontracting 
S ta te  in  th e  te r r i to r y  of which th e  offender or th e  alleged offender i s  p resen t, 
sh a ll  take  him in to  custody or take o ther measures to  ensure h is  presence. The 
custody and o th e r measures sh a ll be as  provided in  the  law of th a t  S ta te  but 
may only be continued fo r such tim e as i s  necessary  to  enable any crim inal or 
ex tra d itio n  proceedings to  be in s titu te d .
2. Such S ta te  s h a ll  immediately make a p relim inary  enquiry in to  th e  fa c ts .
3. Any person in  custody pursuant to  paragraph 1 of th i s  A rtic le  sh a ll  be 
a s s is te d  in  communicating immediately with th e  n eares t app ro p ria te  
re p re se n ta tiv e  of the S ta te  of which he i s  a n a tio n a l.
4. When a S ta te , pursuant to  th is  A rtic le , has taken a person in to  custody, i t  
sh a ll  immediately n o tify  th e  S ta te s  mentioned in  A rtic le  5, paragraph 1, the  
S ta te  of n a tio n a lity  of the  detained person and, i f  i t  considers  i t  advisable , 
any o th er in te re s te d  S ta te s  of the  fa c t  th a t  such person i s  in  custody and of 
the  circum stances which w arrant h is  deten tion . The S ta te  which makes the  
prelim inary  enquiry contemplated in  paragraph 2 of th is  A rtic le  s h a ll  promptly 
re p o rt i t s  f in d in g s  to  th e  sa id  S ta te s  and sh a ll  in d ica te  whether i t  in tends to  
exercise  ju r isd ic tio n .
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A rtic le  7
The C ontracting S ta te  in th e  te r r i to r y  o f which the  alleged offender i s  
found s h a ll ,  i f  i t  does no t e x tra d ite  him, be obliged, w ithout exception 
whatsoever and whether or not the  offence was committed in  i t s  t e r r i to r y ,  to  
subm it th e  case to  i t s  competent a u th o r itie s  fo r  the  purpose of prosecu tion . 
Those a u th o r itie s  sh a ll take  th e ir  decision  in  th e  same manner as  in  th e  case 
of any ord inary  offence of a se rio u s  nature  under th e  law of th a t  S ta te .
A rtic le  8
1. The offences s h a ll  be deemed to  be included a s  ex tra d ita b le  offences in  any 
e x tra d itio n  tre a ty  ex is tin g  between C ontracting  S ta te s . C ontracting S ta te s  
undertake to  include th e  offences as  e x tra d ita b le  offences in every e x tra d itio n  
t r e a ty  to  be concluded between them.
2. If a C ontracting S ta te  which makes e x tra d itio n  cond itional on th e  ex istence  
of a t re a ty  receives a request fo r  e x tra d itio n  from another C ontracting  S ta te  
w ith which i t  has no e x tra d itio n  tre a ty , i t  may a t  i t s  option consider th i s  
Convention as th e  legal b a s is  fo r  e x tra d itio n  in  re sp ec t of the  offences. 
E x trad itio n  s h a ll  be sub ject to  the o ther co n d itions provided by the  law of the  
requested  S ta te .
3. C ontracting S ta te s  which do not make e x tra d itio n  cond itional on the  
ex isten ce  of a t re a ty  s h a ll  recognize the  o ffences as ex tra d ita b le  offences 
between them selves sub ject to  th e  cond itions provided by the  law of the  
requested  S ta te .
4. Each of th e  offences sh a ll be tre a ted , fo r  th e  purpose of e x tra d itio n  
between C ontracting S ta te s , as i f  i t  had been committed not only in  th e  place 
in  which i t  occurred but a lso  in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  of th e  S ta te s  requ ired  to  
e s ta b lis h  th e i r  ju r isd ic tio n  in accordance w ith A rtic le  5, paragraph 1 (b), (c) 
and (d).
A rtic le  9
The C ontracting S ta te s  which e s ta b lish  jo in t  a i r  tra n sp o r t opera ting  
o rgan iza tions o r in te rn a tio n a l operating  agencies, which operate a i r c r a f t  which 
a re  sub jec t to  jo in t or in te rn a tio n a l r e g is tra t io n , sh a ll , by ap p ro p ria te  means, 
designa te  fo r  each a i r c r a f t  the  S ta te  among them which sh a ll ex erc ise  th e  
ju r isd ic tio n  and have th e  a t tr ib u te s  of the  S ta te  of re g is tra t io n  fo r  th e
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purpose of th i s  Convention and s h a ll  give n o tice  th e reo f to  th e  In te rn a tio n a l 
C iv il Aviation O rganization which sh a ll communicate th e  no tice  to  a l l  S ta te s  
P a rtie s  to  th i s  Convention.
A rtic le  10
1. C ontracting S ta te s  s h a ll ,  in  accordance w ith in te rn a tio n a l and n a tio n a l law, 
endeavour to  tak e  a l l  p ra c tica b le  measures fo r  th e  purpose of p reven ting  the 
offences mentioned in  A rtic le  1.
2. Vhen, due to  the  commission of one of th e  offences mentioned in  A rtic le  1, a 
f l ig h t  has been delayed or in te rru p ted , any C ontracting S ta te  in  whose te r r i to r y  
th e  a i r c r a f t  or passengers or crew are  p re sen t s h a ll  f a c i l i t a te  th e  continuation  
of th e  journey of the  passengers and crew as soon a s  p rac ticab le , and s h a ll  
w ithout delay re tu rn  th e  a i r c r a f t  and the cargo to  th e  persons law fully  e n title d  
to  possession .
A rtic le  11
1. C ontracting S ta te s  s h a ll  a fford  one another th e  g re a te s t measure of 
a ss is tan c e  in  connection w ith crim inal proceedings brought in  re sp ec t of the 
offences. The law of th e  S ta te  requested s h a ll apply in  a l l  cases.
2. The p ro v is io n s  of paragraph 1 of th is  A rtic le  s h a ll  not a f fe c t  ob lig a tio n s  
under any o ther tre a ty , b i la te ra l  or m u ltila te ra l, which governs or w ill govern, 
in  whole or in  p a r t ,  mutual a ss is tan c e  in crim inal m atte rs .
A rtic le  12
Any C ontracting S ta te  having reason to  believe th a t  one of th e  offences 
mentioned in  A rtic le  1 w ill be committed s h a ll ,  in  accordance w ith i t s  na tiona l 
law, fu rn ish  any re lev an t inform ation in .i 'te  possession  to  those  S ta te s  which 
i t  believes would be the  S ta te s  mentioned in  A rtic le  5, paragraph 1.
A rtic le  13
Each co n trac tin g  S ta te  s h a ll  in  accordance w ith i t s  n a tio n a l law re p o rt to  
th e  Council of the  In te rn a tio n a l C ivil Aviation O rganization as  prom ptly as 
p o ssib le  any re lev an t inform ation in  i t s  possession  concerning:
(a) the  circum stances of the  offence;
(b) the  ac tio n  taken pursuant to  A rtic le  10, paragraph 2;
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(c) the  measures taken in  re la tio n  to  th e  offender o r the  alleged 
offender and, in  p a r tic u la r , the  re s u l ts  of any e x tra d itio n  proceedings o r o ther 
legal proceedings.
A rtic le  14
1. Any d ispu te  between two or more C ontracting S ta te s  concerning the 
in te rp re ta tio n  or ap p lica tion  of th i s  Convention which cannot be s e tt le d  through 
nego tia tion , s h a ll , a t  th e  request of one of them, be subm itted to  a rb i tra t io n .
If  w ithin  s ix  months from the  da te  of the  request fo r  a rb i tr a t io n  the  P a rtie s  
a re  unable to  agree on th e  o rganization  of th e  a rb i tra t io n , any one of those 
P a rtie s  may re fe r  the  d ispu te  to  th e  In te rn a tio n a l Court of Ju s tic e  by request 
in  conform ity w ith the S ta tu te  of th e  Court.
2. Each S ta te  may a t  the  tim e of signatu re  or r a t i f ic a t io n  of th is  Convention 
or accession th e re to , declare th a t  i t  does no t consider i t s e l f  bound by the  
preceding paragraph. The o ther C ontracting S ta te s  s h a ll  no t be bound by the  
preceding paragraph w ith re sp ec t to  any C ontracting S ta te  having made such a 
re serv a tio n .
3. Any C ontracting S ta te  having made a re se rv a tio n  in  accordance w ith the  
preceding paragraph may a t  any tim e withdraw th i s  re se rv a tio n  by n o tif ic a tio n  
to  the  D epositary Governments.
A rtic le  15
1. This Convention sh a ll be open fo r  s ignatu re  a t  Montreal on 23 September 
1971, by S ta te s  p a r tic ip a tin g  in  th e  In te rn a tio n a l Conference on Air Law held a t  
Montreal from 8 to  23 September 1971 (h ere in a fte r re fe rre d  to  as  the  Montreal 
Conference). A fter 10 October 1971, the  Convention s h a ll  be open to  a l l  S ta te s  
fo r s ig n a tu re  in  Moscow, London and Washington. Any S ta te  which does not sign  
th is  Convention before i t s  en try  in to  force in  accordance w ith paragraph 3 of 
th is  A rtic le  may accede to  i t  a t  any time.
2. This Convention sh a ll be sub jec t to  r a t i f ic a t io n  by th e  s ig n a to ry  S ta te s . 
Instrum ents of r a t i f ic a t io n  and instrum ents of accession  s h a ll be deposited 
with th e  Governments of the  Union of Soviet S o c ia lis t  Republics, the  United 
Kingdom of Great B rita in  and no rthern  Ireland, and th e  United S ta te s  of America, 
which a re  hereby designated the  Depositary Governments.
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3. This Convention s h a ll  en te r in to  force th i r ty  days follow ing th e  date  of the  
d ep o sit of instrum ents of r a t i f ic a t io n  by ten  S ta te s  s ig n a to ry  to  th i s  
Convention which p a rtic ip a te d  in  th e  Montreal Conference.
4. For o ther S ta te s , th i s  Convention s h a ll  en te r in to  fo rce on th e  date  of 
e n try  in to  force of th i s  Convention in  accordance with paragraph 3 o f th i s
- A rtic le , or th i r ty  days following the  date of deposit of th e ir  in strum ents of 
r a t i f i c a t io n  o r accession , whichever i s  la te r .
5. The Depositary Governments s h a ll  promptly inform a l l  s ig n a to ry  and acceding
S ta te s  of the  date  of each signatu re , the  date  of d eposit of each instrum ent of
ra t i f ic a t io n  o r accession, the  date  of en try  in to  fo rce  of th i s  Convention, and 
o th er no tices.
6. As soon as th i s  Convention comes in to  fo rce, i t  sh a ll  be re g is te re d  by the 
D epositary Governments pursuant to  A rtic le  102 of the  C harter of th e  United 
R ations and pursuant to  A rtic le  83 of the  Convention on In te rn a tio n a l C ivil 
Aviation (Chicago, 1944).
A rtic le  16
1. Any C ontracting S ta te  may denounce th i s  Convention by w ritten  n o tif ic a tio n  
to  th e  D epositary Governments.
2. Denunciation sh a ll  take e ffe c t s ix  months following the  d a te  on which 
n o tif ic a tio n  i s  received by th e  Depositary Governments.
IM VITMESS VHEREOF the  undersigned P len ip o ten tia rie s , being duly 
authorized th e re to  by th e i r  Governments, have signed th i s  Convention.
DOME a t  Montreal, th i s  tw en ty -th ird  day of September, one thousand nine 
hundred and seventy-one, in  th ree  o rig in a ls , each being drawn up in  four 
au then tic  te x ts  in  the  English, French, Russian and Spanish languages.
Source: Robert A .Friedlander, Terrorism : Documents of Inte rn a tio n a l and Local 
Control -  Volume 2 . Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry , Mew York 1979, pp.107-112.
S ta te s  signing  and/or ra tify in g  th e  Convention were recorded in  an annex to  the  
Report of the  UM Secretary-G eneral on th e  subject in  September 1983, reproduced 
in Yonah Alexander (ed.), In te rn a tio n a l T errorism: P o li tic a l and Legal Documents.
t
M artinus Mijhoff, Dordrecht, M etherlands 1992, pp.195-197. By th e  tim e of the
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rep o rt, 125 s ta te s  has signed and/or r a t i f ie d  th e  Convention, including such 
s ta te s  a s  Iran , Iraq , Libya, and S yria . ■
Appendix 4
In te rn a tio n a l Convention ag a in s t th e  Taking of Hostages
A rtic le  1
1. Any person who se izes or d e ta in s  and th re a ten s  to  k i l l ,  to  in ju re  or to  
continue to  de ta in  another person (h ere in a fte r re fe rred  to  as the  “hostage") in  
order to  compel a th ird  p a rty , namely, a S ta te , an in te rn a tio n a l 
intergovernm ental organization, a n a tu ra l or ju r id ic a l person, or a group of 
persons, to  do or to  ab sta in  from doing any a c t as an e x p lic it  or im p lic it 
condition fo r  th e  re lease  of the hostage commits the  offence of tak ing  of 
hostages ("hostage-tak ing"> w ithin  th e  meaning of th is  Convention.
2. Any person who:
(a) A ttem pts to  commit an a c t of hostage-tak ing , or
(b) P a r tic ip a te s  as an accomplice of anyone who commits or a ttem pts to  
commit an a c t of hostage-tak ing  likew ise commits an offence fo r  the  purposes of 
th is  Convention.
A rtic le  2
Each S ta te  P arty  sh a ll make th e  offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 punishable by 
appropria te  p e n a ltie s  which take in to  account th e  grave nature  of those 
offences.
A rtic le  3
1. The S ta te  Party  in  the  te r r i to ry  of which the  hostage i s  held by the  
offender s h a l l  take a l l  measures i t  considers app ro p ria te  to  ease the  s itu a tio n  
of the  hostage, in  p a rtic u la r , to  secure h is  re lease  and, a f te r  h is  re lease , to  
f a c i l i ta te ,  when re levan t, h is  departure.
2. I f  any object which the  offender has obtained as  a r e s u lt  of the  tak ing  of 
hostages comes in to  the  custody of a S ta te  P arty , th a t  S ta te  p a rty  sh a ll re tu rn  
i t  as soon as  p o ssib le  to  the  hostage or th e  th ir d  p a rty  re fe rred  to  in  a r t i c le  
1, as th e  case may be, or to  the app ro p ria te  a u h to r itie s  thereo f.
A rtic le  4
S ta te  P a r tie s  s h a ll co-operate in  th e  prevention of th e  offences s e t  fo r th  in  
a r t ic le  1, p a r t ic u la r ly  by:
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Ca) Talcing a l l  p rac ticab le  measures to  preven t p rep ara tio n s  in  th e ir  
re sp ec tiv e  t e r r i t o r ie s  fo r  the  commission of those  offences w ith in  or outside  
th e i r  t e r r i to r ie s ,  including measures to  p ro h ib it  in  th e ir  t e r r i t o r ie s  i l le g a l  
a c t iv i t ie s  of. persons, groups and o rgan izations th a t  encourage, in s tig a te , 
organize or engage in  th e  perp e tra tio n  of a c ts  of tak ing  of hostages;
<b> Exchanging inform ation and co -o rd in a tin g  th e  tak ing  of ad m in is tra tiv e  and 
o ther measures a s  app rop ria te  to  prevent th e  commission of those  offences.
A rtic le  5
1. Each S ta te  Party  s h a ll  take such measures as  may be necessary  to  e s ta b lish  
i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over any of the offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 which are  
committed:
Ca) In i t s  te r r i to r y  or on board a sh ip  o r a i r c r a f t  re g is te red  in  th a t  S ta te ;
(b) By any of i t s  n a tio n a ls  or, i f  th a t  S ta te  considers i t  app ro p ria te , by
those  s ta te le s s  persons who have hab itua l residence  in  i t s  te r r i to ry ;
Cc) In order to  compel th a t  S ta te  to  do o r a b sta in  from doing any ac t; Dr
(d) Vith re sp ec t to  a hostage'who is  a n a tio n a l of th a t  S ta te , i f  th a t  S ta te
considers  i t  app rop ria te .
2. Each S ta te  Party  s h a ll  likew ise take such measures as  may be necessary  to  
e s ta b lish  i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over the  offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 in  cases 
where the  alleged offender i s  p resen t in  i t s  te r r i to r y  and i t  does not e x tra d ite  
him to  any of th e  S ta te s  mentioned in paragraph 1 of th is  a r t ic le .
3. This Convention does not exclude any crim ina l ju r isd ic tio n  exercised  in 
accordance with in te rn a l law.
A rtic le  6
1. Upon being s a t is f ie d  th a t  the circum stances so w arrant, any S ta te  P arty  in  
the  te r r i to r y  of which the  alleged offender i s  p resen t s h a ll , in  accordance w ith 
i t s  laws, take  him in to  custody or take o th e r measures to  ensure h is  presence 
fo r such tim e as  i s  necessary to  enable any crim inal or e x tra d itio n  proceedings 
to  be in s ti tu te d . That S ta te  Party sh a ll immediately make a p relim inary  inquiry  
in to  th e  fa c ts .
2. The custody or o ther measures re fe rred  to  in  paragraph 1 of th i s  a r t ic le  
s h a ll be n o tif ied  w ithout delay d ire c tly  or through th e  Secretary-G eneral of the  
United Nations to :
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(a) The S ta te  where the  offence was committed;
(b) The S ta te  ag a in s t which compulsion has been d irec ted  or attem pted;
(c) The S ta te  of which th e  national or ju r id ic a l  person ag a in s t whom
compulsion has been d irec ted  or attem pted i s  a n a tio n a l;
(d) The S ta te  of which the  hostage is  a n a tio n a l or in  th e  te r r i to r y  of which
he has h is  hab itua l residence;
(e) The S ta te  of which th e  alleged offender i s  a na tio n a l or, i f  he i s  a
s ta te le s s  person, in  th e  te r r i to ry  of which he has h is  hab itua l residence;
(f) The in te rn a tio n a l intergovernm ental o rgan ization  a g a in s t which compulsion 
has been d irec ted  or attem pted;
(g) All o ther S ta te s  concerned.
3. Any person regard ing  whom the  measures re fe rre d  to  in paragraph 1 of th i s  
a r t ic le  a re  being taken sh a ll  be en title d :
(a) To communicate w ithout delay with th e  n e a res t approp ria te  rep re sen ta tiv e  
of the  S ta te  of which he i s  a na tiona l o r which i s  otherw ise e n ti t le d  to
e s ta b lish  such communication or', i f  he i s  a s ta te le s s  person, th e  S ta te  in the
te r r i to r y  of which he has h is  hab itual residence;
(b) To be v is ite d  by a rep resen ta tiv e  of th a t  S ta te .
4. The r ig h ts  re fe rred  to  in  paragraph 3 of th i s  a r t ic le  s h a ll  be exercised in 
conform ity w ith the  laws and regu la tions of th e  S ta te  in  the  te r r i to r y  of which 
the  alleged  offender i s  p resen t, subject to  th e  proviso , however, th a t  the  sa id  
laws and reg u la tio n s  must enable fu ll  e f fe c t to  be given to  the  purposes fo r 
which th e  r ig h ts  accorded under paragraph 3 of th i s  a r t ic le  are  intended.
5. The p ro v is io n s  of paragraphs 3 and 4 of th i s  a r t ic le  s h a ll  be without 
prejudice to  th e  r ig h t of any S ta te  Party  having a claim to  ju r isd ic tio n  in  
accordance w ith paragraph 1 (b) of a r t ic le  5 to  in v ite  th e  In te rn a tio n a l 
Committee of the  Red Cross to  communicate w ith and v i s i t  the alleged  offender.
6. The S ta te  which makes the prelim inary inqu iry  contem plated in paragraph 1 
of th i s  a r t ic le  sh a ll  promptly rep o rt i t s  f in d in g s  to  the  S ta te s  or o rganization  
re fe rred  to  in  paragraph 2 of th is  a r t ic le  and in d ica te  whether i t  in tends to  
exercise  ju risd ic tio n .
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A rtic le  7
The S ta te  P arty  where th e  alleged offender i s  prosecuted sh a ll , in accordance 
with i t s  laws, communicate the f in a l  outcome of th e  proceedings to  the  
Secretary-G eneral of th e  United JTations, who s h a ll  tra n sm it the  inform ation to  
the  o ther S ta te s  concerned and th e  in te rn a tio n a l intergovernm ental o rgan izations 
concerned.
A rtic le  8
1. The S ta te  P arty  in  the  te r r i to r y  of which th e  alleged  offender i s  found 
sh a ll , i f  i t  does not e x tra d ite  him, be obliged, w ithout exception whatsoever 
and whether or no t th e  offence was committed in  i t s  te r r i to ry ,  to  submit the  
case to  i t s  competent a u th o ritie s  fo r  th e  purpose of prosecution, through 
proceedings in  accordance with th e  laws of th a t  S ta te . Those a u th o r itie s  s h a ll  
take th e i r  decision  in  the  same manner a s  in  th e  case of any ord inary  offence 
of a grave na tu re  under the  law of th a t  S ta te .
2. Any person regard ing  whom proceedings a re  being c a rr ie d  out in  connexion
p
with any of th e  offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 s h a ll  be guaranteed f a i r  
treatm ent a t  a l l  s tag e s  of the  proceedings, including enjoyment of a l l  the  
r ig h ts  and guarantees provided by th e  law of th e  S ta te  in  the  te r r i to r y  of 
which he i s  p resen t.
A rtic le  9
1. A req u est fo r  the  e x trad itio n  of an alleged  offender, pursuant to  th is  
Convention, s h a ll  not be granted i f  th e  requested S ta te  Party  has su b s ta n tia l 
grounds fo r  believ ing:
(a) That th e  request fo r e x trad itio n  fo r an offence s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 has 
been made fo r  th e  purpose of prosecuting  or punishing a person on account of 
h is  race, re lig io n , n a tio n a lity , e th n ic  o rig in  or p o l i t ic a l  opinion; or
(b) That th e  person 's  p o sition  may be prejudiced:
(i) For any of the  reasons mentioned in  subparagraph (a) of th i s  paragraph, 
or
(ii> For th e  reason th a t  communication w ith him by th e  app ropria te
a u th o r it ie s  of th e  S ta te  e n ti t le d  to  ex erc ise  r ig h ts  of p ro tec tio n  
cannot be effected .
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2. V ith re sp ec t to  th e  offences a s  defined In th i s  Convention! th e  p ro v is io n s  
of a l l  e x tra d itio n  t r e a t ie s  and arrangem ents app licab le  between S ta te  P a rtie s  
a re  modified as  between S ta te  P a rtie s  to  th e  ex ten t th a t  they are  incom patible 
w ith th i s  Convention.
A rtic le  10
1. The offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 s h a ll  be deemed to  be included as 
e x tra d ita b le  offences in  any e x trad itio n  tre a ty  e x is tin g  between S ta te  P a rtie s . 
S ta te  P a r tie s  undertake to  include such offences as  e x tra d ita b le  offences in  
every e x tra d itio n  tre a ty  to  be concluded between them.
2. I f  a S ta te  Party  which makes ex tra d itio n  cond itiona l on th e  ex istence  of a 
tre a ty  receives a request fo r e x trad itio n  from another S ta te  Party  w ith which 
i t  has no ex tra d itio n  tre a ty , the  requested S ta te  may a t  i t s  option consider 
th i s  Convention as  the  legal b a s is  fo r e x tra d itio n  in  re sp ec t of th e  offences 
s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1. E x trad ition  s h a ll  be sub jec t to  th e  o ther cond itions 
provided by th e  law of the  requested S ta te .
3. S ta te s  P a r tie s  which do no£ make e x tra d itio n  cond itional on th e  ex istence  
of a t r e a ty  s h a ll  recognize the  offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 as  e x tra d ita b le  
between them selves, sub ject to  the  cond itions provided by the  law of the 
requested S ta te .
4. The offences s e t  fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1 s h a ll  be tre a te d , fo r  the  purpose of 
ex tra d itio n  between S ta te s  P a rtie s , as  i f  they had been committed no t only in 
the  place in  which they occurred but a lso  in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  of th e  S ta te s  
required to  e s ta b lish  th e ir  ju r isd ic tio n  in  accordance w ith paragraph 1 of 
a r t ic le  5.
A rtic le  11
1. S ta te  P a rtie s  sh a ll  a ffo rd  one another th e  g re a te s t measure of a ss is ta n c e  
in connexion w ith crim inal proceedings brought in  re sp ec t of th e  offences s e t  
fo r th  in  a r t ic le  1, including the  supply of a l l  evidence a t  th e ir  d isp o sa l 
necessary  fo r  the  proceedings.
2. The p ro v is io n s  of paragraph 1 of th is  a r t i c le  s h a ll  not a f fe c t  o b lig a tio n s  
concerning mutual ju d ic ia l a ss is tan c e  embodied in  any o ther tre a ty .
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A rtic le  12
In so f a r  a s  the  Geneva Conventions of 1949 fo r  the  p ro tec tio n  of war v ic tim s 
o r th e  P ro toco ls Additional to  those Conventions a re  app licab le  to  a p a r tic u la r  
a c t  of hostage-tak ing , and in  so fa r  a s  S ta te s  P a rtie s  to  th i s  Convention are  
bound under those  conventions to  prosecute or hand over th e  h o s tag e -ta k e r, the  
p re sen t Convention sh a ll no t apply to  an a c t  of hostage-tak ing  committed in  the  
course of armed c o n flic ts  a s  defined in  the  Geneva Conventions of 1949 and th e  
P ro toco ls th e re to , including armed c o n f lic ts , mentioned in  a r t ic le  1, paragraph 
4, of A dditional Protocol 1 of 1977, in  which peoples who are  f ig h tin g  ag a in s t 
co lon ia l domination and a lien  occupation and a g a in s t r a c i s t  regimes in  th e  
ex erc ise  of th e ir  r ig h t  to  se lf-d e te rm in a tio n , a s  enshrined in  the  C harter of 
th e  United N ations and the  D eclaration on P rin c ip le s  of In te rn a tio n a l Law 
concerning F riendly  R elations and Co-operation among S ta te s  in  accordance with 
th e  C harter of th e  United Rations.
A rtic le  13
This Convention sh a ll not apply where th e  offence i s  committed w ith in  a 
s in g le  S ta te , the  hostage and the  alleged o ffenders are  n a tio n a ls  of th a t  S ta te  
and th e  a lleged  offender i s  found in  the  t e r r i to r y  of th a t  S ta te .
A rtic le  14
Rothing in  th i s  Convention s h a ll be construed a s  ju s tify in g  th e  v io la tio n  of 
th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r ity  or p o li t ic a l  independence of a S ta te  in  contravention  
of th e  C harter of the  United Rations.
A rtic le  15
The p ro v is io n s  of th is  Convention s h a ll no t a f fe c t  the  ap p lica tio n  of the  
T rea ties  on Asylum, in  force a t  the  date of th e  adoption of th is  Convention, a s  
between th e  S ta te s  which are  p a r tie s  to  those  T rea ties; but a S ta te  P arty  to  
th i s  Convention may not invoke those T rea ties  w ith re sp ec t to  another S ta te  
Party  to  th i s  Convention which i s  not a p a rty  to  those T rea ties .
A rtic le  16
1. Any d isp u te  between two or more S ta te s  P a rtie s  concerning the  
in te rp re ta tio n  or ap p lica tion  of th is  Convention which i s  not s e tt le d  by 
neg o tia tio n  s h a ll ,  a t  the  request of one of them, be subm itted to  a rb itra tio n .
I f  w ith in  s ix  months from the  date of the  req u est fo r  a rb i tra t io n  the  p a r tie s
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are  unable to  agree on th e  organization of th e  a rb i tra t io n , any one of th e  
p a r t ie s  may re fe r  the  d ispu te  to  th e  In te rn a tio n a l Court of Ju s tic e  by request 
in  conform ity w ith th e  S ta tu te  of th e  Court.
2. Each S ta te  may a t  th e  time of signatu re  o r r a t i f ic a t io n  of t h i s  Convention 
or accession  th e re to  declare  th a t i t  does not consider i t s e l f  bound by 
paragraph 1 of th is  a r t ic le .  The o ther S ta te  P a r tie s  s h a ll  not be bound by 
paragraph 1 of th i s  a r t ic le  with resp ec t to  any S ta te  Party  which has made 
such a re se rv a tio n .
3. Any S ta te  Party  which has made a re se rv a tio n  in  accordance w ith paragraph 
2 of th i s  a r t ic le  may a t  any time withdraw th a t  re se rv a tio n  by n o tif ic a tio n  to  
th e  Secretary-G eneral of the  United Nations.
A rtic le  17
1. This Convention i s  open fo r s ignatu re  by a l l  S ta te s  u n til 31 December 1980 
a t  th e  United Nations Headquarters in  New York.
2. This Convention i s  subject to  ra t if ic a t io n . The instrum ents of r a t i f ic a t io n  
sh a ll  be deposited  with th e  Secretary-G eneral of th e  United Nations.
3. This Convention i s  open to  accession by any S ta te . The in strum ents of 
accession s h a ll  be deposited with th e  Secretary-G eneral of the United N ations.
A rtic le  18
1. This Convention s h a ll  en te r in to  force on th e  th i r t i e th  day follow ing the  
date o f d ep o sit of th e  twenty-second instrum ent of r a t i f ic a t io n  o r accession 
with th e  Secretary-G eneral of the  United Nations.
2. For each S ta te  ra tify in g  or acceding to  th e  Convention a f te r  th e  d eposit of 
the  tw enty-second instrum ent of r a t if ic a t io n  or accession , the Convention s h a ll  
en te r in to  fo rce  on the  th i r t ie th  day a f te r  d ep o sit by such S ta te  of i t s  
instrum ent of r a t i f ic a t io n  or accession.
A rtic le  19
1. Any S ta te  Party  may denounce th is  Convention by w ritten  n o tif ic a tio n  to  
the  Secretary-G eneral of the  United Nations.
2. Denunciation sh a ll take e ffe c t one year follow ing th e  date on which 
n o tif ic a tio n  i s  received by the  Secretary-G eneral of th e  United N ations.
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A rtic le  20
The o rig in a l o f th is  Convention, of which th e  Arabic, Chinese, E nglish , French, 
Russian, and Spanish te x ts  are equally au then tic , s h a ll  be deposited  w ith th e  
Secretary-G eneral of the  United Rations, who s h a ll  send c e r tif ie d  copies th e re o f 
to  a l l  S ta te s .
IN VITRESS WHEREOF, th e  undersigned, being duly authorized th e re to  by th e i r  
re sp ec tiv e  Governments, have signed th is  Convention, opened fo r s ig n a tu re  a t  
Few York on ...
Source: United R ations General Assembly Resolutions, O ffic ia l Records, 34th  
Session, 1980, supplement no.48, pp.245-247. This Convention was opened fo r  
s ig n a tu re  on 18 December 1979.
S ta te s  s ign ing  and/or ra tify in g  the  Convention were recorded in  an annex to  the
Report of th e  UR Secretary-G eneral on the  sub ject in  September 1983, reproduced
*
in  Yonah Alexander (ed.), In te rna tiona l Terrorism : P o li t ic a l  and Legal Documents, 
M artinus R ijhoff, Dordrecht, Retherlands 1992, pp.190-191. By th e  tim e of th e  
re p o rt, 47 s ta te s  has signed and/or r a t i f ie d  the  Convention.
Appendix 5
The European Convention on the S uppression . of .Terrorism 
The member S ta te s  of the Council of Europe, s ig n a to ry  hereto ,
Considering th a t  th e  aim of the  Council of Europe i s  to  achieve a g re a te r  
unity  between i t s  Members;
Aware of th e  growing concern caused by th e  increase  in  a c ts  of te rro r ism ; 
Wishing to  take e ffec tiv e  measures to  ensure th a t  th e  p e rp e tra to rs  of such 
a c ts  do not escape prosecution and punishment;
Convinced th a t  ex trad itio n  i s  a p a r tic u la r ly  e ffe c tiv e  measure fo r  
achieving th i s  re s u lt ,
Have agreed as follows:
A rticle  1
For the  purposes of ex trad itio n  between C ontracting S ta te s , none o f th e  
following offences sh a ll be regarded as a p o l i t ic a l  offence or as  an offence
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in sp ired  by p o li t ic a l  motives:
a. an offence w ithin the  scope of the  Convention fo r  th e  Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of A irc ra ft, signed a t  The Hague on 16 December 1970;
b. an offence w ithin  the  scope of the  Convention fo r th e  Supppression 
of Unlawful Acts ag a in s t th e  Safety of C ivil A viation, signed a t  Montreal on 
23 September 1971;
c. a se rio u s  offence involving an a tta ck  a g a in s t the  l i f e ,  physica l 
in te g r i ty  or l ib e r ty  of in te rn a tio n a lly  p ro tec ted  persons, including 
diplom atic agen ts;
d. an offence involving kidnapping, the  tak ing  of a hostage o r serious 
unlawful deten tion ;
e. an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocke t, autom atic 
firearm  or l e t t e r  or parcel bomb i f  th is  use endangers persons;
f . an a ttem pt to  commit any of the foregoing offences or p a r tic ip a tio n  
as an accomplice of a person who commits or a ttem p ts to  commit such an 
offence.
A rtic le  2
1. For the  purposes of ex trad itio n  between C ontracting S ta te s , a C ontracting 
S ta te  may decide not to  regard  as a p o li t ic a l  offence or as an offence 
connected w ith a p o lit ic a l  offence or as an offence in sp ired  by p o li t ic a l  
m otives a se rio u s  offence involving an a c t of violence, o ther than  one covered 
by A rtic le  1, a g a in s t the  l i f e ,  physical in te g r ity  or lib e r ty  of a person.
2. The same s h a ll  apply to  a serious offence involving an a c t a g a in s t property , 
o ther than one covered by A rtic le  1, i f  the  a c t  c reated  a c o lle c tiv e
danger fo r  persons.
3. The same s h a ll  apply to  an attem pt to  commit any of the  foregoing offences 
or p a r tic ip a tio n  as  an accomplice of a person who commits or a ttem p ts  to  
commit such an offence.
A rtic le  3
The p ro v is io n s  of a l l  ex trad itio n  t r e a t ie s  and arrangem ents app licab le  
between C ontracting  S ta te s , including the  European Convention on E x trad itio n , 
a re  modified a s  between C ontracting S ta te s  to  th e  ex ten t th a t  they  are  
incom patible w ith th i s  Convention.
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A rtic le  4
For th e  purposes of th i s  Convention and to  th e  ex ten t th a t  any offence 
mentioned in  A rtic le  1 or 2 i s  not l is te d  a s  an ex tra d ita b le  offence in  any 
e x tra d itio n  convention or tre a ty  e x is tin g  between C ontracting S ta te s , i t  s h a ll  
be deemed to  be included as  such th e re in .
A rtic le  5
frothing in  th is  Convention sh a ll  be in te rp re te d  as  imposing an ob lig a tio n  
to  e x tra d ite  i f  the  requested S ta te  has su b s ta n tia l  grounds fo r  be liev ing  th a t  
th e  req u est fo r  e x trad itio n  fo r  an offence mentioned in  A rtic le  1 or 2 h as  been 
made fo r th e  purpose of prosecuting  or punishing a person on account o f h is  
race , re lig io n , n a tio n a lity  or p o li t ic a l  opinion, or th a t  th a t  p e rso n 's  p o s itio n  
may be prejudiced fo r any of these  reasons.
A rtic le  6
1. Each C ontracting S ta te  sh a ll take such measures a s  may be necessary  to  
e s ta b lis h  i t s  ju r isd ic tio n  over an offence mentioned in  A rtic le  1 in  th e  case 
where th e  suspected offender i s  'p resen t in  i t s  te r r i to r y  and i t  does not 
e x tra d ite  him a f te r  receiv ing  a request fo r  e x tra d itio n  from a C ontracting  S ta te  
whose ju r isd ic tio n  is  based on a ru le  of ju r isd ic tio n  e x is tin g  equally  in  th e  
law of the  requested S ta te .
2. This Convention does not exclude any crim inal ju r isd ic tio n  exercised  in  
accordance w ith national law.
A rtic le  7
A C ontracting S ta te  in  whose te r r i to r y  a person suspected to  have 
committed an offence mentioned in  A rtic le  1 i s  found and which has received a 
request fo r  ex tra d itio n  under the  conditions mentioned in  A rtic le  6, paragraph 
1, s h a ll , i f  i t  does not e x tra d ite  th a t  person, submit the  case, w ithout 
exception whatsoever and without undue delay, to  i t s  competent a u th o r it ie s  fo r  
th e  purpose of prosecution. Those a u th o r itie s  s h a ll  take  th e ir  decision  in  the  
same manner as  in the case of any offence of a se rio u s  nature under th e  law of 
th a t  S ta te .
A rtic le  8
1. C ontracting  S ta te s  s h a ll  affo rd  one another the  w idest measure of mutual 
a ss is ta n c e  in  crim inal m atters  in connection w ith proceedings brought in
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re sp ec t of th e  offences mentioned in  A rticle  1 or 2. The law of the  requested 
S ta te  concerning mutual a ss is ta n c e  in  crim inal m atte rs  sh a ll  apply in  a l l  cases, 
n ev erth e less  th i s  a ss is tan c e  may no t be refused on th e  so le  ground th a t  i t  
concerns a p o li t ic a l  offence or an offence connected w ith a p o li t ic a l  offence or 
an offence in sp ired  by p o li t ic a l  motives.
2. Nothing in  th is  Convention s h a ll  be in te rp re ted  a s  imposing an ob liga tion  
to  a ffo rd  mutual a ss is tan c e  i f  the  requested S ta te  has su b s ta n tia l grounds fo r  
believ ing  th a t  th e  request fo r mutual a ss is tan ce  in  re sp ec t of an offence 
mentioned in  A rtic le  1 or 2 has been made fo r the  purpose of prosecuting or 
punishing a person on account of h is  race, re lig io n , n a tio n a lity  or p o li t ic a l  
opinion or th a t  th a t  person 's  p o sitio n  may be prejudiced fo r  any of these 
reasons.
3. The p ro v is io n s  of a l l  t r e a t ie s  and arrangem ents concerning mutual 
a s s is ta n c e  in  crim inal m atte rs  app licab le  between C ontracting  S ta te s , including 
th e  European Convention on Mutual A ssistance in  Crim inal M atters, are  modified 
as  between C ontracting S ta te s  to  th e  ex tent th a t  they a re  incom patible w ith 
th is  Convention.
A rtic le  9
1. The European Committee on Crime Problems of the  Council of Europe s h a ll  be
*
kept informed regard ing  the  ap p lica tio n  of th is  Convention.
2. I t  s h a ll  do whatever i s  needful to  f a c i l i ta te  a f r ie n d ly  settlem en t of any 
d if f ic u lty  which may a r is e  out of i t s  execution.
✓
A rtic le  10
1. Any d isp u te  between C ontracting S ta tes  concerning th e  in te rp re ta tio n  or 
ap p lica tio n  of th i s  Convention, which has not been s e t t le d  in  the  framework of 
A rtic le  9, paragraph 2, s h a ll , a t  the  request of any P arty  to  the  d ispute, be 
re fe rred  to  a rb i tra tio n . Each Party  sh a ll nominate an a r b i t r a to r  and th e  two 
a rb i t r a to r s  s h a ll  nominate a re fe ree . If any Party  has not nominated i t s  
a rb i t r a to r  w ith in  the  th ree  months following the  req u est fo r  a rb itra tio n , he 
s h a ll be nominated a t  the  request of the  o ther Party  by th e  P residen t of th e  
European Court of Human E ights. If  the l a t t e r  should be a n a tio n a l of one of - 
the  P a rtie s  to  the  d ispu te , th i s  duty sh a ll be c a rrie d  out by th e  V ice-President 
of th e  Court o r, i f  the  V ice-President i s  a n a tiona l of one of the  P a rtie s  to
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th e  d ispu te , by the  most sen io r judge of th e  Court not being a n a tio n a l of one 
of th e  P a rtie s  to  the  d ispute. The same procedure s h a ll  be observed i f  th e  
a r b i t r a to r s  cannot agree on the  choice of re fe ree .
2. The a rb itra t io n  tr ib u n a l s h a ll  lay down i t s  own procedure. I t s  decis ions 
s h a ll  be taken by m ajority  vote. I t s  awards sh a ll  be f in a l.
A rtic le  11
1. This Convention sh a ll be open to  s ig n a tu re  by th e  member S ta te s  of th e  
Council of Europe. I t  s h a ll  be subject to  r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance o r approval. 
Instrum ents of ra t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or approval sh a ll  be deposited  w ith the  
S ecre tary  General of the  Council of Europe.
2. The Convention sh a ll  en te r in to  force th re e  months a f te r  th e  date  of the
d ep o sit of the  th ird  instrum ent of r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or appproval.
3. In re sp ec t of a signato ry  S ta te  ra tify in g , accepting or approving
subsequently, th e  Convention sh a ll  come in to  fo rce th ree  months a f te r  the  date
of th e  d ep o sit of i t s  instrum ent of r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or approval.
A rtic le  12
1. Any S ta te  may, a t  th e  tim e of s ig natu re  o r when depositing  i t s  instrum ent 
of r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or approval, sp ec ify  the  te r r i to r y  olr t e r r i t o r i e s  to  
which th i s  Convention sh a ll  apply.
2. Any S ta te  may, when depositing  i t s  instrum ent of r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or 
approval or a t  any la te r  date, by d ec la ra tio n  addressed to  th e  S ecre tary  General 
of th e  Council of Europe, extend th is  Convention to  any o ther te r r i to r y  or 
t e r r i t o r ie s  sp ec ified  in the decla ra tion  and fo r  whose in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s
i t  i s  resp o n sib le  or on whose behalf i t  i s  au thorised  to  give undertak ings.
3. Any dec la ra tio n  made in  pursuance of th e  preceding paragraph may, in  
re sp ec t of any te r r i to r y  mentioned in  such d ec la ra tio n , be withdrawn by means 
of a n o tif ic a tio n  addressed to  the  Secretary  General of th e  Council of Europe. 
Such w ithdrawal s h a ll  take e ffe c t immediately or a t  such la te r  da te  as  may be 
sp ec ified  in  the  n o tif ic a tio n .
A rtic le  13
1. Any S ta te  may, a t  the  time of signatu re  o r when depositing  i t s  instrum ent 
of r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or approval, d ecla re  th a t  i t  reserv es  th e  r ig h t  to  
re fu se  e x tra d itio n  in  re sp ec t of any offence mentioned in  A rtic le  1 which i t
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co nsiders  to  be a p o lit ic a l  offence, an offence connected w ith a p o li t ic a l  
offence or an offence in sp ired  by p o li t ic a l  m otives, provided th a t  i t  undertakes 
to  take  in to  due consideration , when evaluating th e  ch arac te r of the  offence, 
any p a r tic u la r ly  serious asp ec ts  of the  offence, including:
a. th a t  i t  created  a co lle c tiv e  danger to  the  l i f e ,  physica l in te g r i ty  or 
l ib e r ty  o f persons; or
b. th a t  i t  a ffected  persons foreign to  th e  m otives behind i t ;  or
c. th a t  cruel or v icious means have been used in  th e  commission of the  
offence.
2. Any S ta te  may wholly or p a r tly  withdraw a re se rv a tio n  i t  has made in  
accordance w ith the  foregoing paragraph by means of a d ec la ra tio n  addressed to  
th e  S ecre tary  General of the  Council of Europe which s h a ll  become e ffe c tiv e  as 
from the  date  of i t s  rece ip t.
3. A S ta te  which has made a re se rv a tio n  in  accordance w ith paragraph 1 of th i s  
a r t ic le  may no t claim the  ap p lica tion  of A rtic le  1 by any o ther S ta te ; i t  may, 
however, i f  i t s  reserv a tio n  i s  p a r t ia l  or con d itio n a l, claim  the  ap p lica tio n  of 
th a t  a r t i c le  in  so fa r  as i t  has i t s e l f  accepted i t .
A rtic le  14
Any C ontracting S ta te  may denounce th i s  Convention by means of a w ritten  
n o tif ic a tio n  addressed to  the Secretary  General of th e  Council of Europe. Any 
such denunciation sh a ll take e ffe c t immediately or a t  such la te r  date as may be 
sp ec ified  in  th e  n o tif ica tio n .
A rtic le  15
This Convention ceases to  have e ffe c t in  re sp ec t of any C ontracting S ta te  
which w ithdraws from or ceases to  be a Hember of the  Council of Europe.
A rtic le  16
The S ecre tary  General of the  Council of Europe s h a ll  n o tify  the  member 
S ta te s  of th e  Council of:
a. any signatu re;
b. any d ep o sit of an instrum ent of r a t i f ic a t io n ,  acceptance or approval;
c. any date  of en try  in to  force of th i s  Convention in  accordance w ith 
A rtic le  11 thereo f;
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d. any d ec la ra tio n  or n o tif ic a tio n  received in  pursuance of th e  p ro v isions 
of A rtic le  12;
e. any re se rv a tio n  made in pursuance of the  p ro v isions of A rtic le  13, 
paragraph 1;
f .  th e  w ithdrawal of any re se rv a tio n  e ffec ted  in  pursuance of the  
p rov isions Df A rtic le  13, paragraph 2;
g. any n o tif ic a tio n  received in  pursuance of A rtic le  14 and the  date on 
which denunciation tak es  e ffec t;
h. any cessa tio n  of the  e ffe c ts  of th e  Convention pursuant to  A rtic le  15. 
In w itness whereof, the  undersigned, being duly au thorised  th e re to , have
signed th is  Convention.
Done a t  S trasbourg, th is  27th day of January 1977, in  English and in 
French, both te x ts  being equally a u th o rita tiv e , in  a s in g le  copy which sh a ll  
remain deposited  in  the  arch ives of the  Council of Europe. The Secretary  
General of th e  Council of Europe s h a ll  tra n sm it c e r tif ie d  copies to  each of th e  
s ignato ry  S ta te s .
Source: Eoemi Gal-Or, In te rn a tio n a l Co-operation to  Suppress T errorism . Croom 
Helm, London 1985, pp .370-377.
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